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Abstract 
In South Africa, King III compliance is a JSE listing requirement. Chapter 8 of the King III code states 
that transparent and effective communication with stakeholders is essential for building and 
maintaining their trust and confidence. Investors and creditors, as important sources of finance, are 
two important stakeholders to companies. 
Investor relations is the field that is concerned with the management of relationships between 
companies and investors. Financial communication is an important component of investor relations, 
and entails much more than mere financial statements. While South Africa has recently been ranked 
number one by the World Economic Forum 2015–2016 Global Competitiveness Index for the 
strength of its auditing and reporting standards for the sixth consecutive year, the quality of investor 
relations, as a wider concept, is largely un-researched in South Africa. 
As opposed to financial statements which content is regulated by various standards, acts and codes, 
the investor relations activity is not regulated and companies have a wide variety of investor relations 
communication channels from which to choose. This dissertation is concerned with one of these 
channels, namely the corporate website.  
The purpose of this study was to investigate the quality of the corporate website for investor relations 
purposes in South Africa, to establish the determinants thereof, and to establish whether the use 
thereof has any effect on the level of information asymmetry and the cost of capital. Theoretically, a 
well-developed Internet investor relations strategy will increase company visibility, according to the 
investor recognition hypothesis of Merton (1987). An increased visibility may increase liquidity and, 
according to economic theory, an increased liquidity is linked to the cost of capital through 
information asymmetry.  
Considerable research has been done on the relationship between disclosure and both information 
asymmetry and the cost of capital. The vast majority of empirical research to date has relied on either 
the use of an indirect proxy for disclosure (e.g. analyst ratings) or a measurement of annual report 
voluntary disclosures. Prior research on Internet investor relations is limited. 
Although the weight of empirical evidence points to a negative association between 
disclosure/investor relations and both information asymmetry and the cost of capital, literature is far 
from reaching a consensus; and numerous studies have found no or even positive associations. 
Empirical research in these areas has further favoured the use of developed country data and this 
is the first study that endeavours to examine the determinants of Internet investor relations, as well 
as the effect thereof on information asymmetry and the cost of capital in the South African context.  
In the absence of a readily available and comprehensive measurement instrument, the first objective 
of this study was to develop a measurement instrument that could be used to measure the extent of 
Internet investor relations. The measurement instrument was developed using: (1) the best practice 
corporate website guidelines as published by the Investor Relations Society, (2) an extensive 
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literature review to mitigate the risk of omitting important variables and to improve comparability with 
previous studies, and (3) a pilot study to evaluate the practicality of measuring the attributes as 
selected. The result was a measurement instrument that consisted of 346 attributes.  
Stratified random sampling with proportional allocation (using JSE industry membership) was used 
to select a sample of 85 JSE-listed companies. The corporate websites of these companies were 
assessed from March to September 2015. No research assistants were used and all assessments 
were done by one researcher (the writer of this dissertation).  
The scores of individual attributes were added together to calculate a disclosure score per company. 
Although the majority of attributes were measured as either available (1) or absent (0), 50 attributes 
were measured as partially available (0.5), based on the breadth and depth of content available. 
Non-functional and unuseful links were assessed as absent (0). Outdated information was assessed 
as either partially available (0.5) or absent (0). Where information was available, but as a result of 
factors such as poor layout, inconsistencies and incompleteness was not fully useful, the attributes 
were assessed as partially available (0.5).  
Although there was some subjectivity involved in such a methodology, the dissertation promotes the 
argument that such an approach was important to ensure that the quality of Internet investor relations 
would be measured, and not merely the quantity. No other study in the literature reviewed for this 
dissertation has assessed attributes as being only partially available based on the amount of 
information, and timeliness and usability concerns.  
Overall, the results showed that the majority of companies did not use corporate websites optimally 
to communicate with investors. Suggestions have been made on how companies can improve their 
Internet investor relations. To establish the determinants of Internet investor relations, numerous 
company characteristics that could explain variations in Internet investor relations levels were 
identified from the literature review. Using stepwise regression, it was found that company size, 
leverage, the audit firm used, industry membership, free float, and dual-listing status explained 69% 
of the total variation in Internet investor relations. 
As information asymmetry is not directly observable, this dissertation used five alternative proxies to 
estimate information asymmetry: the bid-ask spread, price impact, share price volatility, share 
turnover, and analyst following. In theory, the first three proxies are positively related to information 
asymmetry and the last two, negatively. The level of Internet investor relations was found to be 
statistically significantly and negatively related to the bid-ask spread and price impact, and positively 
related to share turnover and analyst following. Based on theory, the observed relationships – two 
negative; two positive – therefore all points towards a negative relationship between Internet investor 
relations and information asymmetry. 
By identifying additional variables that were used in literature to explain variations in information 
asymmetry and applying stepwise regression, this study constructed regression models that 
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explained 51%, 54%, 90% and 91% of the variations in the share turnover, analyst following, price 
impact and bid-ask spread, respectively. The activity of Internet investor relations was found to be 
non-significant in explaining the share price volatility information asymmetry proxy. 
When examining the association between Internet investor relations and the cost of debt, it was 
found that Internet investor relations was statistically significantly and negatively related to the cost 
of debt. The cost of debt was measured as the interest expense for the year, scaled by the average 
interest-bearing liabilities. Although the explanatory power of this regression model was very low 
(adjusted R² of 14%), the adjusted R² compared favourably with previous disclosure–cost of debt 
studies. Guidara, Khlif and Jarboui  (2014), for example, examined the relationship between annual 
report voluntary disclosure and the cost of debt using South African data and reported an adjusted 
R² of 8%. 
Owing to the non-availability of analyst forecast data for the study sample, ex ante cost of equity 
estimate methods could not be used. To estimate the cost of equity, this study thus used the capital 
asset pricing model. PwC (2015) valuation surveys have shown that the capital asset pricing model 
is the most often used method in cost of equity calculations in southern Africa. Criticism against the 
use of the capital asset pricing model was carefully considered in this dissertation and an adjustment 
was made to the cost of equity of smaller companies (i.e. companies with a market capitalisation of 
less than R2 000 million). These adjustments were based on current valuation practice in South 
Africa. 
This study found that the level of Internet investor relations was statistically significantly and 
negatively related to the cost of equity. Together with share price, leverage, the market-to-book ratio 
and industry membership, the level of Internet investor relations was found to explain 59% of 
variations in the cost of equity. In a separate analysis of the cost of equity, before any adjustments 
to the smaller companies, the level of Internet investor relations was, however, found to be non-
significantly related. 
Cost of capital – also named the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) – is the weighted average 
cost of equity and cost of debt. Irrespective of how the weightings were calculated (i.e. by means of 
book value or market value) or whether the cost of equity adjustments discussed in the two 
paragraphs above were made or not, the level of Internet investor relations was found to be 
statistically significantly and negatively related to the cost of capital. 
Overall, the results of this study suggested that companies may potentially benefit from a well-
developed Internet investor relations strategy through decreased information asymmetry and cost of 
capital. Since disclosure studies are often criticised for not testing or controlling for endogeneity, the 
Wu-Hausman test statistic was applied, and duly confirmed the absence of endogeneity in all 
regression models.  
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Investors require information for the evaluation of share investments. Such information can be 
obtained directly from the company or indirectly through information intermediaries (e.g. sell-side 
research analysts, share brokers and business news publications). Various terms are used in 
literature and by the financial community to describe the communication of information from 
companies to investors, such as disclosure, financial reporting and investor relations.   
According to definitions.net,1 the term investor relations (IR) implies:  
a strategic management responsibility that is capable of integrating finance, communication, 
marketing and securities law to enable the most effective two-way communication between 
a company, the financial community, and other constituencies, which ultimately contributes 
to a company’s securities achieving fair valuation. 
The Investor Relations Society2 defines investor relations as: 
the management of the relationship between a company with publicly traded securities and 
the holders or potential holders of such securities.  
Marston (1996: 477) defined investor relations as the link between a company and the financial 
community in terms of which information is provided to the financial community for evaluating the 
company. Investor relations is also often referred to as a strategic corporate marketing activity 
(Brown, 1994; Dolphin, 2004).  
According to these definitions, investor relations therefore involves all information types, for example 
both mandatory and voluntary,3 financial and non-financial, and qualitative and quantitative, as well 
as shareholder services to facilitate relationship management and/or strategic marketing. Investor 
relations communication channels available to companies include, but are not limited to, annual and 
interim reports, presentations, media releases, face-to-face meetings, corporate websites and social 
media, such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. 
According to the Investor Relations Society (2013a), the annual report has been the primary source 
of authoritative information about a company in the past, but it now needs to complement and 
supplement other information sources. The development of the World Wide Web (WWW)4 has 
introduced several new and innovative ways for companies to communicate with investors, such as 
                                               
1
 Online resource for definitions and translations, available at www.definitions.net. 
2
 The Investor Relations Society (IRS) is a British professional body for investor relations practitioners.  
3
 Mandatory disclosure is primarily supplied in the annual reports of companies according to various rules and regulations 
(e.g. IFRS). Voluntary disclosure is defined as additional disclosure not required by rules and regulations. 
4
 The terms Internet and WWW are used interchangeably in this dissertation. The Internet and WWW refer to a wide 
collection of web resources such as corporate websites, Twitter and e-mail. 
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corporate websites, social media (e.g. Twitter, Facebook and blogs) and electronic filing systems 
(e.g. Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval System (EDGAR) and System for Electronic 
Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) in the US and Canada respectively). 
According to Jones  (2009: 1.3) 5 , the rapid increase of information channels has driven users closer 
to sources directly controlled by the company, such as corporate websites. Alternative sources are 
often perceived as less reliable and potentially biased. 
Before the research problem, questions, objectives, methodology and limitations of this dissertation 
can be discussed, five questions need to be considered. Firstly, do companies use the corporate 
website as investor relations communication channel? Secondly, how do companies use corporate 
websites? Thirdly, do investors use corporate websites? Fourthly, what are the advantages in using 
a corporate website? And, fifthly, what are the disadvantages in using a corporate website? In 
pondering the last two questions, the uniqueness of using corporate websites as opposed to 
conventional, non-electronic communication channels is discussed.  
1.2 THE CORPORATE WEBSITE AS INVESTOR RELATIONS COMMUNICATION 
CHANNEL 
1.2.1 Do companies use the corporate website as communication channel? 
Empirical findings by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, 2000) and Allam and Lymer 
(2003) have shown that nearly all the largest listed companies in developed countries have corporate 
websites with dedicated investor relations sections. Similar results were documented for South Africa 
by Venter (2002), Loxton (2003), Barac (2004), Nel and Baard (2007), and Esterhuyse and Wingard 
(2016). On the contrary, studies performed in other developing countries reported that a significant 
number of listed companies in these countries do not have websites or do not supply any financial 
information on their websites.6 
It is assumed that given the growth in Internet accessibility, accompanied by decreased development 
and maintenance costs in the last decade, all Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)-listed companies 
have corporate websites with at least some information aimed at investors.7 
1.2.2 How do companies use corporate websites? 
Investor relations, public relations, employment opportunities and ‘about us’ are referred to by some 
as the “big four” components of corporate websites (Investor Relations Marketing, 2006).  Corporate 
websites are, among other things, used for advertising (e.g. to promote brand development or to 
                                               
5
 Jones based his research on interviews with fund managers and analysts. 
6
 Mohammed, Oyelere and Al-Busaidi (2009: 56) reported that only 84 of the 142 listed companies in Oman have a working 
website, with only 31 of the 84 engaging in Internet reporting. Baard and Nel (2011: 1) studied the top 40 companies in 
Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and Tunisia and report that only 162 of the top 200 in these countries have a working 
website, with only 130 of the 162 engaging in Internet reporting. 
7
 This assumption was tested with the selection of the sample, as discussed in Section 4.2, and it was found that five JSE-
listed companies had no working corporate website at that time. 
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enhance the corporate image), e-commerce and to enhance stakeholder relationships (e.g. with 
employees, suppliers, general public, government and shareholders (investors)). It is therefore 
important to note that corporate websites are used for a variety of different reasons by companies, 
and almost never for IR only.8  
Although JSE-listed companies are mandated by International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), the Companies Act (RSA, 2008), Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listing requirements 
and the King III corporate governance code9 to communicate specific information items (by way of 
the integrated annual report) to investors, the decision to engage or to use the corporate website as 
IR communication channel is voluntary (companies may for example elect to distribute only hard 
copy integrated annual reports to eligible shareholders). Applicable sections of the regulatory 
environment are discussed in Chapter 2. 
Despite the fact that various attempts have been made to regulate investor communication via 
corporate websites, such as by the Commission des Operations de Bourse 1999, the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) 1999, the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) 1999, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 2000, Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) 2001, Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) 2004, Web Trust 
2006 and the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (Australia) (AuASB) 2006, to date no 
international standard or its equivalent exists in the South African context.10 
Lymer, Debreceny, Gray and Rahman (1999: 48) described three stages of corporate website 
reporting. At Stage one, the hard copy annual report is merely duplicated in “electronic paper”, e.g. 
PDF.11 Stage two sees hard copy reports converted into HTML.12 DeStefano and LeFevre (2005: 
1616-1617) defined hypertext as a collection of documents containing links that allow readers to 
move from one chunk of text to another. At Stage three, enhancements that cannot be incorporated 
into printed documents, such as eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL),13 are used. 
Similar to Lymer et al. (1999), Hedlin (1999) also proposed a three-stage model. At Stage one, 
companies establish a web presence by introducing a corporate website. During Stage two, 
companies begin to use their corporate website to communicate financial information, and finally, 
                                               
8
 It should further be noted that companies’ use of the Internet is not limited to corporate websites only, but that companies 
also use other Internet technologies such as Twitter and YouTube to communicate with investors. As discussed later in 
this Chapter, this study is limited to an examination of the corporate website as IR communication channel. Some evidence 
of companies’ use of these alternative Internet communication channels is however briefly discussed in Section 4.3.6.2. 
9
 King III is a governance compliance framework issued by the Institute of Directors in South Africa (IoDSA). Compliance 
therewith is a Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listing requirement. King IV is currently in progress. 
10
 The only noteworthy exceptions are the minimum website disclosure requirements of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
for companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and the European transparency directive (2004/109/CE).  
11
 Portable Document Format (PDF). 
12
 Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) is the standard markup language used to create web pages. 
13
 XBRL is a standards-based way to define, communicate and exchange business information (such as annual reports). 
XBRL data are computer-readable only. Research by Pinsker and Li (2008) and Yoon, Zo and Ciganek (2011), both cited 
by Gajewski and Li (2015), suggested that XRBL improves financial transparency and reduces information asymmetry in 
the capital markets. None of the companies examined in this study referred to XBRL on their corporate websites. 
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during Stage 3, companies begin to take advantage of the unique features and possibilities of the 
medium. Loxton (2003) and Esterhuyse and Wingard (2016) used the Hedlin (1999) three-stage 
model to describe the stage of Internet investor relations of JSE-listed companies. According to 
Loxton (2003), “most companies in SA appear to be in the second stage”.  
Thirteen years later, Esterhuyse and Wingard (2016: 215) stated that “instead of moving towards 
stage III (HTML, video and audio) of Hedlin’s model (1999), JSE-listed companies still seem to find 
themselves in stage II (paper-equivalent PDF’s)”. Although it may seem that JSE-listed companies 
have shown no improvement since the Loxton (2003) study, it should be noted that Loxton (2003) 
surveyed only the largest 40 companies, whereas Esterhuyse and Wingard (2016) assessed 205 
JSE-listed companies. 
The use of corporate websites for financial reporting can also be described as a two-stage decision 
process (Trabelsi, Labelle & Dumontier, 2008). The first decision is to use the corporate website as 
communication medium to broaden access to the company’s financial reporting, followed by a 
second deliberate managerial decision to communicate additional information rather than merely to 
reproduce conventional financial reporting content already available. 
Serrano-Cinca, Fuertes-Callén and Gutiérrez-Nieto (2007) used seven attributes to measure the 
stage of development of the online reporting of banks in Spain: 
• Opaque: Mostly legal and contact information. Only isolated, if any, financial information. 
• Bare: Only summary financial information, e.g. highlights. 
• Paper lovers: PDF annual reports. 
• HTML accounts: Annual reports in PDF, and a specialised financial information section. 
• Internet financial portal: Continuous reporting, e.g. updated news. 
• Multimedia: Advanced technological development and alternative ways of displaying and 
downloading information, e.g. webcasts, Excel downloads and PowerPoint presentations.  
• Web 2.0.: Dialogue and interaction with users, e.g. RSS and blogs. 
Prior studies on the use of corporate websites for investor communications (FASB, 2000: 30) further 
often distinguished between content and presentation, with content referring to all financial and non-
financial information and presentation to the use of presentation technologies to enhance the 
information. Marston and Polei (2004: 297) argued that although investors are mainly interested in 
the extent to which information has been provided (i.e. content), they also need to find this 
information as quickly and easily as possible (via clear presentation). 
Four quadrants, as presented in Figure 1.1, were identified on the basis of these two basic 
dimensions of reporting (namely content and presentation). 
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Figure 1.1: The two dimensions of web design attributes: presentation and content 
Source: FASB, 2000: 30 
If all companies were to use corporate websites merely as an alternative source of information for 
investors (as described in Quadrant III of Figure 1.1 and stage 1 as referred to by Lymer et al., 1999 
(see pages 3-4 above)) and thus disseminate no new information and use no presentation 
technologies to enhance the usefulness of the information (as described in Quadrant II and stage 3 
as referred to by Lymer et al., 1999), the usefulness of corporate websites as communication 
channels to investors would be extremely limited.  
Trabelsi et al. (2008: 120) found that approximately 50% of all Canadian companies communicated 
information via their corporate websites that was not available via their annual reports. Trabelsi et 
al. (2008) distinguished between incremental and disaggregated information, defining incremental 
information14 as voluntary information that was not disclosed in the annual report, and disaggregated 
information as the further explanation of information already disclosed in the annual report. 
Striukova, Unerman and Guthrie (2008: 308-310) argued that corporate websites have a distinct role 
to play, as companies use different information sources (e.g. annual reports and websites) 
purposefully in order to communicate different balances and types of information. They specifically 
found that the corporate website was the best source for intellectual capital disclosure (36%), 
followed by the annual report (32%) and the annual review (12%). 
                                               
14
 Trabelsi et al. (2008) categorised incremental information in four categories: 1) background information; 2) management 
forecasts; 3) intangible assets; and 4) social and environmental issues. 
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Aerts, Cormier and Magnan (2007: 1320) found that, while web-based corporate performance 
disclosure15 attracted financial analysts in northern America (Canada and US) and therefore possibly 
conveyed new information to them, financial analysts in continental Europe (Belgium, Netherlands, 
Germany and France) were not attracted by such disclosures. They subsequently argued that 
companies in continental Europe used other communication channels to make the same disclosures 
to their shareholders. 
Cormier, Ledoux and Magnan (2009: 3) inferred from their study that the use of corporate websites 
was not purely symbolic or for impression management, but rather represented an attempt by 
management to communicate value-added information to shareholders.  
Matherly and Burton (2005) did an assessment of the types of information that companies disclose 
on their corporate websites.16 They found that although companies disclosed 51% of convenience 
items (defined as items that are also available elsewhere) and 49% of company background items 
(e.g. brands or products, locations and history), only 28%, 33% and 27% of business data,17 forward-
looking data18 and intangible items19 as measured, respectively, were disclosed on their corporate 
websites. 
The FASB (2000: 40) distinguished between three distinct company goals for electronic business20 
reporting: the complementary group, the substitute group and the innovative group. The 
complementary group publishes only standard financial reports (e.g. the annual report), press 
releases and limited investor information (e.g. the share price). The substitute group publishes the 
same information as the complementary group, with some additional information such as share price 
and dividend history, and proactively encourages the use of corporate websites as a substitute for 
the distribution of printed material by the company. The innovative group publishes the widest range 
of information, which may include conference calls and management presentations, proactively 
maximising the company’s web capabilities to expand its audience, generate more usage and 
provide information in alternative formats. 
Holm (2000: 14) suggested four possible categories that could be used to categorise companies’ 
efforts to communicate with investors via corporate websites: functional, promotional, 
communicational, and unstructured. The functional practice is where the annual and interim reports 
are presented under links with titles such as finance or economy. The promotional practice is where 
the main page provides a link to the latest annual report. The communicational practice is where all 
                                               
15
 Performance disclosure indicators were based on balanced scorecard literature and seven components were included: 
1) financial, 2) corporate governance, 3) customer value, 4) human and intellectual capital, 5) production efficiency, 6) 
innovation, development and growth, and 7) social responsibility. 
16
 A sample of 396 public companies (334 US and 62 foreign) was investigated. Their assessment was based on a 2001 
FASB report with the title: Improving Business Reporting: Insights into Enhancing Voluntary Disclosures. 
17
 Examples: historical growth, key risks and market share. 
18
 Examples: future sales, future goals, industry trends and new products. 
19
 Examples: customer testimonials, list of major customers, list of suppliers, details of alliances, and research and 
development activities. 
20
 Used as a synonym for corporate websites. 
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corporate information is presented in accordance with a conscious and consistent communication 
strategy, where the potential and existing investors are identified specifically (often under a link with 
the title “investor relations”). The unstructured practice is where the financial information is scattered 
all over the website with no obvious structure. 
Significant cross-sectional variations in the use of corporate websites as IR communication channel 
is assumed given the voluntary nature of corporate websites as IR communication channel and the 
wide (and growing) variety of presentation technologies available to companies – coupled to the fact 
that companies will use corporate websites not only for IR, but also for other purposes (e.g. e-
commerce).  
1.2.3 Do investors use corporate websites? 
Any individual with access to the Internet and with a basic knowledge regarding the use of search 
engines has access to corporate websites. Accordingly, users range from the naïve decision maker 
to the institutional investor and analyst. It is important to be aware that different types of investors 
use corporate websites and that they all have different requirements based on their investment 
objectives (e.g. short-term speculation or growth over a longer period of time).   
A Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) report (2008: 6) found that 55% of retail investors 
accessed investment information via the Internet. The majority of retail investors (51%) listed their 
financial advisor or broker, followed by the Internet (16%), as their main sources of investment 
information. 
Wade and Forbes (2000: 9) found that up to 75% of institutional investors reviewed corporate 
websites before meeting with the management of a company. Loehnis (2007: 1) reported that 
approximately two-thirds of the fund managers that were interviewed in a study stated that the quality 
of corporate websites influenced their attitude towards a company as an investment. In a UK study 
on the use of corporate websites,21 Beattie and Pratt (2003) found that a significant percentage of 
survey participants used corporate websites “almost daily” as information source: private 
shareholders (41%), investment analysts (86%), fund managers (92%) and corporate lenders (68%). 
Research by Hodge and Pronk (2006) provided evidence that corporate websites have also become 
an important source of information for information intermediaries such as financial analysts. A case 
study of the Royal Phillips Electronics website has documented that financial analysts represented 
12% of website traffic over a four-week period after quarterly earnings announcements (Hodge & 
                                               
21
 Beattie and Pratt (2003) referred to corporate websites as “the Internet” in their study. In the questionnaire sent to their 
survey participants they made it clear that questions related only to “information provided using the Internet via corporate 
websites’. It should be noted that many of the earlier studies used the terms Internet and corporate websites 
interchangeably. Many well-known Internet applications today (e.g. Twitter, Facebook and YouTube) were only developed 
during the last 10 years (Butler, 2015). 
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Pronk, 2006: 278). In the same study, private shareholders represented 10.5%, institutional 
shareholders 3.2% and lenders 1% of the website traffic. 
In 2009, the consultancy company Makinson Cowell repeated a 2007 study, and found that about 
50% of participants felt that their usage of corporate websites had increased during the previous two 
years. The enhanced availability of information was the most common reason given for the increased 
usage, with a minority of participants attributing their increased use to changes in their own behaviour 
and preferences (Jones, 2009: 2.2). 
FASB (2000: 42) reported that the majority of companies that track website usage agreed that their 
greatest use came from individual investors and shareholders. They further reported that although 
companies in the innovative group attracted more interest from analysts and large institutional 
investors compared to companies in the complementary and substitute groups,22 they still 
considered individual investors as their biggest user group. 
In a study in which institutional investors were asked why they did not use corporate websites, the 
following were given as reasons: reluctance to trust the technology, lack of confidence in their own 
technical ability, preference for existing information suppliers, and negative perceptions as to site 
navigation, quality and the timeliness of information available (Wade & Forbes, 2000: 7). 
Therefore, although individual corporate websites may not always convey exclusive and new 
information, the widespread use of websites as an information source by both investors and 
information intermediaries has been well documented. Not only the quality of the information 
communicated, but also the presentation of the information (e.g. ease of navigation) will affect 
investors’ perceptions of whether corporate websites provide a relevant, important and preferred 
incremental information source or merely a convenient alternative source. 
1.2.4 What are the advantages in using a corporate website? 
Compared to the more traditional media (e.g. hard copy annual reports), the corporate website as a 
communication medium has specific advantages for both companies and investors. For companies, 
it is more cost-effective, faster, more flexible in format, and more accessible to investors; while for 
investors, it may potentially be an easy, quick, cheap, complete, reliable and up-to-date source of 
information that is readily available. Smith and Pierce (2005: 51) listed the following as advantages 
for the website host: to tailor content to match user needs; to use multimedia communications to 
generate dynamic and responsive content; and to use artificial intelligence for possible interactive 
exchanges between preparers and users.  
                                               
22
 As discussed earlier in this chapter on page 6, the complementary group only publishes standard financial reports, press 
releases and investor information; the substitute group publishes the same information as the complementary group with 
some additional information (e.g. share price and dividend history); and the innovative group publishes the widest possible 
range of information in order to maximise its web capabilities to expand its audience and generate more usage. 
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According to Cormier et al. (2009: 4), web-specific attributes, such as dynamic information, real-time 
access and interactive capabilities, all contribute to the perceived superiority of corporate websites 
as the best platform for corporate communications. In addition, the use of a corporate website may 
decrease companies’ dependence on information intermediaries. 
According to the IASB conceptual framework for financial reporting (hereafter referred to as ‘the 
Framework’), the objective of financial reporting is to provide financial information that will be useful23 
to existing and potential investors in making investment decisions (IASB, 2010: A27). The 
Framework specifically states that investors will also have to consult other sources in addition to 
financial reports, as financial reports do not and are not able to provide all the information that 
investors need (IASB, 2010: A28).  
The Framework (IASB, 2010: A33) requires two fundamental qualitative characteristics (relevance 
and faithful presentation) that must be adhered to for financial information to be useful, and four 
enhancing qualitative characteristics that could further improve the usefulness of information 
(comparability, verifiability, timeliness and understandability). 
Relevant information is information that is capable of making a difference in respect of decisions 
made by investors. For a faithful representation, three characteristics are required: completeness, 
neutrality and freedom from error. For information to be neutral there should be no bias in the 
selection of presentation of information. 
Given the inherent advantages of corporate websites discussed above, this study suggests that the 
optimal use of the corporate website as IR communication channel may enhance the usefulness of 
information to investors. Litan and Wilson (2000) suggested that utilising Internet capabilities more 
efficiently should result in financial reporting that is forward-looking and which describes not only 
historical cost-based elements, but also provides a more accurate picture of the organisation’s 
current and future prospects (as cited in Khan, 2006: 13). 
Although the advantages of the corporate website as communication medium is common knowledge 
today given the exponential growth in the use of the Internet over the past two decades, this study 
assumes that, in view of the discussion in Section 1.2.2 above, not all companies fully utilise these 
advantages and thus for some these exist only as opportunities. Therefore this study henceforth 
refers only to potential advantages. As discussed in Section 1.2.5 below, many of these potential 
advantages (e.g. timeliness and navigation) may decrease the usability of corporate websites if not 
utilised effectively. For example, if only good news is published on corporate websites, the neutrality, 
and therefore the faithful presentation and usefulness of information, could be compromised. 
                                               
23
 The usefulness of information communicated via financial statements is often criticised. According to Lymer (1999: 289), 
dissatisfaction with corporate reporting activities and the regulation thereof dates back to the first attempt to regulate 
accounting. 
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1.2.5 What are the disadvantages in using a corporate website? 
Although corporate websites can be used to enhance investor relations through additional content 
and the use of innovative presentation technologies, not all content and presentation technologies 
will benefit investors in the same way.  
Notwithstanding the potential advantages discussed in Section 1.2.4 above, the following are often 
discussed in the literature as disadvantages, risks or challenges in the use of the corporate website 
as communication channel: outdated and incomplete information, disorientation, lack of clear 
boundaries, information or cognitive overload, absence of regulatory standards to standardise 
content, general information technology (IT) risks, high costs of developing and maintaining 
corporate websites, and the lack of assurance regarding the credibility of information. 
• Outdated and incomplete information 
Given the potential advantages discussed above and the widespread use of the corporate website 
as communication channel, users may have the reasonable expectation of timeliness and 
completeness. Hard copy reports (e.g. annual reports) are always dated and the reader of these 
reports will have a reasonable expectation that the bound document will include a pre-determined 
set of information (FASB, 2000: viii) (e.g. accounting notes and an audit report with an annual report). 
According to FASB (2000: viii), information provided on corporate websites does not have the same 
level of pre-determined completeness as hard copy reports and is not always the most current 
information available.  
• Disorientation 
Dillon, McKnight and Richardson (1990) stated that the problem of disorientation or “getting lost in 
hyperspace” arises from the need to know where one is in the network of hyperlinks, where one 
came from, and how to navigate to another place in the network. Conventional (i.e. hard copy) texts 
are primarily sequential in nature (i.e. arranged in a linear fashion) and, for example, have a table of 
contents with topics and page numbers, compared to corporate websites that are non-sequential 
with hundreds or thousands of links (Debreceny, Gray and Mock, 2001: 10). 
Ghani, Laswad and Tooley (2011: 187) found that alternative digital formats (i.e. PDF, HTML and 
XBRL) do not significantly reduce functional fixation.24 Hodge, Kennedy and Maines (2004: 687) 
reported results that support the notion that search-facilitating technologies aid financial statement 
users in finding and integrating information. 
• Lack of clear boundaries 
Although the use of hypertext is generally viewed as a presentation technology that enhances the 
usefulness of corporate website content, research by DeStefano and LeFevre (2007: 1616) and Dull, 
                                               
24
 Functional fixation exists when users of financial statements either overlook information located outside the normal 
location or consider such information to be of lesser importance (e.g. a disclosure on the face of the financial statement or 
in a note to the financial statement) (Ghani, Laswad & Tooley, 2011: 187). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
11 
Graham and Baldwin (2003: 185) reported that this is not always the case. Kelton and Pennington 
(2012: 1178), on the other hand, reported that hyperlink users (specifically non-professional 
investors) expend less effort on the investment task than users of paper-based information. Hodge 
(2001: 675) reported evidence that suggests that companies can influence financial report users’ 
perceptions by hyperlinking unaudited information to information in their audited financial 
statements.  
Hodge (2001) and Trites (1999), as cited by Debreceny, Gray and Rahman (2002: 374), argued that 
the practice of hyperlinking audited financial statements to unaudited information leads investors to 
blend audited information with unaudited information by blurring the boundaries between them. 
Internet users assess the credibility of the unaudited information higher compared to users of hard 
copy information (Hodge, 2001). According to Fitzsimons and Shoaf (2000: 69), companies may 
face potential legal risk if they endorse unaudited information (e.g. forward-looking statements) 
without the necessary cautionary disclaimers.  
Khadaroo (2005a: 66) described the risks associated with hyperlinks as follows:  
Links to third-party information, especially links to analysts’ sites, may invite litigation. Without 
appropriate disclaimers, a company may inadvertently give visitors the impression that all 
information provided in other web sites to which the company’s web site is linked is afforded 
the same level of accuracy and reliability. This is an issue clearly on the minds of those in the 
investor relations function.  
• Information or cognitive overload 
By default, all additional content and presentation technologies (e.g. hyperlinks and alternative digital 
formats) are positively viewed, but it is important to note that, as various studies suggest, this is not 
true in all circumstances. Given the low cost and relative ease with which already available 
information can be uploaded on corporate websites, information overload, as discussed by Lybaert 
(2002), could potentially compromise the usefulness of corporate websites. Debreceny et al. (2001: 
10) were of the opinion that information presented in a complicated and unstructured way may lead 
to cognitive overload and also distract the reader. 
According to Debreceny et al. (2001: 10), overload may result from the need of the user to make 
decisions as to which links to follow and which to abandon when there are a large number of choices. 
Debreceny et al. (2001: 11) further argued that, although companies may wish to create a 
comprehensive corporate website where sophisticated users, such as investment analysts, may find 
all required information, this may overload the smaller, average investor who just requires some 
basic information. 
• Absence of regulatory standards to standardise content 
It is the view of Khadaroo (2005a: 61) and Von Westarp, Stubenrath, Ordelheide, Buxmann and 
König (1999) that a major drawback of corporate website reporting is the absence of standardised 
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data, as companies use their discretion on what to disclose and what not to disclose on corporate 
websites.  
Potential consequences of the absence of such standards include a cross-sectional variation 
between companies, industries and countries and an evolutionary, rather than a revolutionary, 
adoption of the corporate website as communication channel by companies. Previous research has 
documented cross-sectional variations (Aerts et al., 2007: 1320; Debreceny et al., 2002: 372; Beattie 
& Pratt, 2003; Lybaert, 2002: 212; Bollen, Hassink & Bozic, 2006; Matherly & Burton, 2005: 30; 
Marston & Polei, 2004: 299; Lymer et al., 1999; Wade & Forbes, 2000: 12; FASB, 2000: 19; Davey 
& Homkajohn, 2004: 211; Khan, 2006: 184; Khan, 2007: 37; Ettredge, Richardson & Scholz, 2002: 
368) and a slow adoption of the corporate website as communication medium on the part of some 
companies (Baard & Nel, 2011; Davey & Homkajohn, 2004; Smith & Pierce, 2005). 
Chatterjee and Hawkes (2008: 37) argued that such cross-sectional variation decreases the usability 
of corporate websites as it hinders the ability of users to access and compare information across 
companies. The immediate effect is that not all corporate websites would have the same level of 
potential benefits for investors.  
• General information technology risks 
The accounting and consulting firm, BerryDunn, lists the following as the top 10 information 
technology (IT) risks: an overreliance on security monitoring software, inadequate system logging, 
technology innovations that outpace security, outdated operating systems, lack of encryption, 
company data on user-owned mobile devices, IT ‘diplomatic immunity’ within the company, lack of 
management support, the inability to recruit qualified IT staff, and the segregation of duties 
(BerryDunn, 2014). 
Although personal computers (i.e. laptops and desktops) were initially the preferred (and only) 
devices used for accessing corporate websites, it is generally expected that tablets and smartphones 
(mobile devices) will supersede personal computers in future. According to the International Data 
Corporation (IDC, 2014), vendors shipped 1 billion smartphones worldwide in 2013. Given the 
inherent differences between devices (e.g. screen resolution, screen size, input methods, viewing 
distance, processing capabilities and power consumption), this dissertation asserts that the tailor of 
content and presentation for each device may have to be considered given these differences. 
• High costs of developing and maintaining corporate websites 
It will only be financially feasible for a company to use a corporate website as IR communication 
channel if the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs. Expected benefits are, however, not 
easy to measure and a substantial portion of this dissertation has been devoted (see Chapters 6, 7 
and 8) to the measurement of benefits. The cost–benefit analysis theory is also discussed in  
Chapter 2. 
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• Lack of assurance regarding the credibility of information 
It is not clear whether the voluntary information contained on a corporate website is necessarily 
credible, given the conflicting incentives that companies have (Healy & Palepu, 2001: 425). Theories 
explaining voluntary disclosure are discussed in Chapter 2. 
1.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
1.3.1 Background to the research problem 
Accounting boards such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)25 and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB),26 professional auditing firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007: 
7), and investor relations professionals (Agarwal, Taffler, Bellotti & Nash, 2016: 33) often claim 
decreased cost of capital27 as one of the benefits of a well-developed and well-implemented 
disclosure policy. Such a negative association is also well supported by various analytical research 
studies (Leuz & Verrechia, 2000; Verrecchia, 2001; Easley & O’Hara, 2004; Lambert, Leuz & 
Verrecchia, 2009). 
Others, however, have argued that enhanced disclosure will increase the cost of capital. The 
Financial Executives Institute (Berton, 1994) argued that increased disclosure levels would increase 
share price volatility and therefore risk, resulting in an increased cost of equity. 
The FASB (2001) issued a report entitled the Business Reporting Research Project (BRRP). The 
objective of the BRRP was to help companies to improve their business reporting by providing 
evidence that many leading companies are making extensive voluntary disclosures and by listing 
examples of those disclosures. The basic premise underlying its report was that by improving 
disclosure companies could reduce their cost of capital (FASB, 2001: 16). 
Tweedie, former chairman of the IASB, suggested that by providing “high quality, understandable 
and enforceable global accounting standards, the cost of capital is reduced because analysts and 
investors have a better understanding of companies’ prospects” (Gow, Taylor & Verrecchia, 2011: 
2). Foster, a former board member of the FASB, claimed that “more information always equates to 
less uncertainty, and people pay more for certainty” (Lambert, Leuz & Verrecchia, 2007: 386).  
While Tweedie specifically had accounting standards and mandatory disclosure in mind, Foster on 
the other hand indirectly referred to voluntary disclosure. Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse 
                                               
25
 The FASB is responsible for the development of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and is based in the 
US. The Jenkins Committee Report that was issued by the FASB in 1994 gave decreased levels of cost of equity capital 
as an important benefit of increased disclosure levels (Botosan, 1997: 324). 
26
 The IASB is responsible for the development of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and is based in the 
UK. Although the IASB has its offices in London, its board represents a number of jurisdictions (for example, according to 
the IASB, 122 of 147 jurisdictions require IFRS standards for listed companies in their capital markets). According to 
paragraph QC37 of the IFRS Framework, useful information results in a lower cost of capital for the economy as a whole. 
27
 Although cost of capital, or weighted average cost of capital, refers to the combined cost of equity and cost of debt 
weighted according to capital structure, literature is not always consistent and cost of equity, cost of capital, cost of finance 
and capital costs are sometimes used interchangeably.  
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(1990: 122) defined disclosure as any deliberate release of financial information, whether 
quantitative or qualitative, or via formal or informal communication channels.  
Economic theory suggests two distinct routes in support of the hypothesis that disclosure could 
decrease cost of capital, the liquidity route and the estimation risk route (Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; 
Orens, Aerts & Cormier, 2010). The liquidity route leads to improved disclosure and increased 
liquidity, which will result in a decrease in the cost of capital either through reduced transaction costs 
or an increased demand. The estimation risk route is associated with the investors’ assessments of 
the parameters of the expected return. Thus, improved quality of information enables investors to 
make more accurate estimates with less uncertainty about future cash flows and profitability.  
According to Chang, D’Anna, Watson and Wee (2008: 378), the investor relations effect (i.e. the 
benefits thereof) on a company can be observed in two ways: increased visibility as predicted by 
Merton (1987) and increased disclosure resulting in capital markets effects, as documented by 
Easley and O’Hara (2004).  
Ryder and Regester (1989), as cited by Brennan and Kelly (2000) stated that company investor 
relations focus on three principal aims: attain and retain the highest share price, create confidence 
in the capital market (e.g. ensure favourable cost of debt and terms of trade with large suppliers and 
customers) and influence the composition of the shareholder base (e.g. institutional, private or 
foreign investors).  
Agarwal et al. (2016: 33) argued that an investment in investor relations is justified as it raises the 
company’s profile with market participants, resulting in increased company values. Conventional 
finance theory, on the other hand, argues that there is no justification for expenditure that increases 
company visibility without providing new information relevant to investors in valuing the company in 
the perfect market setting assumption (Agarwal et al., 2016: 45).  
Supported by theory and various studies (Easley & O’Hara, 2004; Lambert et al., 2009; Armstrong, 
Core, Taylor & Verrecchia, 201128), an alternative research avenue to examining the direct 
relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital is to investigate the indirect relationship by 
examining the association between disclosure and information asymmetry (Chang et al., 2008). 
Some studies have examined both direct and indirect relationships (Orens et al., 2010). 
Findings to date of empirical research into establishing the link between the various proxies used for 
disclosure and the cost of capital have been mixed. Possible reasons for these mixed results include 
different information environments (e.g. developed versus developing countries), different research 
methodologies, and the variety of different proxies that have been used to measure disclosure.  
                                               
28
 Results showed that in an imperfect competition setting a positive association exists between information asymmetry 
and the cost of capital compared to a perfect competition setting where no relationship exists. 
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According to Khadaroo (2005a: 66), web reporting practices are possibly linked to the stage of 
economic development of a country. This author’s argument is based on a higher observed level of 
Internet reporting for Singapore compared to Malaysia. In the Khan (2006: 146) study, countries 
were classified according to the World Bank classification scheme into low income, lower middle 
income, upper middle income and high income. Khan (2006: 151) found higher disclosure scores for 
listed companies in high-income countries, with a drop in the disclosure score (specifically related to 
the non-financial elements of the disclosure score) for low-income countries.  
Nel and Baard (2007) compared the Internet investor relations of the largest 40 listed companies in 
South Africa to those of selected countries in the rest of Africa (Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and 
Tunisia) and found that companies from the rest of Africa consistently rated lower than the South 
African companies in all categories of their measurement instrument. 
Research carried out by Debreceny et al. (2002: 392) found that the overall financial reporting 
disclosure environment is significant in predicting the presentation and content of Internet financial 
reporting, while Aerts et al. (2007) and Orens et al. (2010) documented variations in the associations 
between disclosure and information asymmetry and the cost of capital given the institutional regime. 
According to Aerts et al. (2007: 1302), each country’s institutional regime provides managers and 
information intermediaries with different incentives to produce or use information. 
Verrecchia (2001: 175) suggested that, given the rich disclosure environment in certain capital 
markets, for example the US, additional voluntary disclosures may lead to economic consequences 
that would be difficult to measure. This author suggests more research using developing country 
data. 
Francis, Khurana and Pereira (2005a: 1126) gave two reasons why voluntary disclosure and the 
expected benefits thereof are not likely to occur in countries outside the US. Firstly, disclosure may 
not be viewed as credible if investor protection is weak and, secondly, there is a lesser need for 
voluntary disclosure in countries with predominantly bank-centred financial systems.  
Gray, Radebaugh and Roberts (1990) documented different perceptions of the cost–benefit 
relationship of specific items of voluntary disclosure (e.g. value-added statements, description of 
major capital expenditure projects, employment information and advertising expenditure) among UK 
and US financial executives. They found that voluntary disclosure items that are perceived to be 
valuable in one country are not always valuable in other countries. 
1.3.2 Study purpose, research problem and research questions 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the quality of the corporate website for investor relations 
purposes in South Africa, to establish the determinants thereof, and to establish whether the use 
thereof has any effect on the level of information asymmetry and the cost of capital. 
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Following Gajewski and Li (2015), Chang et al. (2008) and Froidevaux (2004), companies’ Internet 
investor relations were used in this study as a proxy for disclosure quality owing to the increased 
popularity and advantages of using the corporate website as communication medium.29  The 
underlying motivation for setting this purpose was to shed some light on the benefits of a well-
developed Internet investor relations (IIR)30 programme by examining the effect thereof for 
information asymmetry and the cost of capital.  
It is important to distinguish between the quality of information and the quality of the communication 
process. Authors such as Kothari, Li and Short (2009) and Bhattacharya, Ecker, Olsson and 
Schipper (2007) studied the quality of information.  
Kothari et al. (2009) categorised disclosure as either favourable or unfavourable (i.e. good news or 
bad news) and separately examined the relationship between favourable and unfavourable 
disclosure with the cost of capital. Bhattacharya et al. (2007) used three proxies for earnings quality 
to study the relationship between earnings quality, information asymmetry and the cost of equity: 
accruals quality, absolute normal returns and earnings variability.  
The majority of studies surveyed for this dissertation made no attempt to distinguish between the 
quantity and quality of IIR (see Table B1, Annexure B).  As discussed in Sections 3.2.4.1 to 3.2.4.5, 
various approaches are suggested in the literature as proxy for disclosure quality.  
Firstly, it has been argued that the extent of information disclosed (i.e. content) is an indicator of 
quality (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Louwers et al., 1998; Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Botosan, 1997; Leuz 
& Verrechia, 2000; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Bollen et al., 2006; Abdelsalam et al., 2007; Trabelsi et 
al., 2008).  
Secondly, it is argued that the use of presentation technology-related attributes may improve the 
accessibility, navigation and timeliness of information, resulting in an improvement in quality 
(Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Debreceny et al., 2002; Davey & Homkajohn, 2004; Marston & Polei, 2004; 
Khadaroo, 2005a; Chang et al., 2008). Further, as discussed in Section 1.2.4 above, many of the 
advantages of IIR depend on the proper use of presentation technology-related attributes. While the 
proper use thereof can enhance the quality of IIR, the inappropriate use thereof can compromise its 
usefulness, as discussed in Section 1.2.5. 
Finally, quality is measured through the measurement process (Trabelsi et al., 2008). As discussed 
in Section 3.2.3.3, various studies have motivated the use of weights to reflect the usefulness 
attached to attributes by the users of the information (Celik et al., 2006; Aerts et al., 2007; Bollen et 
al., 2006). 
                                               
29
 Research by Lang and Lundholm (1993: 257-258) found that annual report disclosure levels are positively correlated 
with the disclosure levels provided through corporate investor relations media and other publications. 
30
 For the purpose of this dissertation, the abbreviation IIR will henceforth be used in this study to refer to Internet investor 
relations according to the dissertation title.  
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As discussed in Section 3.3.3, this study attempted to measure quality by measuring content as 
widely as possible (also refer to Section 3.3.1) by measuring the presentation of information (i.e. 
accessibility, timeliness and navigation) and by measuring attributes as partially available (0.5) 
based on the breadth, depth, usability and timeliness of information as opposed merely to measuring 
attributes as available (1) or absent (0). Although there was some subjectivity involved in such a 
methodology, the dissertation promotes the argument that such that such an approach is important 
to ensure the quality of IIR is measured and not merely the quantity. The methodology followed in 
this dissertation to measure attributes as partially available (0.5) is specifically discussed in Sections 
3.3.3, 4.3 and the measurement conventions in Annexure C. 
For the purpose of this study, IIR is therefore defined as to refer to the quality of IIR, as described 
above, throughout his dissertation. Following Bollen et al. (2006: 297), this study, however, did not 
measure the quality of disclosure content nor distinguish between favourable and unfavourable 
information as disclosed by companies on their corporate websites. 
The research problem of this study therefore is: Will variations in IIR between companies have any 
effect, positive or negative, on the level of information asymmetry and cost of capital? 
The research problem is addressed by answering three research questions. The research questions 
are: 
Research question 1: To what extent do JSE-listed companies use corporate websites to 
communicate with investors? 
Research question 2: What company characteristics best explain variations in IIR? 
Research question 3: Will variations in IIR have an effect on the level of information asymmetry and 
cost of capital? 
1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
1.4.1 Research plan 
The first objective of the study is to develop a measurement instrument that could be used to 
measure the extent of IIR. Although a wide variety of existing measurement instruments exist and 
are described in the literature, this study opted to develop an instrument owing to the shortcomings 
of current instruments, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
The second objective is to use this measurement instrument to measure the extent of IIR scores31. 
For reasons of practicality in terms of cost and time limitations the measurement of IIR was limited 
                                               
31
 Given the unique characteristics of the various devices through which corporate websites can be accessed (e.g. personal 
computer, mobile phone or IPAD), this study is limited to the use of personal computers as access device. For the purpose 
of this study, it was assumed that the majority of investors would use personal computers to access corporate websites for 
investment decisions. 
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to a sample of JSE-listed companies. As further discussed in Chapter 4, results were used to 
ascertain the validity and reliability of the instrument.  
The third objective is to establish the determinants of IIR by means of a regression model linking IIR 
to selected explanatory variables, as identified in the literature. 
The fourth objective is to examine the relationship between IIR and information asymmetry through 
the use of a regression model to identify the determinants of information asymmetry. Proxies to 
estimate information asymmetry, as well as additional explanatory variables, were identified following 
a comprehensive literature review. 
The fifth and sixth objectives are to examine the relationship between IIR and both the cost of debt 
and the cost of equity through the use of regression models to identify the determinants of the cost 
of debt and the cost of equity. Proxies to estimate the cost of debt and the cost of equity, as well as 
additional explanatory variables, were identified following a comprehensive literature review. 
The seventh and final objective is to examine the relationship between IIR and the cost of capital 
through the use of a regression model to identify the determinants of the cost of capital.  
1.4.2 Sample selection 
As the sample is used to make inferences about the population, the sample size is set on 25% of 
the defined population of 315 companies. As discussed in Chapter 4, a final sample of 85 companies 
is selected.  
Cheng, Courtenay and Krishnamurti (2006) used a similar sample size (23% of companies listed on 
the Singapore Stock Exchange or 104 companies) to examine the impact of increased voluntary 
disclosure on market information asymmetry. When comparing sample sizes, studies should be 
categorised according to the proxy used for disclosure: content analysis using a measurement 
instrument (i.e. direct disclosure measurement) or an indirect measure (e.g. analyst ratings). Given 
the laborious process of doing a content analysis, indirect disclosure proxy studies are often 
associated with larger sample sizes. Botosan and Plumlee (2002), for example, used Association for 
Investment Management and Research (AIMR) ratings as disclosure proxy to study 3 618 
companies over an 11-year period.   
The sampling technique that was used was stratified random sampling with proportional allocation. 
The sample selection procedure is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
1.4.3 Research methodology 
Different research methodologies are applied throughout the study. The methodologies are 
described in the chapters dealing with each of the research questions. Figure 1.2 provides an 
overview of the research methods that are used in this study. 
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1.4.4 Distinctive characteristics of the research 
As discussed in Chapter 3, this study developed a measurement instrument based on best practices 
published by the Investor Relations Society (IRS), a comprehensive literature review and a pilot 
study. Compared to existing measurement instruments, the measurement instrument used in this 
study is more comprehensive. It also attempted to measure the quality of the communication process 
by considering not only the timeliness and navigation of information, but also the usefulness (e.g. 
the completeness) of information supplied.   
The measurement instrument that is used consists of 346 attributes and by comparison with earlier 
related studies, as summarised in Table B1 in Annexure B, is by far the most comprehensive 
instrument available to date. As discussed in Chapter 4, corporate websites were carefully 
scrutinised to assess the availability or absence of attributes for each company over a six-month 
period, March to September 2015. 
To date, findings of empirical research have been mixed as regards establishing the link between 
the various proxies used for disclosure and, respectively, information asymmetry and the cost of 
capital. Possible reasons for these mixed results include different information environments (e.g. 
developed versus developing countries), and research methodologies, as well as the variety of 
different proxies that have been used to measure disclosure. 
The majority of empirical studies on voluntary disclosure, information asymmetry and the cost of 
capital have been developed using developed country samples, specifically US data. Further, most 
of these studies measured voluntary disclosure using either analyst ratings (or equivalent) as 
disclosure proxy, or measured voluntary disclosure using the annual report as disclosure medium.  
Of the studies reviewed in the literature study in this dissertation, only the following studies examined 
the association between disclosure and either information asymmetry or cost of capital using 
corporate websites as disclosure medium: Froidevaux (2004); Aerts et al. (2007); Trabelsi et al. 
(2008); Chang et al. (2008); Cormier et al. (2009); Lai, Lin, Li and Wu (2010);32 Orens et al. (2010); 
Epping and Wilder (2011); and Gajewski and Li (2015). All these studies were performed in northern 
America and continental Europe, except Chang et al. (2008), which took place in Australia and Lai 
et al. (2010) in Taiwan. 
This study therefore further contribute to the body of knowledge by using data from a developing 
country, namely South Africa. It should however be noted that even within developed countries mixed 
results were reported. For example, Orens et al. (2010) and Aerts et al. (2007) found different 
associations between disclosure and information asymmetry between northern American and 
continental European countries. 
                                               
32
 Lai et al. (2010) measured the association between share price returns and corporate website disclosures. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 
Although investor relations were defined earlier in this dissertation to include disclosure, few studies 
using the corporate website as disclosure medium have specifically referred to investor relations in 
their studies, with the exception of Deller, Stubenrath and Weber (1999), Brennan and Kelley (2000), 
Geerings, Bollen and Hassink (2003), Froidevaux (2004), Hamid (2005), Bollen et al. (2006), Chang 
et al. (2008), Ryan (2010), Sabelfeld (2011), Gajewski and Li (2015), and Esterhuyse and Wingard 
(2016). 
To date, previous studies conducted in the South African environment have been limited to mere 
descriptive studies (Lymer et al., 199933; Stainbank, 2000; Venter, 2002; Loxton, 2003; Barac, 2004; 
Nel, 2004; Bollen et al., 200634; Nel & Baard, 2007; Esterhuyse & Wingard, 2016). This is the first 
South African study to establish the determinants of IIR, and to test for associations between IIR 
and, respectively, information asymmetry and the cost of capital. 
1.5 DETAILS OF THE STUDY 
Figure 1.2 provides an overview of the research questions, objectives and methods that are used in 
this study, as well as an outline of the relevant chapters. Below is a summary of each chapter. 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
IIR is a voluntary activity, but it is well-known that JSE-listed companies are mandated to publish 
annual reports in accordance with the IFRS. Chapter 2 explains the voluntary nature of IIR in terms 
of the South African regulatory environment, followed by an examination of the underlying theories 
that can be used to explain why companies will engage in voluntary disclosure practices such as IIR. 
Given the interdisciplinary nature of this study, an explicit review on IIR is provided. 
Next, the following aspects are discussed: theories explaining why disclosure, and IIR, should have 
an effect on information asymmetry and the cost of capital; and proxies that have been used in the 
literature to estimate information asymmetry, cost of equity and the cost of debt, and empirical 
evidence to date on such relationships. Finally, Chapter 2 looks at the endogeneity problem in the 
context of studies that examine the association between disclosure and, respectively, information 
asymmetry and the cost of capital. 
Chapter 3: Data collection instrument 
Chapter 3 first discusses disclosure proxies that were used in earlier studies, followed by an overview 
of the shortcomings and diversity of existing direct disclosure proxies. This is followed by a 
discussion of the methodology used in the development of the instrument and a brief discussion of 
how the instrument was implemented. 
 
                                               
33
 South Africa and 21 other countries 
34
 South Africa and five other countries 
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Chapter 4: Empirical results of the content analysis 
Chapter 4 briefly discusses how the study sample was selected, how reliability and validity concerns 
were address and the challenges that arose in measuring the IIR of the sample companies. Results 
are discussed by means of a vertical analysis (i.e. average availability per attribute) and a horizontal 
analysis (i.e. analysis of IIR scores per company). In the vertical analysis an overview is first given 
of the results without referring to individual attributes, followed by a discussion of the availability of 
attributes in general and per category, and finally a detailed discussion per attribute, organised into 
eleven categories.35  
The horizontal analysis entails a discussion of the variability of IIR scores over individual companies, 
as well as according to JSE listing status (e.g. sector, board, dual and primary listings). Alternative 
IIR scores, based on the average availabilities of attributes, are also calculated. Finally, a summary 
and discussion of the results, with a brief discussion of how the strategic decision-making process 
of companies may influence IIR, is provided. Recommendations are made on how companies could 
improve the usability of their IIR. 
Chapter 5: Determinants of IIR 
Chapter 5 addresses the third objective of the study, namely to establish the determinants of IIR. 
Following an extensive literature review, independent variables used in earlier studies to explain 
disclosure levels are identified and discussed. A conclusion is drawn about which company 
characteristics best explain variations in IIR levels. 
Chapter 6: Information asymmetry 
The fourth objective of the study, namely to examine the relationship between IIR and information 
asymmetry, is addressed in Chapter 6. Five alternative proxies (the bid-ask spread, price impact, 
share price volatility, share turnover and analyst following) to estimate information asymmetry are 
used. In addition to IIR, independent variables used in earlier studies to explain information 
asymmetry are identified and discussed. A conclusion is drawn on whether variations in IIR also 
cause variations in information asymmetry levels. 
Chapter 7: Cost of debt 
The fifth objective of the study, namely to examine the relationship between IIR and the cost of debt, 
is addressed in Chapter 7. The cost of debt is measured as the interest expense scaled by the 
interest-bearing debt of the company. As in Chapter 6, additional independent variables used in 
earlier studies to explain the cost of debt are identified and discussed. A conclusion is drawn on 
whether variations in IIR also cause variations in the cost of debt. 
                                               
35
 Accessibility, Navigation, Timeliness, Company information, Financial information, Shareholder information, Investment 
case, Relevant news, Bondholder information, Corporate governance, and Corporate responsibility. 
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Chapter 8: Cost of capital 
The sixth and the seventh objectives of the study, namely to examine the relationship between IIR, 
and respectively the cost of equity and the cost of capital, are addressed in Chapter 8. Cost of capital 
is calculated as the weighted average of the cost of equity and the cost of debt. Although the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) was used to estimate the cost of equity, the earnings-to-price ratio and 
realised returns method are also given due consideration as cost of equity proxies. A similar 
methodology to the one followed in Chapter 7 is followed here. A conclusion is drawn on whether 
variations in IIR also cause variations in, respectively, cost of equity and cost of capital levels. 
Chapter 9: Summary and conclusions 
A summary of the study is given and a conclusion is drawn. Limitations and suggestions for future 
research is discussed. 
RESEARCH PURPOSE / 
QUESTIONS  
RESEARCH 
OBJECTIVES  RESEARCH METHOD  CHAPTER 
       
The purpose of this study 
is to investigate the quality 
of the corporate website 
for investor relations 
purposes in South Africa, 
to establish the 
determinants thereof, and 
to establish whether the 
use thereof has any effect 
on the level of information 
asymmetry and the cost of 
capital. 
 
Three questions are 
asked: 
 
1)  To what extent do JSE-
listed companies use 




2)  What company 
characteristics best explain 
variations in IIR? 
 
3) Will variations in IIR 
have an effect on the level 
of information asymmetry 
and cost of capital? 
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IIR  
 
Adoption of the guidelines published 
by the IRS for creating a best 
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review and pilot study to fine-tune for 
the South African environment 
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To measure the 
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Stratified sampling and content 
analysis  4 
      
 
Third objective: To 
establish the 
determinants of IIR 
 
Literature review to identify 
determinants followed by a stepwise 
multiple regression 
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Fourth objective: To 
examine the 
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IIR and information 
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Fifth objective: To 
examine the 
relationship between 
IIR and the cost of 
debt 
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examine the 
relationship between 




To examine the 
relationship between 
IIR and the cost of 
capital 
 
Literature review to identify proxies 
for the measurement of dependent 
variables (i.e. information asymmetry, 
cost of debt and cost of equity), 
followed by a literature review to 
identify the determinants for each. 
 












Figure 1.2: A concise summary of the flow of the study 





Various communication channels are available to companies to communicate with investors. One 
communication channel is the annual report. As briefly discussed in Section 1.2.2, the contents 
thereof are regulated by various standards, acts and codes.36 Such regulated content could be 
referred to as mandatory disclosure. 
In addition, companies may also disclose information voluntarily, for example forecasts and dividend 
policy decisions. A number of communication channels are available for voluntary disclosures, such 
as annual reports, company-specific reports, media releases, presentations and corporate websites. 
De La Bruslerie and Gabteni (2011) referred to mandatory disclosures as financial information and 
voluntary disclosures as financial communication. FASB (2001: v) defined voluntary disclosure as 
disclosure primarily provided outside the financial statements – therefore disclosure not explicitly 
required by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or SEC rule.37  
Previous research using South African data (Venter, 2002; Loxton, 2003; Barac, 2004; Nel & Baard, 
2007; Esterhuyse & Wingard, 2016) found that almost all of the largest38 JSE-listed companies did 
have a working corporate website with a dedicated investor relations section. Although nearly all of 
these companies also publish annual reports on their websites, research reports significant 
variations in the content and presentation of corporate website information. Although the contents of 
annual reports, as such, are regulated by various standards, acts and codes, the distribution thereof 
is less regulated. 
The 1973 Companies Act (RSA, 1973) stipulated that companies should send a hard copy of their 
annual financial statements to all shareholders and that companies were only allowed to substitute 
hard copy statements with electronic statements if the shareholder entitled to receive the financial 
statements agreed thereto in writing, and if the company were so authorised by its articles.  
The 1973 Companies Act was replaced with the 2008 Companies Act on 1 May 2011. According to 
Section 31 of the 2008 Companies Act (RSA, 2008), a company has to issue a notice to each 
shareholder when the annual financial statements become available. This notice should set out the 
steps for shareholders to receive a copy of the statements, which may be in the form of an 
                                               
36
 In South Africa the contents of the annual report (e.g. the integrated annual report) are regulated, among others, by the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), Companies Act (RSA, 2008), JSE listing requirements, and King III 
corporate governance code. 
37
 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), based in the US, issues Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP), while the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issues International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). IFRS standards are applicable to JSE-listed companies. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
regulates stock exchanges in the US in a similar way as the JSE Listing Requirements does. 
38
 Venter and Barac studied the largest 100 listed JSE companies; and Loxton, and Nel and Baard the largest 40. The 
Esterhuyse and Wingard (2016) study is discussed in Section 3.4. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
24 
electronic39 or a hard copy. Shareholders are only entitled to a hard copy if they specifically request 
one from the company.  
It should be emphasised, though not expected, that companies could still opt to distribute hard copy 
statements only to all shareholders and that the electronic copy, as such, could, in addition to placing 
it on the corporate website, be distributed in a number of alternative ways, such as e-mail, Facebook 
or even by compact disc (CD). Given the definition of IIR in Chapter 1, annual financial statements 
are in fact only a small, although important, component of IIR. 
Investor relations, encompassing the management of shareholder relationships, is also important 
from a corporate governance perspective. King III (2009) 40 recommends that the board of directors 
should monitor the relationship between management and the stakeholders41 of the company. 
Chapter 8 of the King III code is devoted entirely to the governance of stakeholder relationships and 
requires listed companies to adhere to the following broad principles: 
• The board should appreciate that stakeholders’ perceptions affect a company’s reputation. 
• The board should delegate management to deal proactively with stakeholder relationships. 
• The board should strive to achieve the appropriate balance between its various stakeholder 
groupings, in the best interests of the company. 
• Transparent and effective communication with stakeholders is essential for building and 
maintaining their trust and confidence. 
• The board should ensure that disputes are resolved as effectively, efficiently and expeditiously 
as possible. 
Besides in the matter of the distribution of annual financial statements (required by the Companies 
Act) and the governance of stakeholder relationships (recommended by King III), neither the 
Companies Act nor King III attempt to regulate IIR. Another important regulatory body in the South 
African context is the JSE, specifically with its JSE listing requirements. The JSE listing requirements 
refer to corporate websites in Section 8.63. According to this section, only key corporate governance 
information as per King III should be disclosed in the integrated report, with more detailed reporting 
in a register format on the corporate website (JSE, 2016a). 
The investor relations activity, and therefore IIR, is not regulated in South Africa. With a few 
exceptions, such as AIM in the UK42 and the European transparency directive (2004/109/CE)), IIR 
                                               
39
 According to wiki.answers.com an electronic copy usually comprises an image of a document that may be stored on a 
computer system. 
40
 King III is a governance compliance framework issued by the Institute of Directors in South Africa (IoDSA), and 
compliance is a JSE requirement. 
41
 Stakeholders include, but are not limited to, shareholders, suppliers, customers or clients, community, employees, 
unions, government and creditors. 
42
 Companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) must from admission 
maintain a website on which specific identified information must be made available free of charge as per AIM Rule 26. 
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is also not regulated in the international environment and this study could therefore be classified as 
a voluntary disclosure study, given the definition of IIR.  
Literature can be categorised as descriptive, determinant or effect studies. Descriptive studies merely 
describe the use of the corporate website as investor communication channel without any, or with little, 
attempt to measure the reasons therefor or the effect thereof. Determinant (also referred to as 
association) studies, on the other hand, explore the possible determinants of IIR, and effect studies 
the consequences or benefits thereof. An extensive number of descriptive, determinant and effect 
studies were examined in the development of the measurement instrument discussed in Chapter 3. 
Determinant studies are further discussed in Chapter 5 and effect studies in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
With reference to the disclosure proxy, the majority of US disclosure studies to date have used 
analyst ratings (e.g. AIMR) as disclosure proxy. On the other hand, most studies in developing 
countries have used disclosure measurement instruments to measure disclosure when doing a 
content analysis, as analyst ratings were not readily available in these countries compared to 
developed countries.  
Content analysis studies can further be categorised according to the disclosure medium measured, 
such as annual reports or corporate websites. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) conducted a meta-analysis 
of determinant studies based on an examination of the conventional print-based annual report, while 
Abdelsalam, Bryant and Street (2007) provided an overview of determinant studies based on an 
examination of corporate websites as disclosure medium. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: In Section 2.2, theories that were used in past 
studies to explain variations in disclosure levels, including IIR, are discussed. One of these theories, 
cost–benefit analysis, holds that companies engage in voluntary disclosure practices given the 
expected benefits thereof. Although various benefits are discussed in the literature, an important 
benefit, if not the most important benefit, is an expected decrease in the cost of capital. 
These benefit studies can be categorised as either direct or indirect studies. Direct studies 
investigate the direct relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital, compared to indirect 
studies that investigate the relationship between disclosure and a measure that is believed to 
influence cost of capital, such as information asymmetry.  
Section 2.3. provides an overview of the concept of IIR. Sections 2.4 (information asymmetry) and 
2.5 to 2.7 (cost of capital) provide an overview of theories and proxies, with some empirical findings 
that were used in past studies to examine the benefits of voluntary disclosure practices. The 
influence of endogeneity on the measurement of these benefits was discussed in Section 2.8, 
followed by a chapter conclusion and summary as Section 2.9. 
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2.2 THEORIES EXPLAINING VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 
2.2.1 Agency problem 
In the case of most listed companies, investors will not participate in the daily management of the 
company. The consequence is a separation of ownership (investors) and control (management), in 
terms of which management, by default, has access to all the information available about the 
company, while investors, by default, do not. As a result, management may act against the best 
interest of investors by either withholding or falsifying information (Froidevaux, 2004: 13). This 
separation is the basis of the agency and the information problem.  
The agency problem arises as a result of the conflicting incentives between managers and investors. 
According to Xiao, Yang and Chow (2004: 197), an assumption of agency theory is that shareholders 
would price-protect themselves against expected expropriations by management.   Craven and 
Marston (1999: 323) asserted that agency theory predicts that voluntary disclosures levels are likely 
to be influenced by managers’ expectations of the share price effect thereof. The following three 
hypotheses (the capital market transactions hypothesis, the corporate control contest hypothesis, 
and the share compensation hypothesis) directly or indirectly prompt the increase of the share price 
of the company. 
This capital market transaction hypothesis is based on the assumption that investors’ perceptions 
are important to companies that are expecting to issue either public debt or equity. If the 
management of a company is in possession of information not known to investors and this 
information represents good news, then management would have an incentive to increase 
disclosures in order to communicate such information to investors and, thus, to decrease the 
expected cost of the share issue. 
Lang and Lundholm (2000: 623) supported this hypothesis by documenting a significant increase in 
disclosure in the six-month period before an equity share offering, while Trabelsi et al. (2008: 144) 
documented a significant positive association between incremental disclosure on corporate websites 
and financing activities. Further support for the capital market transaction hypothesis was given by 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) and Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999). 
The corporate control contest hypothesis is based on the principle that, if managers face the risk of 
losing their jobs as a result of poor share and earnings performance, they will increase disclosure in 
order to reduce the risk of undervaluation and to explain poor earnings performance (Healy & Palepu, 
2001: 421). 
According to the share compensation hypothesis, managers who are compensated by means of 
share-based compensation plans have incentives to disclose more information, for example to 
comply with insider trading rules or reduce the risk of undervaluation. According to Healy and Palepu 
(2001: 422), research by Noe (1999) and Aboody and Kasznik (2000) supports this hypothesis. 
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2.2.2 Information problem 
The information problem can be divided into the amount of information risk (i.e. the estimation risk 
associated with the quality of the information) and the distribution of information risk among investors 
and between investors and the management of the company (i.e. information asymmetry). 
According to Healy and Palepu (2001: 407-409), an information or ‘lemons’ problem may arise as a 
result of information asymmetry and the agency problem.43 This information problem may hinder the 
ability of investors to distinguish between good (peaches) and bad (lemons) investment opportunities 
and this, in turn, may result in a suboptimal allocation of investors’ savings as a scarce resource. In 
order to solve this problem, Healy and Palepu (2001: 409) proposed a number of possible solutions: 
optimal contracts between investors and managers, the regulation of disclosure, corporate 
governance, and information intermediaries.   
Increased disclosure levels may therefore be an attempt by management to remedy the information 
problem. 
2.2.3 Signalling theory 
Signalling theory was first described by Spence44 (1973: 356), using job market signalling as a case 
study, i.e. signalling used by high-quality employee applicants to distinguish themselves from other 
applicants. Applicants used education to signal their quality to their prospective employers. Their 
decision to use education to signal their quality was based on information asymmetry between the 
applicants and the prospective employer.  
Kirmani and Rao (2000: 68) provided the following example to illustrate the basic signalling model. 
Kirmani and Rao (2000: 68) distinguished between high-quality and low-quality companies where 
both know their own quality, but outsiders (e.g. investors) did not, resulting in information asymmetry. 
Each company had the opportunity to signal its quality to outsiders. When high-quality companies 
signal, they receive Payoff A, and when they do not signal, they receive Payoff B. Low-quality 
companies, on the other hand, receive Payoff C when they do signal and Payoff D when they do not 
signal. Signalling is therefore a feasible strategy for high-quality companies when Payoff A exceeds 
Payoff B and when Payoff D exceeds Payoff C. In these circumstances, where high-quality 
companies will signal and low-quality companies will not, outsiders will be able to distinguish 
accurately between high- and low-quality companies based on signalling. Alternatively when both 
types of companies benefit from signalling, investors will not be able to distinguish between the two 
types of companies. 
                                               
43
 The potential negative consequences of information asymmetry was first described by Akerlof in his 1970 article, The 
Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanisms, for which he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize 
in Economics in 2001 (shared with Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz for their analyses of markets with asymmetric 
information) (Nobelprize, 2016). 
44
 Joint recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2001 (see footnote 43). 
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Conelly et al. (2011: 44) discussed the following as key elements of the signalling theory: signaller, 
signal, receiver, feedback and signalling environment.  
The signaller is defined as an insider who obtains information (positive or negative) that is not 
available to outsiders. According to Conelly et al. (2011: 44), signalling theory focuses primarily on 
the deliberate communication of positive information in an effort to communicate positive 
organisational attributes. Receivers are outsiders who lack information and would like to receive this 
information. 
Efficacious signals have two characteristics, signal observability (i.e. the extent to which outsiders 
are able to notice the signal) and signal cost. Signals can be divided into pointing signals and 
activating signals. Pointing signals indicate a characteristic that separates the signaller from its 
competitors, while activating signals also indicate the characteristic, but are also essential to 
activating the quality in the signaller.  
Signalling will only take place if the signaller will benefit from some action from the receiver that 
results from the signal. Feedback refers to the countersignals that receivers send back to signallers 
about the effectiveness of their signals. Distortions in the signalling environment will influence the 
effectiveness of the signal. Individuals who are unsure about how to interpret the signal may base 
their decisions on others’ interpretation of the signal (Sliwka, 2007). 
In the context of this study, the signaller is the company whose investor relations are managed 
through its corporate website. Receivers will include current and potential investors (equity and debt), 
customers, suppliers and analysts. The signals will depend on the company’s strategy and may vary 
from reputation building to attract institutional investors to the marketing of its products. Some 
companies may participate in IIR to signal their competitiveness in the industry and therefore only 
participate because their competitors do. Feedback may vary from a specific investment decision to 
increased e-commerce to improved business relationships with customers and suppliers. The 
signalling environment may be distorted by alternative communication channels available and 
various receivers and interpreters of such information. 
Craven and Marston (1999: 323) argued that the use of IIR may itself be a signal of high quality in 
that it implies that the company is up to date with the latest technology rather than being old-
fashioned and conservative. According to Xiao et al. (2004), signalling theory holds that voluntary 
disclosure is one option for companies to distinguish themselves from peers on dimensions such as 
quality and performance. 
Finance literature often refers to the following specific applications of signalling theory: 
• Dividend signalling theory 
The theory suggests that company announcements of increased dividend payments are a 
signal to indicate strong future prospects. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
29 
• Debt signalling theory 
The theory suggests that a commitment to increase debt and therefore pay interest is a signal 
of financial stability. The reduction of possible future debt is a signal of the company’s inability 
to pay interest and therefore signals a weak financial situation. 
• Equity signalling theory 
The theory suggests that companies will only choose an equity issue to raise additional funds 
if the equity is overvalued (Allen & Morris, 2001: 25). 
• Management talent signalling theory 
The theory suggests that talented managers have an incentive to disclose information in order 
to reveal their management skills to investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001: 424). 
2.2.4 Investor recognition hypothesis  
Merton (1987) used a capital market equilibrium model to argue, firstly, that better followed and 
therefore more visible companies will have, ceteris paribus, higher valuations and, secondly, that the 
impact of this investor recognition will be greater for small companies. 
The key assumption of Merton’s investor recognition hypothesis (IRH) was that when investors 
construct their optimal portfolios, they only use the securities they know about (Merton, 1987: 488). 
Merton (1987: 489) further argued that information communicated by companies will only be useful 
to investors if an investor follows the specific company.   
According to the IRH, an investment in investor relations will therefore increase visibility and 
company value, but for already visible companies, an investment in investor relations will have little 
incremental value and, according to Hong and Huang (2005) and Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2008), 
may even reduce company value if the investment in investor relations is significant (Agarwal et al. 
2016: 35). 
Agarwal et al. (2016: 34) pointed out that empirical research by Lehavy and Sloan (2008), Bodranuk 
and Ostberg (2009), and Richardson, Sloan and You (2012) provided support for the IRH and 
showed that investor recognition can help to explain share prices. 
2.2.5 The follower’s effect 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 150-152) identified three mechanisms of institutional change: coercive 
isomorphism (e.g. pressures from government), mimetic isomorphism and professionalisation (or 
normative isomorphism) (e.g. standards established by professional organisations). Mimetic 
isomorphism describes the situation where companies base their behaviour on peers. 
In the context of this study, mimetic isomorphism refers to the situation where companies in a specific 
industry, say consumer services, base their internet investor relation strategies upon the strategies 
followed by industry peers. Lybaert (2002: 220) first described this as the “follower’s effect”. This 
leads to some industries providing more information (better IIR) than other industries. 
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Companies may base their IIR strategies on industry peers for a number of reasons. The first is to 
enhance organisational legitimacy. Companies may follow early adopters or leaders in an industry 
in order to appear legitimate by endorsing emergent norms. The second is to decrease uncertainty. 
Companies may be uncertain about the surrounding technologies or about the needs of investors, 
and, by adjusting their IIR strategy to peers, may reduce such uncertainties.  
2.2.6 Cost–benefit analysis 
According to Gray et al. (1990: 617), the amount and type of voluntary disclosure will depend upon 
the outcome of a cost–benefit assessment. The measurement of costs and benefits is however not 
clear, as is discussed in the next two sections, and thus the reference to estimated costs and 
expected benefits. 
A cost–benefit argument could be used either to examine why increased disclosure or IIR is required 
(i.e. expected benefits exceed the estimated costs) or why it may not be feasible (i.e. estimated costs 
exceed the expected benefits). For example, Hong and Huang (2005: 2-3) asserted that the benefits 
of having investor relations activities flow to larger shareholders disproportionately, while the costs 
are shared by all shareholders. Hong and Huang (2005) and Doukas et al. (2008) further pointed out 
that for some companies the costs of an effective investor relations programme will outweigh the 
benefits, resulting in reduced market values. 
2.2.6.1 Estimated costs 
Costs include both direct and indirect costs (Verrechia, 1983: 181). Merton (1987: 489) distinguished 
between two types of direct costs: the cost of gathering and processing the information and the cost 
of communicating or transmitting the information. Information required by investors will, however, 
often overlap with the information required by management to manage the company, which will 
decrease the cost of disclosure. According to the information production cost hypothesis, the cost of 
preparing and distributing information via corporate websites is independent of the size of the 
company, although the expected benefits thereof are likely to increase with company size 
(Pirchegger & Wagenhofer, 1999: 391). 
Indirect or proprietary costs, on the other hand, include all the risks associated with voluntary 
disclosure (e.g. increased competition, competitive disadvantage and increased political visibility) 
(De La Bruslerie & Gabteni, 2011). According to the proprietary cost hypothesis, companies have 
an incentive not to disclose information that may, potentially, harm their competitive position (Healy 
& Palepu, 2001: 424). Three factors determine whether information creates a competitive 
disadvantage: the type of information (e.g. routine operating data compared to new product 
development information), the level of detail (e.g. of new product development plans) and the timing 
of disclosure (e.g. before or after a new strategy is implemented) (FASB, 2001: 18). 
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According to the litigation cost hypothesis, the threat of shareholder litigation (e.g. legal actions for 
untimely or inadequate disclosures) may encourage companies either to increase disclosure or to 
avoid certain disclosures (e.g. forward-looking financial statements) (Healy & Palepu, 2001: 423). 
Companies could also consider the costs facing investors to gather the information themselves as 
an alternative to providing the information. Cormier et al. (2009) indicated that a company may 
decide not to disclosure information if doing so is more costly than having investors incur the costs 
themselves. 
2.2.6.2 Expected benefits 
Debreceny et al. (2002: 375) categorised empirical studies that examined the benefits of voluntary 
disclosures into three groups: reduction of agency costs (e.g. Marston & Polei, 2004); reduction of 
the cost of capital (e.g. Froidevaux, 2004); and an increase in the value of the company (e.g. Marston 
& Polei, 2004). The FASB (2001: 17) listed the following benefits for companies: lower cost of capital, 
enhanced credibility, improved investor relations, access to more liquid capital markets, and reduced 
danger of litigation.  
Gray and Roberts (1989: 125) found that for British multinationals the most important perceived 
benefits of voluntary disclosures were: an improved reputation, better investment decisions by 
investors, improved accountability to shareholders, a more accurate risk assessment by investors 
and fairer share prices. 
Empirical studies to date that have attempted to measure these benefits (e.g. regression models to 
link variations in disclosure to the cost of capital) have produced mixed results.  
2.3 INTERNET INVESTOR RELATIONS (IIR) 
As discussed in Section 2.1 above, Chapter 8 of the King III code is devoted entirely to the 
governance of stakeholder relationships. Stakeholders include, but are not limited to, investors, 
suppliers, customers or clients, community, employees, unions, government and creditors. The field 
of investor relations is concerned with the management of relationships between companies and 
investors (IRS, 2013). 
According to Chang et al. (2008: 378) the benefits of investor relations can be observed in two ways: 
increased visibility as predicted by Merton (1987) and increased disclosure resulting in capital market 
effects (e.g. increased share price), as documented by Easley and O’Hara (2004). 
Section 1.1 defines investor relations to include a wide variety of information types, for example 
mandatory and voluntary; financial and non-financial; qualitative and quantitative; shareholder 
services to facilitate relationship management and/or strategic marketing. Given this definition, 
annual and interim financial statements are in fact only a small, although important, component of 
investor relations. 
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Besides annual and interim reports, investor relation communication channels available to 
companies include, but are not limited to presentations, media releases, face-to-face meetings and 
the Internet. A wide variety of Internet-related communication channels are available to companies, 
e.g. the corporate website, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. As discussed in Section 1.3.2, this study 
is limited to an examination of the corporate website. For the purpose of this study, Internet is 
therefore defined to include only corporate websites. As discussed in Chapter 1, the abbreviation IIR 
is used throughout this study to refer to the quality of Internet investor relations. IIR is therefore 
defined as the use of the corporate website as investor relations communication channel. 
Marston and Polei (2004: 297) argued that, although investors are mainly interested in the extent of 
information provided, they also want to find this information as quickly and easily as possible. In a 
similar vein, Chang et al. (2008: 376) reasoned that the primary objective of investor relations is not 
necessarily the provision of information, but rather to improve the flow of information to investors.  
The advantages of using a corporate website as investor relations communication channel were 
discussed in Section 1.2.4. Almost all of these advantages depend on the proper use of presentation 
technology-related attributes. According to Debreceny et al. (2002), presentation is important as it 
can potentially improve the timeliness and verifiability, and ultimately the quality and usefulness, of 
information. 
Although the use of the corporate website as investor relations communication channel can therefore 
enhance the quality of the investor relations function, the inappropriate use of corporate websites 
can also compromise the usefulness of the corporate website as investor relations communication 
channel, as discussed in Section 1.2.5 (e.g. through outdated information, disorientation, lack of 
clear boundaries and information overload). 
The voluntary nature of IIR was discussed in Section 2.1. To aid in answering the second research 
question (What company characteristics best explain variations in IIR?), various theories that could 
be used to explain this voluntary nature were discussed above in Section 2.2.   
As discussed in Section 1.2.5, two possible consequences of this voluntary nature are, firstly, a 
cross-sectional variation between companies; and, secondly, an evolutionary, rather than a 
revolutionary, adoption of IIR by companies. This dissertation therefore assumed from the outset 
that not all companies will use IIR optimally. Given the third research question45 of this dissertation 
in Section 1.3.2, information asymmetry and the cost of capital are discussed in the next four sections 
in this chapter. 
 
                                               
45
 The third research question is: “Will variations in IIR have an effect on the level of information asymmetry and cost 
of capital?” 
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2.4 INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
Economic theory suggests two distinct routes in support of the hypothesis that disclosure could 
decrease the cost of capital, the liquidity route and the estimation risk route. 
The liquidity route suggests that improved disclosure will increase liquidity, which will result in a 
decrease in the cost of capital either through reduced transaction costs or an increased demand. 
Lower share liquidity and the risk of trading with a better informed investor increase the return 
required by investors, causing an increase in the cost of capital (Easley & O’Hara, 2004).  
Botosan, Plumlee and Xie (2004) argued that the cost of equity will increase if information asymmetry 
increases, as investors must be compensated for the anticipated transaction costs arising from low 
liquidity levels or the risk of trading with a more informed party (i.e. the adverse selection component). 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1989) provided empirical support for a positive association between 
expected share returns (i.e. cost of equity) and the bid-ask spread. 
The estimation risk route is associated with investors’ assessments of the parameters of the 
expected return. An improved quality of information enables investors to make more accurate 
estimates with less uncertainty about future cash flows and profitability. According to Botosan et al. 
(2004) and Fu, Kraft and Zhang (2012), disclosure only affects the cost of equity if the estimation 
risk is non-diversifiable. If estimation risk is diversifiable, investors will not be compensated for the 
estimation risk, and disclosure will have no effect on the cost of capital.  
As depicted in Figure 2.1, information asymmetry may exist between the management of a company 
and its investors, and/or between investors and both the liquidity route and the estimation route 







Figure 2.1: The relationship between disclosure, information asymmetry and the cost of 
equity: the liquidity route and the estimation risk route 
Source: Botosan (2000: 61) 
Enhanced public disclosure 
Reduced information asymmetry between 
managers and investors 
Reduced information asymmetry among 
investors 
Reduced estimation risk  Increased market liquidity 
Reduced cost of equity capital 
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Akerlof (1970) first pointed out the negative effects of information asymmetry on the effective 
functioning of markets. In view of the fact that investors require information in order to evaluate 
investments, they will either 1) privately gather the required information; 2) buy the required 
information from other information intermediaries who have already collected and analysed the 
information; 3) not invest in the company; or 4) make a wrong investment decision (Healy & Palepu, 
2001). 
In view of both the cost and the knowledge required to gather information, not all investors will be 
equally informed and this, in turn, may result in there being informed and uninformed investors. 
Brown and Hillegeist (2007) and Chang et al. (2008: 376) described information asymmetry as the 
situation where some investors have private information (i.e. they are informed traders), while others 
have only publicly available information (i.e. they are uninformed traders). According to Gajewski 
and Li (2015: 117), the level of information asymmetry depends on the balance between the informed 
and the uninformed. 
If the informed traders use this information advantage to trade, the uninformed will not trade if they 
detect such information asymmetry (Gajewski & Li, 2015: 117). Gajewski and Li (2015) therefore 
argue that the informed traders will have to adjust their bids in order to keep the uninformed in the 
market. Information asymmetry thus creates costs by promoting adverse selection into transactions 
between buyers and sellers of company shares (Leuz & Verrechia, 2000: 92).   
According to Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985), adverse selection typically 
manifests in reduced liquidity levels. Lev (1988: 1) showed that the consequence of such a state of 
affairs would be a lower trading volume, higher transaction costs, and market illiquidity or even 
complete market breakdown. Welker (1995: 802) suggested that information asymmetry may result 
in a perceived information risk in terms of which the uninformed investor demands compensation in 
the form of price protection, with this, in turn, leading to a decrease in share liquidity and an increase 
in transaction costs.  
Brown and Hillegeist (2007) relied on two theories to explain why increased disclosure levels may 
decrease information asymmetry. Theory 1 is based on the assumption that increased disclosure 
levels will decrease private information search activities, which in turn will decrease information 
asymmetry. Theory 2, on the other hand, is based on the premise that increased disclosure levels 
will decrease the proportion of informed to uninformed trading, resulting in a decrease of information 
asymmetry. These two theories, as explained below, are summarised in Figure 2.2 below. Theory 1, 
the upper branch in Figure 2.2., is depicted by the green blocks and theory 2, the lower branch, by 
the blue blocks. 
According to theory 1, increased disclosure levels will decrease either or both of the available sets 
of private information and the expected net benefits of searching for private information, as depicted 
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by the two lighter green boxes in branch 1 in Figure 2.2. The combined effect is a decrease in private 
information search activities. 
Public information could be viewed as a substitute for private information. Private information will 
therefore lose its usefulness once the information is published. Increased disclosure will therefore 
decrease the available set of private information. 
Public information will also reduce the incentives for investors either to gather information privately 
or to buy the information from other information intermediaries. Increased disclosure will therefore 
lessen the expected net benefits for investors to search for private information, as the information is 
already available without costs in the public domain. Verrechia (1982) and Diamond (1985) reasoned 
that incentives for investors to acquire private information decrease as public disclosure increases.   
 
 
Figure 2.2: The relationship between disclosure, private information search activities, 
privately informed trading and information asymmetry 
Source: Brown & Hillegeist (2007) 
Theory 2, as depicted by the lower branch in Figure 2.2, is based on the argument that increased 
disclosure levels will alter the trading behaviour of uninformed investors through increased visibility 
which will attract more uninformed traders. Based on the investor recognition hypothesis (Merton, 
1987) uninformed investors are more likely to invest in companies with which they are familiar. 
Increased disclosure levels will therefore increase the amount of uninformed trading. Increased 
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Figure 2.2 however shows that increased levels of uninformed trading may also increase the levels 
of informed trading. For example, Chang et al. (2008: 378) argued that a well-developed investor 
relations programme will increase visibility, which leads to increased trading activity, and analyst and 
institutional following – ultimately resulting in greater private information production (i.e. informed 
trading).  
Brown and Hillegeist (2007) made the case that although the amount of informed trading may 
increase as a result of increased uninformed trading, informed traders are risk averse and capital 
constrained, which would ultimately decrease the relative amount of informed trading compared to 
uninformed trading. Empirical research by Brown, Hillegeist and Lo (2004: 364) supported this 
argument. 
Various proxies have been used in past studies for information asymmetry. For the purpose of this 
study, these proxies are categorised into three categories. The first two categories, estimation risk 
(Section 2.4.1) and liquidity (Section 2.4.2), relate to the hypothesised consequences of information 
asymmetry, as showed in Figure 2.1 above. The third category relates to the relative amount of 
informed versus uninformed trading activities (Section 2.4.3). 
2.4.1 Estimation risk 
Aerts et al. (2007: 1320) documented a significant negative association between web-based 
performance (voluntary) disclosure and analyst forecast dispersion for northern American 
companies. For northern American companies whose performance is followed by several analysts, 
the association is less significant. However, no significant association was found between disclosure 
and analyst forecast dispersion for a continental European sub-sample. Trabelsi et al. (2008: 121) 
used analyst forecast dispersion and forecast errors as proxies for the measurement of estimation 
risk. These authors have documented a negative relationship between the extent of information 
disclosed on corporate websites and information asymmetry.  
Aerts et al. (2007) and Trabelsi et al. (2008) measured disclosure using self-constructed 
measurement instruments to measure corporate website disclosures, with Aerts et al. (2007) 
examining northern American and continental European companies, and Trabelsi et al. (2008) 
examining a Canadian sample. 
De La Bruslerie and Gabteni (2011) also used a self-constructed index to measure disclosure, but 
measured only annual report voluntary disclosure. De La Bruslerie and Gabteni (2011) separately 
examined the association between analyst forecast accuracy, as information asymmetry proxy, and 
disclosure for two sub-samples of companies listed in France. For sub-sample one, being companies 
with a disclosure score exceeding the median disclosure score, they report a significant negative 
association; but for sub-sample two, being companies with a disclosure score below the median 
disclosure score, they report no association between disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy. 
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Armstrong et al. (2011) used analyst coverage as one of five proxies for information asymmetry46 to 
examine the relationship between information asymmetry and the cost of capital. According to 
Armstrong et al. (2011), analyst coverage improves the information environment and could therefore 
be associated with lower information asymmetry. Healy et al. (1999) and Aerts et al. (2007) also 
examined the association between disclosure and analyst following. 
2.4.2 Liquidity 
The overwhelming majority of studies to date have used a liquidity-based measure as proxy for 
information asymmetry. The average investor will be more confident about trading in shares if it were 
possible to be relatively certain that share prices reflect all available information. Thus, reduced 
information asymmetries between informed and uninformed investors may, potentially, increase 
share liquidity. Verrecchia (2001: 173) maintained that information asymmetry inhibits investment.  
Teall (2013: 13) refers to liquidity as an asset’s ability to be easily sold or purchased without causing 
a significant change in the price of the asset. Black (1971: 30) described liquidity as follows: 
i) Bid and asked prices are always available for the investor who wants to buy or sell small 
numbers of shares immediately. 
ii) The difference between the bid and asked prices is always small. 
iii) In the absence of special information, an investor who is buying or selling a large number of 
shares can expect to execute the transaction over a long period of time, at a price not very 
different, on average, from the current market price. 
iv) An investor who wants to buy or sell a large number of shares can do so immediately, but at a 
premium or discount. The premium or discount will depend on the size of the share block. The 
larger the block, the larger the premium or discount. 
Kyle (1985) described liquidity in three dimensions: (1) width (also known as tightness or bid-ask 
spread); (2) market depth; and (3) slippage. Market depth refers to a market’s ability to process and 
execute a large order without substantially impacting its price. Slippage (also known as market or 
price impact or market resilience) is the speed at which the price returns to normal from price 
pressure resulting from a non-informative trade.  
According to Van Wyk, Botha and Goodspeed (2015: 203), liquidity requires marketability (ability to 
be sold quickly), price continuity (price does not change from one transaction to another in the 
absence of new information), and market depth. 
Teall (2013: 12) listed the following alternative security market execution systems (i.e. procedures 
for matching buyers to sellers): quote-driven markets, order-driven markets, brokered markets and 
hybrid markets. Stock exchanges are usually order-driven as opposed to over-the-counter currency 
                                               
46
 The other four were: quoted bid-ask spread, adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread (spread decomposition 
based on a trade direction indicator regression), research & development to sales ratio and accruals quality. 
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and bond markets that are primarily quote-driven. In quote-driven markets, dealers post quotes and 
participate on at least one side of every transaction, compared to order-driven markets where dealers 
can trade without the intermediation of dealers. A further distinction is the display of quotes. Quote-
driven markets display quotes of specialists and market makers, whereas order-driven markets 
display all quotes. Orders are the specific trade instructions placed with brokers by traders (Teall, 
2013: 13).  
The JSE and most US stock exchanges are order-driven, i.e. buyers and sellers submit bid and ask 
prices to a central location where the orders are matched. The National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ), on the other hand, is a quote-driven market, i.e. investors 
must transact though a dealer and price is determined by dealers’ bid-offer quotations (Van Wyk et 
al., 2015: 202). 
From the literature review, it was possible to distinguish between four different types of liquidity-
based information asymmetry proxies: bid-ask spreads, depth quotes, price impact and share 
turnover. 
2.4.2.1 Bid-ask spreads 
The bid-ask spread, also known as the width or tightness, is calculated as the difference between 
the bid and the ask price. According to Black (1971), as discussed above, a small bid-ask spread is 
an indicator of liquidity.  
Market microstructure literature shows that spread contains three distinct components: order 
processing costs, adverse selection costs, and inventory holding costs (Ajina, Sougne & Lakhal, 
2015). Two types of spread decomposition models have been developed in the literature to estimate 
these spread components (Ajina et al., 2015). The first uses the serial covariance properties of 
quotes and transaction prices and the second a trade direction indicator regression. One application 
of a trade direction indicator regression is the probability of informed trading (PIN), as developed by 
Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996). The PIN model is discussed below in Section 2.4.3.1. 
In the absence of intraday data, Cheng et al. (2006) used factor analysis to extract two factors from 
the cross-sectional variance of spread, trading volume and price volatility, which are expected to 
proxy for informed and uninformed trading, based on the underlying assumption that informed and 
uninformed trading are mutually exclusive activities. Results reported by Cheng et al. (2006) showed 
that higher levels of informed trading increase bid-ask spreads, trading volume and price volatility 
compared to higher levels of uninformed trading that reduce spreads and increase trading volume. 
Further analysis by Cheng et al. (2006) showed that increased disclosure reduces the degree of 
informed trading, but has no effect on the degree on uninformed trading.  
The adverse selection component arises as a result of informed traders having to adjust their bid 
prices to keep the uninformed traders in the market. Chang et al. (2008: 382) asserted that periods 
of high information asymmetry are characterised by uninformed traders that amend their bid (highest 
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buy price) and ask/offer (lowest sell price) prices away from the market to decrease the probability 
of trading with an informed trader. According to Leuz and Verrechia (2000: 99), less information 
asymmetry implies less adverse selection, which means a smaller bid-ask spread. 
Research further shows that the spread and the components of spread vary between trade sizes.  
Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995), for instance, found that the average effective spread increases with 
trade size. They showed that as order processing cost decreases with trade size, the increase is 
largely the result of an increase in adverse information revealed from large trades. The adverse 
selection component of spread therefore increases with trade size. Lin et al. (1995) further found 
that the adverse selection component decreases during the trading day, being highest at the opening 
and lowest at the closing of each trading day for all but the largest 1% of all trades. 
Easley et al. (1996: 1406) offered three possible reasons for large spreads: the inventory or liquidity 
effect, market power and an information-based explanation (i.e. adverse selection cost). The 
inventory effect is based on higher spreads that are required by specialists (i.e. market makers) to 
compensate them for having to maintain inventory imbalances for illiquid shares. Market power refers 
to the situation where only one market maker is active, resulting in a monopolistic situation that 
allows the market maker to set larger spreads.  
The bid-ask spread is the most frequently used proxy to measure information asymmetry (Gajewski 
& Li, 2015). The following studies, inter alia, all used the bid-ask spread as proxy: Welker (1995), 
Healy et al. (1999), Leuz and Verrechia (2000), Heflin, Shaw and Wild (2005), Chi and Wang (2010), 
Fu et al. (2012), Cheng et al. (2006), Ajina et al. (2015), Chang et al. (2008), Orens et al. (2010), 
and Gajewski and Li (2015). 
The most popular bid-ask spread used in the literature is the quoted or relative spread, which is 
calculated by using the following formula: 
 − 		
 = 	 ()/ (2.1) 
where: 
Ask	 = Lowest selling price; and 
Bid  = Highest purchase price. 
The quoted bid-ask spread is unconditional on the order size or variations in the bid-ask spread 
during the trading day. Some studies (Chang et al., 2008; Gajewski & Li, 2015), employed the time-
weighted relative spread, which could be calculated using the following formula from the time-
stamped data: 
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Time-stamped data can also be used to calculate the effective spread by comparing the mid-price 
to the trading price (e.g. Heflin et al. (2005) and Gajewski and Li (2015)) using the following formula: 
2	.	 (&+#	'(,!()/()/  (2.3) 
Welker (1995: 801) documented that an improvement in disclosure practices reduces information 
asymmetry, as measured by the bid-ask spread, and this, in turn, increases liquidity in capital 
markets. Healy et al. (1999), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Heflin et al. (2005) and Fu et al. (2012), 
all using bid-ask spread as proxy, supported this negative association reported by Welker (1995).  
It should be noted that none of these studies measured disclosure using a measurement instrument. 
Welker (1995) and Healy et al. (1999), for instance, used analyst ratings as issued by the AIMR as 
disclosure proxy. Leuz and Verrechia (2000) used the switch from German to US GAAP as 
disclosure proxy, Heflin et al. (2005) used analyst ratings of disclosure as issued by the Financial 
Analyst Federation (FAF), and Fu et al. (2012) used Moody’s rankings of financial reporting 
frequency. Further, all of these studies, except Leuz and Verrechia (2000), were developed using 
US samples. 
Regarding studies that used a measurement instrument to measure disclosure, the following studies 
reported a negative association between spread and their measurement of disclosure: Cheng et al. 
(2006), Ajina et al. (2015), Orens et al. (2010), and Gajewski and Li (2015). 
Orens et al. (2010) reported a negative association only for a continental European sub-sample 
(Belgium, France, Germany and Netherlands) and reported no association between disclosure and 
spread for northern American countries (Canada and US).  
In addition to investigating the relationship between their total disclosure score and the bid-ask 
spread, Ajina et al. (2015) also examined the relationships for three sub-sets of the total disclosure 
score: a financial disclosure score, a non-financial disclosure score, and a strategic information 
score. Although negative associations for the total, as well as for the financial and non-financial 
disclosure scores, were reported, no significant association between the strategic information score 
and spread was reported. 
Botosan and Frost (2000), as cited by Ajina et al. (2015), reported a negative, but not significant, 
relationship between spread and their measurement of disclosure for a sample of companies listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Chang et al. (2008) conducted their study using an 
Australian sample and reported a positive, but not significant, association between their proxy for 
disclosure, IIR and spread, if controlled for other determinants of spread (trading volume, share price 
and share price volatility).47 
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 Chang et al. (2008) only reported a significant negative association between their disclosure score and spread if 
disclosure was the only explanatory variable in the regression model. In their OLS multi-regression model for a low investor 
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2.4.2.2 Depth quotes and depth-adjusted effective spreads 
As discussed above in Section 2.4.2, liquidity can be described by using three dimensions: width 
(bid-ask spreads), market depth, and slippage (Kyle, 1985). Market depth specifies the maximum 
number of shares for which the quoted bid and ask prices apply.   
Heflin et al. (2005: 836) argued that if disclosure reduces informed traders’ information advantage, 
increased disclosure levels should decrease spread and increase market depth. Heflin et al. (2005: 
848) measured the depth quote as the average of the number of shares quoted at the ask price plus 
number of shares quoted at the bid price, each multiplied with their respective quoted prices.  
Results reported by Heflin et al. (2005) showed a negative relationship between the level of 
disclosure and the quoted depth, after controlling for share price, trade size, trade frequency, 
company size and price volatility. These results therefore suggested that the amount that investors 
can trade at a given spread is lower, not higher, for companies with higher disclosure levels. Based 
on theoretical research by Diamond and Verrechia (1991) and empirical research on tick-size 
reductions, Heflin et al. (2005) concluded that improved disclosure levels may reduce market-making 
rewards, leading to a reduced provision of market-making services and therefore reduced quoted 
depths.  
To examine further the association between disclosure and spread, Heflin et al. (2005) calculated a 
depth-adjusted spread to control for the added trading cost due to lower quoted depths. The depth-
adjusted spread was calculated using the following methodology. 
Orders that were depth-constrained (i.e. size exceeded the quoted depths) were executed as a split 
order (i.e. two or more transactions). As it was not possible to observe directly from trade data 
whether an order was split into two or more trades or even if the order was depth-constrained or not, 
Heflin et al. (2005) classified trade sizes of 80% or more of the quoted depth as depth-constrained. 
Trade sizes less than 100% were included in order to capture voluntarily split orders. Residual trades 
(i.e. the second trade of a split order) were defined as trades subsequent to a depth-constrained 
trade that was on the same side of the market (i.e. buy or sell) as the respective depth-constrained 
trade.  
The next step was to combine the residual trades with their depth-constrained trades, to form 
estimated depth-constrained orders. For depth-constrained orders, a depth-adjusted effective 
spread was calculated, and for trades not depth-constrained the normal effective spread, as 
discussed above in Section 2.4.2.1, was calculated.  
Heflin et al. (2005) used the following example to illustrate how they calculated their depth-adjusted 
effective spreads. A trader wished to buy 2 000 shares when the ask price was $20.125, the bid 
                                               
relations score sub-sample, the authors reported the hypothesised negative, but not a statistically significant association, 
between disclosure and spread. 
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price was $19.875 (the quote midpoint was therefore $2048), and the number of shares available at 
$20.125 was 1 200 shares (i.e. the quoted depth). Assuming that the next best price on the limit 
order book was $20.25, the number of shares available at $20.25 were 800 shares, and a rise in the 
ask price to $20.25 after the first transaction. The transaction was then executed as follows: 1 200 
shares at $20.125 and 800 shares at $20.25.  
In their example, Heflin et al. (2005) calculated the depth-adjusted spread as [(1 200 x $0.25) + (800 
x $0.50)]/2 000, therefore $0.35. The first part of the calculation (1 200 x $0.25) was based on the 
normal effective spread calculation, i.e. 2 x (trading price - midpoint), i.e. 2 x ($20.125 - $20). The 
second part of the calculation for the residual trade ignored the rise in the midpoint after the first 
trade and calculated the spread as twice the absolute value of the difference between the transaction 
price (i.e. $20.25) and the price quote midpoint in effect at the time of the first trade (i.e. $20.00). 
Using the depth-adjusted effective spread, as calculated above, Heflin et al. (2005) reported results 
that suggest that even after adjusting for the added trading cost due to lower quoted depth, the 
effective trading costs (i.e. effective bid-ask spread) were lower for high-disclosure-rated companies, 
even for the largest orders.  
2.4.2.3 Share turnover 
Cheng et al. (2006) and Agarwal et al. (2016) calculated share turnover as the trading volume divided 
by the number of issued shares. Leuz and Verrechia (2000) used the value of shares traded divided 
by the market capitalisation. Agarwal et al. (2016) further adjusted individual company turnover ratios 
for the market-wide activity. Ajina et al. (2015), on the other hand, used the logarithm of the average 
number of shares traded as proxy for share turnover. 
According to Leuz and Verrechia (2000), share turnover captures the willingness of investors to trade 
and should therefore be negatively related to the existence of information asymmetries. Although 
Leuz and Verrechia (2000: 99) reported a significant positive association between trading volume 
and disclosure, they argued that trading volume may not be a reliable proxy for information 
asymmetry, as trading volume can be influenced by various factors unrelated to information (e.g. 
changes in risk preferences). Ajina et al. (2015), too, found a significant positive association between 
disclosure and share turnover. 
Contrary to the findings of Leuz and Verrechia (2000) and Ajina et al. (2015), Cheng et al. (2006) 
reported a significant negative association between share turnover and disclosure. As Cheng et al. 
(2006) also found a negative association between spread and disclosure, they argued that market 
activity in Singapore (where their study was conducted) was driven by informed trading, as informed 
traders appeared to avoid companies with better disclosure, resulting in decreased liquidity. The 
issue of informed versus uninformed traders is further discussed in Section 2.4.3 in this chapter. 
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Agarwal et al. (2016: 31) used analyst nominations for a best overall investor relations award as 
proxy for investor relations quality.49 Agarwal et al. (2016) found a significant positive association 
between investor relations quality and share turnover for smaller companies, but no association for 
large companies. Agarwal et al. (2016: 47) offered lower visibility, higher information asymmetry and 
lower management credibility as potential reasons for the increased benefit experience of smaller 
over larger companies.  
2.4.2.4 Price impact 
As discussed above in Section 2.4.2, liquidity can be described using three dimensions: width (bid-
ask spreads), market depth, and slippage (Kyle, 1985). Slippage (also known as market or price 
impact, or market resilience) is the speed at which the price returns to normal from price pressure 
resulting from a non-informative trade. 
Price impact captures the ability of an investor to trade in a share without affecting its price. Fu et al. 
(2012) measure slippage as the yearly median of the daily absolute return divided by the trading 
volume, using the following formula: 
/&01	&2*03%!	(!%3(+
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Fu et al. (2012) examined the impact of more frequent financial reporting (i.e. interim and quarterly) 
on information asymmetry. The SEC required annual financial reporting in 1934, and raised the 
required reporting frequency to semi-annually in 1955, and to quarterly reporting in 1970. Fu et al. 
(2012) measured reporting frequency for the time period 1951 to 1973. They argued that more 
frequent financial reporting could either decrease or increase information asymmetry. If it increased 
the amount of information available to the public, it could decrease information asymmetry, but if, on 
the other hand, it incentivised sophisticated investors to acquire private information in anticipation of 
these disclosures, it could lead to higher information asymmetry due to increased private information 
acquisition activities.   
Although, as depicted in Figure 2.2, increased disclosure levels will only decrease information 
asymmetry if private information search activities are decreased, the negative association between 
information asymmetry50 and the proxy for disclosure (i.e. frequency of financial reporting) reported 
by Fu et al. (2012) suggests that the better information environment provided to investors more than 
offsets the impact of increased private information-gathering activities. 
Ajina et al. (2015) referred to price impact as the illiquidity ratio and reported no statistically significant 
relationship between the illiquidity ratio and their measurement of disclosure (annual report voluntary 
disclosure using a disclosure checklist based of 112 items for a sample of 196 French companies). 
                                               
49
 The annual award is hosted by the Investor Relations (IR) magazine and survey participants include fund managers, 
buy-side analysts, sell-side analysts and sophisticated retail investors.  
50
 Fu et al. (2012) used two proxies to estimate information asymmetry, the bid-ask spread and price impact or slippage. 
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2.4.3 Informed versus uninformed trading activities51 
As depicted in Figure 2.2 above, disclosure can increase both the amount of uninformed and 
informed trading, but as long as the relative amount of privately informed trading decreases, an 
increase in disclosure levels should also result in a decrease in information asymmetry. As informed 
and uninformed trading is not observable, it has to be inferred. One approach is the probability of 
informed trading (PIN) model as discussed below.  
2.4.3.1 Probability of informed trading  
The probability of informed trading (PIN) was developed by Easley et al. (1996) in their EKOP 





<  =  the probability of an information event; 
=  =  the arrival rate of informed traders (i.e. who know the new information); and  
>  =  the arrival rate of uninformed traders. 
The EKOP model is based on the numbers of buyer and seller initiated trades over a period. Easley 
et al. (1996) documented empirical results that show that highly liquid shares have a lower probability 
of informed trading. The results of these authors also showed that the probability of informed trading 
does not significantly differ across medium and low liquidity shares.  
As discussed in Section 2.4.2.1 above, Easley et al. (1996) suggested three possible explanations 
for differences in spreads: inventory effect, market power, and information. The PIN measures the 
component of the bid-ask spread that can be explained by differences in the risk of information-
based trading.  
Easley et al. (1996) found higher information-based trading (i.e. PIN) in low liquidity shares. Based 
on this finding, they argued that large spreads in low liquidity shares are not merely the result of the 
inventory and market power effects, and that less active shares are therefore riskier as they are 
subject to more information-based trading. Although their results showed that high liquidity shares 
have a higher probability of information events and higher arrival rates of informed traders, these are 
more than offset by the higher arrival rates of uninformed traders. With low liquidity shares, on the 
other hand, the problem is not that there are too many informed traders, but rather that there are too 
few uninformed traders. Easley et al. (1996: 1 415) emphasised that the calculation of the PIN 
                                               
51
 Informed (uninformed) trading refers to trading by market participants with (without) private information about a company. 
52
 EKOP is the acronym for the four authors in Easley et al. (1996), namely Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman. 
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depends on sufficient data to reliably estimate the underlying trade process, and therefore a 
minimum level of liquidity is required. 
Brown and Hillegeist (2007) described the PIN as a company-specific estimate of the probability that 
a trade originates from privately informed investors. According to Brown and Hillegeist (2007), an 
important advantage of PIN is the ability to disaggregate the measure into its component parameters, 
each of which represents a different aspect of a company’s trading and information environment.   
Brown and Hillegeist (2007) examined the relationship between AIMR analyst ratings (as disclosure 
proxy) and the PIN for a US sample. Although they documented a negative association between the 
total disclosure score and information asymmetry, an analysis of the different types of disclosure 
revealed only negative associations for annual report and investor relations components, with an 
unexpected positive association between information asymmetry and the component of the 
disclosure score that measured the quality of quarterly reports. 
Gajewski and Li (2015) examined the relationship between their proxy for disclosure, Internet-based 
disclosure, and they documented negative associations between disclosure and all five proxies that 
were used for information asymmetry (quoted spread, effective spread, time-weighted spread, PIN, 
and adjusted PIN). The adjusted PIN was based on a model developed by Duarte and Young (2009) 
to adjust for liquidity unrelated to information asymmetry. The Gajewski and Li (2015) study was 
based on a sample of 180 companies listed on the French Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 
250 index. 
2.4.3.2 Price volatility 
Leuz and Verrechia (2000) and Cheng et al. (2006) measured price volatility as the standard 
deviation of the daily share returns. Leuz and Verrechia (2000) argued that gradual changes in share 
prices (i.e. low levels of volatility) indicate lower levels of information asymmetry. Private information 
revealed to the market further causes price volatility (Cheng et al., 2006). 
Leuz and Verrechia (2000) documented no significant association between price volatility and their 
disclosure proxy (i.e. switch from German to US GAAP), as opposed to Cheng et al. (2006) who 
reported a significant negative association. Cheng et al. (2006) further reported that only informed 
trading has an impact on price volatility, with no association between higher levels of uninformed 
trading and price volatility.  
Bushee and Noe (2000: 200) reported results that show that the effect of disclosure on volatility is 
complex and may depend on the type of investor (e.g. institutional or retail) that is attracted to the 
company. 
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2.5 COST OF EQUITY, COST OF DEBT AND COST OF CAPITAL53 
Lambert et al. (2007: 385) viewed the link between accounting information and the cost of capital as 
one of the most fundamental issues in accounting. Long before the development of the WWW, 
various analytical (also referred to as theoretical) and empirical studies were undertaken to explore 
the relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity. Since the development of the WWW, 
various studies have attempted to establish a clear link between website disclosure and the cost of 
equity.  
Analytical studies to date have been more successful than the empirical studies, which produced 
mixed results. The following analytical studies have, inter alia, investigated the relationship between 
disclosure and cost of equity: Easley and O’Hara (2004), Lambert et al. (2007) and Lambert et al. 
(2009). 
Easley and O’Hara (2004: 1553) used a rational expectations model to document a positive 
association between investors’ required rate of return and the amount of private information. Easley 
and O’Hara (2004: 1578) argued that a company is able to influence its cost of equity by affecting 
the precision and quality of information available to investors. This may be accomplished in a number 
of ways, for example selection of accounting standards, disclosure policies, attracting an active 
analyst following, and listing decisions.  
Lambert et al. (2007: 385) used a model that is consistent with the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) to show that the quality of accounting information may influence the cost of equity, both 
directly and indirectly. The direct effect is based on the relationship between the disclosure and the 
company’s assessed covariance with the cash flows of other companies as compared to the indirect 
effect where disclosure affects the company’s decisions.  
According to Lambert et al. (2009: 27), it was important to distinguish between information 
asymmetry (measured as the differences in information precision across investors) and information 
precision (measured as the quality of investors’ information about the cash flow of companies). They 
used a rational expectations model to show that the average information precision is a more 
important determinant of the cost of equity than information asymmetry in a setting of perfect 
competition. They concluded that, once it is possible to control for average precision, information 
asymmetry has no effect on the cost of equity in a setting of perfect competition. 
The literature on the subject could also be categorised into direct studies that examine the direct 
relationship between some disclosure proxy and cost of equity and indirect studies that examine the 
relationship between disclosure and a variable that is theorised to have an effect on the cost of 
                                               
53
 Although cost of capital, or weighted average cost of capital, refers to the combined cost of equity and cost of debt 
weighted according to capital structure, literature is not always consistent, and the terms cost of equity, cost of capital, cost 
of finance and capital costs are used interchangeably. 
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equity, such as market value (Agarwal et al., 2016), earnings valuation multiple (Cormier et al., 2009) 
and, as discussed in Section 2.4 above, estimation risk and liquidity. 
Regarding disclosure–cost of equity relationship studies, Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005: 678) 
distinguished between four different types of studies: those that found a strong negative relationship 
(consistent theoretical predictions), no significant relationship, partial evidence, and a positive 
relationship. The remainder of this section now separately discusses: (1) studies that found a strong 
negative relationship, (2) studies that found either no relationship, only partial evidence or a positive 
relationship, and (3) studies that have examined the conditions under which disclosure will have an 
effect on the cost of equity.  
2.5.1 Strong negative relationships 
Studies by Diamond (1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Gibbins et al. (1990) and Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991) (all as cited in Orens et al., 2010: 1058), all found a negative association between 
voluntary disclosure and the cost of equity. 
Hail (2002) examined the association between voluntary annual report disclosure and the cost of 
equity and found a significant negative association. The author’s study included the 50 largest, and 
an additional 61 randomly selected, companies in Switzerland. 
Froidevaux (2004: 74) examined the level of IIR and the cost of equity, and found a significant 
negative association. Her disclosure metric included information disclosed under the investor 
relations section on corporate websites by non-financial US companies. The study sample consisted 
of 160 companies from four industries – healthcare, industrial goods and services, consumer 
discretionary, and the information technology industry. Twenty large and twenty small companies 
were selected from each industry.  
Francis et al. (2005a) relied on voluntary disclosure scores published by the Centre for International 
Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) to examine the association between the cost of equity, 
cost of debt and disclosure in a multiple-country setting of 34 countries outside the US. The authors 
found significant negative associations between both the cost of debt and equity, and disclosure. 
They further reported results that suggest that voluntary disclosure incentives (i.e. reduction of the 
cost of debt and equity) appear to operate independently of country level. 
Orens et al. (2010: 1084) found a significant negative association between the level of corporate 
website non-financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital, with a stronger association in 
countries with lower quality, mandatory reporting requirements (namely continental Europe as 
compared to northern America). The sample consisted of 894 companies from continental Europe 
and northern America, with the largest companies in each country being selected.  
Using frequency of reporting as disclosure proxy, Fu et al. (2012) documented a significant negative 
association between disclosure and the cost of equity for their US sample. 
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Agarwal et al. (2016: 31) used analyst nominations for a best overall investor relations award as 
proxy for investor relations quality. In support of Merton’s investors’ recognition hypothesis, as 
discussed in Section 2.2.4, Agarwal et al. (2016) found a strong positive relationship between 
investor relations ratings and market value for both larger and small companies, after controlling for 
the book value of equity and net income before extraordinary items and dividends. Increased market 
values could be associated with a decreased cost of equity.  
Sengupta (1998), Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005), Orens et al. (2010) and Guidara, Khlif and Jarboui 
(2014) found a significant negative association between disclosure and the cost of debt. Sengupta 
(1998) and Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005) examined the effect of disclosure on the cost of debt in a 
US setting, and Orens et al. (2010) did the same in a cross-country setting (continental Europe and 
northern America). 
Guidara et al. (2014) measured voluntary disclosure levels in annual reports published by a sample 
of 20 South African non-financial listed companies. 
2.5.2 Partial evidence, no significant relationships, and positive relationships 
Research by Kim and Verrecchia (1994) and Zhang (2001: 363) suggested that disclosure may also 
increase the cost of equity if the disclosure leads to a more asymmetrical information environment.  
Botosan (1997: 344) examined the relationship between annual report voluntary disclosures and the 
cost of equity and found that increased voluntary disclosure would reduce the cost of equity for firms 
with low analyst following, but found no association for firms with a high analyst following. Botosan 
used an accounting-based valuation model (as developed by Ohlson) to measure the cost of equity, 
and measured disclosure using a self-constructed index using a US sample. 
Richardson and Welker (2001) examined the relationship between their disclosure proxy, annual 
report ratings as jointly issued by the Society of Management Accountants and the University of 
Quebec at Montreal, and the cost of equity for a Canadian sample. These authors found no 
association for the full sample, but, similar to Botosan (1997) for companies with a low analyst 
following, they found a negative association, but only for financial disclosures. For social disclosure 
they found an unexpected positive association. 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) studied the relationship between their disclosure proxy, analyst ratings 
issued by AIMR, and the cost of equity for a US sample. Similar to Richardson and Welker (2001), 
they found no association for the full sample and total disclosure score. On examining disclosure 
type, they found a negative association between the cost of equity and annual report disclosure, a 
positive association for quarterly report quality, and no association for an investor relation category. 
Kothari et al. (2009) inspected the direct relationship between three risk proxies (cost of capital, 
return volatility and earnings forecast dispersion) and different aspects of disclosure using a US 
sample. Their disclosure proxy distinguished between favourable and unfavourable news items 
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published by the business press, analysts and lastly the company itself (i.e. management). They 
found a significant negative association between all three risk proxies and favourable disclosure and 
positive association with unfavourable disclosures.  
Examining the source of disclosure, Kothari et al. (2009) found no relationship between disclosure 
(favourable and unfavourable) issued by, respectively, management and analysts, and the cost of 
capital. Return volatility and analyst forecast dispersion, on the other hand, showed a positive 
association with unfavourable news published by management. Contrary to news published by 
management and analysts, all three risk factors decreased with favourable disclosure and increased 
with unfavourable disclosures, if published by the business press. 
Francis et al. (2008: 54) used a self-constructed measurement instrument to measure annual report 
and 10-K54 disclosure levels for a US sample. Although the authors found a significant negative 
association between disclosure and the cost of capital, they further reported results that suggest that 
earnings quality drives voluntary disclosure and, after controlling for earnings quality, the negative 
association was substantially reduced. 
Botosan et al. (2004) investigated the association between the cost of equity capital and the precision 
of public and private information for a US sample. The authors’ results suggest the expected negative 
association between the cost of equity and the precision of public information. Contrary to 
expectation, they found a positive association between the cost of equity and the precision of private 
information. Botosan et al. (2004) also found a positive association between public and private 
information precision and showed that the magnitude of the reduction in the cost of equity as a result 
of more precise public information is more than offset by the increase in the cost of equity as a result 
of more precise private information. 
Cormier et al. (2009) studied the effect of corporate website disclosures on the earnings valuation 
multiple (ratio between share price and earnings per share) for a Canadian sample, involving only 
the largest non-financial companies. The authors found no association between the total disclosure 
score and the earnings valuation multiple (also known as the price-to-earnings ratio).  
In a further analysis of the type of disclosure,55 Cormier et al. (2009) found a negative relationship 
for financially related disclosures, a positive association for socially related disclosures and no 
association for business-related disclosures. As the inverse of the price-to-earnings ratio could also 
be used as a proxy for the cost of equity (see Section 2.6), the positive association between socially 
related disclosure and the multiple could be interpreted as a negative association between disclosure 
                                               
54
 All publicly traded companies in the US are required to file a 10-K report each year with the SEC. The 10-K report is 
similar to the annual report, except that it includes more detailed information about the business, finances and management 
of the company compared to the annual report. It, for example, includes the bylaws of the company, other legal documents, 
and information about any lawsuits in which the company may be involved (source: 
http://www.investorwords.com/2/10_K.html). 
55
 Principal component factor analysis was used to assess disclosure patterns across companies. Using 0.5 as their cut-
off for component matrix coefficients, three factors emerged: those related to financial, social and business aspects. 
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and the cost of equity, as opposed to the unexpected positive association between financially related 
disclosure and the cost of equity. Cormier et al. (2009) argued that a possible reason for the 
counterintuitive association was that their measure of financially related disclosures contained many 
elements that were related to companies’ risk profiles. 
Liu and De Villiers (2011) found a positive association between their disclosure proxy that was based 
on the KPMG International Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting and the cost of 
equity for a sample including UK and Australian listed companies. These authors offered two 
possible reasons for the positive association. The first possible reason was that the reporting of 
social responsibility information allows superior judgement to result in an increased cost of equity. 
The second reason was that the costs of disclosing the information may exceed the benefits thereof, 
resulting in an increased cost of equity. 
Similar findings were reported by Dhaliwal, Tsang and Yang (2011), who used the initiation of the 
corporate social responsibility report as disclosure proxy in studying the association with the cost of 
equity for a US sample. The authors found a positive association between the cost of equity and the 
release of a corporate social responsibility report. Based on rankings of the reports, they, however, 
found that companies that achieve rankings superior to their industry peers benefit from a reduction 
in their cost of equity after issuing the reports. 
Eugster (2014) relied on annual report ratings, as issued by the Department of Banking and Finance, 
University of Zurich in Switzerland, as disclosure proxy. This author found no association between 
disclosure and the cost of equity. 
2.5.3 Relationship between disclosure, information asymmetry and the cost of equity 
Bhattacharya et al. (2007) studied the relationship between earnings quality, information asymmetry 
and the cost of equity for a US sample, using three proxies for earnings quality: accruals quality, 
absolute normal returns and earnings variability. Using path analysis, the authors found statistically 
reliable evidence of both a direct and indirect path between earnings quality and the cost of equity.  
According to the direct path, earnings quality directly affects the cost of equity, compared to the 
indirect path where earnings quality affects the cost of equity through information asymmetry. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2007) further found that the direct path dominates the indirect path and that the 
importance of the indirect path is sensitive to the measurement of information asymmetry (PIN and 
bid-ask spread). Their results therefore suggest that the amount of information risk (i.e. earnings 
quality) is more important than the distribution thereof (i.e. information asymmetry). 
Armstrong et al. (2011: 4) stated that, in an imperfect competition setting,56 the cost of equity is 
higher for companies with high information asymmetry than for companies with lower information 
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 Armstrong et al. (2011: 3) used the number of investors in a company as a proxy for the level of competition for a 
company’s shares, with a high number of investors indicating a perfect competition setting and a low number an imperfect 
competition setting. 
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asymmetry. However, in a perfect competitive setting, there is no difference between low and high 
information asymmetry.  
Gow et al. (2011) examined the relationship between disclosure precision, information asymmetry 
and the cost of capital in perfect and less than perfect market settings, using earnings 
announcements as proxies for disclosure precision. Using a US sample, these authors found that in 
a perfect market setting, disclosure affects the cost of capital through information precision. In less 
than perfect markets, disclosure affects cost of capital through information asymmetry and 
information precision. They further found that the relationship between information precision and 
information asymmetry could either be countervailing or reinforcing, and that disclosure could 
therefore either have a positive or negative association with information asymmetry and the cost of 
capital.  
In a similar vein, Akins, Ng and Verdi (2012) studied the relationship between information 
asymmetry, information quality and the cost of equity using a US sample. They found that the pricing 
of information asymmetry on the cost of equity (i.e. whether cost of equity increases with increased 
levels of information asymmetry) decreases when there is more competition among informed 
investors.57 Their findings were based on the underlying theory that increased competition among 
informed investors’ results in private information being incorporated into prices more rapidly.  
Akins et al. (2012) further argued that information quality (i.e. accruals quality and earnings 
smoothness) is also priced, as poor quality is associated with higher information asymmetry. 
Consistent with their findings on the pricing of information asymmetry, they reported results that 
indicate that the pricing of information quality also decreases when there is more competition among 
informed investors. 
2.6 COST OF EQUITY ESTIMATES 
Cost of capital is calculated as the weighted average (according to the composition of a company’s 
capital structure) of the cost of equity and the cost of debt and is central to a variety of investment 
and financing decisions. Cost of equity is the rate of return required by shareholders before they 
invest in a company, while cost of debt is the cost at which a company may borrow money. Cost of 
equity estimates is discussed in Section 2.6 and cost of debt estimates in Section 2.7. 
According to Joos (2000: 125), it is not possible to proxy the cost of equity in either an objective or 
direct way. The empirical studies of Froidevaux (2004: 56), which compare alternative cost of equity 
models in terms of superiority, showed mixed results on which model is practically the most valid.  
                                               
57
 To measure competition among informed investors, a measure of competition was constructed that was based on the 
number of total institutional investors, the percentage shares held by institutional investors and a Herfindahl index of 
competition that captures both the level and the distribution of institutional ownership. 
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For the purpose of the literature review, cost of equity estimates are categorised into two groups. 
The first category is based on analyst forecasts and includes methods such as the dividend discount, 
residual income, and discounted free cash flow models. The second category is based on share 
returns and includes methods such as realised returns, the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model, 
and the earnings-to-price ratio. In a similar way, Froidevaux (2004: 44) distinguished between ex 
ante and ex post estimates of the cost of equity, ex ante being the analyst forecast-based estimates 
and ex post the methods based on share returns. According to PwC (2015: 42), there are two broad 
approaches to estimate the cost of equity: deductive models (e.g. dividend growth models) and risk-
return models (e.g. the CAPM).  
2.6.1 Analyst forecast-based estimates 
In the view of Orens et al. (2010: 1064), all implied cost of equity models available in the literature 
are based on a variation of either the residual income or the dividend discount model. Lundholm and 
O’Keefe (2001a, b) stated that the dividend discount model, the discounted cash flow model and the 
residual income model are all equivalent from a theoretical point of view and only differ in the 
definition of the relevant cash flow to discount. According to these authors, it is further possible to 
distinguish between single-stage and multi-stage models. Single-stage models assume a constant 
future dividend or earnings growth rate, compared to multi-stage models that are based on the 
assumption that the company will experience different growth phases.  
2.6.1.1 Single-stage models  
The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) (CIMA, 2014: 34) asserted that the cost 
of equity for a company can be estimated using the dividend discount model on the assumption that 
the market value of a share is directly related to the expected future dividends from the shares.  
The ‘no growth’ model is the simplest estimate of the cost of equity and is based on a zero dividend 
growth assumption. According to this model, the cost of equity (!)	can be estimated using the 
following formula: 
! = ?@? (2.6) 
where: 
A  =  the annual dividend per share; and  
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The perpetuity model (known as the Gordon growth model) assumes constant growth in perpetuity 
and estimates the cost of equity (!)  using the following formula: 
! = ?(C#)@? + E (2.7) 
where: 
A =  the annual dividend per share; 
BA			 =  the ex-dividend share price; and  
E =  the growth rate.  
According to CIMA (2014: 36), two methods can be used to estimate the growth rate: an analysis of 
the historical growth in dividends or a growth approximation. The growth approximation (E) is 





b	 = the proportion of profits that are retained; and 
r	  = the rate of return on new investments. 
 
Omran and Pointon (2004: 243) cast the dividend growth model in terms of earnings and used the 
following formula as cost of equity (!)  proxy: 
! = ( C@I	(&%*) J1 −
!??
!?
L (1 + E) + E (2.9) 
where:  
A = the annual dividend per share; 
	A = the earnings per share; and  
E = the growth rate. 
2.6.1.2 Multi-stage models 
The residual income model and the discounted free cash flow model are both multi-stage models. 
Plenborg (2002: 306) defines residual income as the difference between the return on equity, and 
the book value of equity multiplied by the cost of equity (i.e. the income generated by a company 
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By using the residual income model, the share price can be broken down into its book value and the 
present values of its expected future residual income as per the following formula: 
MA = MA + J NOC(C()P +
NO
(C()Q +⋯L (2.10) 
where: 
MA  = the share price; 
M  = the book value; 
ST  = the residual income; and 

 = the cost of equity. 
A clear advantage of the residual income model is that dividend payments and cash flows are not 
used. The model is therefore also applicable to companies that do not pay dividends, as well as 
companies that do not generate a positive cash flow.  
Hail (2002: 747) proposed the following residual income model to estimate the cost of equity: 
M% = M% + ∑ VWX%YC J
(@NZ[\]()2^%]C
(C()_ L (2.11) 
where: 
M%	 = the ‘intrinsic’ value of the company; 
M  = the book value; 
V% 	   = the expected value operator; and 
BS`a = the after-tax return on the book value of equity. 
Hail (2002: 748) adopted a three-stage approach: a short-term period using earnings forecasts for 
the following three years, a medium-term fading period where the return on book value of equity is 
faded to the median market return, and the calculation of a terminal value by assuming the latest 
residual income as a perpetuity. The implied discount rate is consequently calculated as an estimate 
of the ex ante cost of equity capital.  
A multi-stage discounted free cash flow method was used by Froidevaux (2004: 58), assuming three 
stages of growth: an initial growth period, a transition growth period and a long-term mature growth 
period (terminal value). Botosan and Plumlee (2005: 21-23) assessed five different methods for 
calculating the cost of equity. The five methods examined differ primarily with respect to their terminal 
value assumptions. 
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2.6.2 Share return-based estimates 
2.6.2.1 Inverse of the price-to-earnings ratio 
According to Omran and Pointon (2004: 243), the inverse of the price-to-earnings ratio (also known 
as the earnings-to-price ratio) is the simplest model to estimate the cost of equity. Liu, Nissim and 
Thomas (2002) and Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2005b) stated that a higher price-to-
earnings multiple implies a lower cost of equity, as investors are willing to pay more for a given dollar 
of earnings. A disadvantage of this method is, however, the difficulty of interpreting a negative ratio. 
As a consequence, Fu et al. (2012) and Francis et al. (2005b) did not use this ratio for non-profitable 
companies.  
According to this method, the cost of equity (!) is estimated using the following formula: 
! = C@I	(&%* (2.12) 
where:  
BV	
Wb = the price-to-earnings ratio. 
2.6.2.2 Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
Although the CAPM is often criticised in the literature, for example by Omran & Pointon (2004) and 
Hail (2002), a recent valuation methodology survey by PwC (2015) found the CAPM to be the most 
preferred method among survey participants to estimate the cost of equity. Of the survey 
participants, 86% indicated that they ‘always’ use the CAPM, while 11% indicated that they 
‘frequently’ use the CAPM. Regarding the use of deductive models (e.g. dividend growth models), 
no participants indicated that they ‘always’ use these models, while 11% indicated that they 
‘frequently’ use them, and 49% ‘sometimes’ and 40% ‘never’ use these models.  
The CAPM estimates the cost of equity (!) using the following formula: 
! = S5 + ß	(S − S5) (2.13) 
where:  
S5	 = the risk free rate; 
ß    = the beta; and 
S 	 = the market return. 
2.6.2.3 Fama-French three-factor and five-factor model 
The Fama-French three factor model expands on the CAPM by adding size and market-to-book ratio 
as two additional factors to market risk in the CAPM. This model was developed by Eugene Fama 
and Kenneth French based on the underlying assumption that two classes of shares tend to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
56 
outperform the market: small market capitalisation companies and shares with a low market-to-book 
ratio (also referred to as value shares).  
Basiewicz and Auret (2010) tested the feasibility of the Fama-French free-factor model in explaining 
share returns on the JSE. Their results provided empirical support for the use of the model to 
estimate the expected returns for JSE-listed companies. Fu et al. (2012) used this model to estimate 
cost of equity. In 2015, Fama and French extended the three-factor model by adding two further 
factors, profitability and investment (Fama & French, 2015). 
2.6.2.4 Realised returns 
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) suggested that ex post realised returns should be an 
unbiased estimator of the unobservable cost of equity in an efficient market. Although Fu et al. (2012) 
admitted that realised returns are a noisy measure of the cost of equity, they include realised returns 
in their study as a cost of equity proxy owing to its theoretical appeal. 
2.7 COST OF DEBT ESTIMATES 
The cost of capital is calculated as the weighted average (according to the composition of a 
company’s capital structure) of the cost of equity and the cost of debt. The cost of equity was 
discussed in Section 2.6.  
Cost of debt is the cost at which a company may borrow money. Sengupta (1998) and Nikolaev and 
Van Lent (2005) used the effective yield to maturity (YIELD) of bonds as their measure of the cost 
of capital. Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005) defined YIELD as the discount rate that equates the current 
value of all future interest and principle payments to the capital provided by the lender at the moment 
of the bond issue. 
Guidara et al. (2014), Orens et al. (2010) and Sengupta (1998) measured the cost of debt (CoD) 
using the following formula: 
dbe = O+%!(!%	!6'!+!	5*(	%$!	1!&(7$*(%	&+	0*+#	%!( 	0&20%!	&%	%$!	2!#+++#	*5	%$!	1!&( (2.14) 
2.8 ENDOGENEITY 
According to Hill, Griffiths and Lim (2011: 405), the ordinary least square (OLS) regression model 
fails in the presence of a correlation between an independent variable and the error term. This 
independent variable is said to be endogenous and the literature refers to this as an ‘endogeneity 
problem’. Among others, Welker (1995), Leuz and Verrechia (2000), Core (2001), Hail (2002), Chang 
et al. (2008), Nikolaev and van Lent (2005), Orens et al. (2010) and Eugster (2014) have cautioned 
that disclosure should be treated as an endogenous variable when studying the effects of voluntary 
disclosure on information asymmetry, the cost of equity and the cost of debt. If not accounted for, 
the endogeneity problem will result in spurious results and incorrect conclusions. Hill et al. (2011: 
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405) listed three possible causes of the endogeneity problem: simultaneous equations bias,58 
omitted variables, and measurement error. 
Earlier in this chapter, theories that could explain variations in disclosure levels were discussed. 
Specifically, the cost–benefit analysis theory was discussed in Section 2.2.6. According to this 
theory, the level of IIR will depend upon the outcome of a cost–benefit assessment. Welker (1995: 
803), Leuz and Verrechia (2000: 100), Hail (2002: 746), Cheng et al. (2006: 48) and Orens et al. 
(2010: 1072) all argued that companies may choose their disclosure strategy, and therefore level of 
IIR, by considering the costs and benefits thereof.  
Eugster (2014: 1) argued that a current high cost of equity may encourage management to increase 
voluntary disclosure in the future based on a cost–benefit analysis. Dye (1985) developed a 
theoretical model in which the level of disclosure depends upon the information asymmetry between 
management and investors. Welker (1995) also argued that uninformed traders perceptions of the 
adverse selection problem may depend on the companies’ disclosure policy.  
Eugster (2014: 1) pointed out that the level of voluntary disclosure may merely be a symptom of an 
unobserved factor, for example managerial ability. Lack of managerial ability may therefore explain 
both decreased levels of IIR and increased levels of the cost of equity. Investigating the association 
between reporting frequency and information asymmetry, Fu et al. (2012) emphasised that the 
decision to voluntarily report more frequently is not likely to be random. They argued that it is possible 
that some unobservable company characteristic, such as risk, may affect both reporting frequency 
and information asymmetry. 
Although some disclosure studies, such as Healy et al. (1999), either did not consider, test or report 
an endogeneity concern in their studies, most disclosure studies that examined the association with 
information asymmetry or the cost of capital did discuss and/or correct endogeneity.  
The Hausman test is often used in literature to test for the existence of endogeneity. Heflin et al. 
(2005)59, Orens et al. (2010)60 and Fu et al. (2012)61 used the Hausman test to confirm the existence 
of endogeneity. Cheng et al. (2006)62 and Gajewski and Li (2015),63 on the other hand, reported test 
results that indicate the absence of endogeneity.  
                                               
58
 Also referred to in the literature as reverse causality or a self-selection bias. 
59
 Heflin et al. (2005) examined the relationship between disclosure and, in turn, the bid-ask spread and quoted depths. 
The 2SLS approach was followed to correct for endogeneity.  
60
 Orens et al. (2010) examined the relationship between corporate website disclosure and, in turn, the bid-ask spread, 
cost of equity and cost of debt. The 2SLS approach was followed to correct for endogeneity. 
61
 Fu et al. (2012) examined the relationship between the frequency of financial reporting (i.e. quarterly and interim 
reporting) and, in turn, the bid-ask spread and price impact. The 2SLS approach was followed to correct for endogeneity. 
62
 Cheng et al. (2006) examined the relationship between the level of annual report voluntary disclosure and, in turn, the 
bid-ask spread, trading volume and price volatility. Although the Hausman test confirmed the absence of endogeneity, the 
authors used 3SLS to confirm their OLS results. 
63
 Gajewski and Li (2015) examined the relationship between corporate website disclosure and five information asymmetry 
proxies.  
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Some studies, found a stronger association between disclosure and each of the following: 
information asymmetry, cost of debt and the cost of equity, after controlling for endogeneity. Nikolaev 
and Van Lent (2005) used panel data techniques to address endogeneity concerns and found that 
the effect of disclosure policy on the cost of debt is 200% higher than the percentage found in an 
OLS estimation. 
Similar to Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005), Orens et al. (2010) found a stronger negative association 
(in terms of the coefficient) between their proxy for disclosure and, in turn, the bid-ask spread, cost 
of equity and cost of debt in the 2SLS model as compared to the OLS models.64 For the trading 
volume regression model, however, the sign and the statistical significance of disclosure as 
explanatory variable for trading volume differed between the OLS and the 2SLS models. In the OLS 
regression model the disclosure coefficient was negative and not statistically significant, but in the 
2SLS regression model the coefficient was positive (as expected) and statistically significant at the 
5% level.  
Fu et al. (2012), on the other hand, found stronger associations (in terms of the coefficient) between 
their proxy for disclosure, reporting frequency, and, in turn, their two proxies for information 
asymmetry and four proxies for the cost of equity in the OLS compared to the 2SLS models.65  
Chang et al. (2008) found a positive and not statistically significant association between their proxy 
for disclosure, IIR, and spread for both the OLS and the 2SLS regression models. 
2.8.1 Instrumental variables 
To do the Hausman test, an instrumental variable is needed first. According to Hill et al. (2011: 410), 
an instrumental variable should have no correlation with both the dependent variable and the 
regression error, but should be correlated with the endogenous independent variable. Instrumental 
variable analysis is implemented using a two-step process (Hill et al., 2011: 412). The first regression 
stage will have the endogenous independent variable as dependent variable with all the exogenous 
and instrumental variables as independent variables. The fitted value for the endogenous variable 
obtained from the first-stage regression is a weighted average or a linear combination of all the 
exogenous and instrumental variables (Hill et al., 2011: 412) and will replace the endogenous 
independent variable in the second-stage regression.  
In econometrics the least square estimators from the second regression are known as the 
instrumental variable (IV) or two-stage least square (2SLS) estimators (Hill et al., 2011: 412).  
 
                                               
64
 For the bid-ask spread, the disclosure score coefficient reported by OLS is -0.002 compared to -0.009 for the 2SLS, both 
significant at the 1% level. Similarly, for the cost of equity regression model, the disclosure coefficient is  -0.022 for OLS 
and -0.051 for 2SLS, but the 2SLS coefficient is slightly less significant (5%) compared to the OLS (1%). For the cost of 
debt regression model, the disclosure coefficient is -0.008 for OLS and -0.014 for 2SLS, both significant at 5%. 
65
 For the bid-ask spread, the disclosure score coefficient reported by OLS is -0.146 compared to -0.085 for the 2SLS. 
Similarly, for the price impact model, a disclosure coefficient of -0.382 is reported by OLS and -0.216 for the 2SLS.   
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Orens et al. (2010: 1072) used the 2SLS method and described the process followed as follows: 
The first stage of the 2SLS method estimates the extent of non-financial disclosure on the 
basis of exogenous variables of the cost of finance equations together with instrumental 
variables. The second stage relates the estimated value of extent of disclosure to the cost of 
finance proxies.  
Fu et al. (2012: 10) describe the 2SLS method as follows: 
In the first-stage regression, the dependent variable is the observed reporting frequency and 
the independent variables include the instrumental variable and control variables in the original 
OLS model. We obtain the predicted reporting frequency from the first-stage regression 
results. The predicted reporting frequency replaces the observed reporting frequency in the 
second-stage regression. 
According to Fu et al. (2012), the success of the 2SLS model to control for endogeneity depends 
critically on the quality of the instrumental variable. Larcker and Rusticus (2010) showed that 
instrumental variables that are of low quality are actually more likely to provide the wrong statistical 
inference than simple OLS estimates that make no correction for endogeneity. 
Various types of instrumental variables have been used in literature for the endogenous disclosure 
variable, for example capital intensity and media exposure (Orens et al., 2010), the year index (Fu 
et al., 2012) and board structure (i.e. one-tier or two-tier) (Gajewski & Li, 2015). 
2.8.2 Simultaneous equations approach 
A common issue with the use of the simultaneous equations approach is the identification of 
appropriate exogenous variables to specify each equation (Chang et al., 2008: 381). If the 
exogenous variables are correlated with both dependent variables, the results will be biased (Brown 
& Hillegeist, 2007). Welker (1995: 817) used the simultaneous equations approach and described 
the processed followed as follows: 
In the first stage, each endogenous variable (S/P and DISQ) is regressed on all exogenous 
variables included in the model (SDRET, DOLVOL, PRICE, LOWPRICE, HIPRICE, RET 
and OFFER) to form a predicted value for the endogenous variable. The predicted values 
of S/P and DISC, which should exhibit less correlation with the error term, are then used as 
the explanatory variables in the second stage regressions that estimate equations (3) and 
(4). The result of this substitution is that the endogenous variables included as explanatory 
variables include only that portion of the variation of the original variable that is explained 
by the instruments. 
Leuz and Verrechia (2010: 109) use the 2SLS model as well as the simultaneous equations 
approach, with the latter as robustness check.  
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2.8.3 Impact threshold for confounding variable  
Agarwal et al. (2016: 44) and Fu et al. (2012) calculate the impact threshold for a confounding 
variable (ITCV). According to Fu et al. (2012), the ITCV is an assessment of how severe the 
endogeneity problem must be to overturn the OLS results. The higher the ITCV, the more robust the 
OLS is to endogeneity. Both Agarwal et al. (2016) and Fu et al. (2012) have argued that the ITCV 
values calculated in their studies are large enough to ensure that any potential endogeneity between 
their independent and dependent variables is unlikely to have a severe impact on their results and 
conclusions. 
2.8.4 Firm fixed effects model 
A firm fixed effect model assumes that the unobservable company characteristics that affect both 
the dependent (i.e. information asymmetry or cost of capital) and independent (i.e. disclosure) 
variables are constant over time. Fu et al. (2012) used the firm fixed effect model as one of three 
models to control for endogeneity and documented similar results over all three models (i.e. firm 
fixed effects, 2SLS, and matched control sample). 
2.8.5 Matched control sample 
The matched control sample compares changes in information asymmetry and cost of capital 
between companies that have changed their reporting frequency and those that have not (Fu et al., 
2012). As discussed in Section 2.8.4, Fu et al. (2012) reported similar results using the matched 
control sample, firm fixed effects and 2SLS models in controlling for endogeneity. 
2.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
As discussed in Chapter 1, IIR is defined to include various information types (e.g. mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures), as well as shareholder services to facilitate shareholder relationships. 
Notwithstanding the fact that IIR will therefore also include mandatory information types, for example 
the annual report, the use of IIR by companies is a purely voluntary decision.  
Various theories were used in the literature to explain voluntary disclosure, and therefore IIR, levels. 
The following theories were discussed in this Chapter: agency problem, information problem, 
signalling theory, investor recognition hypothesis, the follower’s effect, and the cost–benefit analysis 
theory. These theories were used in past studies to develop and to test for explanatory variables that 
best explain variations in disclosure levels between companies. These studies are discussed further 
in Chapter 5. The purpose of Chapter 5 is to address the third research objective set for this study, 
namely to develop to establish the determinants of IIR by means of a regression model. 
According to the cost–benefit analysis theory, the amount and type of disclosure depends upon the 
outcome of a cost–benefit assessment. The studies presented from the literature discuss various 
potential benefits of increased disclosure levels. Given the research problem and research  
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question 3,66 as discussed in Chapter 1, the literature review focused on studies that have examined 
the relationship between disclosure, information asymmetry, cost of equity and the cost of debt. The 
majority of these studies were performed in developed countries and mixed results were reported. 
Various reasons were offered in past studies to explain these mixed results, such as different country 
settings, endogeneity and different proxies used to estimate the following: disclosure, information 
asymmetry, cost of debt and the cost of equity. 
Different proxies that could be used to estimate information asymmetry, cost of equity and cost of 
debt were briefly discussed in this chapter, but the different proxies that were used to measure 
disclosure will be discussed in the next chapter. 
As mentioned in the discussion on the cost–benefit analysis theory in Section 2.2.6 of this chapter, 
it is often raised in the literature that companies may choose their disclosure strategy by considering 
the costs and benefits thereof. If this is done, however, it could cause an endogeneity problem. The 
endogeneity problem was discussed in Section 2.8, along with methods used in the literature to test 
for and remedy this problem. 
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 The third research question is: Will variations in IIR have an effect on the level of information asymmetry and cost of 
capital? 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT 
Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts.67 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The research problem of this study, as discussed in Chapter 1, is whether or not, variations in IIR 
between companies will have any effect, positive or negative, on the level of information asymmetry 
and cost of capital. Accordingly, the first research question for this study was: to what extent do JSE-
listed companies use corporate websites to communicate with investors? Two research objectives 
were set in Chapter 1 to answer this research question: first, to develop an appropriate measurement 
instrument, and, second, to measure the extent of IIR scores for a sample of JSE-listed companies. 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop and describe the measurement instrument. 
As briefly discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.9, different disclosure proxies are often argued to be 
one of the reasons for conflicting empirical results. As discussed in Chapter 1, disclosure is an 
umbrella term and can refer to a range of different items. According to Hassan and Marston (2010: 
3), disclosure is a theoretical concept or latent variable that is difficult to measure directly. Disclosure 
can be measured in a number of ways, as is evident from prior studies. Hassan and Marston (2010: 
9) categorised disclosure proxies in two broad categories. The first approach used a proxy for 
disclosure, which was not directly based on examining the original disclosure vehicle compared to 
the second approach that involved an examination of the original disclosure vehicle. This thesis 
referred to the first approach as indirect disclosure proxies and the second as direct disclosure 
proxies. 
Both direct and indirect disclosure proxies are often criticised in literature for a number of reasons. 
Specific weaknesses and advantages of both direct and indirect disclosure proxies are discussed in 
Section 3.2. As no reliable analyst ratings suitable for use in this study exist in South Africa and 
owing to the inherent shortcomings and diversity of existing measurement instruments, this 
dissertation elected to use a self-constructed measurement instrument based on the Investor 
Relations Society (IRS) best practices, a comprehensive literature review and a pilot study for the 
purposes of this study.  
The remainder of this chapter will discuss disclosure proxies, including existing measurement 
instruments (Section 3.2); the methodology followed in the development of the instrument (Section 
3.3); the results of the Esterhuyse and Wingard (2016)68 study (Section 3.4) and, finally, a chapter 
summary (Section 3.5).  
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 Albert Einstein. 
68
 This study was published too late to be included in the literature review process that was followed to develop the 
measurement instrument used in this study and is therefore also not included in Table B1, Annexure B. The inclusion of 
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3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE PROXIES AND EXISTING INSTRUMENTS 
As discussed in Section 3.1, disclosure studies can be categorised into two broad categories based 
on the disclosure proxy used: direct or indirect. Table 3.1 summarises the disclosure proxies that 
were used by indirect disclosure proxy studies. 
Table 3.1: Indirect disclosure proxies used in the disclosure literature 
Proxy used Study  
Association for Investment Management and 
Research (AIMR) ratings 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002); Welker (1995); 
Healy et al. (1999); Brown and Hillegeist (2007)  
Investor Relations Magazine nominations Agarwal et al. (2016) 
Financial Analyst Federation (FAF) ratings Heflin et al. (2005) 
Switch German to US GAAP Leuz and Verrechia (2000)  
Centre for International Financial Analysis and 
Research (CIFAR) ratings 
Francis et al. (2005a) 
Moody’s ratings Fu et al. (2012) 
Society of Management Accountants of Canada 
(SMAC) / University of Quebec at Montreal 
(UQAM)  
Richardson and Welker (2001) 
Swiss Banking Institute (SBI) Hail (2002) 
KLD Research & Analytics  Dhaliwal et al. (2011) 
KPMG ratings Liu and De Villiers (2011) 
 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002: 22) and Brown and Hillegeist (2007) used ratings based on the opinions 
of expert users (i.e. analysts), as published by the Association for Investment Management and 
Research (AIMR). AIMR ratings69 are based on analyst ratings of aggregate disclosure (mandatory 
and voluntary) (Hassan & Marston, 2010) within three categories: (1) annual report and the form 10-
K (a report required by the SEC), (2) interim reports and other publications and (3) analyst and 
investor relations publications (Healy et al., 1999: 496). 
Given the laborious nature of using a direct disclosure proxy, such as content analysis using 
measurement instruments, indirect disclosure proxies are often used in studies. When comparing 
                                               
this study in the earlier literature review would not have made a difference in the attributes that were included in the 
instrument as used in this study. Using the measurement instrument developed in this study, company websites were 
measured over a six-month period between March and September 2015. 
69
 AIMR was discontinued in 1997. 
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and discussing sample sizes, studies should therefore be categorised according to the proxy used 
for disclosure. Analyst ratings (i.e. indirect disclosure proxies) are often criticised in the literature for 
the following three reasons: 
• Sample bias 
According to Eugster (2014), the AIMR rating covers mainly larger companies. Welker (1995) 
admitted that his results should be interpreted as applying to larger companies only. According to 
Welker (1995: 811), this weakened the power of his empirical tests to the extent that this selection 
bias reduced the cross-sectional variation in disclosure and spreads. 
• Analyst bias 
Healy et al. (1999: 489) admitted that if analysts’ ratings were influenced by less relevant 
considerations (e.g. performance, own interest, relationship with management, etc.) instead of 
disclosure, these ratings may not be a reliable proxy for disclosure. 
• Small investor relations component 
According to Agarwal et al. (2016: 32), the investor relations component contributed only 20–30% of 
the total AIMR rating and may therefore not be a reliable measure of investor relations. 
According to Cheng et al. (2006: 38), ratings by the Centre for International Financial Analysis and 
Research (CIFAR) evaluated both mandatory and voluntary disclosure and were therefore not 
suitable proxies for voluntary disclosure. 
It should also be noted that many of these ratings are only available for one country (e.g. AIMR) 
which inhibits comparison studies. All AIMR studies in Table 3.1 were, for example, developed using 
a US sample. 
On the other hand, it can also be argued that AIMR analysts’ ratings provide a comprehensive 
measure of disclosure, reflecting the quality of both formal (e.g. annual reports) and informal (e.g. 
management presentations at analyst meetings) disclosures and also reflect the expertise and 
experience of top financial analysts (Healy et al., 1999: 491).  
Direct disclosure proxy studies involve the examination of the original disclosure vehicle, which 
implies using a measurement instrument and doing a content analysis. Healy and Palepu (2001: 
426-427) argued that self-constructed measurement instruments have the following potential 
weaknesses: 
• Findings may be difficult to replicate given judgement on the part of the researcher in 
performing the measurements;  
• Only the specific disclosure medium (e.g. annual report) is studied and disclosures that are 
provided in other mediums (e.g. analyst meetings, conference calls, etc.) are omitted or the 
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content of the specific medium is studied without considering that the same information may 
also be available from other sources; and 
• Endogeneity.70 
Trabelsi et al. (2008) identified three additional weaknesses of measurement instruments from prior 
studies that have examined corporate websites as disclosure medium: 
• The use of dichotomous or ordinal variables which could reduce cross-sectional variability;  
• Too much emphasis on the website design (presentation format) over the actual content; and 
• Important variables are ignored. 
Contrary to the second weakness listed above by Trabelsi et al. (2008), Hamid (2005: 12) 
emphasises the omission of information technology attributes (presentation format) in prior 
measurement instruments, as a weakness. 
According to Froidevaux (2004: 53), disclosure level is not easily assessed because the 
development of any measurement instrument relies heavily on a person’s subjective perception. The 
solution proposed by Froidevaux was to include as many variables as possible in the measurement 
instrument used. 
Francis et al. (2008: 62-63), on the other hand, listed the following advantages of using a self-
constructed measurement instrument: 
• Increased confidence that the metric captures what it is intended to capture; and 
• Any company can be included in the sample. Alternatively, the sample may be limited to 
companies selected by external data providers which usually include only the larger 
companies. 
Direct disclosure proxy studies can be further classified in terms of the disclosure medium studied 
(e.g. annual report or corporate website). For the purposes of this literature review, direct disclosure 
proxy studies that examine corporate websites are further classified according to a number of study 
characteristics. These characteristics are: the study purpose (Section 3.2.1), the attributes measured 
and categories used (Section 3.2.2), the use of weights (Section 3.2.3), a distinction or not between 
the quantity and quality of disclosure (Section 3.2.4), the sample selection criteria (Section 3.2.5), 
how the content analysis was done (Section 3.2.6), how the disclosure score was calculated (Section 
3.2.7) and whether reliability and validity tests were done and reported (Section 3.2.8). 
The purpose of this literature review is to discuss each of these characteristics in order to emphasise 
the shortcomings and diversity of existing measurement instruments, but also to provide the 
                                               
70
 See Section 2.8 for a detailed discussion of endogeneity. 
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foundation for the development of the methodology that was used in this study to develop the 
measurement instrument.  
3.2.1 Study purpose according to article titles 
How literature refers to disclosure in the article title can be used as a rough indication of the purpose 
of each study. The wide variety of article titles used in previous disclosure studies point to the 
diversity of these studies. Extracts of how literature referred to disclosure in their article titles are 
presented in Table 3.2 below. Table 3.2 also categorises the literature into three categories, namely: 
descriptive, determinant or effect.  The difference between descriptive, determinant and effect 
studies were discussed in Section 2.1. All studies included in Table 3.2 examine the corporate 
website as disclosure vehicle. 
Considering the wide definition of investor relations, the abbreviation IIR, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
will, for practical reasons, be used throughout the remainder of this dissertation to refer to all studies 
that have examined corporate websites as a disclosure vehicle. 
Table 3.2: Key words used in the literature to refer to disclosure in article titles 
Key words extracted from the 
titles of studies that have 
examined corporate websites 
Authors and categories of studies that have examined 
corporate websites  
Internet financial reporting; 
Financial reporting on the internet; 
Financial information on the 
internet; Financial disclosure on 
corporate websites; Corporate 
financial reporting on the internet; 
Financial data at corporate 
websites 
Descriptive: Debreceny, Gray and Mock (2001); Fisher, Oyelere and 
Laswad (2002); Jones and Xiao (2004); Barac (2004); Trabelsi, 
Labelle and Laurin (2004); Khan (2006); Khan (2007); Mohammed, 
Oyelere and Al-Busaidi (2009); Khan and Ismail (2012); Nel (2004); 
Turel (2010); Ali (2010) 
Determinant: Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999); Craven and 
Marston (1999); Ettredge, Richardson and Scholz (1999); Debreceny 
et al. (2002); Allym and Lymer (2003); Oyelere, Laswad and Fischer 
(2003); Prabowa and Tambotoh (2005); Pervan (2006); Kelton and 
Yang (2008); Almilia (2009) 
Effect: Kelton (2006); Kelton and Pennington (2012); Lai et al. (2010) 
Internet investor relations; Investor 
relations on the internet; Investor 
relations; Investor relations 
websites; Use of internet for 
investor relations; Use of 
corporate websites for investor 
relations; Information for investors 
at corporate websites; Online 
investor relations 
Descriptive: Hedlin (1999); Deller et al. (1999); Brennan and Kelly 
(2000); Loxton (2003)71; Hamid (2005); Africanir (2010); Sabelfeld 
(2011); Dordevic, Dordevic and Stanujkic (2012); Esterhuyse and 
Wingard (2016) 
Determinant: Geerings et al. (2003); Bollen, Hassink and Bozic 
(2006); Ryan (2010); AbuGhazaleh, Qasim and Haddad (2012); 
Ettredge et al. (2002) 
Effect: Froidevaux (2004); Chang et al. (2008); Chang, Hooi and 
Wee (2014) 
  
                                               
71
 Loxton’s Afrikaans title is ‘Beleggersverhoudinge op die Internet’ which, translated into English, is ‘Investor Relations 
on the Internet’ 
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Table 3.2: Key words used in the literature to refer to disclosure in article titles (continued) 
Key words extracted from the 
titles of studies that have 
examined corporate websites 
Authors and categories of studies that have examined 
corporate websites  
Online financial reporting; Online 
reporting; Online corporate annual 
reports 
Determinant: Lybaert (2002); Venter (2002); Hodge and Pronk 
(2006); Allam (2005); Serrano-Cinca, Fuertes-Callen and Gutierrez-
Nieto (2007); Harper (2012) 
Digital reporting formats; Digital 
reporting 
Descriptive: Ghani, Laswad and Tooley (2009) 
Determinant: Bónson and Escobar (2006) 
Effect: Ghani, Laswad and Tooley (2011) 
Corporate reporting on the 
internet; Corporate internet 
reporting; Use of internet for 
corporate reporting; Business 
reporting on the internet; 
Corporate governance and 
strategic information on the 
internet; Internet reporting; 
Internet-based disclosures; 
Internet-based disclosure 
Descriptive: Lymer and Debreceny (2003); Davey and Homkajohn 
(2004); Lodhia, Allam and Lymer (2004); Spanos (2006); Chatterjee 
and Hawkes (2008); Barac (2004); Khadaroo (2005) 
Determinant: Ashbaugh, Johnstone and Warfield  (1999); Bonsón 
and Escobar (2002); Larrán and Giner (2002); Xiao et al. (2004); 
Marston and Polei (2004); Aly, Simon and Hussainey (2010); Lymer 
et al. (1999); Sánchez, Dominguez and Alvarez (2011); Abdelsalam 
et al. (2007); Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) 
Effect: Gajewski and Li (2015); Ahmed, Tahat, Burton and Dunne 
(2015) 
Voluntary disclosure on corporate 
websites; Corporate website 
disclosures; Use of websites as 
disclosure platform; Corporate 
websites  
Descriptive: Matherly and Burton (2005); Nel and Baard (2007); 
Jones (2009); Baard and Nel (2011) 
Determinant: Ettredge et al. (2001) 
Effect: Trabelsi et al. (2008); Cormier et al. (2009) 
Web-based disclosure; Web-
based non-financial disclosure; 
Web-based corporate 
performance disclosure; Web-
based business reporting; Web-
based financial statements; Web 
site disclosures 
Descriptive: Beattie and Pratt (2003)  
Determinant: Celik, Ecer and Karabacak (2006)  
Effect: Dull, Graham and Baldwin (2003); Orens et al. (2010); Aerts 
et al. (2007); Epping and Wilder (2011) 
 
3.2.2 Attributes measured and categories used 
Some studies (e.g. Debreceny et al., 2002; Oyelere et al., 2003; Craven & Marston, 1999 and 
Ashbaugh, Johnstone & Warfield, 1999) measured only whether companies had a web presence 
and whether financial information (reports or summaries) were available on the website or not. Other 
studies (e.g. Hedlin, 1999; Lymer et al., 1999; Loxton, 2003 and Geerings et al., 2003; Esterhuyse 
& Wingard, 2016) used stages to classify the IIR practices of companies.  
The majority of direct disclosure proxy studies divided measured attributes into categories. 
Categories that were used in direct disclosure measurement studies that examined corporate 
websites are summarised in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3: Categories used and number of attributes measured in disclosure studies 
Categories used (number of attributes per category) Study Attributes 
General items (25), Investor relations items (19), Annual report 
items (64), and other items (56) 
Celik et al. (2006) 164 
Financial performance (9), Corporate governance (17), Production 
efficiency (17), Innovation and development (10), Customer value 
(16), Human and intellectual capital (16), Social responsibility (16), 
Management information systems (2), and Website capabilities (8) 
Cormier et al. (2009) 
  
111 
Corporate governance (17), Customer value (16), Human and 
intellectual capital (16), Production efficiency (17), Innovation, 
research and development, and growth (10), and Social 
responsibility (16) 
Orens et al. (2010) 92 
Summary of historical results (5), Projected information (9), 
Background information (16), Key non-financial statistics (20), 
Management discussion (13), Intangible assets (9), and Social 
and environmental information (7) 
Trabelsi et al. (2008) 79 
Content (investor) (30), Content (timeliness) (5), Content 
(social/environmental) (5), Content (contact details) (5), 
Presentation (technological features) (10), and Presentation 
(convenience/usability) (16) 
Marston and Polei 
(2004) 
71 
Background (6), Financial (6), Ratio analysis (7), Share price/ 
shareholder (7), Press releases (2), Contact details/Investor 
related info (4), and FAQ (1) 
Hamid (2005) 33 
Background (4), Financial info (5), Share price, Shareholder info 
(7), Ratios (5), FAQ, Press releases (2), Contact details, Financial 
calendar (2), Analysts (2), and New IR activities (3) 
Brennan and Kelly 
(2000) 
30 
Content (16), Timeliness (4), Technology (6), and User support (5)   Davey and Homkajohn 
(2004) 
31 
Annual/interim reports (9), Press releases/further information (6), 
Presentation advantages (7), Video/audio recordings (3), and 
Direct contact via email (4) 
Bollen et al. (2006) 29 
Fundamental reporting (6), Corporate Social Responsibility (2), 
Corporate Governance (6) 
Khan (2007) 14 
General attributes (10), Specific: financial reports (12), Specific: 
Investor related information (8), and Specific: board/ management 
(6) 
Khadaroo (2005) 36 
Business data (7), Forward-looking data (4), Convenience (10), 
Company background (6), and Intangibles (8) 
Matherly and Burton 
(2005) 
35 
Financial information (31), Corporate governance (2), Social 
responsibility (3), Technological features (4), 
Convenience/usability (4), and Contact/other (7) 
Turel (2010) 51 





Usability (7), Dialogue (3), General info (13), Financial information 
(8), Presentations (7), and Retail shareholders (9)  
Wade and Forbes 
(2000) 
47 
Content (financial) (10), Content (investor) (9), Timeliness (8), 
Technology (8), and User support (9) 
Lybaert (2002) 44 
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From Table 3.3, the range of categories, as well as the number of attributes measured, is evident. 
Some determinant and effect (i.e. information asymmetry and cost of capital) studies examined both 
total and category disclosure scores. Studies listed in Table 3.3 differ in respect to how attributes 
were categorised. For example, the internal search function attribute was categorised into 
navigation, general items, investor relations items, user support, technology, presentation 
advantages, and accessibility categories in existing literature. 
According to Wallace, Naser and Mora (1994: 43) there is no general theory on how to build an 
index. Further to the number of attributes and the use of categories, attributes measured in direct 
disclosure proxy studies could be categorised as presentation or content (Section 3.2.2.1), 
mandatory or voluntary (Section 3.2.2.2), financial or non-financial (Section 3.2.2.3), and objective 
or subjective (Section 3.2.2.4) attributes. 
3.2.2.1 Presentation versus content attributes 
As discussed in Chapter 1, content refers to information and presentation to the use of presentation 
technologies. Many of the advantages of IIR, as discussed in Section 1.2.4 in Chapter 1, and as 
further discussed in this section, depend on the proper use of presentation technology-related 
attributes. 
Marston and Polei (2004: 297) argued that although investors are mainly interested in the extent of 
information provided (i.e. content), they also want to find this information as quickly and easily as 
possible (i.e. presentation). Chang et al. (2008: 376) argued that the primary objective of investor 
relations is not necessarily the provision of information, but rather to improve the flow of information 
to investors.  
Khadaroo (2005a: 64) argued that the presentation of information is important as it determines the 
ease of navigation of users and their ability to access relevant information of interest to them. In a 
2007 Makinson Cowell Report (Loehnis, 2007), the two most important attributes of a corporate 
website were described as, firstly, being as comprehensive as possible (i.e. content) and, secondly, 
being easy to use and fast in terms of performance (i.e. presentation). According to Debreceny et al. 
(2002), presentation is important as it could potentially improve the timeliness and verifiability, and 
ultimately the quality and usefulness, of information. 
Although the proper use of presentation technologies can enhance the usefulness of IIR, on the 
other hand, it can also compromise its usefulness if used inappropriately (as discussed in Section 
1.2.5). 
In the opinion of Wade and Forbes (2000: 8), the usability of IIR is often seen by institutional investors 
as a prerequisite hurdle to clear before they would engage in using corporate websites as an 
information source. According to research by Loehnis (2007), slow sites, poor navigation and 
outdated information irritate fund managers and analysts immensely. A 2009 update of the 2007 
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Loehnis study documented the increasing frustration of users on having to experience poor 
navigation, clutter and long chains of links to relevant information (Jones, 2009).  
Xiao et al. (2004: 197) saw it as an important shortcoming of earlier studies on the use of Internet 
reporting that corporate website disclosure was treated as if it were just an electronic version of the 
hard copy annual report, i.e. ignoring the innovative aspect of the former and therefore the 
advantages available through the use of technology to communicate with investors. Although the 
majority of IIR studies include some presentation variables, they are mostly insignificant. Some 
studies, however, measured only content, such as Orens et al. (2010), Trabelsi et al. (2008), Aerts 
et al. (2007), Khan (2006), Khan (2007), Ali (2010) and Brennan and Kelly (2000). Table 3.4 list IIR 
studies reviewed in this study that have included more than 15% of presentation-related attributes. 
Table 3.4: Presentation versus content-related attributes: corporate website studies 
Study Presentation-related 




of total attributes) 
Total 
attributes  
Pirchegger and Wagenhofer 
(1999) 30 (59%) 21 (41%) 51 
Lybaert (2002) 21 (49%) 22 (51%) 43 
Davey and Homkajohn (2004) 12 (38%) 20 (62%) 32 
Marston and Polei (2004) 25 (36%) 45 (64%) 70 
Wade and Forbes (2000) 11 (24%) 35 (76%) 46 
Geerings et al. (2003) 9 (31%) 20 (69%) 29 
Bollen et al. (2006) 9 (31%) 20 (69%) 29 
Celik et al. (2006) 24 (15%) 138 (85%) 162 
 
Most studies that did include presentation variables made no attempt to distinguish between the two 
dimensions, except Froidevaux (2004), Marston and Polei (2004), Bollen et al. (2006) and Davey 
and Homkajohn (2004). 
Marston and Polei (2004) reported results that suggest different determinants for respective content- 
and presentation-related variables. In a similar vein, Cormier et al. (2009: 19) reported that business-
related disclosure had no impact on the earnings valuation multiple, except for the web-quality (i.e. 
presentation) component of business-related disclosures.  
To summarise this section: It is important not only to include both content and presentation variables, 
but also to distinguish clearly between the two dimensions in the measurement instrument used. 
3.2.2.2 Mandatory versus voluntary information 
The majority of studies that examined corporate websites as disclosure vehicle measured both 
mandatory and voluntary attributes with no attempt to distinguish between the two information types. 
This is, however, not unexpected for the following reason. As discussed in Section 1.2.2 of  
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Chapter 1 and in Section 2.1 of Chapter 2, the use of the corporate website as communication 
channel is a voluntary activity. Notwithstanding that corporate websites may include both voluntary 
and mandatory information types (e.g. the annual report), it can be argued that in the absence of a 
regulatory framework to govern corporate websites, corporate website content is voluntary in nature. 
De La Bruslerie and Gabteni (2011) measured voluntary disclosure by examining the annual report 
as disclosure medium. In their study, they proposed a methodology that could be used to distinguish 
between voluntary, quasi-mandatory and mandatory disclosure. In a literature review of previous 
voluntary disclosure studies, De La Bruslerie and Gabteni (2011: 14) stressed that what was 
considered voluntary in one country, may be mandatory in another country. It should also be noted 
that the classification of disclosure items as voluntary or mandatory will change over time, given the 
evolving nature of legislation. 
Leuz and Verrechia (2000: 94) also examined annual report-based voluntary disclosures and argued 
that the relationship between mandatory disclosures (referred to as a ‘commitment’) and the cost of 
equity should be stronger than the relationship between voluntary disclosure and the cost of equity, 
as voluntary disclosures are reversible and ex post (Leuz & Verrechia, 2000: 94). Mandatory 
disclosure, on the other hand, is not reversible and is ex ante. 
Ettredge et al. (2002: 368) examined the determinants of corporate website disclosure and found 
that fewer explanatory variables could be used to explain variations in the level of mandatory 
information types compared to voluntary information types.72 
Although a distinction and separate analysis of mandatory and voluntary information items may aid 
in researching both the determinants and effect of IIR, the results of such studies should be 
interpreted with care, given the inherently voluntary nature of IIR, the evolving nature of legislation, 
as well as the differences between accounting regulatory systems of countries (e.g. as laid down by 
the IASB and FASB). 
3.2.2.3 Financial versus non-financial information 
Most studies measured both financial and non-financial variables, but made no attempt to distinguish 
between the two types of information, except for Hanafi, Kasim, Ibrahim and Hancock (2009), Celik 
et al. (2006), Aerts et al. (2007), Cormier et al. (2009), Khan (2006) and Khan (2007). According to 
Hanafi et al. (2009), the majority of all prior measurement indexes focused mainly on content, with 
no clear distinction being made between financial and non-financial information.  
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 Ettredge et al. (2002) found that mandatory items are significantly associated only with size and a proxy for information 
asymmetry, while voluntary information items are associated with size, information asymmetry, demand for external capital, 
and companies’ traditional disclosure reputations. 
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3.2.2.4 Objective versus subjective information  
Ettredge, Richardson and Scholz (1999: 24) distinguish between information items with highly 
objective content as opposed to information items with highly subjective content. 
3.2.3 Weighted versus unweighted disclosure scores 
IIR studies can further be divided into studies that have assigned weights and studies that have not 
assigned weights. Studies that did assign weights can be categorised into studies that have assigned 
weights to individual attributes (discussed in Section 3.2.3.1 below) and studies that have assigned 
weights to categories (discussed in Section 3.2.3.2 below). 
The majority of studies did not assign weights and had therefore simply calculated the disclosure 
score as the sum of the individual attributes with each attribute being assigned either one if available 
(i.e. present) and zero if not available (i.e. not present). In respect of the studies that did not assign 
weights, some gave motivations (e.g. Bónson & Escobar, 2002), others not. Arguments used in past 
studies to assign weights are discussed in Section 3.2.3.3 below, followed by a discussion of 
arguments that were used not to assign weights in Section 3.2.3.4. 
See Table B1, Annexure B, for a summary of the use of weights by studies, as surveyed for this 
dissertation. 
3.2.3.1 Attributes  
Regarding studies that assigned weights to individual attributes, it is further possible to distinguish 
between the assignment of weights to reflect the degree of detail and/or to reflect the perceived 
importance thereof for users.  
Aerts et al. (2007), Cormier et al. (2009) and Orens et al. (2010: 1066) assigned weights to reflect 
the degree of detail (three if the attribute was described in quantitative or monetary terms, two if 
discussed specifically, and one if the attribute was discussed only in general). 
Larrán and Giner (2002: 75), on the other hand, assigned a weight of one for all content-related 
attributes and 0.25 to all attributes that were related to accessibility, navigation and the utilisation of 
the advantages provided by presentation technologies (e.g. alternative formats, such as excel 
financial statements and webcasts of presentations) to reflect the perceived importance of attributes 
for users. 
In a similar vein, Chang et al. (2008) and Lai et al. (2010) both used a four-point weighted scale to 
reflect the importance of specific attributes for investors’ decision making. Both studies have 
allocated scores between one and four for a ‘yes’ answer, i.e., say, three if the attribute was present, 
and no points if the attribute was absent.  
Chang et al. (2008), for example, assigned a score of four for having a dedicated investor relations 
area and posting webcasts of analyst presentations; three for attributes such as analyst reports and 
conference call facilities; two for attributes such as the names of analysts covering the company and 
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PowerPoint presentations of the CEO. Most items were scored one. Lai et al. (2010), for example, 
assigned a score of four for the director’s report; three for interim financial reports; two for condensed 
interim reports; and one for the dividend policy. 
3.2.3.2 Categories 
Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999) used four categories to categorise attributes: content, timeliness, 
technology and user support. They perceived content and timeliness to be more important than 
technology and user support, and therefore assigned weights to reflect this. 
Lybaert (2002) used five categories: content (financial information), content (investor-related 
information), timeliness, technology, and user support. Following Pirchegger and Wagenhofer 
(1999), they perceived their first three categories as more important and therefore assigned weights 
to reflect this. 
Marston and Polei (2004) and Spanos (2006) both assumed, based on Pirchegger and Wagenhofer 
(1999), that users regard the content of corporate websites as more important than presentation 
features and therefore assigned a weight of 60% to their content section and 40% to their 
presentation section. 
Davey and Homkajohn (2004) assigned the following weights to their categories: content (40%), 
timeliness (20%), technology (20%) and user support (20%). 
Bollen et al. (2006) categorised attributes in five categories and assigned the following weights to 
their categories: annual and interim reports (100%), press releases and further information (150%), 
presentation advantages of the internet (200%), contact details (150%) and video/audio and online 
participation (200%). 
From Sections 3.2.3.1 and 3.2.3.2 it is therefore clear that studies differ not only in the attributes 
measured and categories used (as discussed in Section 3.2.2), but also in what manner weights 
were assigned to both individual attributes and categories. 
3.2.3.3 Arguments used to assign weights 
Celik et al. (2006) claim that weights should reflect the perceived usefulness attached to attributes 
by the users of the information. Aerts et al. (2007: 1309) asserted that the potential relevance and 
usefulness of monetary disclosure was generally perceived to be higher than that of descriptive 
disclosure and therefore necessitated a higher weighting. 
Bollen et al. (2006) based their weights on the research results of Beattie and Pratt (2003). The 
Beattie and Pratt (2003) study investigated and compared the views of users, financial directors and 
auditors on corporate website reporting.  
Hanafi et al. (2009) used the results of a survey questionnaire distributed to a sample of users 
(including bankers, auditors, finance executives, accountants, academics, regulatory agents and 
students) to assign weights to the various attributes in their measurement instrument.  
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Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999: 393) interviewed companies’ investor relations representatives, 
financial analysts and students as rationale for the assignment of weights. In a similar vein, Spanos 
(2006) discussed their weightings with members of the Greek Union of Institutional Investors. 
Although studies such as Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999), Bollen et al. (2006), Hanafi et al. 
(2009) and Spanos (2006) all have assigned weights based on some sort of survey, they all differ in 
respect of their choice of survey participants. Notwithstanding the contribution made by such studies 
in basing their weights on the researched usefulness attached to attributes, weights and results 
should be interpreted with care as corporate website users range from the naïve decision maker to 
the institutional investor and analyst, all with different requirements. As discussed in the next section, 
the argument that IIR will be used by various types of users is often used in literature as the reason 
not to assign weights. 
3.2.3.4 Arguments used for not assigning weights 
Although the majority of studies surveyed for this dissertation did not discuss either the advantages 
or disadvantages of using weights, a number of studies provided their underlying reasons for not 
using weights in their measurement. Celik,  Ecer and Karabacak (2006: 105) cited the following 
research that showed similar results from using either a weighted or unweighted disclosure score: 
Robbins and Austin (1986) and Firth (1980). More specific to disclosure studies that had examined 
corporate websites as disclosure vehicle, Marston and Polei (2004), Bollen et al. (2006), Lai et al. 
(2010) and Xiao et al. (2004) all reported similar results for weighted and unweighted indices.  
Beattie and Pratt (2003) reported results that show that users’ views on the relevance and 
importance of the various disclosure practices differed considerably. Based on a survey by Beattie 
and Pratt (2003), there are six differences between the needs of private (i.e. retail) and expert (i.e. 
investment analysts and fund managers) users of information. 
Expert users, for example, are more in favour of spreadsheets and XBRL. On the other hand, they 
are less in favour of making details of one-to-one meetings public, and HTML and PDF file formats. 
Private shareholders ranked HTML as the most preferred file format and PDF the least preferred. 
Interviews with fund managers and analysts revealed that the majority of these users prefer their 
documents in PDF format, with only the minority preferring HTML type documents (Jones, 2009: 
1.2).     
Bónson and Escobar (2006: 310), Trabelsi et al. (2008) and Hassan and Marston (2010: 33) 
therefore argued that, as the information would be used by various types of users and for different 
purposes, and as they were not interested in a particular group of users but all users, they had used 
an unweighted index. In a similar vein, Aly, Simon and Hussainey (2010) claim that the relative 
importance of items varied not only from user to user as suggested by Beattie and Pratt (2003), but 
also from company to company, industry to industry and would further change as technology 
evolved. 
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To summaries this section, reasons for not assigning weights include: To avoid the arbitrariness 
thereof (Bónson & Escobar, 2002: 35), information will be used by various types of users and for 
different purposes (Bónson & Escobar, 2006: 310), to avoid subjectivity (Froidevaux, 2004: 53; 
Pervan, 2006: 16) and previous research results that showed that weightings do not significantly 
alter the results (Celik et al., 2006: 105; Aly et al., 2010: 188;  Sánchez, Dominguez and Alvarez 
2011: 484). 
3.2.4 Quantity versus quality of information 
As it is evident from Table B1, Annexure B, the majority of studies surveyed for this dissertation 
made no attempt either to distinguish between the quantity and quality of IIR or to measure the 
quality rather than quantity of information. 
Financial reporting quality is an abstract concept that is hard to measure directly (Trabelsi et al., 
2008). In their study, Hassan and Marston (2010: 32) found that there was no single measure of 
disclosure quality that had attracted no criticism to date.  Core (2001: 452) emphasised two problems 
that could hinder metrics to measure the quality of disclosure: firstly, the labour-intensity thereof and, 
secondly, judgement error.  
Louwers, Pasewark and Typpo (1998) reason that the ability of a website to anticipate all the 
information requirements of users in four areas, namely breadth, depth, frequency and timeliness, is 
a good indicator of the quality of Internet business reporting. Breadth refers to the 
comprehensiveness of the information, depth to the amount of historical information that is available, 
frequency to the number of times information is released, and timeliness to how up-to-date the 
information is. 
As discussed in Sections 3.2.4.1 to 3.2.4.5, various approaches are suggested in the literature as 
proxy for disclosure quality. 
3.2.4.1 Extent of content and use of weights 
A number of studies reason that the extent of information disclosed is also an indicator of quality 
(Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Botosan, 1997; Leuz & Verrechia; 2000; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Bollen et 
al., 2006). Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), for example, argued that voluntary disclosure theories were 
broad enough to allow the interpretation of ‘voluntary disclosure level’ as ‘voluntary disclosure 
quantity’ and ‘voluntary disclosure quality’.    
Ashbaugh et al. (1999: 251) measured quality in terms of the nature of the disclosures (i.e. content) 
and the methods of dissemination (i.e. accessibility, navigation and timeliness). Marston and Polei 
(2004: 293) reasoned that the usefulness and therefore the quality of IIR was determined by the 
amount (i.e. content) and the presentation of the information. Davey and Homkajohn (2004) also 
argued that timeliness and the use of enhancement that could not be provided by hard copy annual 
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reports would improve the quality of IIR. Abdelsalam et al. (2007: 26) listed the following as drivers 
of quality investor communications: comprehensiveness, usability, and verifiability or credibility. 
Chatterjee and Hawkes (2008: 33) used the accessibility and quantity of information as a proxy for 
the quality of corporate website disclosures. Debreceny et al. (2002: 376) asserted that the use of 
presentation technologies might improve the verifiability and the timeliness of information.  
Cormier et al. (2009) measured eight attributes to proxy for web quality. These attributes were all 
related to timeliness (e.g. how up-to-date the website is), navigation (e.g. internal and external links) 
and the use of presentation technologies such as interactive components (e.g. ability to tailor or 
manipulate content), and web- or podcasts. 
Trabelsi et al. (2008) argued that quality was measured by including the correct items in the 
measurement instrument and through the measurement itself (i.e. points should be attributed for the 
categories of information and the level of detail). 
Aerts et al. (2007: 1309) used ratings of one to three to measure the usefulness of specific 
information. Monetary disclosure were, for example, perceived to be more useful than descriptive 
disclosure (Aerts et al., 2007). In a similar vein, Froidevaux (2004: 78), Bollen et al. (2006), Chang 
et al. (2008) and Orens et al. (2010: 1066) all suggested the use of weightings to capture the 
importance of each attribute as proxy for disclosure quality.  
Although a number of studies have suggested the use of weightings (either of individual attributes 
or categories) as proxies for IIR quality, the vast majority of studies that intended to measure the 
quality of IIR have reasoned that both the extent of information disclosed, as well as the 
dissemination of information are indicators of quality. To enable the measurement of quality, this 
section therefore presents the argument that a measurement of IIR should, first of all, measure as 
widely as possible; and, secondly, should include presentation-related attributes. 
3.2.4.2 Research results 
Froidevaux (2004: 75) argued that although her research purpose was limited to the relationship 
between disclosure quantity and the cost of equity, the reported negative relationship between 
disclosure and the cost of equity showed that the disclosure attributes, as measured, were useful to 
investors.  
3.2.4.3 Assessment of the actual content 
Froidevaux (2004: 78) suggested an assessment of the actual content of the disclosed items as one 
alternative to measure the quality of information. Core (2001: 452) suggested the use of techniques 
in natural language processing (e.g. artificial intelligence) to lower the cost of calculating such 
disclosure metrics.  
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3.2.4.4 Indirect disclosure proxy 
Some studies, such as Brown and Hillegeist (2007) and Ettredge et al. (2002), used analysts’ 
evaluations of disclosure activities (i.e. AIMR) as proxy for disclosure quality.  
3.2.4.5 Data reduction techniques 
Hassan and Marston (2010: 35) reason that a drawback of disclosure indexes is that they do not 
explicitly consider the incremental information content (i.e. relative usefulness) of the different items 
of information included in the index. They suggested the use of data reduction techniques (e.g. factor 
analysis) by future researchers.  
3.2.5 Sample selection criteria 
Sample selection criteria used in the existing literature is briefly discussed in Section 4.2 and is 
summarised in Table 4.1. Further, Table B1, Annexure B, provides information of the countries where 
studies were done, as well as sample selection criteria. 
3.2.6 Content analysis  
Krippendorff (1980: 21) defined content analysis as a research technique for making replicable and 
valid inferences from data. It is a well-known and popular research method which has often been 
used to measure disclosure activities (e.g. by Geerings et al., 2003; Hamid, 2005; Marston & Polei, 
2004; Froidevaux, 2004; Bollen et al., 2006). 
The following limitations of content analysis to measure corporate website disclosures are discussed 
in the literature: 
 
• If conducted manually,73 it is a labour-intensive process (Hassan & Marston, 2010: 17), which 
will restrict either or both the sample size and the number of attributes measured;  
• The large and complex nature of corporate websites (e.g. hyperlinked sections) increase the 
risk of missing information (Froidevaux, 2004: 75); and 
• The development of the disclosure index (i.e. measurement instrument to use) (e.g. attributes 
to include and whether to use a weighted or unweighted index) could be a subject to a selection 
bias (Froidevaux, 2004: 75). 
Content analysis can be partial (i.e. it may cover only part of the document) or comprehensive 
(Hassan & Marston, 2010: 16). Froidevaux (2004: 28), Bollen et al. (2006), and Kelton and Yang 
(2008) analyse only the investor relations section of corporate websites, ignoring the remainder of 
the website. Brennan and Kelly (2000), Matherly and Burton (2005) and Froidevaux (2004) argued 
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 The alternative to the manually conducted content analysis is an automated approach using software packages such as 
Nudist or GI.  See Hassan and Marston (2010: 17) for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of an automated 
approach.  
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that the purpose of their study was a content analysis of investor relations and not the annual report, 
and therefore they ignored any content disclosed in the annual report. 
Lymer et al. (1999), FASB (2000), Aerts et al. (2007), Cormier et al. (2009), Orens et al. (2010) and 
Gajewski and Li (2015) measured only information presented in HTML format, ignoring the content 
of PDF documents. 
Davey and Homkajohn (2004: 213), on the other hand, examined both PDF- and HTML-type 
documents. Financial information disclosed in HTML scored higher (2 points) than PDF (1 point). 
They argued that HTML is easier for users to access effectively. For the timeliness component of 
their measurement instrument, Davey and Homkajohn (2004: 225) looked only at HTML-type 
documents. 
Orens et al. (2010) and Abdelsalam et al. (2007) limited their studies to information that was available 
on the homepage plus a maximum of five more drill downs from the homepage. They argued that 
important information should not be hidden, thus they ignored any information available only on 
further drilling down. 
Lymer et al. (1999: 49) and Lybaert (2002: 210) ignored financial reporting pages on third-party sites 
unless there was a hyperlink from the corporate website to the third party site. 
In the context of this study, a content analysis entails an examination of corporate websites using a 
measurement instrument. Literature differs not only in the composition of measurement instruments, 
as discussed in Sections 3.2.4 to 3.2.6, but also, as discussed in this section, in how 
comprehensively corporate websites were examined (e.g. looking at only PDF or both PDF and 
HTML documents, and evaluating all webpages or only specific web pages). 
3.2.7 Disclosure score 
Almost all direct disclosure measurement studies used a dichotomous scoring system, awarding a 
score of one for the presence and zero for the absence of a disclosure item or presentation 
technology (Cheng et al., 2006; Froidevaux, 2004; Xiao et al., 2004; Bollen et al., 2006). 
Some studies used the actual disclosure score, for example Froidevaux (2004), by simply adding 
the scores of the individual attributes compared to other studies that used rank scores, for example 
Botosan (1997), Hail (2002) and Cheng et al. (2006). 
According to Froidevaux (2004), the actual disclosure score is a more sensitive measure of 
disclosure level than disclosure rank. Cheng et al. (2006: 39), whose sample spans seven industries, 
adjusted disclosure scores for industry effects by ranking each company’s disclosure level within its 
own industry in the sample as follows: (rank in industry -1)/(number of companies in industry -1). 
Their adjusted disclosure index ranged from zero (lowest) to one (highest). 
Hail (2002) used the fractional rank (rank divided by the number of companies) of the disclosure 
score, where a fractional rank of one indicates companies with the highest disclosure scores. Hail 
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(2002) argued that rank disclosure scores are less sensitive to the influence of outliers compared to 
absolute disclosure scores. 
IIR studies can be categorised into studies that have used actual disclosure scores and studies that 
have used rank scores. Both methods have specific strengths and weaknesses. Rank scores, for 
example, may be less sensitive to outliers, but, on the other hand, are a less sensitive measure 
compared to the actual disclosure score. 
3.2.8 Reliability and validity concerns 
Hassan and Marston (2010) defined reliability as the ability of a measurement instrument to 
reproduce consistent results on repeated measurements, and validity as the extent to which the 
instrument measures what it is intended to measure. 
Hassan and Marston (2010) discussed three reliability (test-retest; inter-coder and internal 
consistency) and three validity (criterion, content or face and construct) tests that are often used in 
the literature. 
However, as it is evident from Table B1, Annexure B, the majority of those studies74 either performed 
no reliability or validity tests or have performed tests, but failed to report or discuss the results thereof. 
This is consistent with results reported by Hasson and Marston (2010). Of the 50 studies reviewed 
by Hasson and Marston (2010) only 16 and 29 performed respectively a reliability and validity test. 
Trabelsi et al. (2008) referred to the ‘true value’ model to evaluate the reliability and validity of their 
content analysis. According to the ‘true value’ model, the disclosure score consists of the theoretical 
value plus random error plus systematic error, where random error is linked to reliability and 
systematic error to validity. 
3.2.8.1 Reliability tests 
Test-retest measures the stability of the measurement instrument results over time. As the test-retest 
procedure requires repeated trials, resulting in time and money concerns, it is not considered feasible 
for a manual content analysis. Trabelsi et al. (2008) applied the test-retest method. 
Inter-coder reliability measures the stability of results when the same analysis is conducted by more 
than one coder. Correlation coefficients and an analysis of discrepancies between coders can be 
used to assess inter-coder reliability. 
Internal consistency assesses how well the different items in a measurement instrument measure 
the same subject matter. Cronbach’s alpha, a measure of inter-item correlation can be used to 
assess the internal consistency. Hassan and Marston (2010: 27) suggested a minimum alpha of 0.8 
                                               
74
 Only determinant and effect direct disclosure proxy studies that have measured corporate websites as disclosure vehicle 
are included in Table B1. Determinant studies examine the determinants or explanatory variables of disclosure, and effect 
studies the association between disclosure and variables, such as information asymmetry and the cost of capital. 
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to indicate internal consistency. Serrano-Cinca et al. (2007), on the other hand, used 0.7 as the 
recommended value. Nunnaly (1978: 245) also suggested 0.7 as an acceptable level. 
The following studies listed in Table B1, Annexure B, have calculated Cronbach’s alpha (the alpha 
measurement is given in brackets): Aerts et al. (2007) (0.74), Kelton and Yang (2008) (0.6, 0.73, 
0.77 and 0.82), Trabelsi et al. (2008) (0.872), Cormier et al. (2009) (0.703), Orens et al. (2010) (0.74), 
Serrano-Cinca et al. (2007) (0.78), and Eugster (2014) (0.75). 
Botosan (1997), Froidevaux (2004: 53), Cheng et al. (2006: 40) and Kelton and Yang (2008: 72) 
measured the internal consistency of the disclosure score by calculating correlation coefficients 
between disclosure categories.75 Positive and significant correlations between categories were 
assessed as an indication of internal consistency. 
3.2.8.2 Validity tests 
Criterion validity is a measure of how well one measurement instrument compares (i.e. correlates) 
with another instrument (the criterion variable). The correlation between the measurement 
instrument and the criterion variable is used to assess the validity. AIMR scores (Botosan, 1997; 
Ashbaugh et al., 1999), and external awards (e.g. annual report rewards in Eng & Mak, 2003) could 
be used as criterion variables.  
Content or face validity involves an assessment through third-party judgement. Hanafi et al. (2009), 
Hail (2002), Cheng et al. (2006) and Kelton and Yang (2008) applied content validity. According to 
Hassan and Marston (2010), different perceptions among users hindered the use of content validity 
to come to a conclusion on the validity of an instrument. 
Construct validity measures the extent to which a measure performs in accordance with theoretical 
expectations. Hail (2002), Trabelsi et al. (2008), Chang et al. (2008: 388), Froidevaux (2004: 54) and 
Orens et al. (2010: 1069) applied construct validity to validate the use of their measurement 
instruments. 
3.3 METHODOLOGY FOLLOWED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTRUMENT 
The first objective set for this study was to suggest a measurement instrument that could be used to 
measure the quality of IIR in a South African context. Based on the literature review in Section 3.2 




                                               
75
 Botosan (1997), Froidevaux (2004: 53), Cheng et al. (2006: 40) and Kelton and Yang (2008: 72) discussed the internal 
consistency of the disclosure score as part of the study section that discussed validity. Kelton and Yang (2008) and Botosan 
(1997) calculated both Cronbach alpha and correlation coefficients between disclosure categories to assess the internal 
consistency of their measurement instrument. 
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This process entailed the following six questions: 
• Which content and presentation attributes should be measured and how should these 
attributes be categorised? 
• Should weights be assigned to either the individual attributes or the categories into which the 
attributes are organised; or should no weights be assigned? 
• How will the quality of IIR be measured, instead of mere quantity? 
• Will the measurement be limited to any specific sections of the corporate website, and will 
specific documents or document types be excluded from measurement? 
• How will the measurement instrument be applied and how will the disclosure scores be 
calculated? 
• How will reliability and validity concerns be addressed? 
3.3.1 Attributes measured   
Although no standards currently exist to regulate IIR, best practice corporate website guidelines are 
published annually by the Investor Relations Society (IRS). These guidelines offer advice on creating 
a best practice corporate website that will help companies communicate more effectively with 
investors and other stakeholders (IRS, 2013a). Following Hanafi et al. (2009), Brennan and Hourigan 
(1999) and Laskin (2007), this study has also used the IRS guidelines as starting point.  
Although similar guidelines were published by the Nielsen Norman Group, these guidelines were not 
as freely available as the IRS guidelines (the Nielsen Norman guidelines are available for download 
at $248). Abdelsalam et al. (2007) used the Nielson Norman guidelines to develop their 
measurement instrument. Abdelsalam et al. (2007) did not publish the measurement instrument they 
have used in their study.  
Based on the IRS guidelines, core attributes were identified. The categories used by the IRS best 
practice guidelines were used as benchmark to organise attributes in categories throughout the 
development of the measurement instrument. Table 3.6 summarises these categories.  
According to Froidevaux (2004: 53) and Loehnis (2007: 1) content should be measured as widely as 
possible to mitigate the risk of omitting important variables. Therefore, an extensive literature review 
(see Tables B1 and B2, Annexure B, for a brief summary and description of these studies) was done 
to identify attributes measured in existing instruments that are not included in the IRS best practice 
guidelines. This was done for three reasons: 
• To measure as widely as possible to mitigate the risk of important attributes being omitted; 
• To improve the comparability of this study to previous studies; and 
• For guidance on how to measure specific attributes.  
Most studies that have used a measurement instrument refer to one or more prior studies as rationale 
for the development of measurement instruments. Loxton (2003), Geerings et al. (2003), Hamid 
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(2005) and Esterhuyse and Wingard (2016) all used an instrument based on the work of Deller et al. 
(1999) and Hedlin (1999). Lybaert (2002) and Marston (2004) used an instrument based on the work 
of Pirchegger (1999). Aerts et al. (2007), Cormier et al. (2009) and Orens et al. (2010) applied an 
instrument based on balance scorecard literature. Various studies were based on studies conducted 
by the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) (FASB, 2000) and the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC)76 (Lymer et al. 1999).77  
More recently, Gajewski and Li (2015: 123)78 developed a measurement instrument to measure 
Internet-based disclosure based on research by Deller et al. (1999), Pirchegger and Wagenhofer 
(1999), Debreceny et al. (2001), Ettredge et al. (2002) and Marston and Polei (2004). The 
development of an instrument based on prior research is therefore often used. This study, however, 
identified four shortcomings of such an approach: 
• Some of these studies were performed as early as 1999 which may place the relevancy of 
some attributes in question. 
• As is evident from Tables 3.2 and 3.3, not all of these studies intended to measure investor 
relations per se.   
• The inclusion of attributes not listed or discussed in best practice guidelines could be 
questioned. 
• According to the FASB (2001: 14), it is not possible to determine a definitive list of all important 
aspects, as not all companies are alike and attributes that are important for one company may 
not be applicable to another company. 
These shortcomings were considered throughout the development of the measurement instrument 
and were also considered in the pilot study. The next step was a pilot study79 of JSE-listed 
companies. For the pilot study, eight companies80 were randomly selected from a list of JSE-listed 
companies.  
The objectives of the pilot study were as follows: 
• To evaluate the practicality of measuring the attributes as identified from the IRS best practice 
guidelines and the literature review. 
• To identify omitted attributes that may be applicable only in the South African environment  
                                               
76
 The IASC was the predecessor of the current International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 
77
 Debreceny et al. (2002), Larrán and Giner (2002), Trabelsi et al. (2004), Khadaroo (2005), Celik et al. (2006) and Kelton 
and Yang (2008)), for example, used the FASB study; and Allam and Lymer (2003), Larrán and Giner (2002) and Lodhia, 
Allam and Lymer (2004) the IASC study. 
78
 This study was published too late to be included in the literature review process that was followed to develop the 
measurement instrument used in this study and is therefore also not included in Table B1, Annexure B. The inclusion of 
this study in the earlier literature review would not have made a difference in the attributes that were included in the 
instrument as used in this study. Using the measurement instrument developed in this study, company websites were 
measured over a six-month period between March and September 2015. 
79
 Bollen et al. (2006) conduct a pilot study for five to ten companies in each country included in their study. 
80
 The following companies were included in the pilot study sample: Richemont, Imperial, Net1 UEPS Tech, Merafe 
Resources, Ascension Properties, Mustek, Morvest and African Eagle. 
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• To obtain further guidance on how to measure specific attributes. 
• To do preliminary reliability and validity tests 
From the IRS best practice guidelines, 105 attributes (35 presentation and 70 content) were 
identified. Following the literature review and pilot study, additional attributes were added and some 
attributes were further sub-divided into additional attributes to improve the measurement thereof and 
to ensure the continuous use of a binary scale. Table 3.5 provides an example of how one best 
practice guideline was sub-divided into separately measurable attributes using a binary scale. 
Table 3.5: An example to illustrate how some best practice guidelines was sub-divided  
Best practice guideline IRS best practice attribute Attributes measured in 
this study 
Provide biographical detail of all directors 
giving their age, date of appointment and 
other directorships/appointments. Additional 
information such as areas of expertise can 
also be included. 
Directors – biographical 
detail 
(1) List of directors, (2) 
Photos, (3) Age, (4) 
Qualifications, (5) Date of 
appointment, and (6) 
Other directorships 
 
Reliability and validity tests were discussed in Section 3.2.8 above. One of the objectives of the pilot 
study was to do a preliminary assessment of the reliability and validity of the measurement 
instrument. The correlation between disclosure categories (i.e. content and presentation) was used 
as a preliminary reliability test (i.e. internal consistency) and the correlation between the instrument 
score and market capitalisation as a preliminary validity test (i.e. construct validity).  
The Pearson correlation coefficient between the content and presentation category of 0.67 did 
provide preliminary evidence of internal consistency. Previous research (as discussed in Chapter 4) 
used the expected positive association between market capitalisation and disclosure as indicator for 
construct validity. The Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.34 between market capitalisation and the 
total disclosure score was therefore used as indicative of construct validity. 
Figure 3.1 depicts the relationship between the presentation category score, the content category 
score and market capitalisation. The presentation and content category score of each company was 
scaled as a percentage of the maximum score that was achieved by a company in the pilot study for 
the presentation and content category respectively. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
84 
 
Note: CFR (Richemont), IPL (Imperial Holdings), NT1 (Net 1 UEPS Tech), MRF (Merafe Resources), AIA (Ascension 
Properties), MST (Mustek), MOR (Morvest) and AEA (African Eagle). 
Figure 3.1: Pilot study results 
From Figure 3.1 the positive correlations above between the content and presentation category, as 
well as between the disclosure categories (i.e. content and presentation) and market capitalisation, 
are evident. As discussed in Chapter 4, the reliability and validity of the measurement instrument 
were however only confirmed after the measurement of the sample companies was completed. 
Disclosure indices are often criticised for selection bias. Following Froidevaux (2004: 75), this study 
attempted to mitigate this problem by using a disclosure instrument which is as inclusive as possible. 
The result was the selection of a measurement instrument that consisted of 346 attributes, organised 
into 11 categories. The 11 categories that were used in this dissertation to organise the 346 attributes 
are summarised in Table 3.6. These 11 categories are discussed in more detail in Section 4.3 and 
Annexure C (measurement conventions). Table 3.6 also lists the number of attributes that were 
measured per category. The complete list of attributes, organised per category, is available in Table 
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Table 3.6: Categories used and number of attributes measured in this dissertation 





Company information 36 
Financial information 65 
Relevant news 23 
Investment case 26 
Shareholder information 60 
Bondholder information 5 
Corporate governance 50 
Corporate responsibility 42 
 
3.3.2 The use of weights 
As discussed in Section 3.2.3 above, weights can either be assigned to individual attributes or 
categories. The theoretical arguments in support of and against the use of weights were discussed 
in Section 3.2.3, as were related empirical results. 
In conclusion, given the subjectivity involved in the assignment of weights, the fact that corporate 
websites are used by various types of stakeholders and investors with different needs in terms of 
both content and presentation, and previous research that documents similar results for studies 
using weighted and unweighted instruments, this study opted not to apply weights to either individual 
attributes or to categories. 
3.3.3 Quality of Internet investor relations versus quantity  
In Section 1.3.2, IIR, for the purpose of this study, is defined as to refer to the quality of IIR. It is, 
however, important to distinguish between the quality of information and the quality of the 
communication process. The quality of information can be measured in terms of completeness, 
timeliness and accuracy. For example, the questions can be asked: Are all news items published or 
only good news? Are all analyst reports published or only reports with a strong buy-opinion? Is the 
published strategy indeed the latest strategy? Is the list of directors complete? 
Leuz and Verrechia (2000: 99) listed three major problems in testing the relationship between 
disclosure and information asymmetry: information asymmetry cannot be observed directly, self-
selection bias and disclosure have both ‘news’ and ‘information asymmetry’ effects. Although the 
‘news’ effect is extremely important, this study, following Bollen et al. (2006: 297) did not measure 
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the actual or perceived quality of disclosure content or distinguished between ‘good’ news and ‘bad 
news’ as disclosed by companies on their corporate websites.81 
As discussed in Section 3.2.4, a number of authors have argued that the quality of disclosure (and 
of IIR) depends on two broad factors: the extent of the attributes measured (i.e. content) and the 
presentation thereof.  Presentation refers to the accessibility, timeliness, ease of finding the 
information (i.e. navigation) and in general the use of presentation technologies to communicate in 
ways not available via conventional communication channels. ` 
As discussed in Section 3.2.4 above, breadth (i.e. comprehensiveness) and depth (amount of 
historical information) (Louwers et al. 1998) are two indicators of the quality of IIR. According to 
Trabelsi et al. (2008), a dichotomous scoring approach is only suitable for evaluating the existence 
of a piece of information and not its extent or quality. Aerts et al. (2007), Cormier et al. (2009) and 
Orens et al. (2010: 1066) assigned weights to reflect the degree of detail  (three if the attribute was 
described in quantitative or monetary terms, two if discussed specifically, and one if the attribute was 
only discussed in general).  
Instead of assigning ratings to attributes, this study further sub-divided attributes to ensure the 
consistent use of measurement scores per attribute between zero and one (see example in Table 
3.5 above) and, for 50 of the 346 attributes, availability was measured as either absent (0) or partially 
available (0.5) or available (1) to ensure that the measurement instrument distinguished between 
attributes based on their breadth and depth.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, Sections 1.2.4 (advantages) and 1.2.5 (disadvantages), the way in which 
information is presented or not presented is important in realising the benefits available from a well-
developed IIR strategy. Louwers et al. (1998) also included timeliness and frequency (number of 
updates released) as two indicators of IIR quality. 
Non-functional82 and unuseful83 links were assessed as absent (0). Outdated information was 
assessed as either partially available (0.5) or absent (0).84 Where information was available, but as 
a result of factors such as poor layout, inconsistencies and incompleteness was not fully useful, the 
attributes were assessed as partially available (0.5).  
As with Allam and Lymer (2003), the assignment of either a 1 or 0.5 or 0 per attribute did not depend 
on the importance of the attribute or the quality of the underlying information (except timeliness and 
links not working), but was merely a measure of availability. 
                                               
81
 This was also discussed in Chapter 9 as a possible limitation of the study. 
82
 For example: “this page can’t be displayed.” 
83
 For example: “click here for share price history” links to www.jse.co.za homepage. 
84
 As a general rule, information older than five years was assessed as absent, if updated information was a reasonable 
expectation, e.g. shareholders’ information. In a similar vein, information older than a year was assessed as partially 
available, unless updated information was not a reasonable expectation or unless it was classified and separately 
measured as archived information (e.g. archived reports and presentations). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
87 
In conclusion, this research attempted to measure quality by measuring content as widely as 
possible and by measuring the presentation of information (e.g. accessibility, timeliness and 
navigation). Although the majority of attributes were measured as either available (1) or absent (0), 
50 attributes were measured as partially available (0.5), based on the breadth and depth of content 
available. Based on timeliness and usability, some attributes were measured as only partially 
available (0.5). Although there was some subjectivity involved in such a methodology, this dissertation 
argued that such an approach was important to ensure that the quality of IIR would be measured and not 
merely the quantity. Measurement conventions followed are specifically discussed in Annexure C and 
Chapter 4. 
3.3.4 Corporate website sections and document types measured 
According to Lybaert (2002: 195), companies design corporate websites for various reasons, for 
example, to advertise company products, facilitate electronic commerce, promote brand 
identification, attract potential employees, and enhance the corporate image. In view of the fact that 
websites may be extensive, with information spread over numerous pages, it is important that 
conventions followed in the content analysis are discussed. It is further important to distinguish 
between the ability of investors to find information as opposed to the information being available 
somewhere on the website.  
More specifically, the purpose of this section was to consider the following: 
• Should the entire corporate website or only the investor relations section be surveyed? 
• How many clicks or drill downs from the homepage will be surveyed? 
• Should only PDF or only HTML file formats be surveyed, or both? 
• Will research assistants be used? 
3.3.4.1 Corporate website sections analysed: Investor relations versus entire website 
Research by Nel and Baard (2006) found that the 40 largest JSE-listed companies (in terms of 
market capitalisation) all had working corporate websites and dedicated investor relations sections 
in 2006. In accordance with the findings of Nel and Baard (2006), the majority of companies in the 
pilot study had a dedicated investor relations section.  
From the pilot study it was, however, evident that companies also had dedicated sections on their 
corporate websites for financial, corporate governance and sustainability (corporate responsibility) 
information in addition to having a dedicated investor relations section. Some companies also 
published corporate governance and sustainability information under a dedicated ‘about’ or ‘about 
us’ section. 
Although various studies (e.g. Froidevaux, 2004; Bollen et al., 2006; Kelton & Yang, 2008) had 
examined only the investor relations section, this dissertation argues that given the scope of the 
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measurement instrument and the findings from the pilot study, the study objectives would best be 
achieved by an examination of the entire website. 
Following Lymer et al. (1999: 49) and Lybaert (2002: 210), hyperlinks to third party corporate 
websites were ignored, unless there was a clear link to the website with a specific and clear indication 
of the type of information (e.g. share price information) that would be accessed. 
3.3.4.2 Corporate website sections analysed: drill downs from homepage 
It was evident that almost all companies surveyed in the pilot study had a relatively flat website 
structure (i.e. more categories on the homepage, but fewer vertical levels), as opposed to a deep 
structure that would be characterised by fewer categories, but more vertical levels. 
It was therefore decided not to limit the number of clicks investigated, but to investigate all internal 
hyperlinks available on the corporate website. This research decision ran contrary to those adopted 
in other studies, such as Orens et al. (2010) and Abdelsalam et al. (2007) which examined only the 
homepage plus a maximum of five drill downs.  
3.3.4.3 Corporate website documents analysed: PDF versus HTML file formats 
Following Lymer et al. (1999), FASB (2000), Aerts et al. (2007), Cormier et al. (2009), Orens et al. 
(2010), and Gajewski and Li (2015), this study measured only information presented in HTML format, 
thus ignoring the content of all PDF documents. Although the Esterhuyse and Wingard (2016) study 
was not considered in the development of the measurement instrument used in this dissertation, 
these authors followed a similar approach and specifically stated that “this study does not involve an 
assessment of the completeness of integrating reporting, but rather the use of the internet as an IR 
communication channel”. The Esterhuyse and Wingard (2016) study is discussed in Section 3.4. 
Besides using dedicated HTML sections for annual reporting, some companies in the pilot study 
increased the accessibility to annual reports through the use of hyperlinks to the inside of PDF annual 
reports (e.g. ‘for more information about the directors, click here’) or through separate PDF 
downloads for specific information (e.g. separate PDF downloads for directors’ biographies). In these 
instances the PDF documents were analysed. 
Although it was clear that many of the attributes measured in this study would be available within 
PDF annual reports, this dissertation argues that, given the importance of using presentation 
technologies to improve the accessibility of information, companies that only published PDF annual 
reports did not fully utilise the advantages offered by using corporate websites as communication 
medium. With reference to Section 1.2.2 in Chapter 1, such companies could therefore be classified 
as Stage 1 companies (Lymer et al., 1999), as paper lovers (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2007) or as 
quadrant III or IV companies according to Figure 1.1 (FASB, 2000). 
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In similar vein, Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999: 391) argued that although most of the information 
they measured on corporate websites was also available from other sources, it was often less 
convenient, more costly or more time-consuming for investors to access these sources. 
3.3.4.4 Use of research assistants 
To conduct the pilot study, it was necessary to spend an average of eight hours per company.  
Although a considerable learning curve could reasonably be expected as a reward, measuring 85 
companies with an instrument that included 346 attributes was, without doubt, an extremely laborious 
task. 
One possible way of easing the load would have been the use of research assistants or a research 
team. Although the use of more than one researcher in studies of this magnitude is common (e.g. 
Ettredge et al., 1999; Eng & Mak, 2003; Khadaroo, 2005a; Aerts et al., 2007; Chang et al., 2008),  
following an initial attempt to appoint research assistants, it was decided that all companies included 
in the sample would be surveyed by only one researcher (the writer of this dissertation). 
An important advantage of using only one researcher was that it would provide a more consistent 
view of each company (Lybaert, 2002). On the downside, the data collection process in this study 
took six months, which – although longer than for most comparable studies – was nevertheless 
acceptable given, for example, that Bollen collected data over an eleven-month period (Bollen et al., 
2006). 
3.3.5. Calculation of the disclosure score 
As discussed in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 above, all attributes were measured as either absent (0), 
partially available (0.5), or available (1). As it is evident from Table 4.4 (Chapter 4 – Results), the 
majority of attributes were assessed as either absent (0) or available (1). 
To calculate the actual disclosure score per company, the scores of individual attributes were simply 
added together. As discussed in Section 3.2.7, some studies used ranked disclosure scores. 
Following Froidevaux (2004), this study used actual disclosure scores. 
3.3.6 Reliability and validity 
Reliability and validity tests were discussed in Section 3.2.8 above. The first two reliability tests 
discussed in Section 3.2.8, namely test-retest and inter-coder reliability, were not applicable to this 
study. Given the objectives of the study as discussed in Chapter 1, this study only measured IIR per 
company on one occasion and any re-measurement (i.e. test-retest reliability test) would therefore 
not be applicable. Also, as discussed in Section 3.3.4.4 above, all measurements were done by only 
one researcher and, consequently, it was not necessary to perform any inter-coder reliability tests. 
To ensure reliability, internal consistency (as discussed in Section 3.2.8.1) was tested in two ways: 
by applying Cronbach’s alpha and, in accordance with Froidevaux (2004), Cheng et al. (2006) and 
Kelton and Yang (2008), by examining the correlation coefficients between disclosure categories. 
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Following Hail (2002), Trabelsi et al. (2008), Chang et al. (2008), Froidevaux (2004) and Orens et 
al. (2010), construct validity was applied to validate the use of the measurement instrument. If the 
measurement instrument was to be deemed valid, it should produce correlations similar to company 
characteristics found in previous research studies. 
In addition to construct validity, criterion and content validity, as discussed in Section 3.2.8.2, could 
be used as validity tests. Failing to find a suitable criterion variable for the study sample, this 
dissertation disregarded criterion validity as a validity test.85 Content or face validity was not applied 
for three reasons: 
• Given the number of attributes, it was considered impractical owing to the amount of time that 
would be expected from users to express judgment. 
• The instrument was already based on best practices as issued by the Investor Relations 
Society (IRS). 
• The diversity of the users of corporate websites (from the naïve decision maker to the 
institutional investor and analyst) makes it difficult to select the experts needed to express 
judgment. 
Reliability and validity tests, as discussed above, were only done after all measurements for the 
sampled companies were completed (except for the preliminary assessments done for the pilot study 
results, as discussed above). Reliability and validity are therefore discussed further in Chapter 4. 
3.4 ESTERHUYSE AND WINGARD (2016) STUDY 
Esterhuyse and Wingard (2016) (referred to as E&W in the remainder of this section) published a 
study titled An exploration of the online investor relations (IR) practices of companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). This E&W study used an extensive measurement instrument 
consisting of 201 items to assess the websites of 205 JSE-listed companies during the course of 
2012. 
Given the apparent similarity between E&W and the research objectives of this dissertation, a 
separate discussion of the E&W study is justified. As discussed in Section 2.1, the literature can be 
categorised as consisting of descriptive, determinant or effect studies. Seven research objectives 
were set for this dissertation in Section 1.4.1. The first two of these seven objectives (to develop a 
measurement instrument and to measure corporate websites) can be associated with descriptive 
studies; the third objective with determinant studies, and the fourth to seventh objectives with effect 
studies. 
Although the E&W study did discuss information asymmetry in its literature review and the authors 
mentioned that determinants of IIR would be investigated in the next phase of their study, the work 
                                               
85
 As discussed in Section 3.2.8.2, previous studies used AIMR scores, CIFAR scores and investor relations or annual 
report awards as criterion variables, none of which were available for the sample studied. 
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can best be classified as a descriptive study. The E&W study is therefore discussed with reference 
to the first two objectives that were set for this dissertation. Relating to the first dissertation objective, 
the methodology followed in the E&W study to develop their measurement instrument is discussed 
in the next section. The sample selection methodology followed in the E&W study, as well as their 
results, are discussed in Section 4.7. 
3.4.1 Esterhuyse and Wingard (2016): development of a measurement instrument 
E&W developed their measurement instrument using the guidelines86 published by the Nielsen 
Norman Group and the Investor Relations Society (IRS). As discussed in Section 3.3.1, this study 
did consider the guidelines published by the Nielsen Norman Group, but as they were not as freely 
available as the IRS guidelines, the Nielsen Norman guidelines were not used in this study. Similarly 
to Abdelsalam et al. (2007), who also used the Nielsen Norman guidelines, E&W did not publish their 
measurement instrument in their research article. 
To enable some comparison between the E&W study and this dissertation, Table 3.7 re-categorises 
the E&W categories into the categories that were used in this dissertation.  Table 3.7 shows that 
E&W attributes best relate to the following five categories that were used in this dissertation: 
navigation, accessibility, company information, financial information and shareholder information. 
Although some corporate responsibility, corporate governance and investment case-related 
attributes were probably included in the E&W study under “financial and other reports”, it seems that 
the following categories of attributes were not measured in the E&W study: timeliness, relevant news, 
investment case, bondholder information, corporate governance and corporate responsibility. These 
six categories in total comprised 15887 of the 346 attributes that were measured in this study. Table 
3.6 in Section 3.3.1 lists the categories that were used in this dissertation. 
                                               
86
 Designing Websites to Maximize Investor Relations Usability – Guidelines for Investor Relations (IR) on Corporate 
Websites. 
87
 Timeliness (12), relevant news (23); investment case (26); bondholder information (5); corporate governance (50); 
corporate responsibility (42). 
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Table 3.7: Categories measured: Esterhuyse and Wingard versus this dissertation 
E & W - Category E & W -Number 
of attributes 
Equivalent  category used in this study 
Getting to corporate information 6 Navigation / Accessibility 
General usability 18 Navigation / Accessibility 
Company information 32 Company information 
Financial and other reports 26 Financial information 
HTML and PDF reports 14 Financial information 
Presentations 34 Financial information / Shareholder information  
Share details 28 Shareholder information 
Share charts 19 Shareholder information 
Calendar 6 Shareholder information 
Contacting investor relations 16 Shareholder information 
International aspects 2 Shareholder information 
 
Even though a more detailed comparison of the two measurements was not possible as the E&W 
study did not publish its measurement instrument, it is clear that the E&W study focused on usability, 
financial information and shareholder information. The usability focus was probably the result of the 
use of the Nielsen Norman usability guidelines. Granting that usability is extremely important (just 
as the accessibility of information is equally important to the availability of information, as discussed 
in Chapter 1), this dissertation argues that a valid measurement of investor relations should include 
attributes such as relevant news, investment case, bondholder information, corporate governance 
and corporate responsibility. 
The E&W study assessed all attributes as either available or absent and assigned a score of one or 
zero, respectively. As discussed in Section 3.3.3, this study measured some attributes as only 
partially available, resulting in a score of only half a mark. The rationale of assessing attributes as 
only partially available was to distinguish between mere quantity as opposed to quality. 
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, this study decided against the use of weights, given the subjectivity 
involved in assigning weights and other research which had documented similar results between 
weighted and un-weighted scores. The E&W study did refer to the assignment of weights in order to 
emphasise the importance of presentation attributes. 
The E&W study used four postgraduate students to assess the corporate websites. The use of 
research assistants was discussed in Section 3.3.4.4 of this study. As explained in Section 3.3.6, 
this study did not perform any inter-coder reliability tests as all measurements were done by only 
one researcher. The E&W study either performed no reliability and validity tests or failed to report 
on them. 
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3.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The existing literature on this subject were categorised into studies that used an indirect disclosure 
proxy (e.g. analyst ratings) and studies that used a self-constructed measurement instrument to 
measure disclosure levels. As no suitable indirect disclosure proxy or existing measurement 
instrument was available at the outset of this study, it was decided that the study objectives could 
best be reached through the development of a measurement instrument that was based on the best 
practice guidelines as issued by the Investor Relations Society (IRS).  
Attributes identified from these best practice guidelines were further improved with a literature review 
and pilot study. Given the subjectivity involved with the assignment of weights; the fact that corporate 
websites are used by various types of stakeholders and investors with different needs, and previous 
research that had documented similar results for studies using both weighted and unweighted 
instruments, this study opted not to assign weights to either individual attributes or categories. 
The majority of corporate website disclosure studies to date measured only the quantity of 
information and made no attempt to distinguish between quantity and quality. Although this study 
made no attempt to measure the quality of the underlying information (e.g. annual report quality), 
the dissertation promotes the argument that the quality of the communication process, and therefore 
IIR, would be captured with the following three characteristics of the measurement process:  
• By measuring content as widely as possible; 
• By specifically measuring the presentation of information (i.e. accessibility, timeliness and 
navigation); and 
• By measuring some attributes as partially available (0.5), as discussed (e.g. usability and 
timeliness issues). 
In accordance with previous studies and given the importance to distinguish between the availability 
as opposed to the accessibility of information, the content of PDF documents (e.g. annual reports) 
were not examined, unless a dedicated and descriptive hyperlink was provided to guide users to the 
information.  
Notwithstanding the fact that no research assistants were used and that the measurement instrument 
was based on best practice guidelines and a literature review, the internal consistency was assessed 
with Cronbach’s alpha and correlation coefficients between disclosure categories to assess the 
reliability of the instrument and construct validity as validity test (as further discussed in Chapter 4). 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE CONTENT ANALYSIS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first research question for this study was: To what extent do JSE-listed companies use corporate 
websites to communicate with investors? Two research objectives were set in Chapter 1 to answer 
this research question, namely to develop a measurement instrument and to measure the extent of 
IIR scores. As discussed in Section 1.3.2, for the purpose of this study, Internet investor relations 
(IIR) is defined to refer to the quality of IIR. The measurement instrument was developed and 
described in Chapter 3. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the results of the measurements. 
The first section of this chapter (4.2) discusses the sample selection procedure that was followed to 
select the study sample of 85 companies. These companies, as listed in Table A1 of Annexure A, 
were measured during a six-month period from March to September 2015. To ensure a random 
sample which could be used to make valid inferences about the population, the pilot study companies 
were not included in either the results presented in this chapter or in any further statistical tests in 
this dissertation. It should be noted that the pilot study was performed during May 2014 and that the 
results may therefore not be comparable with the sample results.  
Although the majority of attributes were measured as either available (1) or absent (0), 50 attributes 
were measured as either available (1), partially available (0.5) or absent (0) to improve the 
measurement of the breadth and depth of content. Further, as discussed in Section 3.3.3 in Chapter 
3 and Section 1.2.2 in Annexure C, outdated and not fully usable attributes were also measured as 
only partially available (0.5). 
Table 3.6 in Section 3.3.1 lists the 11 categories that were used in this dissertation to categorise the 
attributes that were measured. Section 4.3 discuss these 11 categories and the attributes measured 
in each category, as well as the results of the measurements that were done by means of a vertical 
analysis (i.e. per attribute). The complete list of attributes, organised per category, is available in 
Table D1, Annexure D. The unregulated nature of IIR resulted in a number of challenges in the 
measurement process. These challenges are briefly discussed in Section 4.4.  Section 4.5 discusses 
the results of the reliability and validity tests that were done, as discussed in Section 3.3.6. Further 
to the vertical analysis as discussed in Section 4.3, a horizontal analysis (i.e. per company) was 
done. The results of this horizontal analysis is discussed in Section 4.6. The measurement process 
and research results of the Esterhuyse and Wingard (2016) study is discussed in Section 4.7.88 This 
chapter concludes with a summary, conclusion and recommendations in Section 4.8. 
                                               
88
 As discussed in Section 3.4, the Esterhuyse and Wingard (2016) study is separately discussed in this dissertation given 
the apparent similarity between this study and the first two research objectives of this dissertation. The methodology that 
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4.2 SAMPLE SELECTION 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the sampling technique that was used was stratified random sampling 
with proportional allocation. This section first discusses and motivates the population definition used 
in this study, followed by a detailed description of how the sample was selected. 
4.2.1 Defining the population 
Many studies have included only the largest listed companies in their sample, or included only 
specific industries,89 or excluded specific industries90. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the sample 
selection criteria that were used in previous studies that have examined the association between 
disclosure and either information asymmetry or the cost of capital using a direct measurement of 
disclosure as disclosure proxy.  
Table 4.1: Sample selection criteria used in the disclosure literature 
Sample selection criteria Study (country) (number of companies) (number of attributes 
measured)  
Study limited to one industry only Botosan (1997) (US) (122 companies) (63 attributes) – only 
manufacturing industry 
Only largest companies  - market 
capitalisation (excluding financial 
industry)  
Orens et al. (2010) (US; Canada; Belgium; France; Germany; 
Netherlands) (895 companies) (88 attributes) 
Cormier et al. (2009) (Canada) (189 companies) (111 attributes) 
Specific index  De La Bruslerie and Gabteni (2011) (France) (67 companies) (40 
attributes) – SBF12091 
Chang et al. (2008) (290 companies) (44 attributes) - S&P/ASX 
30092 
All listed companies Cheng et al. (2006) (Singapore) (104 companies) (72 attributes) - 
SGX93  
Lai et al. (2010) (Taiwan) (101 companies) (28 attributes) - TSE94 
Combination of largest and smallest 
companies; specific industries only 
Froidevaux (2004) (US) (141 companies) (102 attributes) 
Random sample Trabelsi et al. (2008) (Canada) (108 companies) (79 attributes) 
Data availability Francis et al. (2008) (US) (677 companies) (25 attributes) 
 
                                               
was followed in the Esterhuyse and Wingard (2016) study in the development of their measurement instrument was already 
discussed in Section 3.4.1. 
89
 Matherly and Burton (2005) specifically compared high risk and low risk industries and therefore selected computer 
hardware and pharmaceuticals as industries that were high-tech and therefore more risky, and auto and auto parts and 
food and beverages as industries that were more mature and less risky. 
90
 Trabelsi et al. (2008) excluded financial sector companies from their sample based on the argument that their particular 
characteristics could bring distortions in the data. In a similar way, Cormier et al. (2009: 6), Aerts et al. (2007: 1307) and 
Orens et al. (2010) excluded all financial companies. 
91
 Société des Bourses Francaises (SBF) 
92
 Standard & Poor’s (S&P) / Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 
93
 Stock Exchange of Singapore (SGX) 
94
 Taiwan Securities Exchange (TSE) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
96 
This study has, however, specifically included all industries without excluding or stratifying for size, 
as well as dual-listed companies and companies with a primary listing other than the JSE, for the 
following reasons. 
According to previous research, industry is a determinant of both disclosure (Lybaert, 2002) and the 
cost of equity (Collins & Abrahamson, 2006). Lybaert (2002: 220) described, tested and found 
preliminary evidence of a follower’s effect. According to the follower’s effect, companies are partly 
inspired by their competitors. Froidevaux (2004) reported results that show a stronger relationship 
between disclosure and cost of equity in the consumer discretionary and information technology 
industry than in the health care and industrial goods and services industry. 
Collins and Abrahamson (2006: 75) compared the cost of equity over industries and over countries. 
In South Africa, the lowest cost of equity was reported for the financial industry (9.76) and the highest 
cost of equity for the information technology industry (17.49). Collins and Abrahamson (2006: 80) 
further concluded that the industry with the highest market capitalisation also had the lowest cost of 
equity in each of six countries that were studied (i.e. Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Zimbabwe 
and South Africa).  
Previous research further found size to be a determinant of disclosure (Bollen et al., 2006) and the 
cost of equity (Hail, 2002; Froidevaux, 2004), with a positive association between size and disclosure 
and a negative association between size and the cost of equity.  
Froidevaux (2004) found a negative and significant association between disclosure and the cost of 
equity for a large company sub-sample, but no (although negative) significant association for a small 
company sub-sample. Based on the assumption that smaller companies would have a lower analyst 
following, conflicting results were reported by Botosan (1997) that found a significant negative 
relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity for companies with a low analyst following 
(i.e. smaller companies), but no relationship for companies with a high analyst following (i.e. larger 
companies). It should be noted that Froidevaux (2004) measured disclosure via the investor relations 
sections of corporate websites, while Botosan (1997) measured voluntary disclosure via annual 
reports. Although both studies were conducted in the US, Botosan (1997) examined only 
manufacturing companies, compared to Froidevaux (2004) who examined four industries (health 
care, industrial goods and services, consumer discretionary and information technology). 
Agarwal et al. (2016) reported results that support the findings of Botosan (1997). Agarwal et al. 
(2016) reported a significant positive association between investor relations quality and analyst 
following for smaller companies, but no similar significant association for larger companies. Lang 
and Lundholm (2000: 627) limited their sample to small companies. They argued that smaller 
companies were more likely to use their disclosure policy to influence market perceptions, and that 
it would be easier for the researchers to capture their disclosure activities more completely.  
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Dual-listed companies – and specifically companies with a primary listing other than the JSE which 
would be governed by jurisdictions other than those governing companies with only a JSE listing 
(e.g. stock exchange listing requirements and Companies Act) – were included in the population 
defined for this study (see Table 4.2 below), for the following reasons.  
According to previous research (Celik et al., 2006; Aly et al., 2010), a significant positive association 
could be expected between listing status and disclosure. Further, research showed that the countries 
examined affected not only the determinants of disclosure (Pervan, 2006),95 the relationship between 
disclosure, and information asymmetry (Orens et al., 2010),96 but also affected the cost of equity 
(Collins & Abrahamson, 2006). 
Research questions 2 and 3, as set out in Section 1.3.2 of Chapter 1, both refer to ‘variations in IIR 
levels’. An important objective with the selection of the sample was therefore to ensure sufficient 
cross-sectional variation. The population was therefore defined to include all industries, all company 
sizes and all JSE-listed companies, irrespective of primary listings, to ensure such cross-sectional 
variation. 
However, as discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 8, and specifically in Section 9.5.3, the inclusion of 
smaller companies (e.g. AltX) and companies with a primary listing other than the JSE did impose 
certain limitations on the study, though not insurmountable, for instance low share trading and 
negative betas for smaller companies and different listing requirements for companies with 
secondary JSE listing. 
To answer the research questions, this study required financial and market-related data from the 
INET BFA database. Based on a list received from the JSE, there were 382 companies listed on the 
JSE on 18 August 2014. Given the information needs of this study, 67 companies were removed for 






                                               
95
 Using the same measurement instrument, Pervan (2006) reported different significant associations for the following 
independent variables between their Croatian and Slovene samples: market-to-book ratio, return on assets, ownership 
dispersion and trading volume.  
96
 Orens et al. (2010) found a significant negative association between disclosure and information asymmetry for 
continental European countries, but found no similar significant association for northern American companies. See Table 
6.3 for more detail. 
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Table 4.2: Population available for the selection of the sample studied 
 
As a first step, 26 companies were removed as these companies had been listed, but were 
suspended as on 18 August 2014. Another 10 companies were removed as these companies were 
not listed in one of the 10 JSE industries.98 The super-sector for these companies was given as debt 
and consisted of preference shares. These companies were either also included in one of the 10 
main industries or had only preference shares listed. Four companies were removed from the 
population as no shares had been traded on the JSE since inception date. For these companies no 
market data (e.g. average spread and share turnover) were available. All four of these companies 
were listed on the AltX. Another 16 companies were removed as these companies did not publish a 
2013 annual report. These companies were removed as no financial statement data was available 
for 2013.  
Given research question 1, which entails a content analysis of corporate websites, all companies 
that did not have a dedicated, working website were removed from the population. Lastly, where two 
or more related companies shared a corporate website (i.e. had the same web address), the smallest 
company, in terms of market capitalisation, was removed from the population.99 Web addresses for 
the majority of companies were available from the INET BFA database. Where no web address was 
available from INET BFA, the following procedure was followed. First, Sharenet and Moneyweb were 
consulted. If no address was available, a Google100 search was done. Only the first 30 search results 
were considered. All web addresses were tested, resulting in the removal of five companies without 
working websites and six companies that shared the same website. 
                                               
97
 382 - 26 - 10 - 4 - 16 - 5 - 6 = 315 
98
 Basic material, consumer goods, consumer services, financials, healthcare, industrials, oil & gas, technology, 
telecommunications and utilities. 
99
 The only exception was where Octodec Invest Ltd acquired control over Premium Properties Ltd, resulting in the 
subsequent trade suspension of Premium Properties Ltd.  
100According to Search Engine Land (available at: http://searchengineland.com/google-worlds-most-popular-search-
engine-148089), Google is the world’s most popular search engine with a market share of 65.2% at the end of 2012 
compared to Baidu (8.2%), Yahoo (4.9%), Yandex (2.8%) and Microsoft (2.5%). Therefore only Google was used to search 
for corporate websites where necessary. 
Detail Number 
Companies listed on the JSE as on 18 August 2014 382 
Companies listed, but suspended 26 
Companies not listed in one of the 10 main industries (super-sector classified as debt) 10 
Companies with no share trades  4 
Companies that did not publish an 2013 annual report 16 
Companies with no working website 5 
Companies sharing websites 6 
Population available for the selection of the sample 31597 
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To summarise: the population was defined as all companies currently listed on the JSE that had not 
been suspended, had traded since inception date, had published 2013 annual reports, and had a 
dedicated, working website. As a result of these criteria, only 315 of the 382 companies currently 
listed on the JSE were included in the population for the selection of the sample. These 315 
companies were spread over the five JSE boards as follows (number of companies in brackets): 
Main board (271), AltX (40), Development Capital Market (DCM) (1), Venture Capital Market (VCM) 
(2) and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) (1).  
4.2.2 Sample selection 
The sample technique that was used was stratified random sampling with proportional allocation. 
Using the relative frequencies of JSE industries in the population, the population was stratified into 
industries. The sample selection process was then done as follows. Numbers were assigned to 
companies per industry; random numbers were generated using Excel; and, according to these 
random numbers, companies were included in the sample. A total of 85 companies were included in 
the sample. The population number of companies per JSE industry as well as the sample distribution 
over the JSE industries is summarised in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3: A comparison of the population and the selected sample size per industry 
JSE Industry Population Sample 
Basic materials 66 17 
Consumer goods 25 7 
Consumer services 36 10 
Financials 82 21 
Healthcare 8 3 
Industrials 74 19 
Oil and gas 3 1 
Technology 15 4 
Telecommunications 5 2 
Utilities 1 1 
 
As discussed in Section 4.2.1 only companies with working corporate websites were included in the 
population. Technically all sample elements ‘replied’ and there were therefore no non-responses. 
4.3 VERTICAL ANALYSIS 
For each of the 346 attributes, 85 scores, ranging from zero to one, were summed to calculate an 
average availability per attribute. In total, 29 410101 attributes were measured. Table 4.4 summarises 
how the 29 410 attributes were measured. 
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 346 x 85 = 29410 
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Table 4.4: Allocation of IIR scores: available, partially available and absent attributes 
Category Score Number   Percentage 
Attributes available  1 7 792  26.5% 
Attributes partially available (not fully usable) (U-Yes) 0.5 141  0.5% 
Attributes partially available (outdated) (T-Yes) 0.5 147  0.5% 
Attributes partially available (breadth and depth) 0.5 785 2.7% 
Attributes not available (i.e. absent) 0 20 545  69.9% 
Total attributes  29 410 100% 
 
In total, 346 attributes were assessed as U-No and 324 as T-No and were included in the 20 545 
absent variables, as per Table 4.4. U-No refers to attributes where a link or download is available, 
but either the link is: (1) not functional (e.g. “this page can’t be displayed” or “HTTP 404”); (2) access 
is denied (e.g. password is required); (3) only link title is provided with no hyperlink (e.g. “click here 
for more information about directors”, but no hyperlink is available); or (4) the link is functional, but 
linked to irrelevant information (e.g. link title is “website disclaimer”, but the link is to the investor 
relations section landing page). Such attributes were assessed as absent. All U-No links were re-
assessed to ensure the correct assessment. 
T-No refers to attributes that were either outdated for more than five years (e.g. reference to only the 
2010 credit rating) or were considered outdated given the specific attribute that was measured (e.g. 
attribute “current SENS” assessed as T-No as only archived Stock Exchange News Service – or 
SENS were available).  Such attributes were assessed as absent. 
U-Yes refers to attributes where information was not complete (e.g. functional link to King III report 
was provided, but only Chapter 2 was available); inconsistencies occurred (e.g. board committees 
listed in two website sections differed); page layouts were extremely poor; only some links were 
functional (e.g. out of the five links to provide more information about the products, only two were 
not functional); links were erroneously swapped (e.g. under sustainability two links were listed, one 
for community and one for BBBEE, community linked to BBBEE and BBBEE linked to community); 
and poor use or no use was made of applicable categories (e.g. SENS, press releases and news 
items published by the financial media were mixed under one category ‘news’ with no clear 
distinction). 
T-Yes refers to attributes outdated for more than a year (excluding archived, related attributes) (e.g. 
shareholder information) or outdated links (e.g. the “for more information about directors” link linked 
to the 2012 integrated annual report).  
U-Yes and T-Yes attributes were assessed as being partially available (0.5). In total 141 attributes 
were assessed as U-Yes and 147 as T-Yes. Although the utmost care was taken to ensure a 
consistent and fair measurement, some subjectivity was involved with the assessment of attributes 
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as only ‘partially available’ based on usability and timeliness. It should, however, be noted that, as 
shown in Table 4.4, only a small percentage of the total attributes were assessed as respectively U-
Yes (0.5%) and T-Yes (0.5%). 
In addition to U-Yes and T-Yes attributes that were measured as partially available, 50 of the 346 
attributes were from the outset measured as available (1), partially available (0.5) or absent (0) to 
improve the measurement of the breadth and depth of content. These 50 attributes are discussed 
separately in Annexure C. As per Table 4.4, 785 attributes were assessed as partially available. 
Figure 4.1 shows the number of attributes that had an average availability of less than 10%, more 
than 10% but less than 20%, etc. Figure 4.1 shows that of the 346 attributes, 286102 attributes had 
an average availability of less than 50%. Only 60103 attributes therefore showed an average 
availability of 50% or more.  
 
Figure 4.1: Average availability per attribute measured 
To judge whether these low average availabilities could be associated with a specific category or 
categories of attributes, average availabilities were examined also per category. Table 4.5 shows 
the average availability per category, as well as the number and percentage of attributes per 
category that have an average availability of 50% or less and more than 50%. 
Navigation and company information were the highest scoring categories, while investment case 
and bondholder information were the lowest scoring categories. In the navigation and company 
information categories, 36% and 32% of attributes, respectively, had an average availability of 50% 
or more, compared to 0% in the investment case and bondholder information categories. With the 
exception of bondholder information (7%), investment case (11%) and navigation (41%), the 
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 76+81+61+33+35 = 286 
103
 22+15+12+7+4 = 60 
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remaining eight categories had scores between 20% and 40%. As these eight categories 
represented 87% of the total attributes, it was not possible to conclude that any specific category or 
group of categories had resulted in the low average availabilities. 
Further all categories had between 64% and 100% of their attributes in the less than 50% category 
and between 0% and 36% in the 50% or more category. 
As the number of attributes measured per category varied from as little as five (bondholder 
information) to 64 (financial information), the last column in Table 4.5 (distribution of the less than 
50% attributes) measured the percentage distribution of the 286 attributes (i.e. attributes with an 
average availability of less than 50%) over the 11 categories. Although the financial information and 
shareholder information category attributes had the highest percentage contribution in the less than 
50% category, they were also the two largest categories in terms of the number of attributes. 














of the less 
than 50% 
attributes 
  Number % Number % Number %  
Sample 346 97.98 28 286 83 60 17  
Accessibility 13 3.59104 28105 10 77106 3 23107 3.50%108 
Navigation 14 5.69 41 9 64 5 36 3.15% 
Timeliness 12 3.99 33 10 83 2 17 3.50% 
Company 
information 
36 13.81 38 25 69 11 31 8.74% 
Financial 
information 
65 20.92 32 51 78 14 22 17.83% 
Relevant news 23 7.68 33 18 78 5 22 6.29% 
Investment 
case 
26 2.78 11 26 100 0 0 9.09% 
Shareholder 
information 
60 16.23 27 50 83 10 17 17.48% 
Bondholder 
information 
5 0.34 7 5 100 0 0 1.75% 
Corporate 
governance 
50 14.54 29 41 82 9 18 14.34% 
Corporate 
responsibility 
42 8.42 20 41 98 1 2 14.34% 
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Tables E1 and E2, Annexure E, show the 30 attributes with the highest and lowest average 
availabilities. These tables therefore reflect the minimum information that an investor can usually 
expect when visiting the website of a JSE-listed company, as well as the information that the investor 
will not find as such information is seldom available outside annual reports and presentations. 
Although the majority of company websites have basic financial information (i.e. annual and interim 
reports, including archived reports), general company information (i.e. contact details, products and 
operating divisions), basic corporate governance information (i.e. about directors and King III report) 
and news (i.e. SENS), few companies provide any corporate responsibility information, bondholder 
information, shareholder services or information to improve their investment case.  
Although companies generally provide a dedicated investor relations section on their corporate 
website, content is usually limited to financial results. Regarding the use of presentation 
technologies, the majority of companies do use some navigation tools (i.e. internal search function, 
breadcrumb trail, internal hyperlinks and clear homepage links) and have somewhat user-friendly 
homepages, but generally do not use any presentation technologies to improve the timeliness or 
accessibility of information. 
The remainder of the vertical analysis will discuss the attributes in more detail, according to the 11 
categories that were used to organise the attributes: accessibility (4.3.1), navigation (4.3.2), 
timeliness (4.3.3), company information (4.3.4), financial information (4.3.5), relevant news (4.3.6), 
investment case (4.3.7), shareholder information (4.3.8), bondholder information (4.3.9), corporate 
governance (4.3.10) and corporate responsibility (4.3.11). 
4.3.1 Accessibility 
For an investor who is unfamiliar with a company, the first step is to find the corporate website. A 
study that examined investors’ use of corporate websites, showed that 40% of users tend to guess 
the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) (i.e. website address) of a company for which they are looking, 
compared to 36% that use Google, and 24% that use other search engines or internet directories 
(Seberger, 2006). Most (74%) corporate websites investigated in this study have a unique URL.  
This study deemed the URL not unique if: (1) a similar URL existed for either a different company or 
a subsidiary of the company studied; (2) a different company used the same website address with 
only a different extension, and (3) the URL had no semantic relationship with the company. The 
following are examples: 
i) The website address for Ellies Holdings Ltd (ELI) is www.elliesholdings.co.za, but a similar 
website address is used for a subsidiary that conducts e-commerce only, i.e. www.ellies.co.za.  
ii) The website address for Micromega Holdings Ltd (MMG) is www.micromega.co.za, closely 
resembling www.micromega.com, which is the website address of an unrelated company that 
supplies audio products. 
iii) The website address for AH-Vest Limited (AHL) is www.alljoy.co.za 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
104 
Although various possible reasons exist for a company to use only one working website extension 
(e.g. co.za or .com), this dissertation argues that having both a working .co.za and .com extension 
could potentially increase website traffic. Website address extensions used by the study sample 
were as follows (number of companies): only .co.za (40), only .com (15), co.za and .com (25), 
.com.au (2), .mu (1), .co.uk (1) and .mu and .com (1). 
For some companies (e.g. www.elliesholdings.co.za and www.elliesholdings.com) both extensions 
are functional, but for other companies either the .co.za automatically redirects to the .com (e.g. 
www.howden.co.za to www.howden.com) or the .com automatically redirects to the .co.za (e.g. 
www.astrapak.com to www.astrapak.co.za). 
For a number of companies, the .com or .co.za extensions are already used by another company 
(e.g. www.bat.co.za is used by Net*Point and www.bat.com is the website address used by British 
American Tobacco (BTI)). For other companies the .com extension is still available and for sale (e.g. 
www.wbho.com) or simply not functional (i.e. “this page can’t be displayed”) (e.g. for 
www.illiadafrica.com). 
This dissertation makes the argument that – although not essential for the finding of corporate 
websites – the use of a unique URL and having both a .co and .com working website extension can 
potentially improve accessibility. The majority of companies had a unique URL (74%), and only 29% 
had both a .co and .com working website extension. 
Nielsen (1999) argues that the excessive use of graphics impacts negatively upon the user 
experience (as cited by Debreceny et al., 2001). Excessive use of graphics, without a text-only 
option, may disadvantage users with visual and hearing impairments. As measured in this study and 
discussed in Annexure C, 33 (39%) companies surveyed either used excessive graphics on their 
homepage or excessive scroll-down was necessary to see all information and links on the 
homepage.  
Specific user impairments (e.g. visual, hearing, cognitive and motor) may result in some formats 
being inaccessible to these users. Alternative formats (e.g. podcast and transcript of a conference 
call) should therefore be available. According to the IRS best practice guidelines, important content 
should be available in alternative formats. 
It should be noted that alternative formats (e.g. e-reader, Excel downloads, webcasts and transcripts) 
were also measured separately in categories other than the accessibility category (e.g. see attributes 
77 to 81 and 93 to 95 in Table D1, Annexure D). Therefore, as indicated in Table D1, Annexure D, 
for example, attributes four to six, measurement of these attributes excluded accessibility attributes 
measured elsewhere to prevent double counting. 
Notwithstanding this measurement, average availabilities for all alternative formats measured under 
accessibility were less than 10%. Only five (6%) companies used specific presentation technologies 
(e.g. option to adjust font size) to improve accessibility for users with a visual impairment.  
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Corporate websites should be accessible to users with specific user impairments for a number of 
reasons (e.g. it is ethical, it improves website traffic, and it prevents discrimination). Some basic 
steps that companies could follow to improve accessibility to these users are to refrain from the 
excessive use of graphics without a text-only option; to make use of alternative forms of content (e.g. 
transcripts and podcasts); to introduce screen readers; and to offer the option of adjusting font size. 
As discussed above, few companies currently use these technologies to improve accessibility. 
General website disclaimers, e.g. terms of use and privacy policy, were often used by corporate 
websites (55%), but only five (6%) companies used separate media or a forward-looking information 
disclaimer to make users aware of the fact, for example, that media articles published on their 
website might not include all media articles and that forward-looking information as published was 
not audited. It should, however, be noted that, as discussed in 4.3.6 (relevant news) and 4.3.7 
(investment case), not all companies publish media articles or forward-looking information. 
Further attributes used to measure accessibility included the use of a “print this page function” (22 
(26%) companies used this function) and “recommend this page function” (26 (30%) companies 
used this function). Only thirteen (15%) companies ‘advertised’ specific support for users of mobile 
devices on their corporate websites. Eighteen (21%) companies presented website content in more 
than one language.  
While it could be argued that from a cost perspective, providing website content in alternative 
languages may not be financially feasible, the vast majority of companies could improve accessibility 
by using inexpensive presentation technologies such as a “print this page” function or “recommend 
this page” function. 
4.3.2 Navigation 
Although separately categorised and discussed, navigation tools could also be viewed as 
presentation attributes that would improve the accessibility of information. The search function, FAQ, 
help function and sitemap are useful navigation tools that can assist users to find specific information 
they are looking for. The search function is the most popular navigation tool used, followed by the 
sitemap function.  
Almost two-thirds (55 companies) made a search function available. Some companies, as measured 
with the attribute ‘ability to manipulate’, offered customised search functions to enable users to limit 
their internal search of the corporate website to specific information, e.g. annual reports or media 
articles or SENS. This attribute had an average availability of 9%. 
Although 45 (53%) companies had a sitemap, sitemaps for nine companies were not fully usable 
(e.g. sitemaps were incomplete, inconsistencies existed between sitemap and corporate website 
structure, and sitemaps focused only on e-commerce offering only products and services). These 
nine companies were therefore awarded only 0.5 for the availability of a sitemap.  
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Few companies had FAQ or help functions with useful information for investors (12%), and even 
fewer (5%) categorised this information into categories to improve the navigation and accessibility 
thereof for users. Cookie policies were not often used by companies, or were used without explaining 
the concept to users.  
The accessibility of information is as important as the availability of information. Given the large and 
complex nature of corporate websites, companies could easily improve the ability of users to find 
information by using navigation tools, such as a search function, sitemap, FAQ or even a help 
function. Although the majority of companies had used a least one of these functions, an astonishing 
19 (22%) of companies had not used any of these functions to aid navigation. 
According to Debreceny et al. (2001), hyperlinks and multimedia provide a different method of 
accessing information, which could be either sequential or non-sequential, compared to conventional 
hard copy information which is primarily sequential in nature. Although hyperlinks provide some 
flexibility, as discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.5, they can result in disorientation and cognitive 
overload if not properly used. Internal (i.e. to other sections within the corporate website) hyperlinks 
were often used by companies, but only 38 (45%) of the companies used the drill down functionality 
offered by internal hyperlinks. Drill down links can be used as an effective tool to prevent information 
overload. To help prevent disorientation, users should always know where they are on the website 
and a ‘back to the homepage’ link should be clearly visible on all pages. Although both these 
functions were available in the case of the majority of company websites, 35 (41%) companies used 
neither breadcrumb trails109 nor navigation panels110 to help users orient themselves on webpages, 
and 12 (14%) companies did not have ‘back to homepage’ links on all webpages. 
Company websites often made use of external hyperlinks to other websites. As many as 50 (59%) 
companies supplied at least one external link as information source for more information about 
subsidiaries, a business segment or the parent company. However, only two companies warned 
users that they were about to leave the corporate website and that the external hyperlinks would be 
taking them to websites not maintained by the company. 
Although the use of hyperlinks (providing the drill down functionality) can improve the ability of users 
to find information, it can also compromise their ability if used inappropriately. Disorientation (i.e. 
where users get lost on websites) and lack of clear boundaries were discussed as disadvantages of 
corporate websites in Section 1.2.5. Even though companies could do far more to prevent 
disorientation, few use basic navigation functions to this effect.  
 
                                               
109
 Breadcrumb trails track and display pages in the order in which pages were viewed by a visitor, e.g. Home page > 
About us > Board of directors > Executive directors > John Doe. 
110
 Hyperlinked menu of sub-links that appear on either the left or right hand side of a webpage. 
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4.3.3 Timeliness 
An important potential advantage of corporate websites is the provision of timely and therefore 
regularly updated information to investors. Ettredge, Richardson and Scholz (2001: 150) described 
the use of the Internet for investor relations as providing individual investors with timely information 
which was in the past only available to an exclusive group of investors (i.e. analysts and institutional 
investors).  
For investors to judge the timeliness of information, it should be dated. In some cases, undated 
information may be misleading or even useless. Only 24 (28%) companies clearly dated information 
(e.g. “last updated on …”) such as shareholder and dividend information and the market 
capitalisation. Another attribute that may give some indication of timeliness is the provision of a 
copyright date on the homepage. Only 54 (64%) companies provided a copyright date on their 
homepage, with only 40 (47%) of these copyright dates being either 2014 or 2015. 
Instead of clearly dating information, companies can emphasise timeliness by clearly labelling 
information as being ‘the latest’ or by having a dedicated area or areas on the homepage for the 
latest information. Of the five timeliness indicators measured, only one, share price, had an average 
availability of more than 50%.  
Only 36 (42%) companies provided an e-mail alert service to which users could subscribe for 
updated information. Of these 36 companies, only 11 offered website users specific categories to 
choose from regarding the areas for which they would like to receive e-mail updates (e.g. company 
news, SENS, annual results, dividend information). Subscribing to a RSS111 feed removes the need 
for investors manually to check corporate websites for new content.  Only nine (11%) companies 
however offered their corporate website users the option to subscribe to RSS content feeds, but for 
two of these companies this function was assessed as absent (0). For one company, the RSS link 
was not functional (displaying the words “500 view not found”) and for the second company an RSS 
link was available, but it merely acted as an internal hyperlink to the press office. 
Only one company provided an option for its users to synchronise their own calendars with the 
company’s financial calendar. Such an option automatically populates corporate website users’ 
personal calendars with company scheduled events (e.g. release of annual results, presentations, 
annual general meetings and dividend payment dates). 
This dissertation measured timeliness in three ways: firstly, whether companies dated information to 
enable users to judge the timeliness and usability of information; secondly, whether companies 
promoted, or directed users to, updates by clearly labelling information or links as ‘the latest’ (e.g. in 
the case of the latest financial statements or updates), and finally, whether presentation technologies 
(e.g. an e-mail alert service, RSS content feed and calendar sync option) were used to improve the 
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 Really simple syndication or rich site summary. 
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flow of the latest information to users. Overall, the results show that companies can improve 
timeliness by dating information supplied on websites, by directing users to the latest information, 
and by providing functionalities such as an e-mail alert service and RSS content feed. 
This dissertation, however, did not attempt to gauge whether information supplied on corporate 
websites was in fact the latest information or how quickly companies provided newly available 
information on their websites.  
4.3.4 Company information 
According to the IRS best practice guidelines, telling the company story is one of the main functions 
of the corporate website (IRS, 2013). Although the majority of companies provided a dedicated 
‘about’ or ‘about us’ section with information about their operating divisions, their products and 
services, and their customers, few companies provided information about their vision, mission, 
objectives, critical success factors and their suppliers. Though almost all (except three) companies 
provided contact details, only 60 (71%) provided the ever-important company e-mail address. While 
43 (51%) of companies provided a dedicated history section, an astonishingly low, 15 (35%) 
companies had not updated their company history within the last two years. 
More specifically, company information results are discussed below in ten sub-categories: dedicated 
‘about us’ link, history, contact details, organisational chart and group structure, vision and mission, 
customer information, products and services, suppliers, properties and critical success factors. 
4.3.4.1 Dedicated ‘about us’ link 
The majority of companies (72%) had dedicated homepage links to either an ‘about us’ (51%) or 
‘about’ (21%) section. The remaining companies did provide company information under various 
other links (e.g. corporate profile, group, the company, profile, ‘who we are’, company profile and 
‘the company’), but only the ‘about us’ and ‘about’ links were measured, being deemed best practice. 
Most companies provided information such as a homepage summary of HTML information about the 
company (64%) and the date the company was founded (67%), but only six (7%) companies 
provided either a corporate webcast or podcast as introduction to the company’s business and 15 
(18%) companies gave a dedicated fact sheet that summarised important company information such 
as the company business, recent results, directors and share price, and dividend history. One 
company did provide a link to a corporate video, but the link was not functional (with the message 
appearing “this video does not exist”) and the attribute was therefore assessed as being absent. 
Three fact sheets were last updated 12 months earlier or contained only outdated information (older 
12 months), resulting in a score of 0.5. 
4.3.4.2 History 
Only 43 (51%) companies provided a dedicated company history section on their corporate websites. 
Important information that companies can communicate via this section include: date listed, name 
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changes, important acquisitions and disposals, and geographical expansions of the company 
business. Only 15 (35%112) companies that provided history had updated their company history 
sections within the last two years. 
4.3.4.3 Contact details 
Only three companies provided no contact details (i.e. neither telephone number nor e-mail address 
nor online form to complete). Only 71% of companies provided a company e-mail address and only 
32% provided separate investor contact details. 
4.3.4.4 Organisational chart and group structure 
An organisational chart outlines the roles, responsibilities and relationships between employees (i.e. 
internal structure of a company). Only six (7%) of the companies provided an organisational chart. 
Although almost 70% of companies provided information about their operating divisions, only 30 
companies provided a group structure (i.e. subsidiaries, associates and other investments). 
4.3.4.5 Vision and mission 
Although 42 (49%) companies had either a dedicated homepage link or sub-link (usually under the 
‘about us’ or ‘about’ section) to either one or a combination of the attributes measured in this category 
(i.e. vision, mission, strategy, business model, objectives and values), the average availability of 
these attributes was a mere 30%, with the highest average availability (42%) for reference to strategy 
and the lowest (11%) for a quantitative discussion of the strategy. 
4.3.4.6 Customer information 
More than 50% of companies reported some description or profile of their customers (62%) and 
provided either a map or list of their geographical presence (57%), but only 12 (14%) companies 
provided a list of their major customers.113 
4.3.4.7 Products and services 
Although the majority of companies did publish at least a list of their major products and services 
(76%) with a brief description thereof (60%), only 24 (28%) provided dedicated and descriptive 
downloads with detailed product and/or services information. 
4.3.4.8 Suppliers 
Few (16%) companies provided any reference to their suppliers or business partners (such as a list, 
description or brief discussion of relationships). 
                                               
112
 15 / 43 
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 For the purpose of this measurement, customers were defined as widely as possible to also include industries or 
companies that would use or retail the companies’ products, and not only end-users. 
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4.3.4.9 Properties 
Only 32% of companies provided a list or reference to major factories or warehouses or properties 
(e.g. administration headquarters or distribution centres), while only 25% provided some description 
and 27% provided photos thereof. Only four (5%) of the companies provided a virtual visit (including 
videos) to provide information of these properties to investors. 
4.3.4.10 Critical success factors 
Only 12 (14%) companies provided a reference or brief description or list of critical success 
factors.114 
4.3.5 Financial information 
Although almost all companies published their latest annual and interim reports, as well as archived 
reports (as PDF downloads) and just over 50% provided PDF slides of annual and interim results 
presentations, less than half of the companies provided additional financial information to aid 
financial analysis, such as financial ratios and key performance indicators. Few companies, however, 
made any attempt to improve the accessibility of information either by providing dedicated and 
descriptive hyperlinks to information inside PDF reports and presentations, by providing homepage 
links to promote available information, or by using alternative formats such as HTML financial 
statements hyperlinked to notes and spreadsheet downloads of financial information or transcripts 
and podcasts of results presentations. 
Financial information results will now be discussed in more detail in four sub-categories: financial 
reports, presentations, financial analysis, and archives. 
4.3.5.1 Financial reports 
Almost all companies published annual financial statements and/or115 integrated annual reports 
(96%) and interim reports (88%) as PDF downloads. However, few companies provided any 
alternative formats or dedicated homepage links to these reports or updated financial information 
since the latest annual, integrated or interim report was published. According to the IRS best practice 
guidelines, important content should be available in alternative formats (e.g. both PDF and HTML).  
Interviews with fund managers and analysts revealed that the majority of these users prefer their 
documents in PDF format, with only the minority preferring HTML type documents (Jones, 2009). 
According to a survey by Beattie and Pratt (2003) expert users (i.e. investment analysts and fund 
managers) prefer spreadsheet downloads and are less in favour of HTML and PDF file formats. 
Private shareholders ranked HTML as the most preferred file format and PDF the least.  Gassen 
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 Measurement or quantitative information was measured separately under the financial information category, and any 
strategy or implementation issues under the investment case category. 
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 Although JSE-listed companies are required to publish an integrated annual report, some also publish annual financial 
statements. Companies with a primary listing other than the JSE publish mostly annual financial statements. Most (82%) 
companies publish an integrated annual report and 44% publish annual financial statements. 
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(2001: 20), on the other hand, reports experimental research results that strongly suggest that 
participants prefer HTML reports over PDF reports. In the Gassen study, participants were required 
to answer specific questions from financial reports. Participants were able to answer questions faster 
and with fewer mistakes using HTML compared to PDF reports. Based on these results, Gassen 
(2001: 20) argues that these alternative formats are not mutually exclusive. 
The following five attributes (average availability percentage given in brackets) were used to 
measure alternative formats to the PDF annual financial statements or integrated annual reports: e-
book (also called e-reader) (18%), online mini results site (35%), HTML (24%), HTML financial 
statements hyperlinked to notes (15%) and spreadsheet (i.e. Excel) downloads (11%). Online mini 
results sites are dedicated sections on corporate websites for financial reports. Although they all 
differed – for instance, some provided HTML financial statements and some only provided PDF 
downloads – they all attempted to improve the navigation and accessibility of the various sections of 
reports by providing separate links to the main sections of the annual reports (e.g. operations, 
corporate governance, sustainability and financial results). HTML financial statements that are 
hyperlinked to notes improve navigation and can prevent information overload by linking each 
financial statement line item to a financial note or set of notes for more information (i.e. drill down).  
Only 14 (16%) companies provided at least one alternative format116 to the PDF interim annual 
report. As interim reports contain significantly less information than annual financial statements or 
integrated annual reports, alternative formats were not measured separately.  
A direct homepage link to financial reports can improve the accessibility thereof to investors. Only 
34% and 21% of corporate websites provided direct homepage links to the annual or interim reports 
respectively. Given the importance of the auditor’s and chairman’s report, two attributes measured 
whether the auditor’s reports were available via a separate link (e.g. via online mini results site) and 
whether the auditor’s reports were linked to financial statements, and one attribute measured 
whether the chairman’s reports were available via separate link or not. 
Although the auditor’s report is part of the annual financial statements or integrated annual reports, 
separate links will improve the accessibility thereof. Only 18% of corporate websites provided a 
separate link to the auditor’s report and only 8% provided one or more hyperlinks to the financial 
statements that were audited. Only 32% provided a separate link to the chairman’s report. Although 
companies can use internal links to any specific sections of the annual financial statements or 
integrated annual reports to improve the accessibility thereof (e.g. “for more information about the 
intangible assets, click here”), only 11 (13%) companies used such links and, of these companies, 
two companies provided outdated links, which were assessed as only 0.5. 
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 The following were assessed as alternative formats: e-book, spreadsheet download (e.g. Excel), online mini results site 
and html financial statements. 
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4.3.5.2 Presentations 
Results presentations refer to presentations held by the company to present annual and interim 
results (quarterly results presentations were not measured). Investor presentations117 (all other 
presentations, excluding annual general meeting presentations) were measured under the 
investment case category. Annual general meeting presentations were measured under the 
shareholder information category.  
The majority of companies provided PDF slides of annual and interim results presentations 
(respectively 58% and 55%), but, as with financial reports, few provided alternative formats. Specific 
user impairments (e.g. visual, hearing, cognitive and motor) may result in some formats being 
inaccessible to these users. Alternative formats (e.g. podcasts and transcript of a conference call) 
should therefore be available. Few companies however provided alternative formats. Webcasts were 
the most popular alternative format with an average availability of 19% for annual report 
presentations and 15% for interim report presentations. Second were podcasts with 10% average 
availability (annual) and 15% (interim), and last were transcripts with 6% for both annual and interim. 
According to a survey done by Jones (2009), the provision of transcripts was the most frequently 
mentioned alternative format among fund managers and analysts. 
To improve the accessibility of presentations, around one-third of companies used dedicated and 
descriptive links for presentations. Only 16% and 15% of companies, however, provided direct 
homepage links to annual and interim results presentation slides, respectively. 
4.3.5.3 Financial analysis 
Three different types of attributes were measured under the financial analysis category: financial 
highlights or summaries, financial ratios, and key performance indicators. As in the case of financial 
reports and presentations, not only the availability of the attributes was measured, but also the use 
of presentation technologies and links to improve the accessibility thereof. In descending order, 
average availabilities were as follows: share price related ratios (49%), financial statement-related 
summaries or highlights (46%), financial ratios (excluding share price-related ratios) (37%), and key 
performance indicators (20%).  
The following ratios were measured as share price-related ratios: earnings per share, dividends per 
share, price/earnings ratio, share return, and share liquidity. The financial ratio availability of 37% 
applied to companies that provided at least one financial ratio. The average availability of companies 
that provided two, three of four ratios were 28% and for five and more ratios it was 14%. Examples 
of financial ratios included the current ratio, debtors’ days, inventory days, creditors’ days, return on 
equity, return on assets, solvency ratio, and interest cover. Only eight (9%) companies had organised 
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these ratios in relevant categories (e.g. liquidity, solvency, and profitability) to improve the navigation 
thereof. 
Only 20% of companies provided at least one key performance indicator (KPI). The following ratios 
were counted as being a KPI ratio: ratios clearly labelled as KPIs and ratios under headings such 
as, “how do we measure success?” or “measurement of critical success factors”.  
The usefulness of highlights or summaries, ratios and KPIs is increased if the information is provided 
for more than one year. Few companies, however, provided a comparison with previous years. Only 
16% (financial highlights or summaries), 20% (financial ratios) and 7% (KPIs) of companies provided 
archived information for more than one year on their corporate websites. As financial statements 
always include comparative information for one financial year, highlights or summaries, ratios and 
KPIs that were provided for only one archive year were ignored. 
Dedicated and descriptive links or downloads were measured as presentation attributes that could 
improve the accessibility of information. Average availabilities were 24% for financial statement 
highlights or summaries, 41% for share price-related ratios, 22% for financial ratios and 8% for KPIs. 
4.3.5.4 Archives 
Four different types of attributes were measured under the archive category: annual results archives, 
interim results archives, annual and interim results presentations, and other investor presentations 
(excluding results presentations).  
Almost all companies provided archived annual reports (94%) and interim reports (92%) for at least 
25% of qualifying listed years118 or three years, but only 52% and 45% provided archived annual and 
interim reports respectively for all qualifying years or 12 years. As with financial reports (see Section 
5.3.5.1 above), few companies provided alternative formats to the PDF report. Only 25% of 
companies provided at least one alternative format (e.g. HTML, spreadsheet or e-reader) for the first 
annual report archive year and 16% for the first interim report archive year.  
Companies which provided annual results presentation slides generally also provided archived 
slides with an average availability of 60%, 55% and 48% for the first, second and third archived years 
respectively. Although 31% of companies provided at least one investor presentation and 13% at 
least two in the past 12 months,119 average availabilities of only 12%, 25% and 19% were measured 
for the first, second and third archived years respectively. 
As with presentations (see Section 4.3.5.2 above), few companies provided alternative formats120 to 
PDF presentation slides, with average availabilities of only 25%, 11% and 4% measured for 
companies that provided at least one, two or three alternative formats for either results or investor 
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 Investor presentations provided for the past 12 months were measured under the investment case category and only 
archive investor presentations were therefore measured here. 
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 The following were assessed as alternative formats: webcasts, podcasts and transcripts. 
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presentations. To improve accessibility and navigation, 41 (48%) companies organised their 
archives either per annum or used a filter to improve the accessibility to specific archives. 
4.3.6 Relevant news 
This category distinguished between three types of news: SENS121, media (or press) releases 
prepared by the company, and news published in the financial media. Some companies did not make 
any attempt to distinguish between these categories. Some provided SENS, media releases and 
news published by the financial media in one list under one heading. Given the distinct nature of 
these categories, this study assessed such cases as not fully usable (refer to Section 1.2.2 in 
Annexure C). 
Although the majority of companies provided SENS information on their websites, only 41 (48%) 
companies published media releases and only 21 (25%) re-published news published in the financial 
media. Even though the content thereof was not examined in this study, 33 (39%) companies 
promoted their use of at least one of the following social media channels on their website: Twitter, 
YouTube, Linkedln and Facebook. 
Similar to the situation with financial information, few companies made any attempt to improve the 
accessibility of news items, for example, by categorising news items per annum or providing search 
or filter options, by offering alternative formats (e.g. podcasts), or by providing dedicated contact 
details of the public relations department for the public and media. Only 34 (40%) of companies 
provided such contact details. 
Results will now be discussed in more detail in three sub-categories: SENS, media releases 
prepared by the company, and news published in the financial media. 
4.3.6.1 SENS 
JSE listing requirements oblige companies to use SENS to publish corporate news or price-sensitive 
information prior to using any other media outlet (JSE, 2016a). The majority of companies also 
provided current (75%) and archived (68%) SENS information on their corporate websites. To 
improve the accessibility and navigation of SENS information, 44 (52%) companies categorised 
archived SENS information per annum and 14 (16%) provided an option for users to manipulate 
SENS information, for instance to search or filter for specific topics within SENS articles. The attribute 
‘dedicated SENS link’ measured whether companies provided direct access to SENS via a 
homepage link (18 companies (21%)) or via a sub-link under another category (e.g. ‘about us’ or 
‘investor relations’) (53 companies). 
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4.3.6.2 Media (press) releases made by the company 
The availability of media releases122 was measured for the current year (i.e. the past twelve months) 
and two archive years. Although 41 companies provided media releases for the current year, 12 of 
these companies did not clearly distinguish between media releases made by the company and 
news published in the financial media. Similar results were documented for the two archived years. 
Regarding the use of alternative formats, only six (7%) of the companies used pod- or webcasts to 
communicate news to investors.123 
A survey by Investis in 2013124, found that 54% of companies globally125 use social media for 
corporate or investor relations communications. According to Investis, the three most important 
social media platforms for investor relations communications are Twitter, YouTube and Linkedln. 
Less popular mediums are Facebook, Google +, Flickr and Slide Share. The four most popular social 
media channels used by companies in this study, in descending average availability, were: Twitter 
(28%), Linkedln (24%), Facebook (22%) and YouTube (16%). A small number of companies used 
media such as Google+, Flickr, Pinterest, blogging, Instagram and Foursquare. 
4.3.6.3 News published by the financial media 
Compared to the number of companies that publish SENS and media releases made by the 
company, fewer companies re-publish news published by the financial media. Average availability 
for the current (i.e. the past twelve months) and two archived years ranged between 19% and 22% 
for printed material. A similar percentage (20%) was reported for companies that re-published or 
shared media webcasts (i.e. media interviews or discussions of a company). 
4.3.7 Investment case 
The IRS lists four attributes that should be included for a good investment case: corporate profile 
(i.e. history, products and services, geographical reach and industry), analysis of the company’s 
markets and future trends, current sector challenges and an online investor pack (i.e. a summary of 
key information providing a motivation for an investment in the company). Although various attributes 
measuring corporate profiles had already been measured under the company information category, 
some additional attributes were measured here. 
Investment case results are discussed in four sub-categories:  investment pack, forecasts, industry 
and corporate profile. Of the 11 categories measured, the investment case category had the second 
lowest average availability (bondholder information was the lowest). None of the 26 attributes 
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measured in this category had an average availability of 50% or more. The only two attributes that 
were provided by at least 25% of companies were accolades via awards and investor presentations 
(excluding results presentations). 
4.3.7.1 Investment pack 
Only 13 (15%) companies made some sort of investment pack available, giving reasons to invest in 
the company. Two companies provided outdated information (i.e. older than 12 months) and were 
therefore only awarded 0.5, as discussed in Section 1.2.2 in Annexure C. 
4.3.7.2 Forecasts 
With average availabilities ranging between 2% (cash flow forecasts) and 18% (production, sales or 
profit forecasts), it is clear that few companies opted to provide forecast information outside 
presentations, annual reports and news items.126 Regarding marketing opportunities, only five (6%) 
companies referred to future marketing opportunities (i.e. expansion in sales or geographical reach) 
that were being investigated by the company. Only two companies provided a dedicated link to 
forecast information. Therefore, most of the small number of companies that did give this forecast 
information provided the forecasts as part of another link (e.g. ‘about us’) or another document (e.g. 
fact sheet or corporate brochure). 
Though not a forecast, 12 (14%) companies did indeed provide some form of updated financial 
information since the last annual or interim results were published. 
4.3.7.3 Industry 
Only 15 (18%) companies provided information to describe the industry in which the company 
operates, and only four (5%) of the companies provided a forecast or discussion of expected future 
industry trends. 
4.3.7.4 Corporate profile 
Attributes that measured the history, structure, products and services, and geographical reach of the 
company have already been discussed in the company information category in Section 4.3.4. One 
quarter of companies provided details of at least one accolade via awards (e.g.  product or service 
quality, research and development, financial reporting, sustainability reporting and marketing),  
customer testimonials or employee testimonials. Only seven (8%) companies discussed how they 
managed quality in the company, two (2%) strategies and plans for achieving critical success factors 
and two (2%) specific actions that were taken in this regard. Almost no companies provided 
information (either quantitative or qualitative) regarding their research and development activities 
and intangible assets outside annual reports, presentations and news items.  
                                               
126
 As discussed in Section 8.1 in Annexure C. 
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Although few companies provided forecasts, and industry and corporate profile information, as 
discussed above, nearly one-third of companies provided PDF slides of at least one investor 
presentation that was held during the previous 12 months. As discussed in Sections 4.3.5.2 and 
4.3.5.4 above, investor presentations excluded result presentations and the presentations held at 
annual general meetings. The content of presentations was not examined, and it is acknowledged 
that they might have included relevant investment case information such as forecasts, industry 
discussion and reasons to invest, given the nature of these presentations. To facilitate navigation, 
22 (26%) companies provided a dedicated and descriptive link for investor presentations. 
Almost all of these investor presentations were, however, only available via PDF slides, with only 
one company providing transcripts and four companies providing either a pod- or webcast of investor 
presentations on their corporate websites. 
4.3.8 Shareholder information 
Even though almost 90% of companies had a dedicated investor relations link, the majority of 
companies provided less than 50% of the attributes measured under this category. Around 50% of 
companies published the following information on their websites: shareholder communication (e.g. 
circulars), company advisors (e.g. commercial bankers and sponsors), share price information (e.g. 
share price history and interactive charts), a financial calendar, and listing information. Very few 
companies, however, published any dividend information, information related to analysts (e.g. 
reports), shareholder information (e.g. principal shareholders) or minutes of shareholder meetings 
(e.g. outcomes of AGMs). 
Although much of the information measured in this category was probably also available from other 
sources, this dissertation makes the argument that it is less convenient, more costly or more time-
consuming for investors to access these sources. Furthermore, few companies made any attempt 
to promote the availability of shareholder information inside other sources (e.g. the annual report) or 
made any significant effort to create opportunities for investors to obtain relevant information (e.g. 
by providing a dedicated investor relations e-mail contact address, a manual explaining the 
procedures for persons who wish to request information or a reference to the existence of a 
shareholder relations policy). 
Shareholder information results are now discussed in more detail in 13 sub-categories: dedicated 
investor relations section, contact details, shareholder communications, Promotion of Access to 
Information Act (PAIA), company advisors, analysts, share price information, dividend information, 
shareholder information, shareholder meetings, financial calendar, listing information and other 
shareholder services and information. 
4.3.8.1 Dedicated investor relations section 
Almost all companies (76 or 89%) had a dedicated investor relations link on their homepage. One 
company’s link was, however, only visible after scrolling down through a range of e-commerce 
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information on the homepage and was therefore assessed as not being fully usable (thus 0.5 was 
awarded for the attribute). Although various alternative link titles were also accepted in this study 
(see Section 9.1 in Annexure C), 72%127 of companies with dedicated links used either investor 
relations (36) or investors (19) to describe the link. 
Content provided via the investor relations link varied significantly and, although some companies 
used the link as a portal to all relevant investor-related information, some provided only the minimum 
information (i.e. share price information) under the investor relations link, with separate homepage 
links for financial and corporate governance information. 
4.3.8.2 Contact details 
Though 54 (64%) companies provided a dedicated link for investor relations contact details, the type 
of contact details that were provided, as well as where the link could be accessed, varied significantly 
between companies. Among the companies that provided such a dedicated link, 31 (36%) provided 
the link as a sub-link under the homepage contact link, and 43 (51%) provided the link as sub-link 
under the investor relations section. Therefore, 20 (24%) companies (i.e. 31+43-54) provided an 
investor contact link under both the homepage contact and investor relations sections. 
Of the 45 (53%) companies that provided an e-mail address, 25 provided only a general e-mail 
address (e.g. Investor@hunter.co.za) and 20 provided a dedicated e-mail address (e.g. 
JohnDoe@hunter.co.za). 
Although only 20 (24%) companies provided a dedicated e-mail address, 38 (45%) provided the 
name of the person that could be contacted and 27 (32%) gave a job title for the contact person. 
Only one company provided detailed information of the investor relations department. One possible 
reason for this lack of detail could be that companies simply may not have an investor relations 
department and that the function is either outsourced or resorts under an existing department (e.g. 
finance). According to a survey of the investor relations function of UK-listed companies, only 20% 
had a dedicated investor relations officer (Marston, 1996: 482). Of the remaining companies, 32% 
had an investor relations function, but organised as part of another department and 48% had no 
investor relations function (either separate or as part of another department). Survey participants 
with an investor relations function (i.e. the 20% and the 32%) were asked to provide their job titles. 
These titles varied widely and included descriptions such as investor relations, corporate affairs, 
public relations, corporate communications, finance director and company secretary. 
4.3.8.3 Shareholder communications 
Although about 50% of companies provided general shareholder communications (e.g. circulars128), 
they were mostly scattered around the website. Only 28% of companies provided a dedicated section 
                                               
127
 (36 + 19) / 76 
128
 Examples include rights issues, share consolidations and share splits and de-listings. 
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for such communications.  Few companies provided newsletters or some form of online shareholder 
administration or communication,129 with average availabilities of 14% for newsletters and 12% for 
online shareholder administration or communication respectively. 
4.3.8.4 Promotion of Access to Information Act  
According to the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA), companies must publish a manual 
explaining the relevant procedures for persons who wish to request access to information. A total of 
38 (45%) companies did provide access to this manual on their corporate website, but one 
company’s link was not functional, one manual was outdated (i.e. 2012) and only 17 (20%) 
companies provided a descriptive link130 to facilitate access to the manual. 
4.3.8.5 Company advisors 
Nearly 50% of companies provided a list of company advisors (e.g. sponsor, transfer agent, 
commercial banker, and external auditor). Significant variation existed between the places where 
the list was provided (e.g. under ‘investor relations’, ‘about us’ or ‘contact details’).  
4.3.8.6 Analysts 
Only 13 (15%) companies made a list of analysts available (that follow the company), and of these 
only 10 (12%) provided contact details for all the analysts (two companies provided contact details 
only for some of the analysts listed). Less than 10% of companies provided reports131 that were 
published by these analysts (e.g. forecasts and buy/sell/hold opinions). 
4.3.8.7 Share price information 
Around 50% of companies offered share price information, such as a share price history (52%), 
volume traded (55%), interactive charts (45%) and market capitalisation (44%). Only 16 (19%) 
companies provided the option to compare the company’s share price history with an index (e.g. 
JSE or Top 40 or Industry) and only 21 (25%) companies provided a share price calculator (e.g. to 
calculate the current market value of x number of shares or the share price growth of x number of 
shares bought on x date). 
Although around a third (32%) of companies provided information relating to their capital structure 
(e.g. number and types of shares authorised and issued), only 11 (13%) companies referred to 
recent changes in the capital structure. 
                                               
129
 Examples include an online share register, online share management, and an online investor information order service. 
130
 Examples of descriptive links are: information act, access to information act, and access to information manual. The 
following were deemed not to be descriptive links: PAIA, Section 51 Act, terms and conditions, privacy policy and 
disclaimer. 
131
 Excluding credit ratings and industry-related reports that were separately measured under the bondholder information 
and investment case categories, respectively. 
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4.3.8.8 Dividend information 
This study did not attempt to distinguish between companies that had and didn’t have paid dividends 
in the previous financial year. Only 33 (39%) companies provided information about their latest 
dividend. Of these companies, only 13 (15%) provided information of important dividend dates (such 
as date declared, last day of registration to be entitled to receive the dividend, and date on which the 
dividend will be paid). Although 32 (38%) companies provided some dividend history (e.g. dividend 
payments over the last 10 years), only 10 (12%) companies provided a qualitative discussion of their 
dividend policy and only two (2%) provided quantitative dividend policy information (e.g. ‘our policy 
is to maintain a dividend to earnings per share ratio of 0.2’). 
Six companies provided access to a dividend calculator (for ease of working out, e.g. amount of 
dividends that will be received by a holder of x number of shares), and two companies made 
reference to a dividend reinvestment plan. 
4.3.8.9 Shareholder information 
Few companies published shareholder information outside their annual reports. A total of 24 (28%) 
companies provided a list of their principal shareholders, while six provided outdated information 
(older than 12 months). Criteria used by companies to define a shareholder as ‘principal’ also differed 
and varied between the use of a percentage (e.g. all shareholders with an interest exceeding 5%) to 
a list containing top shareholders (e.g. the ten largest shareholders). These criteria were however 
not applied consistently by companies and some, for example use a 3% shareholder interest to 
define principle shareholders and others publish the largest five shareholders. 
Only 14 (16%) companies provided shareholder analysis information (e.g. number of shareholders 
for different classes of shareholding percentages (<1%, 1% - 5%, etc.)), but again six (7%) provided 
outdated information and the criteria used to categorise or analyse shareholdings varied between 
companies. 
4.3.8.10 Shareholder meetings 
On average less than 10% of companies made information available about the outcome of annual 
general or general meetings (e.g. voting results). Only one company provided any reference to the 
availability of online participation of meetings. 
Although 38 (45%) companies provided a date for their next annual general meeting, 15 (18%) of 
these dates were outdated and were therefore assessed as outdated (0.5.). Examples of outdated 
dates were company A that referred to the next meeting that “will be held 19 May 2015” in August 
2015 and company B which stated that “the 2014 annual general meeting will be held 22 October 
2014” in June 2015. Around a third of companies provided notices to annual general meetings (34%) 
and other general meetings (26%). 
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4.3.8.11 Financial calendar 
A financial calendar can be used by companies to communicate important dates, such as the dates 
of the release of financial results, AGMs and dividend payments. For such a calendar to be useful, 
it should, as a minimum, include some future dates and be available via a descriptive link. The 
financial calendar of nine (11%) companies did not include any future dates and were therefore 
assessed as outdated (0.5). Only four (5%) of the 53 (62%) companies that did provide a calendar 
did not use a descriptive link132 or homepage title to describe their calendar. A mere eight (9%) 
companies provided reference to closed or silent periods and only one company provided an option 
for investors to synchronise their own calendar with the company’s calendar. The calendar 
synchronise option was measured under the timeliness category. 
4.3.8.12 Listing information 
More than 50% of companies made some listing information available, e.g. name of exchange listed 
(79%), date listed (59%) and any further listing or exchange information (52%). Only 22 (26%) 
companies provided a statement of listing requirements compliance regarding the exchange where 
listed (e.g. JSE). While this study made no attempt to distinguish between companies with an 
American Depository Receipts (ADR) programme, and those without, only 12 (14%) companies 
provided any reference to having an ADR programme. 
4.3.8.13 Other shareholder services or information 
Only seven (8%) companies offered a glossary of terms to explain concepts to investors (e.g. ex-
dividend share price or price/earnings ratio). Only five (6%) companies provided access to a 
complete downloadable shareholder relations policy, with eight (9%) companies providing a mere 
reference or brief one- or two-page description of the existence of such a policy.  
4.3.9 Bondholder information 
Only 10 (12%) of the companies published bondholder information via a dedicated and descriptive 
link. Few companies provided any of the attributes measured here, with average availabilities 
ranging between 2% (debt presentations), 7% (information on listed debt instruments) and 11% 
(reference to credit ratings as issued by credit rating agencies). Only one company provided contact 
details for the treasury department. 
4.3.10 Corporate governance 
Compared to the 90%, 76% and 72% of companies that had provided a dedicated investor relations, 
news and ‘about’ or ‘about us’ link, only 58% of companies provided a dedicated corporate 
                                               
132
 Non-descriptive links for the purpose of this study were shareholder structure, shareholder services, unit holders’ 
information and quarterly, annual and interim reports. Descriptive links used varied from shareholders’ diary, investor diary, 
diary, investor calendar, shareholders’ calendar, financial calendar, calendar, events calendar, events and unitholders 
diary. 
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governance link. Although many of the attributes measured in this category (e.g. information about 
directors, board committees and risk management) were also available in the integrated annual 
report, similar to shareholder information discussed in Section 4.3.9, this dissertation makes the 
point that it is less convenient, more costly or more time-consuming for investors to access these 
sources. Almost a third of companies did promote the availability of corporate governance 
information inside the annual report, however, according to the IRS best practice guidelines (IRS, 
2013), it is no longer sufficient for companies simply to refer corporate website users to relevant 
parts of the annual report for corporate governance information. 
Granting that a significant number of companies did provide a list of directors with basic biographical 
information (e.g. photographs, age, qualifications, experience, type of director and information about 
other directorships), only a small number of companies provided any information (i.e. outside the 
annual report) about directors’ shareholdings, performance evaluation, remuneration or attendance 
of board meetings.  
Although just over 50% of companies did provide a list of board committees, only half of these 
companies provided any further detail such as board charters and board membership. Almost none 
of these companies provided any information about the attendance and outcomes of board meetings. 
Even though almost all companies provided a King III compliance schedule, companies neglected 
to provide important corporate governance documents such as a code of conduct, memorandum of 
incorporation, insider trading and whistle-blowing policy.  
Corporate governance information results are now discussed in more detail in 11 sub-categories: 
dedicated corporate governance links, corporate governance report, King III, directors, executives 
and management, board committees, management committees, code of conduct, memorandum of 
incorporation, insider trading policy, and whistle-blowing policy. 
4.3.10.1 Dedicated corporate governance links 
Thirty-six (42%) companies provided no dedicated corporate governance link and therefore no 
dedicated section for corporate governance information. Some of these companies provided 
corporate governance-related information, but the information was scattered over various sections 
of the corporate website. Of the remaining 49 (58%) companies, 13 (15%) provided a direct 
homepage link to corporate governance and 36 (42%) a corporate governance link as sub-link under 
a homepage link (usually ‘about us’ or ‘investor relations’). 
4.3.10.2 Corporate governance report 
Only three (4%) companies published a separate corporate governance report for the last financial 
year and only two companies archived corporate governance reports. Given the scope of integrated 
and annual reports, and the fact that integrated reports generally include the required corporate 
governance information, internal links to specific sections of corporate governance would improve 
the accessibility of such information (e.g. “for more information about the board of directors, please 
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click here”). Of the 28 (33%) companies that did provide such a link, one link was not functional and 
five links were outdated (i.e. not for the most current annual results). Four (5%) companies did 
provide an internal link to specific sections of a corporate governance manual, policy or charter (e.g. 
“for more information about the whistle-blowing policy, please click here”). 
4.3.10.3 King III 
With an average availability of 71%, almost all companies provided either a complete King III 
compliance schedule or at least a reference to or summary of compliance. As discussed in Section 
11.2.2., Annexure C, King III equivalents were also assessed. 
4.3.10.4 Directors 
Although 75 (88%) companies provided a list of directors, 11 (13%) companies’ lists were assessed 
to be outdated, with only 0.5 awarded, as discussed in Section 1.2.2 in Annexure C. The following 
are three examples of lists that were assessed as outdated by this study. Company A listed Director 
A as a director, but the director had already resigned the previous year. Company B discussed the 
board of directors and referred to x number of directors, but listed only x-2 directors in its list. 
Company C had two lists of directors on its corporate website and, according to list one, x directors 
were serving, but according to list two, y directors were serving. Of the companies that provided a 
list of directors, 57 (67%) companies also provided photographs and 30 (35%) companies provided 
the age of directors.  
The majority of companies provided further information (average availability) about their 
qualifications (64%), experience (63%), date appointed to the board (54%), board committees 
involved (42%), type of directorship (e.g. chairman, chief executive, chief financial officer) (81%) with 
a clear distinction between executive and non-executive directors (45%) and other directorships 
(73%). Thirty-seven (44%) companies provided the name of the company secretary. Only 13 (15%) 
companies provided a detailed policy of board responsibilities, with 18 (21%) companies providing 
only a brief reference or summary of board responsibilities, and the remaining 54 (64%) companies 
providing neither reference nor policy beyond the annual financial statement, integrated annual 
report or corporate governance report. 
A few companies, however, provided information such as (average availability): policies regarding 
board membership (15%), compensation (6%), directors’ ownership (8%), recent board 
appointments and retirements (5%), board meeting attendance (5%), directors’ share trading (1%), 
and minutes of board meetings (1%). 
4.3.10.5 Executives and management 
Only 42 (49%) companies provided a list of executives and management, and only 34 (40%) 
companies provided photographs of their executives. Almost all companies that provided a list of 
executives also provided the responsibilities of executives and managers (e.g. head of marketing). 
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Slightly less than half of companies that provided this list, also provided information about executives’ 
qualifications, experience and date of appointment. 
4.3.10.6 Board committees 
Just over half of the companies (55%) made a list of board committees (e.g. audit, risk, remuneration, 
health and environment, nomination, transformation, social and ethics and investment) available. In 
the case of the companies that had provided such a list, the number of board committees given 
varied significantly, with the average number of board committees being 4.25 and the standard 
deviation being 1.44. Some companies combined two or more committees, while others had 
separate committees (e.g. audit and risk combined, compared to separate audit and risk 
committees). Although 33 (39%) and 34 (40%) companies did provide board charters and board 
committee membership information respectively, only 15 (18%) companies provided complete 
charters and 22 (26%) listed the members of each committee. The remaining companies provided 
only summaries of charters and the policy used to govern board committee membership.  
Risk management is a board responsibility. Twenty-three (27%) companies provided at least a brief 
summary or description of their risk management framework (one outdated).  Ten (12%) companies 
provided at least a brief description of their remuneration policy (one outdated), and nine (11%) 
companies provided their board performance evaluation policy, but only three (4%) company’s linked 
compensation to performance evaluation in some way. Regarding board attendance, only six (7%) 
companies provided attendance records for board committees (one outdated), and four (5%) 
companies provided outcomes of board committee meetings (one outdated).  
4.3.10.7 Management committees 
Almost no companies provided any information about management committee members and 
management committee charters, with average availabilities of 6% and 5% respectively. 
4.3.10.8 Code of conduct  
The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC, 2007) defines the code of conduct as follows: 
Principles, values, standards, or rules of behaviour that guide the decisions, procedures 
and systems of an organization in a way that (a) contributes to the welfare of its key 
stakeholders, and (b) respects the rights of all constituents affected by its operations  
Twenty-nine (34%) companies published either a summary (7%) or a complete downloadable code 
of conduct (27%). Twenty-three (27%) companies also discussed the importance of having such a 
code for the effective management of the company. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
125 
4.3.10.9 Memorandum of incorporation133 
The South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA, 2009) defines the memorandum of 
incorporation (MOI) as the document that “sets out the rights, duties and responsibilities of 
shareholders, directors and others within a company”. As the MOI is required by the South African 
Companies Act and not all companies examined in this study are registered in South Africa, this 
study defines MOI also to include similar documents used by other jurisdictions (e.g. Articles of 
Association (UK) or Articles of Incorporation (US and Canada). 
Twenty-eight (33%) companies made either their memorandum of incorporation or similar document, 
as discussed above, available on their corporate website. 
4.3.10.10 Insider trading policy 
Although 17 (20%) companies referred to or briefly described their insider trading policy (e.g. 
discussion of price sensitive dealings by directors), only three (4%) companies provided a complete 
policy. 
4.3.10.11 Whistle-blowing policy  
Twenty-one (25%) companies referred to or briefly described their whistle-blowing policy (e.g. how 
to report misconduct or corruption or how to raise concerns), but only eight (9%) provided a complete 
policy. Almost all of these companies (25 of the 29) provided relevant contact details (e.g. tip-offs 
anonymous). 
4.3.11 Corporate responsibility 
Similar to the 58% of companies that provided a dedicated corporate governance section, 59% 
provided a dedicated corporate responsibility section. Although many of the attributes measured in 
this category (similar to corporate governance) might also have been available in their integrated 
annual reports, few companies promoted the availability of such information. Even though not equally 
important for all companies examined, less than a third of companies provided an environmental or 
health and safety policy or report. 
Although nearly 60% of companies published some sort of workplace-related policy, few companies 
provided any detail about their workforce (e.g. number, average age, breakdown, remuneration, and 
union affiliation). Notwithstanding the potential commercial value thereof, less than 50% of 
companies provided their latest BBBEE certificate or detail about their community involvement and 
stakeholder relationships. 
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 The 2008 Companies Act of South Africa requires a memorandum of incorporation (MOI) to register a company. It 
replaces the articles and memorandum of association that were required by the previous Companies Act.  
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Corporate responsibility information results are now discussed in more detail in seven sub-
categories: dedicated corporate responsibility links, reports, policies, BBBEE, employees, corporate 
citizenship and stakeholders. 
4.3.11.1 Dedicated corporate responsibility links 
Thirty-four (40%) companies had a direct homepage link to a dedicated corporate responsibility 
section and a further 16 (19%) provided a sub-link to such a section under a homepage link (usually 
‘about us’ or ‘investor relations’). Although the remaining 35 (41%) companies had therefore provided 
no dedicated section for corporate responsibility issues, some of these companies did provide 
corporate responsibility-related information, but the information was scattered over various sections 
of the corporate website. 
4.3.11.2 Reports 
Slightly more companies offered archived corporate responsibility reports (i.e. sustainability or social 
reports) (25%) compared to a current corporate responsibility reports (i.e. for the latest financial year) 
(21%). Given the scope of integrated and annual reports, and the fact that integrated reports 
generally include the required corporate responsibility information, internal links to specific corporate 
responsibility sections would improve the accessibility of such information (e.g. ‘for more information 
about the stakeholders relationships strategy, click here’). Of the 20 companies that did provide such 
a link, one link was not functional and six were outdated (i.e. not for the most current annual results).  
Few companies (average availability percentage given in brackets) provided the following as either 
a separate report or via a dedicated inside hyperlink to the relevant section in either the annual 
financial statement, integrated annual report or the corporate responsibility (i.e. sustainability or 
social report) report: environmental report (15%), health and safety report (12%), value added 
statement (8%), carbon report (24%), water usage report (16%), discussion of work-related 
accidents (18%), and progress made on environmental issues (11%).  
Regarding alternative formats, only four companies (one not functional) provided a sustainability-
related web- or podcast (e.g. interview with directors on sustainability issues). Further, some 
companies also provided information about compliance with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
(24%), United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) principles (9%), International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) standards (14%), and the JSE Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) index 
(9%). 
Additionally, in total 13 (15%) companies referred to compliance of at least one of the following: 
National Occupational Safety Association (NOSA) (three companies), National Environmental 
Management Act (NEMA) (one company), industry membership (sustainability-related) (six  
companies), and Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series (OHSAS) 18001 (seven  
companies). 
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4.3.11.3 Policies 
Some companies had a combined safety, health, environmental and quality (SHEQ) policy and 
others separated policies (e.g. an environmental policy, and a health and safety policy). The majority 
of companies (66%) that provided an environmental policy only gave a summary or brief description 
thereof (25 of 38 companies), with only 34% providing a complete policy. Thirty (35%) companies 
also provided some information about their environmental objectives. 
Similar results were found for health and safety policies, where 26 (31%) companies provided only 
a summary or brief description, and merely four (5%) provided complete policies. 
Of the companies that published these policies, 18 (21%) also referred to or discussed internal 
arrangements for implementing these policies, 16 (19%) provided contact details of executives 
responsible for these policies, and nine (11%) gave the details of the sustainability auditor that would 
provide assurance. Some companies also published a supplier code of conduct on their websites 
(18%). 
4.3.11.4 Broad-based black economic empowerment 
Of the 41 (48%) companies that made Broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE) 
certificates available, six (7%) provided certificates that were outdated (i.e. already expired). A further 
seven (8%) companies provided only a reference to their BBBEE status without providing a 
certificate. Thirty-three (39%) companies also provided some reference to either empowerment 
transactions and equity programmes or BBBEE partners. 
4.3.11.5 Employees 
Fifty (59%) companies published either a summarised (24%) or complete (7%) workplace policy or 
some sort of workplace-related policy (28%). Only 32 (38%) companies provided the number of 
employees (three outdated). Few companies provided any further details (average availability), such 
as work conditions (including development and teamwork) (24%), any breakdown (e.g. gender, 
nationality or race) (21%), staff turnover (16%), compensation policy (15%), temporary or permanent 
status of staff (11%), union membership (11%), employee costs (9%) and average age (4%). 
4.3.11.6 Corporate citizenship 
Although 47 (55%) companies (three outdated) referred to their community involvement (e.g. non-
commercial projects in which they were involved), only 22 (26%) companies (four outdated) provided 
any quantitative information (i.e. amount invested), and 14 (16%) provided detail about sponsorship 
policies (e.g. criteria for donations). Ten (12%) companies provided a separate section for corporate 
citizenship-related news items. 
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4.3.11.7 Stakeholders 
Only 29 (34%) companies offered some information about their stakeholders, with 11 (13%) 
providing only a list of stakeholders and 18 (21%) (three outdated) providing their stakeholder 
relationship policies or strategy. 
4.4 CHALLENGES IN MEASURING INTERNET INVESTOR RELATIONS (IIR) 
In the absence of standards to regulate IIR and consistent with previous research, considerable 
variation exists in terms of the information disclosed and the presentation technologies used. 
Significant differences in corporate website structures (e.g. number and type of categories used on 
homepages) also exist.  
Although most companies used a relatively flat website structure with information organised in 
categories, some websites scattered related information over various webpages. The majority of 
websites that were examined were large and complex and, despite significant effort on the part of 
the researcher,134 some attributes may have been overlooked. Such variations increased the 
difficulty of consistent measurements over all companies. 
Some information was not usable (e.g. links not working or incorrect hyperlinks), and other 
information, while readily available, was extremely outdated. As briefly discussed in Section 3.3.3 
and further discussed above in Section 4.3 and Annexure C, some attributes were measured as 
partially available as a result of their degree of availability and their timeliness.  
Furthermore, companies did not use the same terminology to describe and to categorise information. 
Although the majority of companies, for example, did provide a dedicated section to describe their 
operations (e.g. products and services offered), various alternative link titles were used, for example 
operational profile, group overview, business, capabilities, operations, products and services, 
portfolios, brands, how we work, and trading divisions.  
Some companies provided homepage links to dedicated corporate governance and corporate 
responsibility sections, others provided only sub-links under investor relations or the ‘about-us’ 
section. Some companies scattered corporate governance attributes over various sub-links (e.g. 
board of directors, executive committee and non-executive committee).  
Although most companies with a dedicated corporate responsibility section used either sustainability 
or corporate responsibility as the link title, some companies used alternatives such as ISO135 
management, social responsibility, transformation, society, socioeconomic impact, corporate social 
responsibility, responsibility, and citizenship. 
                                               
134
 The average number of hours needed to do the content analysis per company was seven hours. 
135
 International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
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Not all companies examined had a primary listing on the JSE or were registered in South Africa. For 
these companies, different listing requirements and company laws would therefore prevail. Some 
attributes (e.g. King III and JSE listing requirements) were therefore defined also to include 
equivalents as required by other jurisdictions. 
Although companies examined had on average been listed for 23 years, the number of years listed 
varied from two years to 75 years. Some companies would therefore simply have more information 
to provide than others. Some attributes (e.g. archived annual and interim reports and archived 
presentations) were therefore measured considering the number of years listed. Another example of 
where the measurement of attributes had to be adjusted to accommodate internal differences 
between companies was board committees. To measure how many board committee charters had 
been provided, the number of board committees had to be tallied, bearing in mind that some 
companies combined committees such as audit and risk committees, while others kept them 
separate. 
4.5 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
As discussed in Section 3.3.6, reliability was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha and by an 
examination of the correlation coefficients between disclosure categories. Construct validity was 
applied to validate the use of the measurement instrument. 
4.5.1 Reliability 
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for each of the 11 categories (Ac, N, T, Ci, Fi, Rn, IC, Si, Bi, Cg 
and Cr)136 that were used in this study to categorise attributes and is shown in Table 4.6.137 Although 
Cronbach’s alpha for three categories (accessibility, timeliness and company information) is below 
the often suggested 0.7 (e.g. Serrano-Cinca et al., 2007; Nunnaly, 1978; Kelton & Yang, 2008), it 
can still be viewed as acceptable given the alpha of 0.51 as reported by Gul and Leung (2004) and 
0.64 reported by Botosan (1997). Gul and Leung (2004) did however admit that the low alpha 
reported by their results suggested that random measurement error could reduce the power of the 
empirical tests in their study. Part of the process in calculating Cronbach alpha is to determine the 
level of redundancy in the measurement instrument. No attributes have indicated significant 
redundancy. This implied that all attributes were kept for analysis, and further confirms the 
methodology discussed in Section 3.3.1 to measure as widely as possible to mitigate the risk of 
                                               
136
 Ac refers to the accessibility category, N to navigation, T to timeliness, Ci to company information, Fi to financial 
information, Rn to relevant news, Ic to investment case, Si to shareholder information, Bi to bondholder information, Cg to 
corporate governance and Cr to corporate responsibility. 
137
 The statistical software package, Statistica, that was used for this study allowed the calculation of Cronbach’s alpha 
only for a maximum of 300 attributes. It was therefore not possible to calculate one alpha for all attributes. It should, 
however, also be noted that Cronbach’s alpha increases as the number of attributes increase and, given the amount of 
attributes, it could be argued that such a calculation would not have been a reliable measurement. 
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important attributes being omitted. Also, as discussed in Section 3.2.4, the breadth or 
comprehensiveness of information is one of the indicators of the quality of IIR. 
Table 4.6: Cronbach’s alpha per measurement instrument category 
 
Further to Cronbach’s alpha, correlation coefficients were also used to assess internal consistency. 
This study examined the relationship between the total IIR score and its disclosure components (Ac, 
N, T, Ci, Fi, Rn, IC, Si, Bi, Cg and Cr) 138 and the results are reported in Table 4.7 (Pearson correlation 
coefficients). 
Table 4.7 shows that the categories are all positively related to each other and that all relationships 
are statistically significant at the 1% level, except for three at the 5% level, one at the 10% level and 
one that is not statistically significant.139 For the convenience of the reader, all coefficients that are 
statistically significant at the 1% level are printed in green, those at the 5% level in blue, and those 
at the 10% level in red. Similar results were used by Froidevaux (2004), Cheng et al. (2006), and 
Kelton and Yang (2008) to assess the reliability of their measurement instruments.  
Table 4.7: Correlation matrix: measurement instrument categories 
Variable IIR-
100 
Ac N T Ci Fi Rn IC Si Bi Cg Cr 
IIR-100 1.00            
Ac 0.59 1.00           
N 0.70 0.64 1.00          
T 0.62 0.41 0.48 1.00         
Ci 0.61 0.46 0.46 0.28 1.00        
Fi 0.88 0.47 0.60 0.51 0.36 1.00       
Rn 0.68 0.33 0.56 0.45 0.48 0.56 1.00      
IC 0.67 0.45 0.36 0.50 0.36 0.52 0.40 1.00     
Si 0.80 0.39 0.53 0.50 0.40 0.65 0.58 0.44 1.00    
Bi 0.38 0.21 0.24 0.07 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.25 0.32 1.00   
Cg 0.85 0.42 0.50 0.52 0.48 0.66 0.47 0.56 0.71 0.25 1.00  
Cr 0.79 0.45 0.48 0.38 0.50 0.68 0.37 0.60 0.41 0.29 0.61 1.00 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level; Blue = significant at the 5% level and Red = significant at the 10% level 
                                               
138
 Ac refers to the accessibility category, N to the navigation category, T to the timeliness category, Ci to the company 
information category, Fi to the financial information category, Rn to the relevant news category, Ic to the investment case 
category, Si to the shareholder information category, Bi to the bondholder information category, Cg to the corporate 
governance category and Cr to the corporate responsibility category. 
139
 All five of these associations relate to the bondholder information category. The bondholder information category 
measures only five of the total 346 attributes 
Categories Ac N  T Ci Fi Rn IC Si Bi Cg Cr 
Number attributes 13 14 12 36 65 23 26 60 5 50 42 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.57 0.71 0.63 0.68 0.94 0.80 0.77 0.89 0.80 0.93 0.95 
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4.5.2 Validity 
As discussed in Section 3.3.6, this study applied construct validity to validate the use of the 
measurement instrument. If the measurement instrument is to be deemed valid, then it should 
produce correlations similar to company characteristics found in previous research studies. The 
Pearson correlation coefficient was used.  
Table 4.8 depicts four studies that have used construct validity to validate measurement instruments 
(all were used to measure corporate website content). The statistically significant positive 
correlations between the disclosure score and size, leverage, listing status and financing activities, 
and negative correlation between the disclosure score and ownership structure are all, as expected, 
consistent with the results of former studies that have used these company characteristics to confirm 
the validity of their measurement instruments. 












This study   
Chang et al. 
(2008) 





(4) Trading volume 
(5) Share price 
volatility 
  Significant positive associations 
at the 1% level for size, analyst 
following, trading volume, and 
share price volatility. Institutional 
ownership not tested. 
Orens et al. 
(2010)  
 
(1) Size  
(2) Analyst 
following 












Significant positive associations 
at the 1% level for size and 
analyst following. Significant 
positive association at the 5% 
level for number of listings. 
Significant negative association 
at the 5% level for ownership 
structure. Media exposure not 
tested. 




(3) Future financing 
activities 
  Significant positive association 
at the 1% level for size and at 
5% level for past financing 
activities. Positive, but not 
significant association for 









(5) Leverage  
Significant positive associations 
at the 1% level for size and 
leverage. Positive, but not 
significant associations for 
performance (p=0.364) and 
market to book (p=0.103). Beta 
not tested. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
132 
4.6 HORIZONTAL ANALYSIS 
For the horizontal analysis, individual attribute scores were added, without any weightings as 
discussed in Chapter 3, in order to calculate one IIR score per company. The maximum IIR that 
could be achieved was therefore 346 (346 attributes were measured). Figure 4.2 shows the variation 
in the total IIR score over the 85 companies. 
 
Figure 4.2:  Distribution of Internet investor relations scores over companies 
The minimum and maximum IIR scores are 13.5 and 193.5 respectively, with 71% of scores falling 
between 45 and 135, and only three scores in each of the lower and upper categories. The average 
IIR score is 98 and the median 96. Both the kurtosis (-0.745) and the skewness (0.229) are close to 
zero. Based on Figure 4.2 and the descriptive statistics above, the IIR scores closely resemble a 
normal distribution (an assumption that is not needed in further analysis). Table 4.9 presents the 
average, median, minimum and maximum IIR scores per JSE sector. Four sectors have IIR scores 
higher than 100 (basic materials, oil and gas, healthcare, and telecommunications), and another four 
sectors have IIR scores lower than 90 (consumer goods, consumer services, technology, and 
utilities). Table 4.9 therefore indicates that some JSE sectors may provide more IIR than others.   
Table 4.10 presents the average, median, minimum and maximum IIR scores per JSE board listing. 
Table 4.10 shows that companies listed on the AltX, DCM and VCM on average have lower IIR 




































Distribution of IIR score
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Table 4.9: Internet investor relations scores per JSE sector 
 Number of companies Average Median Minimum Maximum 
Sample 85 97.98 96.00 13.50 193.50 
Industrials 19 98.58 82.00 51.50 167.50 
Basic materials 17 103.53 101.00 38.50 184.00 
Consumer goods 7 88.29 90.50 13.50 193.50 
Consumer services 10 87.00 95.25 19.50 155.50 
Technology 4 89.00 74.75 71.50 135.00 
Oil and gas 1 110.5 110.50 110.50 110.50 
Financials 21 97.10 99.50 20.00 184.00 
Utilities 1 66.50 66.50 66.50 66.50 
Healthcare 3 105.33 120.00 45.50 120.00 
Telecommunications 2 159.75 159.75 153.00 166.50 
 
Table 4.10: Internet investor relations scores per JSE board listing 
 Number 
companies 
Average Median Minimum Maximum 
Sample 85 97.98 96.00 13.50 193.50 
Alternative Equity Exchange (AltX)  8 57.38 68.25 13.50 82.00 
Development Capital Market (DCM) 1 20 20 20 20 
Venture Capital Market (VCM) 1 55.50 55.50 55.50 55.50 
Main board 75 103.92 101.00 19.50 193.50 
 
Companies can be categorised according to either their primary stock exchange listing or whether 
only JSE listed or dually listed.  Table 4.11 indicates that companies with either a primary listing on 
a stock exchange other than the JSE or dual-listed companies have higher IIR scores compared to 
companies that have a JSE primary listing or are only JSE-listed. 
Table 4.11: Internet investor relations scores per listing status 
 Number of 
companies 
Average Median Minimum Maximum 
Sample 85 97.98 96.00 13.50 193.50 
Primary listing – JSE 71 95.20 94.50 13.50 184.00 
Primary listing – other  14 112.11 106.75 62.00 193.50 
Only JSE-listed 60 90.65 81.50 13.50 167.50 
Dual-listed 25 115.58 110.50 38.50 193.50 
 
Table 4.12 shows the minimum and maximum IIR scores per category. In all categories, except 
accessibility, company information, and shareholder information, at least one company provided 
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none of the category attributes. In only one category, bondholder information, there was at least one 
company that provided all the category attributes. 
From Figure 4.2 and Tables 4.9 to 4.12, the following is evident: a significant variation exists between 
the IIR scores of JSE-listed companies and none of the companies examined in this study achieved 
a 100% IIR score. The next section discusses possible reasons why no company achieved the 
maximum score. 








IIR score % 
Sample 346 13.50 193.50 55.92 
Accessibility 13 0.50 9.50 73.08 
Navigation 14 0.00 12.00 85.71 
Timeliness 12 0.00 10.00 83.33 
Company information 36 4.00 24.50 68.06 
Financial information 65 0.00 48.00 73.85 
Relevant news 23 0.00 16.00 69.57 
Investment case 26 0.00 16.00 61.54 
Shareholder information 60 1.00 36.00 60.00 
Bondholder information 5 0.00 5.00 100.00 
Corporate governance 50 0.00 35.00 70.00 
Corporate responsibility 42 0.00 29.50 70.24 
 
4.6.1 Possible reasons for no company achieving the maximum IIR score 
Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999: 391) argued that it is not obvious that companies would wish to 
achieve their maximum disclosure score, nor that users of their corporate websites would want the 
company to achieve the maximum score. According to Lybaert (2002: 220), companies trade off the 
benefits and costs of using corporate websites to communicate with investors, with various internal 
and external factors that can influence a company’s decision as to how much to invest in the 
development of an IIR presence.  
Table B1, Annexure B, lists the average and maximum scores as reported by studies that were 
reviewed during this research into the development of a measurement instrument. The majority of 
studies in Table B1 have maximum and average scores that are significantly higher compared to the 
56% maximum and 28% average reported by this study. It should, however, be noted that most 
studies listed in Table B1 focused on either developed countries (e.g. US) or only on the largest 
companies in each country, whereas this study selected a random sample from a population defined 
also to include the smaller AltX-listed companies.  
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Further, the studies in Table B1 include on average only 55 attributes compared to the 346 attributes 
measured in this study as a result of the use of a measurement instrument developed to measure 
as widely as possible. 
However, similar maximum and average results were reported by Froidevaux (2004) (maximum 55% 
and average 27%), Xiao et al. (2004) (maximum 60% and average 31%), Celik et al. (2006) 
(maximum 39% and average 9%), Cormier et al. (2009) (maximum 58% and average 25%) and Lai 
et al. (2010) (maximum 50% and average 31%).  
Further to the reasons offered by Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999) and Lybaert (2002), the 
following can be offered as possible reasons for the low average of 28% and maximum of only 56% 
achieved in this study: 
i) The measurement instrument used in this study aimed to measure as widely as possible and, 
as such, various attributes were included in addition to the prescribed best practices, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. It may be argued that many of these attributes are only ‘nice to haves’. 
For example, the following three accessibility attributes measure alternative formats, excluding 
similar items also separately measured elsewhere in the instrument: 
o E-reader (dynamic or interactive PDF documents) 
o Excel downloads 
o Webcasts, podcasts or transcripts of presentations 
Some attributes may be deliberately ignored by companies, as they may argue that these 
attributes are readily available elsewhere (e.g. SENS, share price information, financial 
highlights) or are already included in their integrated annual report (e.g. shareholder 
information, company advisors, corporate governance, and corporate responsibility 
information), and that it is therefore not necessary to duplicate this information on their 
corporate websites. 
Some attributes, such as the outcomes of meetings, appointment and dismissal of directors, 
and share trading by directors, measured separately in this study, are also SENS items and 
companies may therefore argue that these attributes are already accessible via SENS. 
ii) Some of the attributes measured in this study may be viewed by companies as alternatives in 
the development of their corporate website. For example, as navigation tool, companies may 
choose between a search function, sitemap and help or FAQ option. Companies may argue 
that if they use one, e.g. search function, it is not necessary to use the others.  
Other examples of alternatives are the use of both an e-mail alert service and RSS content 
feed to improve the timeliness of information communicated to investors; the provision of 
alternative types of contact details to investors (i.e. telephone number and e-mail and online 
form to complete); and the use of more than one social media channel (i.e. Twitter, YouTube, 
Linkedln, Facebook, blog, etc.). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
136 
iii) Some attributes measured in this study, for example dividend reinvestment plan, ADR140 
programme, information listed debt instruments, analyst reports and JSE SRI141 may not be 
applicable to all companies, as some companies simply may not have a dividend reinvestment 
plan, ADR programme, any listed debt instruments, any analysts following the company or be 
included in the JSE SRI index. No attempt was made by this study to distinguish between 
companies with respect to the relevancy or not of such attributes. 
iv) Although the utmost care was taken in measuring corporate websites, it is possible that some 
attributes might have been overlooked, given the complexity (e.g. number of internal 
hyperlinks) and the variety of website layouts. Similar arguments were used by Lybaert (2001) 
and Lymer et al. (1999). 
v) No study reviewed has assessed attributes as being only partially available based on the 
amount of information, and timeliness and usability concerns. This methodology resulted in 
lower IIR scores as opposed to assessing attributes as merely available (1) or absent (0). 
vi) Lastly, the information environment (i.e. in South Africa) and the sample selected (i.e. a random 
selection to include all company sizes) could have resulted in lower average and maximum 
scores compared, for example, to studies in development countries where only the largest 
listed companies were included in the sample. 
Given the fact that 286 or 83% of attributes measured in this study had an average availability of 
less than 50%, as discussed in Section 4.3 above, it may be argued that if an attribute is only 
disclosed by, for example, 5% of companies, the attribute is either not applicable to all companies, 
not required by investors, or deliberately ignored by the company in view of the cost versus benefit 
in providing the attribute.  
Information overload was discussed in Chapter 1 as a possible disadvantage of using corporate 
websites as communication channel and, as the instrument employed in this study measured 346 
attributes, it is debatable whether investors would find all these attributes useful.   
To facilitate further analysis and understanding, attributes with average availabilities less than 10%, 
20%, 30%, 40% and 50% were removed from the calculation of the IIR score in order to calculate 
five additional IIR groupings: IIR-90, IIR-80, IIR-70, IIR-60 and IIR-50.  
To calculate these alternative groupings, attributes were first sorted in descending order according 
to the average availability of each. Of the 346 attributes measured, 76 attributes had an average 
availability of less than 10%. To calculate the first alternative IIR grouping, IIR-90, these 76 attributes 
were removed from the measurement instrument, resulting in IIR-90 that therefore included only 270 
attributes (i.e. 346 – 76). The second alternative IIR grouping, IIR-80, was therefore calculated by 
                                               
140
 American Depository Receipt  
141
 Johannesburg Stock Exchange Socially Responsible Investment index 
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removing all attributes (i.e. 157) with an average availability of less than 20% from the 346 attributes. 
IIR-80 was therefore based on the measurement of 189 attributes (i.e. 346 – 157).  
Table 4.13 presents descriptive statistics for these five alternative IIR groupings as well as the 
original IIR score that was based on all 346 attributes (IIR). Table 4.13 shows the number of attributes 
that were included in each IIR grouping, as well as the average company score per IIR grouping. 
Skewness, as measured for the degree of symmetry, and the kurtosis, as measured for the degree 
of peakedness or flatness, were close to zero for all IIR scores in Table 4.13, which is an indication 
of a normal distribution. The number of attributes included in the IIR scores decreased from 346 (IIR) 
to 60 (IIR-50) as a result of the 246 attributes with an average availability of less than 50%.   
Table 4.13: Descriptive statistics for alternative Internet investor relations groupings 






IIR  346 97.98 13.50 67.00 96.00 130.50 193.50 43.18 0.23 -0.74 
IIR-90 270 93.85 13.50 66.00 92.50 122.50 172.00 39.45 0.09 -0.86 
IIR-80 189 82.06 13.50 61.00 82.00 104.50 135.00 30.71 -0.16 -0.82 
IIR-70 128 67.23 12.50 53.00 69.00 85.50 101.00 22.01 -0.49 -0.47 
IIR-60 95 55.92 12.50 46.50 57.50 69.50 79.00 16.86 -0.67 -0.24 
IIR-50 60 39.97 9.50 35.50 42.50 47.00 55.00 10.16 -0.98 0.74 
 
Although the standard deviation decreased from 43.18 (IIR) to 10.16 (IIR-50) indicating decreasing 
variability, the coefficient of variation was calculated to compare the relative variability of the six data 
sets depicted in Table 4.13. For ease of comparison, percentages were calculated for the average, 
Q1, Q2, Q3 and maximum IIR, for these data sets. Table 4.14 shows these percentages and the 
coefficients of variation.  
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Table 4.14: Comparison of alternative Internet investor relations groupings 









IIR 346 28.32%142 19.36%143 27.75% 37.72% 55.92%144 44.07%145 
IIR-90 270 34.76% 24.44% 34.26% 45.37% 63.70% 42.04% 
IIR-80 189 43.42% 32.28% 43.39% 55.29% 71.43% 37.42% 
IIR-70 128 52.52% 41.41% 53.91% 66.80% 78.91% 32.74% 
IIR-60 95 58.86% 48.95% 60.53% 73.16% 83.16% 30.15% 
IIR-50 60 66.62% 59.17% 70.83% 78.33% 91.67% 25.42% 
 
As depicted in Table 4.14, the coefficient of variation146 decreased from 44.07% for IIR to 25.42% 
for IIR-50, confirming the decreasing variability trend. Removing the least available attributes 
resulted in an increasing average and maximum IIR scores, as could be expected. The IIR-50 
average was 66.62% compared to the 28.32% reported if all attributes were included in the score 
(i.e. IIR). Although still less than 100%, the IIR-50 maximum score was 91.67% compared to the 
55.92% measured for IIR. 
4.7 ESTERHUYSE AND WINGARD (2016): MEASUREMENT PROCESS AND RESULTS 
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, the sample of this study was selected using stratified random 
sampling. The E&W study, on the other hand, consists of the 188 companies that were listed on 30 
June 2002 and remained listed on 1 June 2012, plus another 13 companies that were among the 
largest 100 companies on 30 December 2011, but not included in the list of 188 companies. 
In the E&W study, the assessment of sampled corporate websites took place during 2012. According 
to the E&W study, the average South African bandwidth was 3.22 Mbps in 2012. According to 
Mybroadband (2015) the average bandwidth in South Africa was 6.92 Mbps in March 2015, therefore 
showing a considerable increase since 2012. Throughout the E&W study it was argued that 
companies in developing countries would only fully utilise the benefits of corporate websites as 
communication vehicle if bandwidth were increased to acceptable international standards. As a 
recommendation for further research, E&W (2016) stated that “a follow-up study could also be 
conducted, as bandwidth increases continuously”.  
The E&W study relied primarily on a vertical analysis of its results (i.e. per attribute), while this 
dissertation discussed research results using both vertical (Section 4.3) and horizontal (i.e. per 
                                               
142
 97.98 (IIR average in Table 4.13) / 346 
143
 67 (Q1 in Table 4.13) / 346 
144
 193.50 (IIR max in Table 4.13) / 346 
145
 43.18 (IIR standard deviation in Table 4.13) / 97.98 (IIR average in Table 4.13) 
146
 Standard deviation divided by the average. 
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company) (Section 4.6) analysis. The following similarities and differences between the results 
reported by the E&W study and this dissertation are noteworthy: 
i) The E&W study found an average score of 39.78% compared to the 28% in this study. Besides 
the reasons for the differences between the E&W study and this dissertation discussed earlier 
in Section 3.4, two further possible reasons were: (1) the objective of this dissertation was to 
measure as widely as possible (see Section 3.3.1) and as a result, some of the attributes 
included in the measurement instrument were only available for a small number of companies 
(see Figure 4.1); and (2) the distinction made in this study between available, partially available 
and absent (as discussed in Section 3.3.3; also see discussion in Section 4.6.1) may have 
resulted into lower scores. 
ii) The highest scoring category in the E&W study was “getting to corporate information”. 
Similarly, the highest score category is this study was navigation (see Table 4.5). 
iii) The E&W study listed the top 10 corporate websites (according to their IIR scores) per industry. 
Six of the 10 companies were from the basic materials industry. An average IIR score of 103.53 
was found for the basic materials industry in this study compared to a sample average of 97.98 
(see Table 4.9). Four of the 10 IIR corporate websites found in this dissertation were 
companies listed in the basic materials industry. 
4.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
As is evident from the vertical and horizontal analysis in this chapter, significant variation existed in 
the number of IIR attributes that were provided by companies. Such variation was, however, not 
unexpected given the absence of standards to regulate what and how information should be provided 
on corporate websites and the diversity of companies examined in this study. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the variation in IIR scores was expected – as, to a certain extent, was the low average IIR 
score – the majority of companies examined did not use corporate websites optimally to 
communicate with investors. Recommendations are made in Section 9.3 on how companies can 
improve their IIR. 
Companies, however, differ and there may not be one best IIR strategy that works equally well for 
all companies. Some attributes (e.g. environmental issues) may further be more important for some 
JSE sectors (e.g. basic materials) than for others (e.g. financial sector). As discussed in the sample 
selection process in Section 4.2, an important objective was to select a sample that would ensure 
variation in IIR scores to facilitate statistical analysis in the remainder of this study. 
Although the average (28%) and maximum (56%) IIR scores were lower than most of the studies 
listed in Table B1, Annexure B, this was also not totally unexpected given the country, sample 
selection procedure, number of attributes, and the measurement conventions followed in this study. 
Considering the measurement conventions, as discussed in Annexure C, and the challenges 
inherent in the study, as discussed in Section 4.4 above, IIR scores reported in this chapter were 
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likely to be an underestimate of the total information that was available to investors from companies. 
Significant improvements in the average and maximum IIR score were reported following a 
systematic exclusion of attributes based on their average availabilities (see Table 4.14). 
Reasons for not achieving a maximum score were discussed in Section 4.6.1. It should further be 
noted that each company’s unique strategy (e.g. cost versus benefit analysis) is likely to influence 
what, and how, information is communicated via corporate websites. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
corporate websites are also only one of various information channels that can be used by companies. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, this study was restricted to an examination of corporate websites. 
IIR scores depended on a number of strategic decisions taken by companies in the past. The first 
decision was whether to use the corporate website as communication channel to communicate with 
investors. Almost 90% of the companies that were examined provided a dedicated and descriptive 
investor relations link on their homepage. This indicates that the majority of companies had therefore 
either taken the deliberate decision to use the corporate website as investor communication channel 
or simply believed that it was the right thing to do given common arguments such as: all our 
competitors are doing it; we have a corporate website, so we might as well add an investor section; 
or using corporate websites is an inexpensive way to distribute annual reports. 
Once companies have elected to include an investor communication channel as part of the corporate 
website, they need to decide whether to simply reproduce financial reports in a PDF format with no 
further information, or whether to provide additional information not available in these reports. Almost 
all companies in the study disclosed PDF annual or integrated annual reports (96%) and interim 
reports (88%). Although almost all companies also disclosed archived reports, the depth (i.e. the 
number of years of doing so) varied significantly between companies. 
A further decision that companies can take is whether to provide for – and to what extent to provide 
for – the information needs of smaller investors (e.g. private or retail investors). Most attributes in 
the shareholder information category (e.g. analyst reports, share prices and dividend information) 
and the relevant news category relate to the information needs of smaller investors. 
In a similar way that stairs in buildings may be problematic to physically disabled people, corporate 
websites may present barriers to access. Few companies provided information in multiple languages 
(15%), few used any presentation technologies to improve accessibility for users with a disability 
(6%), and few provided any specific support for users of mobile devices (15%). Furthermore, few 
companies provided any transcripts of meetings (only five annual results presentations were 
recorded), whereas presentation transcripts can be used with relative ease to improve accessibility. 
Companies also need to decide whether they should update financial and non-financial information 
only when annual reports are published, or as the information becomes available. Evidence was 
found in this study that some companies only update information when annual reports are published, 
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for instance shareholder analyses and principal shareholders were found to be dated according to 
the last annual report.  
Of the 12 attributes used in this study to measure timeliness, only two attributes had average 
availabilities of 50% or more. None of the timeliness attributes were included in the top 30 attributes, 
as listed in Table E1, Annexure E. Further, 147 attributes were assessed as only partially available 
as a result of being deemed outdated. Of the 44 companies that provided company history, only 15 
companies clearly indicated that they had updated their history within the last two years. Just over 
50% of companies provided annual results presentations, news updates and share price updates.   
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CHAPTER 5 
DETERMINANTS OF INTERNET INVESTOR RELATIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the key findings of this study, as set out in Chapter 4, was the significant variation in Internet 
investor relations (IIR) scores between companies. This variation was not entirely unexpected, given 
the unregulated nature of IIR, the results of previous research and the use of the sample selection 
method in this study. The third objective of the study was to establish the determinants of IIR by 
means of a regression model linking IIR to selected explanatory variables as identified in the 
literature. The remainder of this chapter is organised into five distinct sections as follows. 
First, a brief overview is given of the various disclosure proxies and research methodologies that 
were used in prior literature in Section 5.2.147 The purpose thereof is to set the background against 
which reported results are interpreted, and compared with previous studies.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, various theories were used in the literature to explain disclosure policies 
followed by companies, namely the agency problem, information problem, signalling theory, investor 
recognition hypothesis, follower’s effect and cost–benefit analysis.  Based on these theories, various 
company-specific characteristics were developed and tested in the literature and can be used to 
explain disclosure levels.  
The second section of this chapter, Section 5.3, discusses these tested company-specific 
characteristics as independent or explanatory variables to explain disclosure levels. Based on these 
studies, hypotheses predicting the relationships between the IIR score, as measured and discussed 
in Chapter 4, and various company characteristics are developed.  
Proxies used to measure these independent variables are also discussed in Section 5.3. Similar to 
Marston and Polei (2004: 297), all financial statement-related information was measured based on 
the data of the latest annual report. 
In Section 5.4, the research methodology followed in this study to test for the determinants of IIR are 
discussed, including the regression model of choice. Empirical results are discussed in Section 5.5, 
followed by a chapter summary and conclusion in Section 5.6. 
5.2 DISCLOSURE PROXIES AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
Disclosure is generally viewed in the literature as a latent variable (Hassan & Marston, 2010: 32) 
and as such is not amenable to be observed and measured directly. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
disclosure studies can be categorised as indirect disclosure proxy studies that are based on a proxy 
without examining the disclosure vehicle and direct disclosure proxy studies that are based on an 
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 For a comprehensive discussion, see Chapter 3. 
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examination of the original disclosure vehicle (i.e. content analysis). Direct disclosure proxy studies 
can further be categorised into studies that have examined corporate websites as disclosure vehicles 
as opposed to studies that have examined annual reports as disclosure vehicles.   
For the purpose of this study, disclosure studies were further categorised into descriptive, 
determinant and effect studies. Table B1, Annexure B, summarises the literature according to: 
• The country where the study was performed (i.e. data used); 
• The sample selection criteria used (e.g. random sample or largest companies); 
• The number of attributes measured, as well as a further distinction between presentation and 
content attributes; 
• The maximum disclosure score that was achieved by a company in the study; 
• The average disclosure score that was achieved by the companies in the study; 
• Whether weights were assigned in the study or not; 
• Whether the study distinguished between the quantity as opposed to the quality of disclosure; 
• Whether reliability tests to ensure the reliability of the measurement instrument used were 
specifically discussed; and 
• Whether validity tests to ensure the validity of the measurement instrument used were 
specifically discussed in the study. 
All studies listed in Table B1 examined corporate websites as disclosure vehicles. 
As specifically discussed in Section 3.2.6 in Chapter 3, direct disclosure proxy studies that are based 
on an examination of corporate websites further differ regarding the document types (e.g. PDF and 
HTML) that were examined or not examined, as well as website sections examined or not examined. 
Further, some studies include only specific industries compared to other studies that have 
purposefully excluded specific industries (e.g. the financial industry). 
Studies can also be categorised based on the country where the study was performed, e.g. 
developed versus developing countries. However, even within developed countries mixed results 
were reported, for example Allym and Lymer (2003: 191) reported no significant association between 
size and disclosure for US, UK, Canada and Hong Kong, compared to a significant association for 
Australia.  
Pervan (2006: 22) used the same measurement of voluntary financial Internet reporting for Croatian 
and Slovene listed companies and reported different significant independent variables in predicting 
disclosure as dependent variable between the two countries. According to Bollen et al. (2006: 280) 
previous research showed that disclosure practices may differ between countries for a number of 
reasons, e.g. cultural differences, role of equity markets, and legal factors.  
Debreceny et al. (2002: 382) used six categories to classify countries. The categories (sorted in 
ascending disclosure levels) are: (1) Emerging (Malaysia, Mexico, Brazil and Chile), (2) Latin (Italy 
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and Spain), (3) Franco-German-Japanese (France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands and South 
Korea), (4) Asian-Colonial (Hong Kong, Singapore and South Africa), (5) Nordic (Sweden, Denmark 
and Norway) and (6) Anglo-American countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, US and UK). 
In a similar vein, Bollen et al. (2006: 285) used three categories. The categories (also sorted in 
ascending disclosure levels) are: (1) Continental (Belgium and France), (2) Asian-Colonial (South 
Africa) and (3) Anglo-American countries (Australia, Netherlands and UK).  
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) listed sampling error, different attributes, different definitions of 
explanatory or independent variables, and different research settings as possible explanations for 
mixed results in the literature. 
As discussed in the next section of this chapter, prior studies further differ regarding how 
independent variables were measured, as well as regarding their respective hypothesised 
relationships between disclosure and these independent variables. 
5.3 PRIOR THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS OF RELATIONSHIPS AND MEASUREMENT 
Table 5.1 shows the different proxies that were used in the literature for each of the independent 
variables discussed below. This section discusses ten variables that were tested in previous studies 
as independent or explanatory variables to explain variations in disclosure levels. More specifically, 
this sections discusses: (1) the underlying reasons used by the literature to hypothesise the direction 
of relationships, (2) the results found in the literature in terms of statistical significance and the 
economic sense of directions, (3) the direction hypothesised in this dissertation and finally, (4) a brief 
discussion of how each of these variables were measured in this dissertation. 
Table 5.1: Proxies used in the literature to measure the determinants of disclosure 
Variable Proxy used: Study 
SIZE Earnings: Pervan (2006) 
Turnover: Larrán and Giner (2002) 
Market capitalisation: Larrán and Giner (2002); Xiao et al. (2004): Bollen et al. (2006); 
Orens et al. (2010); Ettredge et al. (2002) and Pervan (2006) 
Number of employees: Orens et al. (2010) and Larrán and Giner (2002) 
Total assets: Larrán and Giner (2002); Abdelsalam et al. (2007); Orens et al. (2010); 
Trabelsi et al. (2008); Cormier et al. (2009) and Pervan (2006) 
LEVERAGE Book value of debt/Market capitalisation: Froidevaux (2004) 
Debt/assets: Orens et al. (2004); Aly et al. (2010) and Xiao et al. (2004) 
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Table 5.1: Proxies used in the literature to measure the determinants of disclosure 
(continued) 
Variable Proxy used: Study 
FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE  
Return on equity: Larrán and Giner (2002); Pervan (2006); Aly et al. (2010); Bollen et 
al. (2006); Froidevaux (2004) and Marston and Polei (2004) 
Return on assets: Abdelsalam et al. (2007); Pervan (2006); Cormier et al. (2009) and 
Ettredge et al. (2002) 
Rank transformed return on assets: Xiao et al. (2004) 
Return on sales: Pervan (2006) 
Dummy variable of one if profit increased year to year: Trabelsi et al. (2008) 
EPS growth: Orens et al. (2004) 
Annual share return: Ettredge et al. (2002) and Bollen et al. (2006) 
FINANCING 
ACTIVITIES 
Dummy variable of one if any new equity was issued: Trabelsi  et al. (2008); Xiao et 
al. (2004) and Ettredge et al. (2002) 
Dummy variable of one if year-to-year change of more than 20% in debt to market 
value of equity ratio: Cormier et al. (2009) 
BIG FOUR AUDIT Dummy variable of one if audited by one of big 4 audit firms: Bonsón and Escobar 
(2006); Xiao et al. (2004); Trabelsi et al. (2008) and Aly et al. (2010) 
INDUSTRY  Dummy variable of one if company is in manufacturing industry: Abdelsalam et al. 
(2007) 
Three dichotomous variables for primary, secondary and tertiary (services) industries: 
Larrán and Giner (2002) 
Ten dichotomous variables for 10 industries:  Bonsón and Escobar (2006)  
All companies assigned to one of two industries, (1) production and retail (2) services 
and telecommunications: Geerings et al. (2003) 
Dummy variable of one for companies in the services or telecommunications industry: 
Bollen et al. (2006) 
Dummy variable of one for high technology industry based on ISE classification: Celik 
et al. (2006) 
Dummy variable of one for companies in the IT industry: Xiao et al. (2004) 
LISTING STATUS Weight of one and a half (1.5) for all US and LSE listings and one for all other listings: 
Orens et al. (2010) 
Dummy variable of one if listed on at least one foreign stock exchange: Larrán and 
Giner (2002); Marston and Polei (2004); Trabelsi et al. (2008) and Bollen et al. (2006) 
Dummy variable of one for SEC registration (i.e. US stock exchange listing): Cormier  
et al. (2009) 
OWNERSHIP – 
CONCENTRATION 
Dummy variable of one if single investor has more 20% shareholding: Orens et al. 
(2010) and Cormier et al. (2009) 
Percentage of shares held by executives and major shareholders (major = more 10% 
shares): Trabelsi et al. (2008) 
Percentage of shares held by major shareholders (major = more 5% shares): 
Abdelsalam et al. (2007) 
Percentage of shares held by directors: Abdelsalam et al. (2007) 
OWNERSHIP – 
DISPERSION 
Free float: Celik et al. (2006) and Marston and Polei (2004) 
Percentage shares available to individual investors: Bollen et al. (2006) 
Number of shareholders: Pervan (2006) 
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5.3.1 Company size (SIZE) (H1) 
According to Celik et al. (2006: 107), company size was the most widely used variable in the literature 
to explain disclosure levels. Various reasons are offered in the literature for a positive association 
between disclosure and size.  
• Information asymmetry and agency costs 
Celik et al. (2006: 108) argued that large companies have higher information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders, resulting in higher agency costs that motivate larger 
companies to disclose more information than smaller companies. In a similar vein, Marston 
and Polei (2004: 293) argued that larger companies are more complex and more information 
disclosure is therefore necessary to allow investors to make efficient investment decisions.  
• Political cost hypothesis 
The political cost hypothesis predicts that larger companies have a stronger motivation to 
improve corporate reputation and public image, as they are more publicly visible (Celik et al. 
2010: 108) and attract the attention of government bodies (Debrency et al. 2002). Watts and 
Zimmermann (1978: 115) agreed that larger companies face higher political costs. 
• Economies of scale 
Marston and Polei (2004: 294), Bollen et al. (2006: 281), Trabelsi et al. (2008), Ashbaugh et 
al. (1999) and Oyelere et al. (2003) all argued that larger companies are expected to disclose 
more information given the assumption that the relative costs of information production are 
lower for larger companies than for smaller ones.  
• Availability of information to disclose 
Aly et al. (2010: 185) argued that larger companies tend to disclose more information as they 
simply have more to disclose compared to smaller companies. For example, larger companies 
usually have more products and more complex distribution networks, which require more 
complex management information systems and databases for management control purposes. 
• Internationalisation 
Larger companies are expected to be more active in an international context (e.g. foreign listing 
or foreign revenue) and as such are potentially exposed to a wider variety of shareholders, 
customers and jurisdictions, each of which may impose additional information requirements. 
With a few exceptions almost all studies show a significant positive relationship between size and 
disclosure (both printed media and corporate websites). Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999), for 
example, found no association between corporate website disclosure and size for a German-listed 
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sub-sample. Allym and Lymer (2003: 191) measured and tested for an association between size and 
internet financial reporting in five countries, but only found a significant association in Australia.148  
Table 5.1 shows that a wide variety of size proxies have been used in previous studies. Given the 
diversity of companies included in the study sample (e.g. the number of employees) and the 
availability of alternative accounting policies (e.g. to measure total assets), this study uses market 
capitalisation as proxy for size. The daily market capitalisation of each company’s ordinary shares 
was captured from the INET BFA database (product called Market Data) for all trading days from 1 
December 2014 to 30 November 2015.  
The average market capitalisation for each company was then calculated over these trading days to 
smooth the effect of short-term market movements. For five companies daily market capitalisation 
was only captured as available, as their JSE listings were suspended149 or delisted150 during this 
period.  
A positive association between IIR level and market capitalisation was expected (H1). 
5.3.2 Leverage (LEV) (H2) 
Agency theory is often used in the literature as underlying theoretical foundation to hypothesise a 
positive association between disclosure and leverage. Debreceny et al. (2002) argued that an 
increase in the debt-equity ratio creates agency costs and, according to Aly et al. (2010: 186), 
companies could voluntarily disclose information on corporate websites to allow creditors constantly 
to monitor the company in assessing the ability of the company to repay its debts.  
Xiao et al. (2004: 209) noted that as the risk of default increases with leverage, lenders and 
shareholders would demand more information to assess the company’s health. Larrán and Giner 
(2002: 66) argued that by increasing disclosure levels, a company can reduce agency costs and the 
possible conflicts between shareholders and creditors.  
On the other hand, signalling theory was used by Cormier et al. (2009) to argue that companies in a 
poor financial condition may be unable to withstand the initial negative consequences associated 
with additional disclosures and might therefore opt to disclose less. Cormier et al. (2009) reported a 
significant negative association between disclosure and leverage, but only at the 10% level, and no 
significant associations were reported for two of the three categories used to organise attributes, 
namely business-related and socially related categories.  
It should be noted that the measurement instrument used by Cormier et al. (2009) measured only 
performance disclosure attributes that are based on balance scorecard literature, and that they 
included only eight presentation-related attributes, and no relevant news or shareholder information 
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 No significant associations were found in the US, UK, Canada or Hong Kong. 
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 Evraz Highveld Steel & Vanadium Ltd, Firestone Energy Ltd and IPSA Group Plc. 
150
 Fountainhead Property Trust and Infrasors Holdings Ltd. 
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attributes. Cormier et al. (2009) based their study on a Canadian sample, including only the largest 
listed non-financial companies. 
Although Bollen et al. (2006: 279) contended that, if debtholders are primarily informed via alternative 
communication channels (i.e. alternative to corporate websites), the association between leverage 
may be negative in cases where an increased level of debt results in the reduced importance of 
equity holders. They hypothesised that the quality of investor relations websites is not affected by 
leverage.  Bollen et al. (2006: 292) accordingly reported no significant association. 
Research to date reports positive; negative; and no association between disclosure and leverage.  
Xiao et al. (2004: 215), Celik et al. (2006), and Ismail (2002) all reported a positive association. As 
discussed above, Cormier et al. (2009: 8) reported a negative association. The following studies 
however reported no significant association: Aly et al. (2010: 191), Bollen et al. (2006: 291), 
Debreceny et al. (2002), Froidevaux (2004), Almilia (2009: 95), Larrán and Giner (2002), and Oyelere 
et al. (2003). 
As Table 5.1 shows, a wide variety of leverage proxies have been used in previous studies. This 
study used the debt to asset ratio as proxy for leverage. The debt to asset ratio was captured from 
the INET BFA database (product called Ratios-General).  
The ratio is a measure of a company’s financial leverage and if the ratio is greater than 0.5, the 
majority of assets are financed through debt. If smaller than 0.5, assets are primarily financed 
through equity. INET BFA calculates the debt to asset ratio using the following ratio: 
*%&0	!2%
*%&0	&!% (5.1) 
A positive association between IIR level and the debt to asset ratio was expected (H2). 
5.3.3 Current ratio (CUR) (H3) 
Leverage and the current ratio are both risk measures, but where increased leverage is associated 
with increased risk, an increased current ratio is associated with decreased risk.  
As with leverage, underlying theories are however somewhat conflicting, with signalling theory 
predicting a positive association and agency theory a negative one between disclosure and the 
current ratio. Signalling theory suggests that more liquid companies will disclose more to distinguish 
themselves from less liquid companies, but agency theory on the other hand proposes that less 
liquid companies may disclose more information to satisfy the information needs of shareholders 
and creditors (Aly et al. 2010: 186).  
Oyelere et al. (2003) found a positive association, while Aly et al. (2010: 186), and Leventis and 
Weetman (2004: 240) found no significant association. 
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Following Aly et al. (2010), this study measured the current ratio as the ratio between current assets 
and current liabilities. The current ratio was captured from the INET BFA database (product called 
Ratios-General). A negative association between IIR level and the current ratio was expected (H3). 
5.3.4 Financial performance (ROE) (H4) 
Signalling theory can be used to hypothesise a positive association between disclosure and financial 
performance. Companies with good news are more likely to disclose more information compared to 
companies with bad news (Aly et al., 2010: 185). Profitable companies have an incentive to 
distinguish themselves from less successful companies in order to raise capital at the lowest possible 
price (Marston & Polei, 2004: 294). Lev and Penman (1990: 49) and Ettredge et al. (2002) pointed 
out that the absence of voluntary disclosure may be perceived as “bad news” about a company. 
Larrán and Giner (2002: 66) argued that increased disclosure associated with profitability could be 
seen as a mechanism to improve the image of the company, to secure directors’ job security and to 
improve their remuneration. 
On the other hand, Bollen et al. (2006: 279) argued that profitable companies may be concerned 
about maintaining their competitive advantage and therefore may deliberately not use all disclosure 
options available in order to protect their position. As almost all information measured in this study 
was also available via other sources and the only category that measured strategic information was 
the investment case category, this dissertation asserts that this argument as used by Bollen et al. 
(2006) is not applicable to this study.  Bollen et al. (2006) hypothesised that the quality of IIR is not 
affected by company performance and also reported results that show no significant association. 
Celik et al. (2006: 110), Aly et al. (2010: 185) and Trabelsi et al. (2008) pointed to the mixed results 
reported in the literature and listed research that found both positive and negative associations. 
Positive associations were reported by Froidevaux (2004), Celik et al. (2006), Aly et al. (2010) and 
Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999) (Austrian sample). 
On the other hand, Ashbaugh et al. (1999: 250), Ettredge et al. (2002: 366), Marston and Polei 
(2004), Oyelere et al. (2003), Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999) (German sample), Xiao et al. 
(2004: 215), Larrán and Giner (2002), Abdelsalam et al. (2007), Bollen et al. (2006: 291), Cormier et 
al. (2009) and Leventis and Weetman (2004) all document no significant association between 
financial performance and disclosure. 
Performance proxies used in the literature can be categorised as either accounting-based or 
performance-based. Accounting-based performance measures are based on information that was 
reported in the financial statements of the company (e.g. return on equity) compared to market-
based performance measures that are based on share price performance (e.g. annual share return). 
In addition to the various performance proxies (see Table 5.1) that were used and reasons as 
discussed in Section 5.2 above, a possible non-linear relationship (Ismail, 2002) and the 
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manipulation of earnings (Orens et al., 2010) can be offered as two further possible reasons for 
conflicting results. 
Ismail (2002: 17-18) reported a positive association between profitability and Internet disclosure, but 
only within a specific profitability range. Beyond this range, a negative association was reported. It 
is more difficult to analyse firms with negative earnings than those with positive earnings (Brown, 
2001) as the former tend to manipulate their earnings to a larger extent than the latter (Orens et al., 
2010: 1070).   
As none of the studies reviewed for this dissertation showed any significant association between 
disclosure and a market-based performance measure, this study did not include a market-based 
performance measure as performance proxy.151 This study used return on equity (ROE) as 
performance proxy. The return on equity (ROE) ratio was captured from the INET BFA database 
(product called Ratios-General). INET BFA calculates ROE as follows: 
@(*5%	&%%(23%&20!	%*	*(+&(1	$&(!$*0!(
Z(+&(1	$&(!$*0!(	+%!(!%  (5.2) 
A positive association between IIR level and ROE was expected (H4). 
5.3.5 Market to book (MTB) (H5) 
Market to book (MTB) is a financial ratio that compares the market’s valuation of a company to the 
book value of the company as reflected in its financial statements. According to INET BFA, a high 
ratio is caused either by the market being willing to pay a premium or by companies (e.g. in the 
technology sector) that have intangible or other hidden assets that are not reflected in the financial 
statements and therefore are not reflected in the book value per share. 
Myers (1977) and Ohlson (1995) reason that growth perspectives and intangibles are intertwined 
and could be (broadly) represented by the difference between the market value and the book value 
of a company. Celik et al. (2006: 110) argued that companies with high growth prospects and 
intangibles have specific knowledge that is not effectively and efficiently transferable to investors 
through conventional accounting disclosures. 
In a similar vein, Trabelsi et al. (2008) argued that companies where a large percentage of value is 
represented by intangibles may be more likely to disclose additional information. These authors 
argued that as company value is relatively more difficult to assess based on available accounting 
information (i.e. book value), more information is disclosed. Larrán and Giner (2002: 67) argued that 
as higher market-to-book ratios are associated with higher amounts of intangibles not recorded in 
the financial statements of companies there will be greater motivation for such companies to disclose 
more information to ensure that the company is properly valued. 
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 Bollen et al. (2006) and Ettredge et al. (2002) tested, but found no significant association. 
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Bollen et al. (2006: 280), on the other hand, hypothesised that the quality of IIR is not related to the 
growth rate of a company as measured by the market-to-book value ratio for the following reasons. 
Firstly, fast-growing companies may choose to disclose less since disclosure of information may 
result in the loss of competitive advantage. Secondly, given the need to devote considerable funds 
and time to manage their high growth rates, fast-growing companies may lack the financial or human 
resources to optimise IIR.  
As also discussed above in Section 5.3.4, almost all information measured in this study is also 
available via other sources. The first argument is therefore rejected in this dissertation. Although the 
second argument may be valid, this dissertation argues that, given the cost–benefit trade-off principle 
as discussed in Section 2.2.6, even companies with high growth rates and fewer available resources 
will still disclose more information if the benefits outweigh the costs thereof. 
Significant positive associations were reported by Cormier et al. (2009), Orens et al. (2010) and 
Slovene (2006), as opposed to Bollen et al. (2006: 291) and Abdelsalam et al. (2007: 24)152 who 
reported significant negative associations.  
Froidevaux (2004), Celik et al. (2006), Trabelsi et al. (2008) and Larrán and Giner (2002), on the 
other hand, all reported no significant association between the market-to-book ratio and disclosure 
levels.  
The market-to-book value ratio was captured from the INET BFA database (product called Ratios-
General). INET BFA calculates the market-to-book value as a share’s market value divided by its 
book value. Book value per share is calculated as the ordinary shareholders’ interest divided by the 
number of ordinary shares in issue. 
A positive association between IIR level and the market-to-book value ratio was expected (H5). 
5.3.6 Financing activities (NET.ISS and NET.BB) (H6 and H7) 
Cormier et al. (2009: 8) argued that companies that access capital markets on a continuous basis 
have more pressure to disclose more regularly, as investors and lenders dislike any unpleasant 
surprises. Cormier et al. (2009: 16) documented a highly positive association at the 1% level between 
their measure of capital market reliance153 and web-based performance disclosure.  
Trabelsi et al. (2008) also reported a significant positive association (although only at the 10% level) 
between their measure of financing activities154 and incremental155 voluntary website disclosure. Xiao 
et al. (2004), on the other hand, reported no significant association between their proxy for financing 
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 At the 10% level between two sub-sections of their total disclosure score, general content and usability, and the market-
to-book ratio. 
153
 Dummy variable of one for year-to-year change of more than 20% in the debt to market value equity ratio. 
154
 Dummy variable of one if any new debt/equity has been issued in the prior three years. 
155
 Incremental disclosure was defined as disclosure additional to SEDAR (i.e. mandatory) disclosure requirements. 
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activities and the total disclosure score, and a not expected, significant negative association at the 
5% level for a voluntary disclosure sub-category. 
In this study, a dummy variable of one was assigned if the company on net156 issued shares during 
2015. In a similar vein, a dummy variable of one was assigned if the company on net bought back 
shares during 2015. The total number of shares as at 31 December 2014 and 31 December 2015 
were captured from the INET BFA database (product called market data) to ascertain whether the 
company on net issued (i.e. increase in shares) or bought back (i.e. decrease in shares). 
A positive association between the IIR level and a net issue of shares was expected (H6), as 
opposed to a negative association between IIR level and a net buy back of shares (H7). 
5.3.7 Big four audit (AUDIT) (H8)  
Xiao et al. (2004: 200) as well as Wang, O and Claiborne (2008: 18) argued that both agency and 
signalling theory support the hypothesis that increased levels of IIR are expected for companies that 
are audited by one of the big four audit companies. Larger audit companies have more to lose from 
damage to their reputations and are therefore likely to call for more extensive disclosures. The 
auditing function may help to reduce the interest conflicts between management and shareholders. 
Knowing that larger auditing companies usually demand more detailed disclosure, the engagement 
of a big four auditor is a signal to shareholders and the investment community of their acceptance of 
such demands. Xiao et al. (2004: 201) proposed that international audit companies are more likely 
to facilitate the use of innovative practices, such as Internet reporting, and are therefore more likely 
to facilitate the use of innovative IIR practices. Xiao et al. (2004: 215) reported a positive associate 
between audit quality and the level of voluntary disclosure via corporate websites, but no significant 
associations between the total disclosure score, content, presentation or mandatory scores. 
Aly et al. (2010: 187) cited research that reported, respectively, positive and no association between 
disclosure and being audited by a big four audit company. 
A dummy variable of one was assigned in this dissertation for companies that were audited by a big 
four audit company. The audit company was captured from the audit report in the latest financial 
statements. The following four companies were taken as being one of the big four audit companies: 
Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG157 and PwC158. 
A positive association between the IIR level and being audited by a big four audit company was 
expected (H8). 
                                               
156
 It is recognised that some companies may have issued and bought back shares during the measurement period. No 
distinction was made between share issues and share buy backs. For the purpose of this study, a net issue is defined as 
an increase in shares. In a similar vein, a net buy back of shares is defined as a decrease in shares. 
157
 Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG) 
158
 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
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5.3.8 Industry (IND.JSE) (H9) 
Aly et al. (2010: 187) used signalling theory to explain an association between industry type and 
disclosure. If a company within an industry discloses less information compared to industry peers it 
may be interpreted as a signal that the company is hiding bad news. This trend of companies to 
disclose similar information as industry peers is often referred to in the literature as the ‘follower’s 
effect’ (e.g. Lybaert, 2002). 
Celik et al. (2006: 107) cited and briefly discussed the following studies that all report an association 
between industry type and level of disclosure: Cooke (1992); Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995); Botosan 
(1997); Sengupta (1998), and Ferguson, Lam and Lee (2002). These studies, however, all measured 
disclosure as available via the printed media, e.g. the annual report. 
Studies that have used corporate websites as disclosure vehicles for measurement purposes 
showed conflicting results. Abdelsalam et al. (2007), Pervan (2006), Lybaert (2002), Celik et al. 
(2006), Aly et al. (2010), Bonsón and Escobar (2002; 2006), Ettredge et al. (2001) and Xiao et al. 
(2004: 202) all reported an association as opposed to Trabelsi et al. (2008), Larrán and Gilner (2002), 
Geerings et al. (2003), Oyelere et al. (2003) and Bollen et al. (2006), who reported no significant 
association. 
According to Abdelsalam et al. (2007: 14), the type of industry and direction of association was 
uncertain and appeared to be driven by country-specific variables. Aly et al. (2010: 187) argued that 
the different industry classifications used in prior research could possibly explain conflicting results, 
for example:  Celik et al. (2006: 107) categorised all companies listed on the ISE159 into one of three 
industries: manufacturing, finance and service, as compared to Aly et al. (2010: 190) who 
categorised 62 companies into nine different industries. Pervan (2006: 17) categorised 55 Croatian 
and 30 Slovene listed companies into seven industries. In support of Abdelsalam et al. (2007), 
Pervan (2006) found significant associations for the tourism and shipping industries in their Croatian 
sub-sample, but in their Slovene sample they found associations only for the transport industry. 
Bonsón and Escobar (2006: 305) categorised their sample into 10 industries, but only found a 
significant association between one industry (financial) and internet disclosure. 
According to Xiao et al. (2004: 202), information technology (IT) companies were more likely to 
optimise IIR for three reasons: (1) IT is their area of expertise, (2) it provides an incentive to 
demonstrate that they are technology leaders, and (3) companies tend to imitate early adopters 
within the same group according to the fad perspective.160 
As Table 5.1 shows, a wide variety of industry proxies have been used in previous studies. For the 
purpose of this study, companies were dichotomised based on their JSE industry membership. As 
                                               
159
 Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) 
160
 Abrahamson (1991: 597) described the ‘fad’ perspective as the tendency of companies to follow early adopters in the 
industry as a result of uncertainty. 
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discussed in Chapter 1, the sample selection process that was followed in this study entailed that 
the defined population was first stratified according to their JSE industry membership before a 
random sample was selected.  
As Table 4.3 in Chapter 4 shows, all sample companies could be categorised in one of 10 JSE 
industries. To avoid the dummy variable trap,161 dummy variables were only created for nine of the 
10 JSE industries. 
JSE industry classification was captured from a spreadsheet received directly from a JSE 
representative. An association (positive or negative) is expected between the IIR level and the JSE 
industry classification (H9). 
5.3.9 Listing status (LIST.D, LIST.P and LIST.Y) (H10, H11 and H12) 
According to Xiao et al. (2004: 201) and Kang and Stulz (1997), foreign shareholders are more likely 
to face higher levels of information asymmetry. A foreign listing will extend the dispersion of 
shareholders and therefore increase information asymmetry (Bollen et al., 2006: 278). Marston and 
Polei (2004: 295) and Debreceny et al. (2002) argued that higher disclosure levels can decrease 
these information asymmetries. Extensive voluntary disclosure via corporate websites can also 
create the impression of greater transparency (Xiao et al., 2004: 201), which may be important for 
foreign investors. 
On another point, Cooke (1992: 232) argued that companies with listings on a foreign stock 
exchange face additional disclosure requirements and would therefore disclose more information 
than companies not subject to these additional requirements. In a similar vein, Xiao et al. (2004: 201) 
used the forced selection perspective162 to motivate why more extensive disclosures are expected 
from companies with foreign listings. Bollen et al. (2006: 278) emphasised that for companies to 
communicate with local and foreign stakeholders (e.g. customers, consumers, corporate partners or 
investors) a communication channel, such as the corporate website that can simultaneously provide 
identical information to all interested stakeholders, is needed. 
Lang, Lins and Miller (2003: 318) listed three possible reasons why companies listed in the US will 
disclose more information compared to companies not listed in the US: (1) increased regulation by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), (2) a more demanding litigation environment, and 
(3) enhanced disclosure and reconciliation to US GAAP. 
Research by Murphy, Poist, Lynagh and Grazer (2003: 248) suggested a positive association 
between the use of the Internet to generate corporate revenue at a global level and the development 
of corporate websites. 
                                               
161
 As discussed in Chapter 7 of the textbook ‘Principles of Econometrics’ (Hill et al., 2011) 
162
 According to the forced selection perspective, a company is pressured by powerful external organisations (e.g. 
government or providers of capital) to adopt an innovation (e.g. IIR) irrespective of any benefits to the company.  
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A number of studies to date have documented an association between disclosure (as measured via 
printed media, e.g. hard copy annual reports) and the number of listings or a listing on a US or UK 
stock exchange (Celik et al., 2006: 109). A positive association between Internet reporting and listing 
status was reported by Xiao et al. (2004), Debreceny et al. (2002), Bollen et al. (2006: 291) and Aly 
et al. (2010: 191). Oyelere et al. (2003) found no association between Internet reporting and listing 
status. Ali (2010), as cited by Khan and Ismail (2012: 7), documented a positive association between 
listing age and Internet financial reporting.  
As Table 5.1 shows, a wide variety of proxies have been used in previous studies. This study uses 
three alternative proxies for listing status. The first two dichotomise companies based on whether 
they are dually listed or not and the stock exchange where they are primarily listed. A dummy variable 
of one was assigned to companies with a dual stock exchange listing (H10) and a dummy variable 
of one was assigned to companies with a primary listing other than the JSE (i.e. only having a 
secondary JSE listing) (H11). The third proxy is a measure of the listing age (i.e. number of years 
listed) of the company as on the date that the IIR of the company was measured (H12). 
The data requirements for all three proxies were captured from a spreadsheet received directly from 
a JSE representative. Positive associations between the IIR level and all three listing status proxies 
(i.e. LIST.D (H10), LIST.P (H11) and LIST.Y (H12)) were expected. 
5.3.10 Ownership (DIR.SH, F.FLT and 20%.SH) (H13, H14 and H15) 
Investors with smaller shareholding percentages have less access to information compared to 
investors with large shareholdings that may obtain information more easily from internal sources 
within the company. According to Marston and Polei (2004: 294), it could therefore be assumed that 
investors with smaller shareholdings will use corporate websites to gather company-specific 
information as other information sources may be more inaccessible than they are for the larger 
shareholders.  
Trabelsi et al. (2008) state that the decision to disclose information via corporate websites depends 
to an extent on whether managers have incentives to provide all users (including small investors) 
with equal and immediate access to information, therefore facilitating a ‘clientele effect’ scenario. 
Ettredge et al. (1999) reported results that suggest that information disclosed on corporate websites 
varies systematically with the relative sophistication of the user base, where higher levels of retail 
ownership163 are associated with relatively subjective and more abbreviated information. 
According to Ho and Wong (2001: 144) and Marston and Polei (2004: 294), agency theory dictated 
that in a dispersed ownership shareholder structure, companies will disclose more information to 
reduce agency cost and information asymmetry. As Table 5.1 shows, a wide variety of ownership 
proxies have been used in previous studies. Proxies such as the number of shareholders (e.g. 
                                               
163
 The number of investors was used as proxy for the level of retail ownership. 
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Pervan, 2006) and free float percentage (e.g. Celik et al., 2006) could be used to proxy for ownership 
dispersion. The free float percentage is calculated with the following formula: 
(*%&0	3!	$&(!N!%(,%!	$&(!)
*%&0	3!	$&(!  (5.3) 
Restricted shares (i.e. ‘locked in shares’ or shares not readily available for trade) are defined by the 
JSE ground rules document (JSE, 2016b) and include shareholdings such as shares held by the 
government; shares held by directors, senior executives and managers; employee share schemes; 
and shares held by public companies. 
Based on agency theory, positive associations for the number of shareholders and the free float 
percentage, both as measures of shareholder dispersion, could therefore be expected.  
Some studies, however, developed a proxy to measure the opposite of shareholder dispersion, i.e. 
shareholder concentration. Orens et al. (2010) measured shareholder concentration as a dummy 
variable of one if companies had a single investor that had a 20% or more shareholding.  Abdelsalam 
et al. (2007) used two proxies to measure shareholder concentration, namely the percentage of 
shares held by directors and the percentage of shares held by major shareholders.164 Based on 
agency theory, negative associations for such proxies (i.e. shareholder concentration) could be 
expected.  
Directors who are also shareholders will have to bear both the consequences and benefits of the 
quality of management. Abdelsalam et al. (2007: 9) argued that high levels of director shareholdings 
align the interest of management and shareholders, which, in turn, reduces the need for additional 
voluntary disclosure to reduce agency costs. 
According to Chau and Gray (2002: 249) family-controlled companies have less motivation than 
companies that have wider ownership to disclose more information, given their relative weak demand 
for public disclosure. Trabelsi et al. (2008) argued that companies with a concentrated ownership 
may want to preserve that information advantage by not using disclosure channels such as corporate 
websites.   
Two other proxies that could be used as ownership proxy are foreign ownership and institutional 
ownership. A larger percentage of foreign ownership could also be expected to result in increased 
disclosure levels – for the same reasons that a foreign listing is expected to result in increased 
disclosure levels (see discussion of listing status in Section 5.3.9). Xiao et al. (2004) argued that as 
institutional owners have more resources and expertise to monitor listed companies than individual 
investors, one could expect an association between increased disclosure and increased institutional 
ownership. Bushee and Miller (2007) identify institutional ownership as a trait of companies that have 
implemented a successful investor relations programme. Chang et al. (2008) found a significant 
                                               
164
 Abdelsalam et al. (2007) defined major shareholders as all shareholders with a shareholding exceeding 5%. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
157 
positive association between institutional ownership and the measure of investor relations disclosure 
quality. 
Literature measuring disclosure using the printed media as disclosure vehicle reports conflicting 
results. For example, Chau and Gray (2002: 257) found a positive association between ownership 
dispersion and voluntary disclosure compared to Raffournier (1995: 273-274), who reported a non-
significant relationship.  
More specifically in regard to studies that measured corporate websites as disclosure vehicle, Orens 
et al. (2010) and Abdelsalam et al. (2007) reported significant negative associations between 
disclosure and ownership concentration, but Trabelsi et al. (2008) and Cormier et al. (2009) reported 
no similar significant associations.  
Regarding the association between disclosure and ownership dispersion, Bollen et al. (2006) 
reported a significant positive association from their univariate analysis, but reported no significant 
association following a multivariate analysis. Marston and Polei (2004) found a significant positive 
association for their 2000 sub-sample, but no significant association for their 2003 sub-sample from 
their multivariate analysis. Pervan (2006) reported a significant positive association for a Croatian 
sub-sample, but no significant association for a Slovene sub-sample. 
This study uses three alternative proxies for ownership, two for ownership concentration and one for 
ownership dispersion. 
A dummy variable of one was assigned for companies where a single shareholder had an interest 
of 20% or more as proxy one for ownership concentration (H15). As discussed below, two different 
information sources were examined to measure H15: INET BFA and Profile data. INET BFA provides 
ownership information as per the latest annual reports, as well as according to STRATE165. 
Although only dematerialised166 shares can be traded on the JSE, the decision to hold a share 
certificate or to dematerialise is a voluntary decision. However, only dematerialised share ownership 
is available from STRATE, and INET BFA therefore calculates ‘certificated shareholdings’ as the 
balancing figure for shareholdings where the ownership is not available from STRATE. Further, 
foreign shareholding is also not available from STRATE and, as such, is included in the certificated 
shareholding balancing figure calculation by INET BFA. 
As alternative to the STRATE ownership data, ownership information as published via annual reports 
is also available via INET BFA. Section 8.63 I of the JSE listing requirements (JSE, 2016a) requires 
                                               
165
 Share transactions totally electronic (STRATE) is the licensed Central Securities Depository (CSD) for electronic 
settlements in South Africa. 
166
 In terms of the Security Services Act (SSA) 36 of 2004, share certificates may be handed in for custody at a depository 
institution. Dematerialisation is the process where share certificates are handed in at a CSD participant where any 
subsequent transfer of shares is effected with an electronic change of the name of the particular person in the records of 
the CSD participant (Havenga & Locke, 2010: 53). The South African Financial Markets Act of 2012 defines a CSD as a 
facility which provides services that include the custody and administration of securities, the clearing of transactions in 
listed securities and the settlement of transactions in listed securities (Van Wyk, Botha & Goodspeed, 2015: 214). 
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companies to disclosure a list of shareholders with a beneficial interest exceeding 5%. More 
specifically, paragraph I requires companies to disclose (JSE, 2016a):  
the interest of any shareholder, other than a director, who, in so far as it is known to the 
company, is directly or indirectly beneficially interested in 5% or more of any class of the 
listed company’s capital, together with the amount of each such shareholder’s interest or, if 
there are no such shareholders, an appropriate negative statement. [underlining inserted] 
According to STRATE (2015: 19) the securities register of a company comprises the principal 
certificated register and the electronic sub-register. The sub-register reflects registered ownership 
and not beneficial ownership. Havenga and Locke (2010: 54) distinguished between nominee and 
beneficial holders of shares as follows. The nominee holder is the person or the entity in whose 
name the shares are registered, while the beneficial holder is the person who is entitled to the rights 
attached to the share. The Central Securities Depository (CSD) participants and not the company 
maintain and administer these sub-registers. According to STRATE (2015: 21), nominees must 
disclose the identity of beneficial holders as well as the number and classes of shares held to the 
issuer company in respect of shares registered in the name of a nominee. 
Further, as the JSE listing requirements are only applicable to companies with a primary listing on 
the JSE, not all companies disclose a list of beneficial shareholders. This being the case, shareholder 
information, as available via Profile Data, was also examined and compared with data extracted from 
INET BFA. If INET BFA STRATE, INET BFA annual report data or Profile Data listed a single 
shareholder with an interest of 20% or more, a dummy variable of one was assigned. Four 
companies were assigned this dummy variable based on Profile Data, not listed as such according 
to INET BFA. 
Given the limitations as discussed above, the measurement of this variable (H15) (i.e. dummy 
variable for 20% shareholding) is probably understated and results should therefore be interpreted 
with the necessary caution. 
The second ownership concentration proxy used in this study was the director shareholding 
percentage. The director shareholder percentage was extracted from INET BFA (product called 
financial statements under Sundry Data167). According to INET BFA, the director shareholder 
percentage is the number of shares held by the directors of the company, whether direct or indirect, 
beneficial or non-beneficial. The ownership dispersion proxy, free float, was captured from a 
spreadsheet received directly from a JSE representative.  
A negative association between IIR level and the two ownership concentration proxies, i.e. single 
ownership exceeding 20% (H15) and director shareholding percentage (H13) was expected, and, 
                                               
167
 Three different INET BFA line items were used: Directors’ shareholding beneficial (non-gold) + Directors’ shareholding 
non-beneficial (non-gold) + Directors’ shareholding % (gold). 
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as discussed, a positive association between IIR level and the ownership dispersion proxy, free float 
(H14) was expected. 
5.4 METHOD OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Various statistical software packages are available for analysis in statistics and econometrics. For 
the purpose of this study, Statistica was used. Statistica (2016) defines stepwise regression as a 
model-building technique that finds subsets of predictor (i.e. independent) variables that most 
adequately predict responses on a dependent variable by regression, given the specified criteria for 
adequacy of model fit. According to Keller and Warrack (1997: 871), stepwise regression is an 
iterative procedure that adds and deletes one independent variable at a time, where the decision to 
add or delete a variable is made on the basis of whether the variable improves the model or not. 
According to Keller and Warrack (1997: 875), stepwise regression procedures produce equations 
that include only independent variables that are statistically significant in the presence of the other 
variables in the model. 
Stepwise regression is a well-known statistical procedure that is often used in empirical research 
and discussed in regression textbooks, such as Keller and Warrack (1997: 871-875), Cramer (2003: 
59-73), Fujikoshi, Ulyanov and Shimizu (2010: 194-197), Afifi, Clark and May (2004: 174-192), 
Sharma (1996: 265-273) and Meyers, Gamst and Guarino (2006: 171-176). Further, the use of the 
stepwise regression is supported by well-known statistical packages such as SAS, SPSS, Statistica, 
Stata and R. 
The stepwise regression procedure was used throughout this dissertation to develop multiple 
regression models (i.e. Sections 5.4 (determinants of IIR), 6.4 (information asymmetry), 7.4 (cost of 
debt) and 8.5 (cost of equity and cost of capital) in accordance with the third to the seventh objective 
set for this study in Chapter 1. The stepwise regression procedure was applied as follows all through 
this dissertation where applicable. 
The first step was to identify independent variables that were used in the literature to explain 
variations in each of the dependent variables that were examined. Based on theory and the results 
found in prior studies, an anticipated association between each independent variable and the 
dependent variable examined was hypothesised. Normality plots and histograms were examined for 
all variables and where appropriate, the natural logarithm of variables were used to reduce the 
skewness of distributions. Log transformation is a well-known method to remedy non-normality 
(Keller & Warrack, 1997; Sharma, 1996; Afifi et al., 2004; Cramer, 2003) and to summarise what 
follows, was successfully applied throughout this dissertation to rectify non-normality as evident from 
visual inspections of normality plots and histograms. Pearson correlation coefficients between 
independent variables (i.e. correlation matrix) were examined to identify highly correlated 
independent variables. Where appropriate, an alternative proxy was used for independent variables 
to avoid multicollinearity. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
160 
Stepwise regression results were examined for statistical fit, theoretical sensibility of directions and 
econometric criteria. The statistical fit of each model was firstly assessed using the reported t-values 
to ensure that all independent variables included in the model have significant coefficients at the 
10% or better level. Secondly the ANOVA table was examined to assess the F-value and the 
adjusted R² to ensure the overall fit of the regression model. 
The signs of the significant independent variables in each regression model were examined to 
ensure the theoretical sensibility thereof. More specifically, the directions of significant coefficients 
were compared to the hypothesised associations. 
Finally, the required conditions for the validity of a regression analysis were inspected. The first 
requirement is that residuals should be approximately normally distributed. Histograms of the raw 
residuals and normality plots of residuals were examined for this purpose, as well as to identify any 
influential outliers. The second requirement is that the variance of the error variable (i.e. residual) is 
constant. A violation of the second requirement is referred to as heteroscedasticity. Residual plots 
of predicted versus residuals were examined throughout this dissertation for any evidence of 
heteroscedasticity. Where necessary the Breusch-Pagan test was used to test and control for 
heteroscedasticity.  
The third requirement is the nonindependence of the error variable. A violation of the third 
requirement is referred to as autocorrelation. The data in this dissertation are cross-sectional as all 
measurements were made between March and September 2015. Although autocorrelation is more 
frequently observed with time-series data, the existence of autocorrelation was assessed throughout 
this dissertation by means of the Durbin-Watson test statistic. 
A further problem that is applicable to multiple regression models, is multicollinearity. Multicollinearity 
is a condition that exists where the independent variables are correlated with one another. According 
to Keller and Warrack (1997: 808), multicollinearity distorts the t-tests of the coefficients, making it 
difficult to interpret the coefficients. One of the advantages of the stepwise regression technique is 
that muliticollinearity is inherently considered in the model-building methodology. Notwithstanding 
this advantage, tolerance values were monitored in all regression models throughout this study. 
Given research objective 3 (to establish the determinants of IIR), and the number of independent 
variables as identified and discussed in Section 5.3 above, the stepwise regression method was 
used. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the description of variables that were entered into the stepwise 
regression models. For three independent variables (market capitalisation, market-to-book ratio, and 
the number of years listed), the natural logarithm was used to reduce the skewness in the distribution 
of these variables. Log transformations are often used in the literature to transform independent 
variables such as market capitalisation (Larrán & Giner, 2002), market-to-book ratio (Bollen et al., 
2006), and the number of shareholders (Ettredge et al., 1999). 
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Table 5.2: Dependent variables used in the stepwise regression models of IIR  
Acronym Variable H Description 
Dependent variables 
IIR  Internet investor 
relations score, including 
all attributes (i.e. 346) 
 The total IIR score per company, i.e. the sum of the 






relations score, including 
270 (IIR-90), 189 (IIR-
80), 128 (IIR-70), 95 
(IIR-60) and 60 (IIR-50) 
attributes 
 Attributes with average availabilities less than 10%, 
20%, 30%, 40% and 50% were removed from the 
calculation of the IIR score to calculate the following 
alternative IIR groupings IIR-90, IIR-80, IIR-70, IIR-60 
and IIR-50 
 
Table 5.3: Independent variables used in the stepwise regression models of IIR  
Acronym Variable H Description 
Independent continuous variables 
SIZE Market capitalisation 1 Natural logarithm of the average daily market 
capitalisation of all trading days from 1 December 2014 
to 30 November 2015 
LEV Leverage 2 Ratio between debt and assets  
CUR Current ratio 3  Ratio between current assets and current liabilities 
ROE Financial performance 4 Ratio between profit to ordinary shareholders interest  
MTB Market-to-book value 5 Natural logarithm of the ratio between the share price 
(market value) and the book value of equity 
LIST.Y Number of years listed 12 Natural logarithm of the number of years listed as on 
the date the IIR of each company was measured 
DIR.SH Director shareholding 
percentage 
13 The percentage direct and indirect, beneficial and non-
beneficial shareholding of directors 
F.FLT Free float percentage 14 Ratio between the total issues shares minus restricted 
shares to the total issued shares 
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Table 5.3: Independent variables used in the stepwise regression models of IIR (continued) 
Independent categorical variables 
NET.ISS Net issue of shares 6 Dummy variable representing one if the company on net 
has issued shares in the preceding 12-month period 
NET.BB Net buy back of 
shares 
7 Dummy variable representing one if the company on net 
has bought back shares in the preceding 12-month period 
AUDIT Big four audit 8 Dummy variable representing one if the company is 
audited by either PwC, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche or Ernst 
& Young 
IND.JSE JSE industry 
classification 
9a – 9j JSE industry classification. Each company is assigned to 
one of the following ten industries: basic material (9a), 
consumer goods (9b), consumer services (9c), financials 
(9d), healthcare (9e), industrials (9f), oil and gas (9g), 
technology (9h), telecommunications (9i) and utilities (9j) 
LIST.D Dual listing 10 Dummy variable representing one if the company is dually 
listed on the JSE and any other stock exchange 
Acronym Variable H Description 
LIST.P Primary listing 11 Dummy variable representing one if the company has a 
primary listing other than the JSE 
20%.SH Block ownership 15 Dummy variable representing one if one shareholder has 
more than 20% of issued shares 
 
Table 5.4 summarises the expected associations between each of the independent variables as 
listed in Table 5.3 above and IIR. These expected associations were discussed in Section 5.3 above. 
Table 5.4: Expected associations between IIR and independent variables  
Independent variables IIR 
Market capitalisation (SIZE) + 
Leverage (LEV) + 
Current ratio (CUR) - 
Financial performance (ROE) + 
Market to book (MTB) + 
Net issue of shares (NET.ISS) + 
Net buy back of shares (NET.BB) - 
Big four audit (AUDIT) + 
Industry (IND.JSE) + / - 
Dual listing (LIST.D) + 
Primary listing (LIST.P) + 
Number of years listed (LIST.Y) + 
Director shareholding percentage (DIR.SH) - 
Block ownership (20%.SH) - 
Free float percentage (F.FLT) + 
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5.5 RESULTS 
5.5.1 Selected descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics are set out in Table 5.5. Statistics for market capitalisation, the market-to-
book ratio and the number of years listed are presented prior to the natural logarithmic 
transformations, which were used in the multivariate regression analysis. 
The results indicated that the highest IIR score (IIR) achieved by any company was 193.50 (British 
American Tobacco), while the lowest was 13.5 (AH-Vest). The average was 97.98. These results 
suggest that, across the 85 JSE-listed companies in the sample, there was widespread variation in 
the level of IIR. 
The smallest company included in the sample, AH-Vest (formerly All Joy Foods), had a market 
capitalisation of only R38.67 million compared to the largest company, British American Tobacco, 
which had a market capitalisation of R1 411 045 million. The average market capitalisation was 
R49 409 million. These results support the objective of the sample selection criteria followed in 
Section 4.2 to select a sample that would ensure significant cross-sectional variation. Similar to the 
market capitalisation, the market-to-book value ratio showed similar variation, as expected. 
The smallest company in the sample, AH-Vest, therefore also had the lowest IIR score and the 
largest company, British American Tobacco, the highest IIR score. 
Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics: variables used to examine variations in IIR  
Panel A: Dependent variables 
  Average Minimum Quartile Maximum Standard 
deviation 
   Q1 Q2 Q3   
IIR 97.98 13.50 67.00 96.00 130.50 193.50 43.18 
IIR-90 93.85 13.50 66.00 92.50 122.50 172.00 39.45 
IIR-80 82.06 13.50 61.00 82.00 104.50 135.00 30.71 
IIR-70 67.23 12.50 53.00 69.00 85.50 101.00 22.01 
IIR-60 55.92 12.50 46.50 57.50 69.50 79.00 16.86 
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Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics: variables used to examine variations in IIR (continued) 
Panel B: Continuous independent variables 
 Average Minimum Quartile Maximum Standard 
deviation 
   Q1 Q2 Q3   
Market cap (ZAR’ 
000 000) 
49 409.17 38.67 584.88 6 247.90 25 944.84 1 411 045.16 169 730.55 
Leverage 
(debt/assets) 
0.45 0 0.28 0.40 0.61 1.21 0.25 




11.03 -40.09 2.78 12.77 20.62 84.02 21.14 
Market-to-book 
value 
2.28 0.13 0.89 1.43 2.88 12.99 2.53 
Number of years 
listed 
22.75 1.78 8.94 17.19 27.58 75.23 17.99 
Director 
shareholding (%) 
13.88 0.00 0.10 2.87 23.13 81.79 20.47 
Free float (%) 59.70 2.50 36.00 60.00 87.00 100.00 28.63 
Panel C: Categorical independent variables 
 Yes (1) No (0) Total     
Net issue of 
shares 
36 49 85     
Net buy back of 
shares 
15 70 85     
Big four audit 61 24 85     
Basic material 
industry 
17 68 85     
Consumer goods 
industry 
7 78 85     
Consumer 
services industry 
10 75 85     
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Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics: variables used to examine variations in IIR (continued) 
Panel C: Categorical independent variables 
 Yes (1) No (0) Total     
Healthcare industry 3 82 85     
Industrials industry 19 66 85     
Oil and gas industry 1 84 85     
Technology industry 4 81 85     
Telecommunications 
industry 
2 83 85     
Utilities industry 1 84 85     
Dual listing 25 60 85     
Primary listing (other 
JSE) 
14 71 85     
Block ownership 52 33 85     
 
The average leverage168 was 0.45. As this ratio was smaller than 0.5, it showed that on average the 
assets of the sample companies were primarily financed through equity. The third (Q3) quartile 
however was 0.61, showing that 25% of companies financed the majority of their assets through 
debt. Brait SE, an investment holding company, had no debt on measurement date and therefore 
the minimum leverage was 0. Although the current ratio169 varied between as low as 0.03 to a 
maximum of 159.31, it should be noted that only three companies (Tawana Resources, Randgold 
and Brait SE) had a current ratio of more than 5. 
The average company was profitable, with an average return on equity (ROE) of just over 11%. 
Profitability, as measured with ROE, however, varied significantly with the lowest ROE reported by 
Sentula Mining, reflecting a loss of -40%, and the highest ROE of 84% reported by Randgold. As 
suggested by the average (11.03%) and the median (12.77%), ROE closely resemble a normal 
distribution. 
The average company was listed on the JSE for nearly 23 years, with 25% of the companies listed 
for more than 27 years and 25% listed for less than nine years. Twenty-five companies had a dual 
listing and were therefore listed on both the JSE and at least one additional international stock 
exchange, for example the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
Fourteen companies had only a secondary listing on the JSE, with a primary listing on a stock 
                                               
168
 Ratio between debt and assets. 
169
 Ratio between current assets and current liabilities. 
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exchange other than the JSE.170 Regarding financing activities, 36 companies on net issued shares 
during 2015, and 15 companies on net bought back shares. 
On average, 13.88% of shares were held by directors. As showed by the first (Q1) and third (Q3) 
quartiles, directors’ shareholding varied significantly, with 25% of companies where directors had 
almost no shares (less than 0.1% of issued shares) as opposed to 25% of companies where directors 
held about one quarter of issued shares. Similar variations were evident in an analysis of the 
distribution of the free float percentage, which is an indication of the percentage of unrestricted 
shares, i.e. shares that are expected to be available to trade. Of the 85 companies in the sample, 52 
had a single shareholder who owned more than 20% of the issued shares. 
Although, the majority of the companies (61) were audited by PwC, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche or 
Ernst & Young, almost 30% were audited by smaller audit companies. 
5.5.2 Correlation analysis 
Table 5.6 provides a comparison between the 22 companies with an IIR score less than the 25th 
percentile, (the lower quartile companies) and the 21 companies with an IIR score above the 75th 
percentile (the upper quartile companies). All results reported in Table 5.6 are as expected and as 
summarised in Table 5.4 above. 
The lower quartile companies are smaller (market capitalisation), have less debt (leverage) and are 
less profitable (ROE) compared to the upper quartile companies. Further, the lower quartile 
companies have a higher average director shareholding percentage and smaller free float 
percentage compared to the upper quartile companies. Lower quartile companies on average have 
been listed 18 years, compared to the upper quartile companies that are on average listed for 34 
years. 
                                               
170
 These 14 companies had primary listings as follows: London Stock Exchange (LSE) (6), Australian Stock Exchange 
(AUSX) (2), Luxembourg Stock Exchange (LUSE) (1), Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSX) (1), Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) 
(2), Bucharest Stock Exchange (BVB) (1), and Mauritius Stock Exchange (MSX) (1). 
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Table 5.6: A comparison of the bottom and top quartile companies: IIR scores  
Variable Total sample IIR score < 25th 
percentile  
IIR score > 75th 
percentile  
Size (market capitalisation)    
Average (R’ million) 49 409.17 2 610.59 151 694.53 
Standard deviation (R’ million) 169 730.55 4 589.14 311 980.68 
Median (R’ million) 6 247.90 212.79 22 329.97 
Leverage (debt/assets)     
Average 0.45 0.35 0.61 
Standard deviation 0.25 0.22 0.27 
Median 0.40 0.32 0.59 
Current ratio    
Average 5.07 8.04 1.33 
Standard deviation 22.52 28.44 0.56 
Median 1.32 1.34 1.28 
Financial performance (ROE)    
Average 11.03 8.52 15.53 
Standard deviation 21.14 24.67 17.55 
Median 12.77 9.67 13.56 
Market-to-book value    
Average 2.28 1.63 3.16 
Standard deviation 2.53 1.58 3.84 
Median 1.43 1.03 1.70 
Number of years listed    
Average 22.75 18.11 34.03 
Standard deviation 17.99 11.24 23.75 
Median 17.19 16.46 21.14 
Director shareholding percentage    
Average 13.88 19.82 4.96 
Standard deviation 20.47 22.79 12.54 
Median 2.87 8.56 0.27 
Free float percentage    
Average 59.70 46.11 78.90 
Standard deviation 28.63 26.83 24.93 
Median 60.00 40.00 92.00 
 
Table 5.7 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between IIR, as well as the five alternative IIR 
groupings (IIR-90; IIR-80; IIR-70; IIR-60 and IIR-50) as discussed in Chapter 4, and the independent 
variables as listed in Table 5.3.  According to Table 5.7, size, leverage, being audited by a big four 
audit company, having a dual listing, directors’ shareholding, free float and blockholder ownership 
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(single shareholder with more than 20% interest) are all statistically significantly correlated at the 5% 
or better level with IIR. All coefficients are as expected.  
Table 5.7: Correlation matrix: alternative IIR groupings and independent variables 
    IIR IIR-90 IIR-80 IIR-70 IIR-60 IIR-50 
SIZE H1 0.65 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.54 
LEV H2 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.29 
CUR H3 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.10 
ROE H4 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04 
MTB H5 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.05 
NET. ISS H6 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.22 
NET. BB H7 -0.09 -0.10 -0.14 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 
AUDIT H8 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.38 0.35 0.26 
BM H9a 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.08 
CG H9b -0.07 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 -0.10 -0.12 
CS H9c -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 -0.15 -0.17 -0.20 
F H9d -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
HC H9e 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 
I H9f 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.14 
OG H9g 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.00 
TEC H9h -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 
TEL H9i 0.22 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.09 
U H9j -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 
LIST.D H10 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.18 
LIST.P H11 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.17 
LIST.Y H12 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.06 -0.02 
D.SH H13 -0.30 -0.31 -0.29 -0.27 -0.28 -0.27 
F. FLT H14 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.30 
20%.SH H15 -0.27 -0.26 -0.26 -0.23 -0.23 -0.25 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level;  Blue = significant at the 5% level; Red = significant at the 10% level; SIZE 
(market capitalisation); LEV (leverage); CUR (current ratio); ROE (return on equity); MTB (market-to-book ratio); NET.ISS 
(net issue of shares); NET.BB (net buy back of shares); AUDIT (big four audit); BM (basic material); CG (consumer goods); 
CS (consumer services); F (financials); HC (healthcare); I (industrials); OG (oil and gas); TEC (technology); TEL 
(telecommunications); U (utilities); LIST.D (dual listing); LIST.P (primary listing); LIST.Y (years listed); D.SH (director 
shareholding percentage); F.FLT (free float percentage); 20%.SH (block ownership) 
All these variables are also significant at the 5% level for the five alternative IIR groupings, except 
for dual listing. The dummy variable used for dual-listed companies was only significant at the 10% 
level for IIR-70 and IIR-60, and not significant for IIR-50. The number of years listed was only 
significant at the 10% level and only for two IIR scores, IIR and IIR-90. The dummy variable used for 
companies that on net issued shares during 2015, NET.ISS, increased in significance as the number 
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of attributes measured decreased according to their average availabilities. NET-ISS was statistically 
significant at the 10% level for IIR and IIR-90, but at 5% for IIR-80, IIR-70, IIR-60 and IIR-50. 
The dummy variable used for companies that on net bought back shares during 2015, NET.BB, was 
only significant at the 10% level for one of the disclosure scores, IIR-70. Regarding JSE industries, 
only the telecommunications industry showed a significant association at the 5% level and only for 
two disclosure scores, IIR and IIR-90. The consumer services industry (CS) dummy variable was 
statistically significant at the 10% level and only for IIR-50. 
Table 5.8 shows Pearson correlation coefficients between the independent variables listed in Table 
5.3. 
Only two correlations in Table 5.8 are higher than 0.5. The correlation between the market-to-book 
ratio (H5) and the return on equity (ROE) (0.54) and the correlation between dual listing (H10) and 
primary listing (H11) (0.69). The high correlation between dual listing and primary listing was 
expected as 14 of the 25 companies with a dual listing also have a primary listing other than the JSE. 
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Table 5.8: Correlation matrix: independent variables used to examine variations in IIR 
 

















































































































H1 1.00                         
H2 0.28 1.00                       
H3 -0.02 -0.30 1.00                      
H4 0.41 0.06 0.44 1.00                     
H5 0.49 0.27 -0.07 0.54 1.00                    
H6 0.41 -0.03 0.04 0.13 0.33 1.00                   
H7 0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 -0.40 1.00                  
H8 0.42 0.07 0.09 0.27 0.14 0.11 -0.26 1.00                 
H9a -0.23 -0.25 0.11 -0.25 -0.38 -0.25 0.00 0.12 1.00                
H9b 0.12 0.09 -0.05 0.02 0.14 0.00 -0.14 0.00 -0.15 1.00               
H9c 0.16 0.19 -0.06 0.29 0.49 0.13 -0.17 0.23 -0.18 -0.11 1.00              
H9d 0.27 -0.06 0.09 0.17 0.08 0.23 0.16 0.06 -0.29 -0.17 -0.21 1.00             
H9e -0.01 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.10 0.22 -0.09 -0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 -0.11 1.00            
H9f -0.23 0.03 -0.08 -0.14 -0.22 -0.17 0.12 -0.29 -0.27 -0.16 -0.20 -0.31 -0.10 1.00           
H9g -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 -0.24 -0.03 -0.09 -0.05 0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 1.00          
H9h -0.07 0.10 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.13 -0.04 -0.12 -0.02 1.00         
H9i 0.21 -0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.10 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 1.00        
H9j -0.19 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.15 -0.09 -0.05 -0.17 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 1.00       
H10 0.20 -0.09 0.24 -0.10 -0.13 0.18 -0.10 0.18 0.32 -0.01 -0.16 0.11 -0.12 -0.35 0.17 -0.02 0.07 0.17 1.00      
H11 0.16 -0.03 0.15 -0.09 -0.12 0.20 -0.12 0.00 0.17 0.10 -0.16 0.19 -0.08 -0.24 -0.05 -0.10 -0.07 0.25 0.69 1.00     
H12 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.14 -0.02 -0.23 0.16 0.31 0.14 -0.03 0.15 -0.16 -0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.37 1.00    
H13 -0.35 0.00 0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.11 0.09 -0.25 -0.15 0.06 -0.09 -0.16 0.18 0.30 -0.07 0.06 -0.10 -0.07 -0.31 -0.17 -0.06 1.00   
H14 0.39 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.20 -0.12 0.26 -0.06 -0.18 0.13 0.09 -0.04 0.02 -0.14 0.05 0.09 -0.15 -0.05 -0.14 0.15 -0.39 1.00  
H15 -0.34 -0.20 0.12 -0.17 -0.33 -0.29 0.12 -0.02 0.16 -0.02 -0.16 0.06 -0.11 -0.04 0.09 -0.05 -0.04 0.09 -0.07 -0.23 0.21 0.16 -0.32 1.00 
Red = significant at the 5% or better level; Blue = significant at 10% level. Notes: SIZE (market capitalisation); LEV (leverage); CUR (current ratio); ROE (return on equity); MTB (market-
to-book ratio); NET.ISS (net issue of shares); NET.BB (net buy back of shares); AUDIT (big four audit); BM (basic material); CG (consumer goods); CS (consumer services); F (financials); 
HC (healthcare); I (industrials); OG (oil and gas); TEC (technology); TEL (telecommunications); U (utilities); LIST.D (dual listing); LIST.P (primary listing); LIST.Y (years listed); D.SH 
(director shareholding percentage); F.FLT (free float percentage); 20%.SH (block ownership). 
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5.5.3 Regression estimation results 
Table 5.9 presents the multivariate regression results of the stepwise regressions that were 
performed using the dependent and independent variables, as listed and described in Tables 5.2 
and 5.3 above. The dataset which was applied in the stepwise regression model comprised IIR 
scores for the 85 companies included in the study sample.  
For the convenience of the reader, all regression coefficients that were statistically significant at the 
1% or better level are printed in green; those at the 5% or better level in blue; and, finally, those at 
the 10% or better level in red. The regression results depicted in Table 5.9 are further discussed in 
Sections 5.5.3.1 to 5.5.3.6. 
As discussed in Section 5.4, one of the advantages of the stepwise regression technique is that 
muliticollinearity is inherently considered in the model-building methodology. Notwithstanding this 
advantage, tolerance values were monitored for all regression models reported in Table 5.9 and the 
minimum tolerance value was 0.50. 
Statistica (2016) defines the tolerance of a variable as 1 minus the squared multiple correlation of 
this variable with all other independent variables in the regression equation. The smaller the 
tolerance of a variable, the more redundant is its contribution to the regression (i.e. it is redundant 
with the contribution of other independent variables). Some studies reported variance inflation factors 
(VIF) to indicate potential multicollinearity. The VIF is calculated as 1 / tolerance. The maximum VIF 
regression model reported here is therefore 2 (1 / 0.5).  
The results of the Durbin-Watson statistics were all between 1.84 and 2.27, confirming the absence 
of autocorrelation (see Table 5.9).   
As discussed in Section 5.4, histograms of the raw residuals, as well as normality plots of residuals, 
were examined, and, for all regression results reported here, results suggested that residuals were 
approximately normally distributed. Residual plots of predicted versus residuals were examined, and 
no evidence of heteroscedasticity were found in any of reported regression models.  
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Table 5.9: Regression results: regression of IIR on significant independent variables 
 IIR   IIR-90   IIR-80  IIR-70  IIR-60  IIR-50  
fg -151.91 -132.47 -102.30 -63.80 -47.27 -26.39 
SIZE 9.69 9.13 7.96 5.82 4.78 2.79 




    
AUDIT 21.45 18.03 13.96 7.14 
  
JSE CS -52.99 -51.59 -42.89 -33.46 -25.04 -9.78 
JSE CG -37.92 -40.34 -37.34 -29.53 -21.78 -7.47 
JSE F -32.16 -28.17 -22.27 -15.97 -12.23 -7.25 
JSE TEC -21.89 -20.92 
    
JSE BM 
     
7.45 
JSE I 
     
7.75 
NET.BB  -11.67 -13.44 -13.87 -11.94 -7.89 
F.FLT 20.18 17.91 
    
LIST.D 10.79 9.72 
    
Adjusted R²  68.76% 69.79% 67.12% 67.72% 63.65% 61.68% 
F-value 21.55 18.64 25.50 26.17 25.52 20.32 
Durbin-Watson 2.26 2.27 2.07 1.98 1.94 1.84 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level; Blue = significant at the 5% level; Red = significant at the 10% level; SIZE 
(market capitalisation); LEV (leverage); CUR (current ratio); AUDIT (big four audit); JSE CS (consumer services); JSE CG 
(consumer goods); JSE F (financials); JSE TEC (technology); JSE BM (basic materials); JSE I (industrials); NET.BB (net 
buy back of shares); F.FLT (free float percentage); LIST.D (dual listing) 
5.5.3.1 Internet investor relations (IIR) 
As depicted in Table 5.9, market capitalisation (SIZE), leverage (LEV), being audited by a big four 
audit company (AUDIT), JSE industry membership (CS, CG, F and TEC), free float (F.FLT), and 
dual listing (LIST.D) are explanatory factors that explain the level of IIR in JSE-listed companies.  
As expected, coefficients for SIZE, LEV and AUDIT were positive and statistically significant at the 
1% or better level. As discussed in Section 5.3.1, almost all prior studies showed a significant positive 
association between disclosure and company size. Froidevaux (2004), Bollen et al. (2006) and 
Orens et al. (2010) all document a significant positive association between website disclosure and 
company size.  
Agency theory is often used in the literature as underlying theoretical foundation to hypothesise a 
positive association between disclosure and leverage (Debreceny et al., 2002; Xiao et al., 2004 and 
Larrán and Giner, 2002). As opposed to the association between disclosure and size, empirical 
research to date has produced mixed results on the association between disclosure and leverage. 
Following Xiao et al. (2004: 215) and Celik et al. (2006), this study provides further support for a 
positive association between website disclosure and leverage.  
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As discussed in Section 5.3.7, signalling theory and agency theory both support the hypothesis of a 
positive association between disclosure and being audited by a big four audit company (i.e. Deloitte 
& Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG171 and PwC172). The positive association found in this study 
between IIR and being audited by a big four audit company do provide support for Xiao et al. (2004), 
Bonsón and Escobar (2002) and Wang et al. (2008). 
Further, as expected and discussed in Section 5.3.8 above, companies tended to disclose 
information similar to that disclosed by their industry peers. More specifically, the results in Table 5.9 
showed that lower IIR levels can be expected from companies categorised as constituents of the 
consumer goods, consumer service, financial, and technology JSE industries rather than other JSE 
industries.173  Table 4.9 in Section 4.6 shows the average IIR score per JSE sector. The consumer 
goods, consumer services, financial and technology sectors all had a lower average IIR score 
compared to the average for the total sample. 
Also as expected, coefficients for the free float percentage (F.FLT) and the dual-listed dummy 
variable (LIST.D) were positive, but only statistically significant at the 10% level. Marston and Polei 
(2004) also found a significant positive association between free float and website disclosure for their 
2000 sub-sample, but found no association for their 2003 sub-sample. A positive association 
between having a dual listing and website disclosure was reported by Xiao et al. (2004), Debreceny 
et al. (2002), Bollen et al. (2006: 291) and Aly et al. (2010: 191). 
The magnitude of the reported adjusted R² of 68.76% compared favourably to studies such as Hail 
(2002) that reported an adjusted R² of 34.2%; Almilia (2009) (47.6%); Leventis and Weetman (2004) 
(35.6%); Celik et al. (2006) (33%); Marston and Polei (61.7%); Trabelsi et al. (2008) (35.42%); Aly 
et al. (2010) (70%); Cormier et al. (2009) (27.9%); Ettredge et al. (2002) (17.5%); Bollen et al. (2006) 
(21.1%); Pervan (2006) (69%); Xiao et al. (2004) (11%); Abdelsalam et al. (2007) (35.8%); Larrán 
and Giner (2002) (33.2%), and Bonsón and Escobar (2006) (50%).174 
5.5.3.2 IIR-90  
As with the dependent variable, IIR, market capitalisation (SIZE), leverage (LEV), being audited by 
a big four audit company (AUDIT), JSE industry membership (CS, CG, F and TEC), free float 
percentage (F.FLT) and dual listing (LIST.D) are explanatory factors that explain the level of IIR-90 
in JSE-listed companies. Further to these variables, Table 5.9 shows that the current ratio (CUR) 
and the net buy back variable (NET.BB) were significant independent variables, both negative (as 
expected) and statistically significant at the 10% level.  
                                               
171
 Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG) 
172
 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
173
 JSE industry classification is based on the industry classification benchmark (ICB). The ICB consists of four levels of 
classification. At the top level there are 10 industries. As discussed in Chapter 4, the study sample was randomly selected 
based on a population stratified according to the 10 industries. 
174
 The highest R² as reported in each study is listed here. 
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The negative association found in this study between IIR-90 and the current ratio (CUR), provide 
support for the reasoning by Aly et al. (2010) that less liquid companies may disclose more 
information to satisfy the information needs of shareholders and creditors. Aly et al. (2010), however, 
found no significant association between disclosure and the current ratio. Trabelsi et al. (2008) found 
a significant positive association between their measure of financing activities (i.e. dummy variable 
of one if any new debt or equity has been issued) and corporate website disclosure.  The negative 
association found in this study between the net buy back variable (NET.BB) and IIR-90 therefore do 
provide some support for the positive association found by Trabelsi et al. (2008) between the issue 
of shares and disclosure. 
5.5.3.3 IIR-80 
As with the IIR and IIR-90 regression models, market capitalisation (SIZE), leverage (LEV), being 
audited by a big four audit company (AUDIT), and JSE industry membership (CS, CG and F) are 
explanatory factors that explain the level of IIR-80 in JSE-listed companies. 
The net buy back variable (NET.BB) was slightly more significant at the 5% level compared to the 
IIR-90 regression model. The CUR, TEC, F.FLT and LIST.D variables that were all significant in the 
IIR-90 regression model were, however, not statistically significant in the IIR-80 regression model. 
The adjusted R² was slightly lower compared to the IIR and IIR-90 regression models. 
5.5.3.4 IIR-70 
Similar regression results were reported compared to the IIR-80 regression model, with the only 
difference that Net.BB was now statistically significant at the 1% level, and AUDIT only at the 5% 
level. The adjusted R² was slightly higher compared to the IIR-80 regression model. 
5.5.3.5 IIR-60 
All independent variables included in the IIR-70 regression model were statistically significant at the 
1% or better level, except for the AUDIT variable which was found not statistically significant. 
Possible reasons for the AUDIT variable being non-significant in this regression model are discussed 
in Section 5.6 below. 
5.5.3.6 IIR-50 
In addition to the IIR-60 regression model, two additional JSE industry variables were significant in 
this regression model: basic materials (JSE BM) and industrials (JSE I). Similar results were reported 
in Table 4.9 in Section 4.6. Table 4.9 shows the average IIR score per JSE sector. Both basic 
materials and the industrials sector had higher IIR scores compared to the average for the total 
sample. 
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5.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The third objective of the study was to establish the determinants of IIR. The purpose of this chapter 
was to establish the determinants of IIR by means of a regression model linking IIR to selected 
explanatory variables as identified in the literature. The development of alternative IIR groupings, i.e. 
IIR-90, IIR-80, IIR-70, IIR-60 and IIR-50, were discussed in Chapter 4. The stepwise regression 
method was applied for each of these alternative IIR groupings. 
Company-specific characteristics that were used in the literature to explain IIR levels were identified 
following a comprehensive literature review. Stepwise regression was used to develop the 
regression models. Market capitalisation (SIZE), leverage (LEV) and JSE industry membership (CS, 
CG and F) were statistically significant at the 1% or better level in all six regression models, as 
depicted in Table 5.9. Companies that were larger and had more debt had better IIR levels, but 
companies in the consumer services, consumer goods and financial industry tended to have lower 
IIR levels compared to their counterparts in other industries. 
Companies that are audited by a big four audit company (AUDIT), that have a more dispersed 
ownership structure (F.FLT) and that have a dual stock exchange listing (LIST.D) also tended to 
have higher IIR scores compared to companies that were not audited by a big four audit company, 
had a more concentrated ownership structure and were only listed on the JSE.  
To enable further analysis, five alternative subsets of the IIR score was developed and tested as 
dependent variable in five additional stepwise regression models, namely IIR-90, IIR-80, IIR-70, IIR-
60 and IIR-50. IIR-90 was calculated to include only those 270 attributes for which an average 
availability of 10% or more were found in this study. In a similar fashion, IIR-80, IIR-70, IIR-60 and 
IIR-50 were based on respectively 189, 128, 95 and 60 attributes, i.e. including in turn only attributes 
with an average availability exceeding in turn 20%, 30%, 40% and 50%. The explanatory power of 
these additional regression models showed a slight increase with the IIR-90 regression model 
(69.79% compared to 68.76% for the IIR regression model that have included all 346 attributes), but 
decreased systematically in the other regression models to 61.68% for IIR-50. 
The AUDIT variable, was significant at the 1% level in the IIR, IIR-90 and IIR-80 regression models, 
and at 5% in the IIR-70 regression model, but was not significant in the IIR-60 and IIR-50 regression 
models. Big four audit companies had more to lose from damage to their reputations and were 
therefore likely to impose more extensive disclosures. The IIR-60 and IIR-50 regression models 
included results for only 95 and 60 attributes respectively, being the attributes with average 
availabilities exceeding 40% and 50% availability respectively. It can be argued that these attributes 
did not represent those more extensive disclosures imposed by big four audit companies. The 
attributes included in these alternative IIR groupings (i.e. IIR-60 and IIR-50) can be viewed as basic 
IIR information. 
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On the other hand, the variable used for companies that bought back shares during the year, 
NET.BB, increased in significance if the number of attributes were decreased. The NET.BB was 
found to be not statistically significant in the IIR regression model, significant at the 10% level in the 
IIR-90 regression model, at the 5% level in the IIR-80 regression model and at 1% in the IIR-70, IIR-
60 and IIR-50 regression models. The increasing negative significance may indicate that companies 
that bought back shares tended not to disclose the more basic IIR information. 
In a similar vein, companies in the basic materials and industrials JSE industries had higher IIR 
scores, but these were significant only in the IIR-50 regression model. It appeared that companies 
in the basic materials and industrials JSE industries tended to disclose more of the basic IIR 
information compared to other industries. 
 




6.1 INTRODUCTION  
In Chapter 2 the different theories that were used in the literature to explain variations in disclosure 
levels were discussed. The objective of Chapter 5 was to establish the determinants of Internet 
investor relations (IIR) by means of a regression model linking IIR to selected explanatory 
variables175. One of the theories that was discussed in Chapter 2 was the cost–benefit analysis 
theory. According to this theory, the level of IIR will depend upon the outcome of a cost–benefit 
analysis.  
This involves an understanding of both the perceived costs and the expected benefits. Costs were 
briefly discussed in Chapter 2 and will not be discussed further in this study as the focus of this study 
is an examination of the expected benefits (i.e. decreased information asymmetry and cost of 
capital). Brown and Hillegeist (2007) and Chang et al. (2008: 376) described information asymmetry 
as the situation where some investors have private information (i.e. they are informed traders), while 
others have only publicly available information (i.e. they are uninformed traders).  
Empirical studies to date that have examined the effect of disclosure on information asymmetry, cost 
of debt and cost of equity produced mixed results. Possible reasons for such mixed results include: 
different proxies used for disclosure, information asymmetry, cost of debt and cost of equity; different 
research methodologies (e.g. sample selected); and the characteristics of the country where the data 
were obtained (e.g. developing or developed countries). 
According to Ashbaugh et al. (1999: 255), IIR may increase or decrease information asymmetry 
across investors. If all investors have equal access to and expertise regarding the use of corporate 
websites as information source, IIR may decrease information asymmetry, but, if not, IIR may 
increase information asymmetry. Given the development of information technologies since 1999, 
and specifically the increased levels of accessibility to the WWW, this study assumes that investors 
are now far closer to achieving equal access and have greater expertise in the use of the corporate 
website as information source than was the case in 1999. 
Ashbaugh et al. (1999) further argued that IIR would increase information asymmetry if IIR activities 
were dominated by unreliable information communicated to uninformed investors. According to 
Froidevaux (2004), the disclosure of information would reduce the cost of equity only if the 
information was useful. In a similar vein, this dissertation argue that IIR will only decrease information 
asymmetry if IIR is reliable and useful. 
                                               
175
 Company size, leverage, being audited by a big four audit company, industry membership, free float, having a dual 
listing and financing activities (i.e. buy back of shares) appeared to be the company characteristics that best explains 
variations in IIR levels. 
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The fourth objective of the study, and the purpose of this chapter, was to test for the association 
between the level of IIR and information asymmetry in a sample of JSE-listed companies. The 
remainder of this chapter is organised into five distinct sections as follows.  
Firstly, Section 6.2 discusses the information asymmetry proxies that were used, as well as how 
these proxies were measured. Next, independent variables, besides IIR, that were used in the 
literature to explain variations in information asymmetry levels are discussed in Section 6.3. Section 
6.4 then elaborates on the specific research methodology. In the last two sections, the results are 
discussed, and finally a summary and conclusion close the chapter. 
6.2 INFORMATION ASYMMETRY MEASUREMENT 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000: 98–99) argued that, although economic theory suggests a negative 
association between disclosure and information asymmetry, it is difficult to demonstrate this 
empirically for a number of reasons, one being that it is not possible to observe information 
asymmetry directly and that an appropriate proxy should therefore be used.176 Proxies measuring 
information asymmetry are often criticised as they relate inconsistently to a company’s risk indicators 
(e.g. market beta and the market-to-book value) (Fama & French, 1992) and for being extremely 
sensitive to short-term information asymmetry (Khurana & Raman, 2004).  
Chapter 2 discussed the following information asymmetry proxies that were used in the literature: 
estimation risk (analyst forecast accuracy and the number of analysts following the company), bid-
ask spreads (quoted, time-weighted average, effective spread and the depth-adjusted effective 
spread), share turnover, price impact, probability of informed trading (PIN), and share price volatility. 
Table 6.1 summarises the use of these proxies and further categorises the literature according to 
the disclosure proxy that was used in each study. Disclosure proxies are discussed in Section 3.1. 
                                               
176
 Two other reasons given by Leuz and Verrechia (2000) were that disclosure has both ‘news’ and information asymmetry 
effects and self-selection bias. Although this study acknowledges that IIR may have both a ‘news’ and an information 
asymmetry effect, this study made no attempt to examine, for example, whether information published on corporate 
websites represented ‘good’ news or ‘bad’ news. See Chapter 9 (Summary and Conclusion) for a further discussion thereof. 
Self-selection bias is addressed in the endogeneity tests as discussed in Section 6.4 and 6.5. 
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Table 6.1: Proxies used in the literature to measure information asymmetry 
Notes: AF = analyst following; AFA = analyst forecast accuracy; ST = share turnover; PI = price impact; SPV = share price 
volatility; PIN = probability of informed trading  
As it is evident from Table 6.1, a number of studies have used more than one proxy for information 
asymmetry (e.g. Orens et al., 2010; Ajina et al., 2015; Gajewski & Li, 2015; Fu et al., 2012).  For 
reasons, as discussed below, the following proxies, as listed in Table 6.1, were not used in this study: 
analyst forecast accuracy (AFA), time-weighted average spread, effective spread, depth-adjusted 
effective spread, and probability of informed trading (PIN).  











ST PI SPV PIN 
Welker (1995)   X        
Healy et al. (1999) 
  X        
Leuz and 
Verrechia (2000) 
  X    X  X  
Heflin et al. (2005) 
    X X     
Brown and 
Hillegeist (2007) 
         X 
Fu et al. (2012) 
  X     X   
Agarwal et al. 
(2016) 
X      X    
Direct disclosure 
proxy – annual 
report 







ST PI SPV PIN 
Cheng et al. 
(2006) 
  X    X  X  
De La Bruslerie 
and Gabteni 
(2011) 
 X         
Ajina et al. (2015) 












ST PI SPV PIN 
Aerts et al. (2007) X X         
Trabelsi et al. 
(2008) 
 X         
Chang et al. 
(2008) 
   X       
Orens et al. 
(2010) 
  X    X    
Gajewski and Li 
(2015) 
  X X X     X 
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Analyst forecast accuracy is based on analyst forecast dispersion. At least two analyst forecasts are 
needed to calculate this proxy and, as only 30 of the companies in the study sample are followed by 
two or more analysts, it was decided not to use this proxy. To calculate the time-weighted-, effective, 
and depth-adjusted effective spread, as well as the PIN, intraday data are needed. Given, firstly, the 
laborious nature of working with intraday data and, secondly, based on research that found similar 
results for alternative information asymmetry proxies (Gajewski & Li, 2015; Ajina et al., 2015), such 
intraday-based proxies were not used in this study. 
Gajewski and Li (2015) studied the relationship between internet-based disclosure and information 
asymmetry. They used five proxies for information asymmetry (i.e. quoted spread, effective spread, 
time-weighted spread, PIN and adjusted PIN177) and found negative associations with disclosure for 
all five proxies. Ajina et al. (2015) found statistically significant negative relationships between both 
the quoted and the effective bid-ask spread, and their disclosure proxy (voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports). 
This study has used the following five information asymmetry proxies: the quoted or relative bid-ask 
spread, price impact, share price volatility, share turnover, and analyst following. Data requirements 
for these proxies were captured from the INET BFA database. The bid-ask spread, price impact and 
share turnover proxies were calculated over the JSE trading days from 1 December 2014 to 30 
November 2015. During this period, the JSE listing for three companies were suspended178 and two 
companies were delisted179. For these companies, calculations were therefore adjusted to reflect the 
reduced trading days. 
It was decided – based on an examination of the normal p-plots for the bid-ask spread, price impact 
and share price volatility – to use the natural logarithm (ln) of these proxies to reduce the 
skewness.180 Various previous studies, for example Welker (1995), Leuz and Verrechia (2000) and 
Cheng et al. (2006), used similar transformations of their information asymmetry proxies. The five 
information proxies are now briefly discussed. 
6.2.1 Bid-ask spread (BAS) 
The relative or quoted bid-ask spread is the most frequently used proxy for information asymmetry. 
Being consistent with previous research (see Chapter 2), the quoted spread is calculated by means 
of the following formula:  

()/ (6.1) 
                                               
177
 The adjusted PIN is based on a model developed by Duarte and Young (2009) to adjust for liquidity unrelated to 
information asymmetry. 
178
 Evraz Highveld Steel & Vanadium Ltd, Firestone Energy Ltd and IPSA Group Plc. 
179
 Fountainhead Property Trust and Infrasors Holdings Ltd. 
180
 In an examination of the predicted values versus residuals scatterplots, as discussed later in this chapter, it was also 
found that using these transformed regression models improved the homoscedasticity of the regression results.  
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where: 
Ask		 = lowest price at which a seller is willing to sell the share (also known as the offer price); and 
Bid		 = highest price at which a buyer is willing to purchase the share. 
The bid-ask spread was calculated using Formula 6.1 for each trading day between 1 December 
2014 and 30 November 2015. The median bid-ask spread per company was then calculated. 
As discussed in Section 2.4, the bid-ask spread is positively correlated with information asymmetry. 
A negative association between IIR and the bid-ask spread is therefore expected. Table 6.3 (page 
193) shows that almost all studies to date have found such a negative association.181  
6.2.2 Price impact (PI) 
As discussed in Section 2.4.2, liquidity can be described using three dimensions: width (bid-ask 
spread), market depth and slippage (Kyle, 1985). Slippage, or market resilience (also referred to as 
price impact182 or the illiquidity ratio183), captures the ability of an investor to trade in a share without 
affecting its price. Price impact as illiquidity ratio was developed by Amihud (2002).  
Amihud (2002: 32) defined price impact as “the daily ratio of absolute stock return to its dollar 
volume”. Fu et al. (2012) measured price impact as the yearly median of the daily absolute return 
divided by the dollar value of the trading volume. Being consistent with previous research, price 
impact is calculated by means of the following formula: 
/&01	&2*03%!	(!%3(+
43 2!(	*5	$&(!	%(&!	6	7$&(!	'(,! (6.2) 
where: 
Daily	absolute	return = change in the closing market capitalisation between two trading days. 
The price impact ratio was calculated for each trading day between 1 December 2014 and  
30 November 2015 using Formula 6.2. The median price impact per company was then calculated 
over the trading days. 
As discussed in Section 2.4, price impact is positively correlated with information asymmetry. A 
negative association between IIR and price impact is therefore expected. 
As Table 6.6 (page 196) shows, empirical research to date has produced mixed results. For example, 
Fu et al. (2012) found a significant negative association between their disclosure proxy, namely 
                                               
181
 The only exception in Table 6.3 is Orens et al. (2010). Although Orens et al. (2010) found the a negative association 
for their continental European sub-sample, they found no association between the bid-ask spread and their proxy for 
disclosure, namely corporate website non-financial performance disclosure, using northern American data. 
182
 See Fu et al. (2012). 
183
 See Ajina et al. (2015). 
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reporting frequency, and price impact using US data. However, Ajina et al. (2015), on the other hand, 
found no similar significant association using French data.184 
6.2.3 Share price volatility (SPV) 
Leuz and Verrechia (2000) argued that gradual changes in share prices (i.e. low levels of volatility) 
indicate lower levels of information asymmetry. Furthermore, private information revealed to the 
market causes price volatility (Cheng et al., 2006). Ajina et al. (2015) argued that any change in 
share price following a change in investors’ expectations will increase volatility. Share price volatility 
is also a well-known risk measure, with high volatility indicating high risk.  
Share price volatility was captured from the INET BFA database (product called Market Data) as on 
30 November 2015. INET BFA calculates share price volatility as the daily standardised deviation of 
share prices for the historic one-year period, multiplied by the square root of the number of trading 
days to annualise. 
As discussed in Section 2.4, share price volatility is positively correlated with information asymmetry. 
A negative association between IIR and share price volatility is therefore expected. 
As Table 6.6 (page 196) shows, empirical research to date has produced mixed results. For example, 
Cheng et al. (2006) found a significant negative association between their proxy for disclosure, 
namely voluntary annual report disclosure, and share price volatility using Singapore Stock 
Exchange data. However, Leuz and Verrechia (2000), on the other hand, found a significant positive 
association between their disclosure proxy, namely the switch from German to US GAAP, and share 
price volatility. 
6.2.4 Share turnover (STO) 
Share turnover captures the willingness of investors to trade. Following prior studies (Leuz & 
Verrechia, 2000; Cheng et al., 2006; Orens et al., 2010; Agarwal et al., 2016), as discussed in 
Chapter 2, share turnover is calculated by means of  the following formula: 
43 2!(	*5	$&(!	%(&!	6	7$&(!	'(,!
)&(!%	,&'%&0&%*+  (6.3) 
 
 
The share turnover ratio for each trading day between 1 December 2014 and 30 November 2015 
was calculated using Formula 6.3. The average share turnover per company was then calculated 
over the trading days. 
As discussed in Section 2.4, share turnover is negatively correlated with information asymmetry. A 
positive association between IIR and share turnover is therefore expected. As Table 6.5 (page 195) 
shows, empirical research to date has produced mixed results.  
                                               
184
 Ajina et al. (2015), however, did find significant (and the direction of coefficients as expected) associations for the other 
information asymmetry proxies used in their study: quoted bid-ask spread, share turnover and the effective bid-ask spread.  
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A significant positive association between disclosure and share turnover was found by both Leuz 
and Verrechia (2000) and Ajina et al. (2015). Orens et al. (2010), on the other hand, only found a 
significant positive association using continental European185 data, with no significant association 
found using northern American186 data.  Cheng et al. (2006) found an unexpected significant negative 
association between disclosure and share turnover using Singapore Stock Exchange data.  
6.2.5 Analyst following (AF) 
Analyst coverage improves the information environment of a company and could therefore be 
associated with lower information asymmetry (Roulstone, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2011; Aerts et al., 
2007). 
According to Merton (1987), an effective investor relations programme may lower the cost of analyst 
information production, resulting in an increase in analyst following, which in turn will raise the 
company’s profile with investors. Bhushan (1989: 262) argued that voluntary disclosure could either 
decrease the cost of gathering information, which would increase analysts’ supply of information, or 
may be a substitute for the information that analysts could collect readily, thereby requiring the 
analyst to collect additional more costly private information.   
Agarwal et al. (2016: 35) asserted that higher visibility as a result of an effective investor relations 
strategy would create a higher demand for analyst coverage. Agarwal et al. (2016: 35) found a 
significant positive association between analyst coverage and investor relations for smaller 
companies, but found no similar association for larger companies. 
The number of analysts that are following each company was captured from the INET BFA database 
(product called Broker Consensus – Broker coverage per company) as at 1 December 2015. Analyst 
following is expected to be negatively correlated to the existence of information asymmetry, implying 
a positive association between IIR and analyst following. 
As Table 6.6 (page 196) shows, empirical research to date has produced mixed results. Aerts et al. 
(2007) compared the association between disclosure and analyst following for a continental 
European187 and northern American188 sample and found the expected positive association for the 
northern American sample, but no significant association for the continental European sample.  
6.3 PRIOR THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS OF RELATIONSHIPS AND MEASUREMENT 
Although the purpose of this chapter was to test for the association between the level of IIR and 
information asymmetry, additional independent189 variables that were used in the literature to explain 
variations in information asymmetry levels were identified and discussed in this section. Table 6.2 
                                               
185
 Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. 
186
 Canada and US. 
187
 Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. 
188
 Canada and US. 
189
 Referred to by some studies as explanatory or control variables. 
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shows the different proxies that were used in the literature for each of the independent variables 
discussed in this section. More specifically, this section discusses: (1) the underlying reasons used 
by literature to hypothesise the direction of relationships, (2) the results found in literature in terms 
of statistical significance and the economic sense of directions, (3) the direction hypothesised in this 
dissertation and finally, (4) a brief discussion of how each of these variables were measured in this 
dissertation. 
Table 6.2: Proxies used in the literature to measure the determinants of information 
asymmetry 
Variable Proxy used 
SHARE PRICE Chang et al. (2008), Welker (1995); Healy et al. (1999); Heflin et al. (2005); Chi 
and Wang (2008); Ajina et al. (2015); Gajewski and Li (2015) 
(Welker calculate share price as the average bid and ask price on the last trading 
date of the year; Healy et al. (1999) use the logarithm of the share price, three 
months prior to the fiscal year-end; Chi and Wang (2008) use the natural 
logarithm of the annual average daily closing price; Ajina et al. (2015) use the 
average of the daily closing price) 
LEVERAGE Debt/Assets: Orens et al. (2010); Brown and Hillegeist (2007) 
Debt/Equity: Aerts et al. (2007) 
SHARE PRICE 
VOLATILITY 
Orens et al. (2010); Chang et al. (2008); Heflin et al. (2005); Chi and Wang 
(2008); Fu et al. (2012); Cheng et al.(2006); Ajina et al. (2015); Gajewski and Li 
(2015) 
(All studies use the standard deviation of the daily share price returns) 
OWNERSHIP 
DISPERSION  
Leuz and Verrechia (2000) use the free float percentage 
OWNERSHIP 
CONCENTRATION 
Cheng et al. (2006); Chang et al. (2008); Brown and Hillegeist (2007); Aerts et al. 
(2007); Orens et al. (2010) and Gajewski and Li (2015) 
 
(Orens et al. (2010) and Aerts et al. (2007) assigned a dummy variable of one for 
any single shareholding exceeding 20%; Gajewski and Li (2015) calculate the 
percentage of shares held by block owners (i.e. shareholdings exceeding 5%). 
Chang et al. (2008) and Brown and Hillegeist (2007) calculate the percentage of 
shares held by institutional investors; Cheng et al. (2006) assigned a dummy 
variable of one for the presence of an inside block owner (i.e. management or 
directors with shareholding exceeding 5%) 
SHARE 
TURNOVER 
Average daily number of shares traded: Chang et al. (2008); Chi and Wang 
(2008); Cheng et al. (2006); Ajina et al. (2015) 
Average daily dollar value of trading volume: Welker (1995) 
Logarithm of annual trading volume scaled by the number of issued shares: Healy 
et al. (1999) 
Value of shares traded scaled by the market capitalisation: Leuz and Verrechia 
(2000) and Fu et al. (2012) 
Average daily number of shares traded, scaled by the number of issued shares 




Orens et al. (2010); Ajina et al. (2015); Aerts et al. (2007) 
(Orens et al. (2010) and Aerts et al. (2007) assign weightings as follow: a weight 
of one and a half (1.5) for US or LSE listings and one for all other listings; Ajina et 
al. (2015) assign a dummy variable of one for US listing) 
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Tables 6.3 to 6.6 summarise the literature regression results – with Table 6.3 dealing with studies 
that have used the quoted bid-ask spread as information asymmetry proxy; Table 6.4 with analyst 
forecast accuracy and intraday-based proxies (e.g. effective and time-weighted spread); Table 6.5 
with share turnover and Table 6.6 with price impact, share price volatility and analyst following. Prior 
theoretical directions and results discussed in Sections 6.3.1 to 6.3.6 are summarised in Tables 6.3 
to 6.6. Tables 6.3 to 6.6 are available at the end of this section. 
6.3.1 Share price (SP) (H2) 
The microstructure of financial markets stipulates that the share price should explain liquidity (Ajina 
et al., 2015: 1228).  According to Hearn and Piesse (2015: 6), the share price acts as a risk proxy 
with lower priced shares generally tending to be more risky than higher priced shares. 
Significant negative associations were found between share price and the following information 
asymmetry proxies: (1) quoted bid-ask spread (Welker, 1995; Healy et al., 1999; Ajina et al., 2015), 
(2) time-weighted spread (Chang et al., 2008) and (3) effective spread (Heflin et al., 2005; Ajina et 
al., 2015).  
Ajina et al. (2015), on the other hand, found no significant association between share price and price 
impact. Gajewski and Li (2015) further found no significant association between share price and any 
of the five proxies190 used for information asymmetry.  
Table 6.2 shows that the literature varies significantly in respect of the calculation of the share price 
variable. Welker (1995), for example, calculated share price as the average bid-and-ask price on the 
last trading date of the year; Healy et al. (1999) used a three-month average; and Chi and Wang 
(2008) used an annual average of the daily closing share prices. Similar to Chi and Wang (2008), 
this study has used the annual average. 
The daily closing share price for each company was captured from the INET BFA database (product 
called Market Data) for all trading days from 1 December 2014 to 30 November 2015. The average 
share price was then calculated for each company. As already discussed, the JSE listings for three 
companies were suspended191 and two were delisted192 during this period. For these companies, 
calculations were adjusted to reflect the available data. 
Negative associations (H2-) were expected between the share price and each of the following: the 
bid-ask spread, price impact and share price volatility proxies. Positive associations (H2+) were 
expected between share price and each of the following: share turnover and analyst following 
proxies. 
                                               
190
 Quoted or relative bid-ask spread, effective spread, time-weighted spread, PIN and adjusted PIN. 
191
 Evraz Highveld Steel & Vanadium Ltd., Firestone Energy Ltd. and IPSA Group Plc. 
192
 Fountainhead Property Trust and Infrasors Holdings Ltd. 
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Some studies (such as Fu et al., 2012) have used market capitalisation as independent variable 
rather than the share price; while one study (Ajina et al., 2015) has used both. Orens et al. (2010) 
used total assets as size variable, but documented no significant association between total assets 
and either of the two proxies used for information asymmetry, namely the quoted bid-ask spread and 
share turnover. 
Ajina et al. (2015) used both share price and market capitalisation as independent variables. Using 
the bid-ask spread as information asymmetry proxy, these authors found the expected negative 
association for share price, but no significant association was found for market capitalisation. Using 
share turnover as information asymmetry proxy, Ajina et al. (2015) found the expected negative 
association for share price, but, contrary to expectation, observed a significant positive association 
for market capitalisation. Muliticollinearity between share price and market capitalisation may explain 
these results. 
Following Chang et al. (2008) and Gajewski and Li (2015), this study opted to use share price as 
independent variable. It should be noted that Chang et al. (2008) and Gajewski and Li (2015), as in 
the case of this study, measured corporate website disclosure.  
6.3.2 Leverage (LEV) (H3) 
Theoretical arguments are used in the literature to hypothesise positive and negative associations 
between leverage and information asymmetry. Aerts et al. (2007) and Boot and Thakor (1993) 
hypothesised a positive association, compared to Brown and Hillegeist (2007) that have expected a 
negative association. 
Aerts et al. (2007: 1311) argued that as indebted companies rely less on equity markets, analysts 
will be less interested in such companies. A negative association between leverage and analyst 
following was therefore expected by Aerts et al. (2007). As analyst following is negatively correlated 
with information asymmetry, as discussed in Section 6.2.5, this equates to a positive association 
between leverage and information asymmetry, and therefore a positive association with information 
asymmetry proxies such as the bid-ask spread, price impact and share price volatility. Confirming 
their own reasoning, Aerts et al. (2007) found a significant negative association between analyst 
following and leverage using northern American data, but, on the other hand, they observed no 
significant association using continental European data. 
Boot and Thakor (1993), as cited by Brown and Hillegeist (2007), argued that higher levels of 
leverage will stimulate private information production, which, as discussed in Section 2.4 and 
depicted in Figure 2.2, will increase information asymmetry. 
On the other hand, Brown and Hillegeist (2007) argued that the pecking order theory of capital 
structure implies a negative association between leverage and information asymmetry. Brown and 
Hillegeist (2007) also found a significant negative association between leverage and their proxy for 
information asymmetry, namely the probability of informed trading (PIN). 
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One could however also use pecking order theory to argue a positive association between leverage 
and information asymmetry. According to the pecking order theory, companies will follow the route 
of least resistance when deciding on how to fund operations. Companies will therefore first use 
internal funds, then issue debt and lastly issue equity. Signalling theory, and specifically debt 
signalling and equity signalling theory, was discussed in Section 2.2. According to debt signalling 
theory, an increase in debt is a signal of financial stability and, according to equity signalling theory, 
companies will only issue debt if equity is overvalued. As discussed in Section 2.2, companies more 
often use signals in asymmetrical information environments. As such, the issue of debt (resulting in 
increased leverage) as signal can be associated with information asymmetry.  
Further, leverage is a measure of financial risk, with risk being positively correlated with required 
returns. Based on theoretical arguments that information asymmetry is positively correlated with cost 
of equity (i.e. based on expected returns), a positive association between leverage and information 
asymmetry is expected. 
In support of these arguments for a positive association, Orens et al. (2010) found a significant 
positive association between leverage and bid-ask spread and a significant negative association 
between leverage and share turnover in a full sample including both northern American and 
continental European companies. These associations were however driven by the northern 
American companies as they found no significant association between leverage and, by turn, the 
bid-ask spread and share turnover for the continental European companies. Similar non-significant 
results for continental European countries compared to significant results for northern American 
countries were reported by Aerts et al. (2007), as discussed above. 
As Table 6.2 shows, the debt/asset ratio (Orens et al., 2010) and debt/equity ratio (Aerts et al., 2007)) 
were used as proxy for leverage in the literature. This study has used the debt-to-asset ratio as proxy 
for leverage.  
The debt-to-asset ratio was captured from the INET BFA database (product called Ratios–General).  
INET BFA calculates the debt-to-asset ratio as follows: 
*%&0	!2%
*%&0	&!% (6.4) 
A positive association (H3+) was expected between leverage and each of the following: the bid-ask 
spread, price impact and share price volatility. Negative associations (H3-) were expected between 
leverage and each of the following: share turnover and analyst following. 
6.3.3 Share price volatility (SPV) (H4) 
According to Orens et al. (2010: 1072), share price volatility results from disagreements between 
buyers and sellers, and can therefore be associated with the requirement of higher risk premiums, 
which, in turn, will increase the bid-ask spread. Share price volatility indicates the degree of 
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uncertainty or risk (Gajewski & Li, 2015) and can be used as a measure of the price risk that investors 
have to bear (Welker, 1995: 808). 
Although the majority of the literature about disclosure and information asymmetry found a positive 
association between share price volatility, as independent variable, and the quoted bid-ask spread, 
as dependent variable (Orens et al., 2010; Fu et al., 2012; Leuz & Verrechia, 2000; Cheng et al., 
2006; Ajina et al., 2015), some studies did not find any significant association (Welker, 1995; 
Gajewski & Li, 2015).  
Although Ajina et al. (2015) found the expected positive association using bid-ask spread as 
information asymmetry proxy, they found no significant association when price impact was used as 
information asymmetry proxy. Fu et al. (2012) found a significant positive association between share 
price volatility, as independent variable, and price impact, as dependent variable. 
As discussed in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.4 above, bid-ask spread and share turnover are respectively 
positively and negatively correlated with information asymmetry. If a positive association between 
share price volatility, as independent variable, and bid-ask spread, as dependent variable, is 
therefore expected, as discussed above, one will intuitively expect a negative association between 
share price volatility, as independent variable, and share turnover, as dependent variable. 
However, according to Orens et al. (2010: 1072), share price volatility, as independent variable, is 
expected to show a positive association with share turnover due to the increased trading activities 
between informed and liquidity traders. In support of their argument, a significant positive association 
between share price volatility, as independent variable, and share turnover, as dependent variable, 
were reported by studies such as Orens et al. (2010), Leuz and Verrechia (2000), Cheng et al. 
(2006), and Ajina et al. (2015). 
Bhushan (1989: 271) found a positive association between share price volatility and analyst 
coverage, suggesting that the demand for analysts’ services is higher for companies with a higher 
risk, as measured by share price volatility. 
Share price volatility was captured from the INET BFA database (product called Market Data) as on 
30 November 2015. INET BFA calculates share price volatility as the daily standardised deviation of 
share prices for the historic one-year period, multiplied by the square root of the number of trading 
days to annualise. Based on the discussions in this section, and previous research results, positive 
associations (H4+) between share price volatility and the following information asymmetry proxies 
were expected: bid-ask spread, price impact, share turnover and analyst following. 
6.3.4 Ownership structure (F.FLT and DIR.SH (H5 and H6)) 
As discussed in Section 2.4 and depicted in Figure 2.2, information asymmetry is interrelated with 
the extent to which privately informed trading takes place and private information search activities. 
Large institutional investors not only have the resources to generate private information, but also 
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benefit from economies of scale – which will further decrease their information acquisition cost 
relative to smaller retail investors. According to Orens et al. (2010: 1072) and Leuz and Verrechia 
(2000), large shareholders (e.g. institutional shareholders) usually have greater access to corporate 
information, thus increasing the level of information asymmetry. 
Two broad classes of ownership structure variables are used in the literature. The first is a measure 
of concentrated ownership. Examples are Orens et al. (2010), who assigned a dummy variable of 
one for any single shareholding exceeding 20%; Chang et al. (2008), who calculated the percentage 
of shares held by institutional owners; and Gajewski and Li (2015), who calculated the percentage 
of shares held by block owners (defined as shareholdings exceeding 5%).  
The second is an inverse proxy for the presence of insiders, for example the free float percentage. 
The free float percentage measures the ratio between total issued shares minus restricted shares, 
scaled to total issued shares.193 Restricted shares (i.e. locked-in shares or shares not readily 
available for trade) are defined by the JSE ground rules document (JSE 2016b) and include 
shareholdings such as shares held by the government, shares held by directors, senior executives 
and managers, employee share schemes and shares held by public companies. Leuz and Verrechia 
(2000: 109) used free float as an inverse proxy for the presence of insiders, with a hypothesised 
negative relationship between free float and information asymmetry. Confirming their own reasoning, 
Leuz and Verrechia (2000) found a significant negative association between free float and both the 
bid-ask spread and share price volatility proxies, as well as the expected positive association 
between free float and share turnover. 
Orens et al. (2010) found a significant positive association between ownership concentration and 
the bid-ask spread and a significant negative association between ownership concentration and 
share turnover, but only for continental European countries,  with no significant association for 
northern American countries.   
In a similar vein and in further support of the argument above (positive association between 
concentrated ownership and information asymmetry), Aerts et al. (2007) found no significant 
association between concentrated ownership and analyst following for northern American 
companies, and a negative association for their continental European sample. Based on their 
empirical findings, Aerts et al. (2007) argued that, if ownership is concentrated, information is likely 
to be communicated through private information channels, thus decreasing the role of analysts. 
On the other hand, Cheng et al. (2006) found no significant association between their proxy for 
concentrated ownership194 and any one of the three proxies that they used for information 
asymmetry, namely quoted bid-ask spread, share turnover, and share price volatility.  Gajewski and 






 Dummy variable of one for inside block ownership, defined as management or director(s) with shareholding exceeding 
5% and classified as one of the top five shareholders in the annual report.   
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Li (2015) found no association between concentrated ownership and information asymmetry for 
three of the five proxies that they used for information asymmetry, namely quoted bid-ask spread, 
effective bid-ask spread, and probability of informed trading (PIN). For the other two information 
asymmetry proxies, namely time-weighted spread and an adjusted PIN, they did find the expected 
positive association.  
Contrary to the results of Gajewski and Li (2015), Brown and Hillegeist (2007) found a significant 
negative association between concentrated ownership and PIN. Brown and Hillegeist (2007) argued 
that these findings were consistent with the heterogeneity among institutional investors, where some 
institutional investors would trade on private information as informed investors, and others as 
uninformed investors. Further, according to Brown et al. (2004: 357) the association between 
institutional ownership (i.e. concentrated ownership) and information asymmetry would fluctuate 
from quarter to quarter. Based on these arguments, Brown and Hillegeist (2007) argued that the 
relationship between institutional ownership and information asymmetry was unclear. 
This study has used two ownership structure proxies, one for dispersed ownership (free float) and 
one for concentrated ownership (directors’ shareholding). Free float was captured from a 
spreadsheet received directly from a JSE representative. The directors’ shareholder percentage195 
was captured from INET BFA (product called Financial Statements under Sundry Data).  
Based on the discussions above, the following associations were expected:  
• Negative associations between free float and each of the following: the bid-ask spread, price 
impact and share price volatility (H5-) 
• Positive associations between directors’ shareholding and each of the following: the bid-ask 
spread, price impact and share price volatility (H6+) 
• Positive associations between free float and each of the following: share turnover and analyst 
following (H5+) 
• Negative associations between directors’ shareholding and each of the following: share 
turnover and analyst following (H6-) 
6.3.5 Share turnover (STO) (H7) 
Trading volume consists of both informed and uninformed trading. As discussed in Section 2.4 and 
depicted in Figure 2.2, it can be hypothesised that informed trading increases information asymmetry 
and uninformed trading decreases information asymmetry. Ajina et al. (2015) have argued that 
increased levels of trading volume may cause disequilibrium in the market, resulting in extra costs 
that have to be recouped by the enlargement of the spread.  
                                               
195
 INET BFA defines the directors’ shareholder percentage as the number of shares held by the directors of the company, 
whether direct or indirect, beneficially or non-beneficially. 
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Although the relationship between share turnover and information asymmetry is therefore somewhat 
ambiguous, the majority of studies to date found a negative association between share turnover, as 
independent variable, and information asymmetry, as dependent variable. 
A significant negative association was reported between share turnover, as independent variable, 
and each of the following: the bid-ask spread (Ajina et al., 2015; Gajewski & Li, 2015), price impact 
(Fu et al., 2012; Ajina et al., 2015), effective spread (Gajewski & Li, 2015), time-weighted spread 
(Chang et al., 2008), and the probability of informed trading (PIN) (Gajewski & Li, 2015).  
To be consistent with the literature, this study calculated share turnover (STO) as the rand value of 
the trading volume scaled by the market capitalisation using the following formula: 
43 2!(	*5	$&(!	%(&!	6	7$&(!	'(,!
)&(!%	,&'%&0&%*+  (6.5) 
Market capitalisation and the rand value of the trading volume (number of shares traded multiplied 
by share price) were captured from the INET BFA database (product called Market Data). The share 
turnover ratio was calculated for each trading day between 1 December 2014 and 30 November 
2015. The average share turnover per company was then calculated.196 
Based on the discussions in this section, and previous research results, negative associations 
(H7-) between share turnover and the bid-ask spread, price impact and share turnover were 
expected. Analysts would be attracted to more visible companies. A positive association (H7+) 
between share turnover, as independent variable, and analyst following as information asymmetry 
proxy, was therefore expected. 
6.3.6 Stock exchange listings (LIST.D) (H8) 
Multiple stock exchange listings are often associated with increased transparency and increased 
disclosure (Orens et al., 2010: 1070). Ajina et al. (2015: 1229) have argued that the compliance of 
the disclosure requirements associated with a US listing is perceived by investors as a positive 
signal, resulting in increased liquidity and decreased levels of information asymmetry. 
Ajina et al. (2015) found a significant negative association between having a US listing and the 
quoted bid-ask spread, price impact and the effective spread. In further support of a negative 
association between having a dual listing and information asymmetry, these authors also found a 
significant positive association between having a US listing and share turnover. 
A foreign listing may further stimulate analyst activity in the foreign country, as foreign investors will 
experience more information asymmetry compared to domestic investors, thereby creating a 
demand for analyst research in the foreign country (Aerts et al., 2007: 1311). Aerts et al. (2007) 
                                               
196
 As discussed earlier in this chapter, the JSE listing of three companies were suspended and two were delisted during 
this period. Calculations were therefore adjusted accordingly. 
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found a significant positive association between their foreign listing proxy197 and analyst following 
using continental European data, but failed to find a similar association using data from northern 
American countries. 
Although using a different information asymmetry proxy (i.e. bid-ask spread), Orens et al. (2010), 
similarly to Aerts et al. (2007), compared continental European and northern American countries. 
Contrary to the findings of Aerts et al. (2007), Orens et al. (2010) found the expected negative 
association for northern American countries, but found no association for continental European 
countries. 
For the purpose of this study, a dummy variable of one was assigned for companies with a dual 
stock exchange listing. The listing status of companies was captured from a spreadsheet received 
directly from a JSE representative. Based on the discussions in this section, and previous research 
results, a negative association (H8-) was expected between having a dual listing and the bid-ask 
spread, price impact and share price volatility. On the other hand, a positive association (H8+) was 










                                               
197
 Aerts et al. (2007) assigned a weight of one-and-a-half for a US or LSE listing and one for all other listings. 
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Table 6.3: Information asymmetry (quoted bid-ask spread) studies: regression results 
















Country CE+NA CE NA US US US Germany Singapore France France 
Adjusted R² (%) 27.9 31.5 23.6 62.6 28.4 42.9 80.5 84.7 73.6 59.5 
Disclosure *** *** # ***  * *** ** ** *** *** 
Size variable # # #  *** *** *** *** #  
Share price    *** ***    *** # 
Leverage ** # ***        
Number of listings ** # **      ***  
Share price volatility *** *** *** #  *** *** *** *** # 
Concentrated ownership *** *** #     #  # 
Dispersed ownership       ***    
Share turnover    *** # *** *** *** *** *** 
Hi Price198    ***       
Low Price199    ***       
SEPT11200        #   
IFRS201         ***  
Table notes: ***,** and * represents statistically significant negative associations at respectively the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; ***,** and * represents statistically significant 
positive associations at respectively the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; # no statistically significant association; CE = Continental Europe; NA = North America; US = United States 
                                               
198
 Welker (1995) assigned a dummy variable of one if the company mean share price is greater than $100 
199
 Welker (1995) assigned a dummy variable of one if the company mean share price is less than $12.50 
200
 Dummy variable used to control for the global financial markets effects induced by attacks on the US in 2011 
201
 Dummy variable used to control for IFRS implementation 
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Table 6.4:  Information asymmetry (effective and time-weighted spread, PIN and analyst forecast accuracy): regression results 








De La Brusleri 
and Gabteni 
(2011) 































Adjusted R² (%) 59.9% 49.9% 25.2% 34.8% 41.2% 83.8% 45.9%    71.6% 
Disclosure *** *** *** * *** # **    *** 
Size variable     ***  ***    *** 
Share price # # # #  *** ***    * 
Leverage     ***        
Number of 
listings 
          *** 
Share price 
volatility 
# # # #  *** ***    *** 
Concentrated 
ownership 
# * # *** **202       
Dispersed 
ownership 
           
Share turnover *** *** *** ***  *** ***203    *** 
Analyst following     #        
Analyst forecast 
dispersion 
    ***        
Earnings volatility     **       
IFRS 
implementation 
          *** 
Table notes: ***,** and * represents statistically significant negative associations at respectively the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; ***,** and * represents statistically significant 
positive associations at respectively the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; # no statistically significant association
                                               
202
 Calculated as the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. Institutional investors were not defined in the study. 
203
 Two separate independent variables were used, trade size (average number of shares traded per transaction x average share price) and trade frequency (average number of times 
shares trade per day) – both were reported statistically significant and negative 
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Table 6.5: Information asymmetry (share turnover) studies: regression results 





Ajina et al. 
(2015) 
Country CE+NA CE NA Germany Singapore France 
Adjusted R² (%) 43.7 35.4 38.2 34.3 30.4 53.7 
Disclosure ** *** # ** * *** 
Size variable  # # # # ** *** 
Share price      *** 
Leverage *** # ***    
Stock exchange listings # * *   *** 
Share price volatility ***  *** *** ** *** *** 
Concentrated ownership *** *** #  #  
Dispersed ownership    ***   
SEPT11204     #  
Asset growth     ***  
Index inclusion205     **  
IFRS206      # 
Table notes: ***,** and * represents statistically significant negative associations at respectively the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 
10% (*) levels. ***,** and * represents statistically significant positive associations at respectively the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 
10% (*) levels; # no statistically significant association; CE = Continental Europe; NA = North America; US = United States 
                                               
204
 Dummy variable used to control for the global financial markets effects induced by attacks on US in 2011 
205
 Dummy if company is included in the most widely followed index in Singapore (Straits Times Index) 
206
 Dummy variable used to control for IFRS implementation 
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Table 6.6: Information asymmetry (price impact, share price volatility and analyst following) 
studies: regression results 
 Price Impact (PI) Share price volatility 
(SPV) 
Analyst following 







Cheng et al. 
(2006) 
Aerts et al. (2007) 
Country US France Germany Singapore 
 
CE NA 
Adjusted R² (%) 35.38% 67.2% 18.3% 14.0% 55.9% 27.5% 
Disclosure *** # * ** # *** 
Size variable *** *** ** ** *** *** 
Share price  #     
Leverage     # * 
Number of listings  ***   *** # 
Share price volatility *** #     
Concentrated ownership    # * # 
Dispersed ownership   **    
Share turnover *** ***     
SEPT11207    #   
IFRS208  ***      
Beta factor   *** ** *** ** 
Market-to-book     *** ** 
Table notes: ***,** and * represents statistically significant negative associations at respectively the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 
10% (*) levels. ***,** and * represents statistically significant positive associations at respectively the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 
10% (*) levels; # no statistically significant association; CE = Continental Europe; NA = North America; US = United States 
6.4 METHOD OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
As in Chapter 5 (as discussed in Section 5.4), the stepwise regression method was used to address 
the fourth research objective in this study, namely to examine the relationship between IIR and 
information asymmetry. As discussed, five alternative information proxies have been used in this 
study. Table 6.7 reviews the calculation of these proxies, as discussed in Section 6.2. 
                                               
207
 Dummy variable used to control for the global financial markets effects induced by attacks on US in 2011 
208
 Dummy variable used to control for IFRS implementation 
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Natural logarithm of the median daily (over 250 trading days) of the difference 
between the last offer or ask (selling price) and last bid (buying price) scaled by 
the daily average of the last offer and last bid price  
Price impact (PI) Natural logarithm of the median daily (over 250 trading days) of the absolute 
daily return scaled by the daily rand value of shares traded 
Share price volatility 
(SPV) 




Average daily (over 250 trading days) of the rand volume of shares traded 
scaled by the daily market capitalisation  
Analyst following 
(AF) 
The number of analysts following the company, i.e. the number of analysts that 
issue e.g. earnings per share forecasts per company as available on the INET 
BFA database 
 
Besides, the IIR score, additional explanatory variables as used in the literature to explain variations 
in information asymmetry levels were discussed in Section 6.3. These are the variables that were 
used in each of the stepwise regression models in this chapter as applicable. Table 6.8 summarises 
the calculation of these variables for this purpose of the study. 
Table 6.8: Independent variables used in the stepwise regression models of information 
asymmetry 
 
The expected associations between the independent variables, as listed in Table 6.8, and each of 
the information asymmetry proxies, as listed in Table 6.7, are summarised in Table 6.9. 
Acronym Variable H Description 
Independent continuous variables 
IIR  Internet investor relations 1 Internet investor relations (IIR) score per company 
SP Share price 2 Natural logarithm of the average daily (over 250 
trading days) closing share price 
LEV Leverage 3 Ratio between debt and assets  
SPV Share price volatility 4 Natural logarithm of the annualised share price 
volatility as on 30 November 2015 
F.FLT Free float percentage 5 Ratio between the total issued shares minus restricted 
shares to the total issued shares 
DIR.SH Directors’ shareholding 
percentage 
6 The percentage of direct and indirect, beneficial and 
non-beneficial shareholding of directors 
STO Share turnover 7 Average daily (over 250 trading days) of the rand 
volume of shares traded scaled by the daily market 
capitalisation 
Independent categorical variable 
LIST.D Dual listing 8 Dummy variable representing one if the company is 
dually listed on the JSE or any other stock exchange, 
and zero if otherwise 
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It should be emphasised that the bid-ask spread (BAS), price impact (PI) and share price volatility 
(SPV) proxies are all expected to be positively correlated with information asymmetry. Share 
turnover (STO) and analyst following (AF), however, measure the inverse of information asymmetry 
and are therefore expected to be negatively correlated with information asymmetry. This explains 
the expected negative association between IIR and the bid-ask spread (BAS), price impact (PI) and 
share price volatility (SPV), as opposed to the expected positive associations between IIR and share 
turnover (STO) and analyst following (AF). 
Table 6.9: Expected associations between information asymmetry proxies and independent 
variables  












Independent variables      
Internet investor relations (IIR) - - - + + 
Share price (SP) - - - + + 
Leverage (LEV) + + + - - 
Share price volatility (SPV) + +  + + 
Free float (F.FLT) - - - + + 
Directors’ shareholding (DIR.SH) + + + - - 
Share turnover (STO) - - -  + 
Dual listing (LIST.D) - - - + + 
 
As discussed in Section 2.8, various studies to date have cautioned that disclosure, and therefore 
IIR, should be treated as an endogenous variable when studying the effects of voluntary disclosure 
on each of the following: information asymmetry (Chapter 6), the cost of debt (Chapter 7) and the 
cost of equity (Chapter 8). If not accounted for, the endogeneity problem will result in spurious results 
and incorrect conclusions. The Wu-Hausman test was therefore used to test for this potential 
endogenous problem. The results thereof are discussed in Section 6.5. 
6.5 RESULTS 
As a result of extremely thin trading, the bid-ask spread was not available for one company, as this 
company’s shares only traded for 40 days in the measurement period. The sample was therefore 
reduced to 84 companies. All the results reported in this chapter are therefore applicable to this 
reduced sample. 
6.5.1 Selected descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics are set out in Table 6.10. As discussed in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, the natural 
logarithm (ln) of some of the dependent and independent variables was used to reduce the 
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skewness. The descriptive statistics for these variables (i.e. bid-ask spread, price impact, share price 
volatility and share price) are presented prior to their natural logarithmic transformations, which were 
used in the multivariate regression analysis. 
Table 6.10: Descriptive statistics: variables used to examine variations in information 
asymmetry 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
  Average Minimum Quartile Maximum Standard 
deviation 
   Q1 Q2 Q3   
Bid-ask spread (BAS) 0.0472 0.0011 0.0028 0.0065 0.0394 0.4783 0.0876 
Price impact (PI) 254.60 2.96 7.36 21.11 125.49 3 540.92 626.75 
Share price volatility (SPV) 51.40 17.68 26.23 35.16 57.24 455.89 54.74 
Share turnover (STO) 0.0015 0.00003 0.0004 0.0012 0.0022 0.0049 0.0012 
Analyst following (AF) 2.31 0 0 1 3 11 3.33 
Panel B: Continuous independent variables 
 Average Minimum Quartile Maximum Standard 
deviation 
   Q1 Q2 Q3   
Internet investor relations (IIR) 98.70 13.50 69.25 96.25 130.63 193.50 42.73 
Share price (SP) (ZAR) R65.79 R0.03 R4.04 R18.89 R111.46 R696.21 R102.40 
Leverage (LEV) 0.45 0.00 0.28 0.40 0.61 1.21 0.24 
Share price volatility (SPV) 51.40 17.68 26.23 35.16 57.24 455.89 54.74 
Free float % (F.FLT)  59.43 2.50 36.00 60.00 87.50 100 28.70 
Directors’ shareholding % 
(D.SH) 
13.93 0.00 0.09 2.80 23.23 81.79 20.58 
Share turnover (STO) 0.0015 0.00003 0.0004 0.0012 0.0022 0.0049 0.0012 
Panel C: Categorical independent variables 
 1 0 Total     
Dual listing 25 59 84     
 
The results in Table 6.10 underline the significant variation between the companies included in the 
sample and support the objective of the sample selection criteria followed in Chapter 4, namely to 
select a sample that would ensure significant cross-sectional variation.  
6.5.2 Correlation analysis 
Table 6.11 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the five information asymmetry 
proxies (as discussed in Section 6.2) and the independent variables (as discussed in Section 6.3).  
For the convenience of the reader, correlation coefficients in Tables 6.11 significant at the 1% or 
better level are printed in green, those at 5% or better in blue, and finally those at the 10% or better 
level in red. For log transformed variables, the correlation coefficient depicts the correlation with the 
natural logarithm of the variables, as applicable. 
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Table 6.11: Correlation matrix: information asymmetry and independent variables 














Independent variables      
Internet investor relations (IIR) -0.64 -0.57 -0.33 0.50 0.57 
Share price (SP) -0.88 -0.79 -0.76 0.49 0.55 
Leverage (LEV) -0.26 -0.26 -0.25 0.17 0.24 
Share price volatility (SPV) 0.79 0.74 1.00 -0.28 -0.25 
Free float (F.FLT) -0.50 -0.57 -0.31 0.65 0.34 
Directors’ shareholding percentage (D.SH) 0.35 0.35 0.20 -0.29 -0.26 
Share turnover (STO) -0.63 -0.76 -0.28 1.00 0.66 
Dual listing (LIST.D) -0.09 0.05 0.09 -0.01 0.14 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level;  Blue = significant at the 5% level; Red = significant at the 10% level 
All the coefficients reported in Table 6.11 are as expected and as summarised in Table 6.9, except 
in three instances. Firstly, no significant association between dual listing (LIST.D) and any of the five 
information asymmetry proxies was found. Aerts et al. (2007) and Orens et al. (2010) also did not 
find any significant association between having multiple stock exchange listings and each of the 
following: analyst following (northern American data) and bid-ask spread (continental European 
data). As discussed in Section 6.5.3 below (see Table 6.14), dual listing was however found to be 
significant, and negative as expected, in the regression model where the bid-ask spread was used 
as information asymmetry proxy. 
Secondly, a positive association between leverage and information asymmetry was expected, 
namely positive with the first three proxies (bid-ask spread, price impact and share price volatility) 
and negative with the last two (share turnover and analyst following). Table 6.11, however, depicts 
associations contrary to what were expected. As discussed in Section 6.3.2, theoretical arguments 
were used in the literature to hypothesise positive and negative associations between leverage and 
information asymmetry, and empirical results to date were mixed. Brown and Hillegeist (2007), for 
example, also found a significant negative association between leverage and information 
asymmetry.  
The regression results reported in Table 5.9 (Section 5.5.3) may be used to explain the negative 
association between information asymmetry and leverage reported in Table 6.11. Table 5.9 shows 
a significant positive association between leverage, as independent variable, and IIR, as dependent 
variable. Table 6.11 further shows significant negative associations between IIR and the bid-ask 
spread, price impact and share price volatility, indicating a negative association between IIR and 
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information asymmetry.209 The positive association between IIR and leverage, coupled with the 
negative association between IIR and information asymmetry, can therefore at least to some extent 
explain the negative association between leverage and information asymmetry. 
Lastly, as discussed in Section 6.3.3 and depicted in Table 6.9, a positive association was expected 
between share price volatility, as independent variable, and share turnover and analyst following, as 
information asymmetry proxies. Although Table 6.11 depicts negative associations, significant and 
positive associations were found for both variables in the respective regression models, as discussed 
in Section 6.5.3 (see Table 6.14) below. 
Table 6.12 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients between the independent variables that 
were used in the stepwise regression model to explain variations in information asymmetry levels. 
As with Table 6.11, green indicates 1% statistical significance, blue 5% and red 10%. The high 
correlations between share price (SP) and share price volatility (SPV), and free float (F.FLT) and 
share turnover (STO) send cautionary signals that tolerance (or variance inflation factors) should be 
carefully monitored for signs of multicollinearity.  
Table 6.12: Correlation matrix: independent variables used to examine information 
asymmetry variations 
 IIR SP LEV SPV F.FLT DIR.SH STO LIST.D 
Internet investor relations (IIR) 1.00               
Share price (SP) 0.52 1.00             
Leverage (LEV) 0.36 0.29 1.00           
Share price volatility (SPV) -0.33 -0.76 -0.25 1.00         
Free float (F.FLT) 0.39 0.39 0.03 -0.31 1.00       
Directors’ shareholding (DIR.SH) -0.31 -0.26 -0.01 0.20 -0.39 1.00     
Share turnover (STO) 0.50 0.49 0.17 -0.28 0.65 -0.29 1.00   
Dual listing (List.D) 0.26 0.04 -0.11 0.09 -0.05 -0.31 -0.01 1.00 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level;  Blue = significant at the 5% level; Red = significant at the 10% level 
6.5.3 Regression estimation results 
As discussed in Section 6.4, the Wu-Hausman test is used in this chapter to test for a potential 
endogenous problem. As discussed in Chapter 2, an instrumental variable is needed to perform the 
Wu-Hausman test. For the purpose of this chapter, as well as Chapters 7 (cost of debt) and 8 (cost 
of equity and cost of capital), being audited by a big four audit company was used as the instrumental 
variable. A dummy variable of one was assigned for all companies that were audited by a big four 
audit company.210 As discussed and reported in Chapter 5, being audited by a big four audit company 
                                               
209
 In a similar vein, the positive associations between IIR and both share turnover and analyst following depict a negative 
association between IIR and information asymmetry, given the inverse relationship between both share turnover and 
analyst following and information asymmetry. 
210
 Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PwC. 
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is highly significant and positively related to the endogenous independent variable, IIR, but is not 
correlated with information asymmetry.  
The Wu-Hausman test also tests for the strength of the instrumental variable used. In all regression 
models reported in this chapter, the Wu-Hausman test confirmed the fit of this instrumental variable, 
as well as the absence of endogeneity. Similar results were found by Cheng et al. (2006) and 
Gajewski and Li (2015). The Wu-Hausman test results are showed in Table 6.13. For each of the 
test results showed in Table 6.13, the Ho hypothesis that IIR is an exogenous variable was tested. 
As the P-values in Table 6.13 indicate, none of these hypotheses were rejected and all four Ho 
hypotheses were therefore accepted, thus showing IIR is not an endogenous independent variable. 
The OLS regression model is therefore used in all further analyses in this chapter.  
Table 6.13: Wu-Hausman results: IIR as independent variable and information asymmetry as 
dependent variable 
Dependent variable F P-value 
Bid-ask spread 0.069 0.79 
Price impact 1.201 0.28 
Share turnover 0.128 0.72 
Analyst following 1.035 0.31 
 
Table 6.14 presents the multivariate regression results of the stepwise regressions that were 
performed using the dependent and independent variables as listed and described in Tables 6.7 and 
6.8 above. Using the full sample of 84 companies, the regression results showed that IIR is not a 
statistically significant independent variable to explain variations in share price volatility. No 
regression results are therefore reported for this information asymmetry proxy.  
As in Tables 6.11 and 6.12, green indicates 1% statistical significance, blue 5% and red 10%. The 
regression results depicted in Table 6.14 are further discussed in Sections 6.5.3.1 to 6.5.3.5. 
Tolerance values were assessed for all regression models reported in Table 6.14 and the minimum 
tolerance value was 0.31 (i.e. the maximum variance inflation factor was 3.21). This indicates the 
absence of multicollinearity. The results of the Durbin-Watson statistics were all between 1.72 and 
2.23, confirming the absence of autocorrelation. 
Histograms of the raw residuals, as well as normality plots of residuals, were examined, and for all 
regression results reported here results suggest that residuals were approximately normally 
distributed with no influential outliers. Residual plots of predicted versus residuals were examined. 
From these residual plots no evidence of heteroscedasticity was found for the bid-ask spread and 
price impact model. The respective residual plots for share turnover and analyst following, however, 
both depict evidence of heteroscedasticity. The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity confirmed 
the existence of heteroscedasticity in both regression models. The regression results reported in 
Table 6.14 is before adjustments were made for heteroscedasticity. Regression results, adapted for 
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heteroscedasticity, for the share turnover and analyst following regression model is discussed in 
Sections 6.5.3.4 and 6.5.3.5 below, but to summarise what follows – IIR remained significant in both 
regression models. 
Table 6.14: Regression results: regression of information asymmetry proxies on IIR and 
other significant independent variables 
 Bid-ask 
spread 




q0 -5.36 0.68 -0.003 -11.21 
Share price  -0.61 -0.28 0.0004 1.468 
Share turnover  -368.84 -840.77  1 133.06 
Share price volatility  1.109 1.449 0.0004 1.50 
IIR -0.01 -0.004 0.000005 0.02 
Dual listed  -0.26     
Free float    0.002  
Adjusted R² (%) 91.18% 89.55% 51.19% 54.14% 
F-value 172.57 178.84 22.759 25.49% 
Durbin-Watson 2.23 2.19 1.72 1.72 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level; Blue = significant at the 5% level; Red = significant at the 10% level 
6.5.3.1 Bid-ask spread 
As discussed in Section 2.4.2.1 the bid-ask spread is the most popular information asymmetry proxy 
used in the literature. Of all the variations of the bid-ask spread used in the literature (e.g. quoted or 
relative, time-weighted relative, effective and depth-adjusted effective spreads), the quoted bid-ask 
spread is the most popular. 
In the context of this study, adverse selection refers to the situation where buyers and sellers have 
different information. If IIR therefore decreases this adverse selection, it should result in a narrowing 
of the bid-ask spread. 
As depicted in Table 6.14, the coefficient for IIR is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The coefficients of all other independent variables are as expected and highly significant (share 
price, share turnover and share price volatility), except for dual listing that is only significant at the 
10% level. Although only significant at the 10% level, the negative association provides some 
evidence of one potential advantage for JSE-listed companies in having a dual listing, i.e. through a 
decrease in information asymmetry. 
The negative IIR coefficient indicates that enhanced IIR reduces the level of the bid-ask spread, and 
therefore information asymmetry, which is in accordance with theoretical expectation and previous 
research. Although most studies to date that have found a similar negative association have used 
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either an indirect disclosure proxy (e.g. analyst ratings) or measured the annual report as disclosure 
vehicle, Gajewski and Li (2015) and Orens et al. (2010) have found the negative association based 
on a measurement of corporate website disclosure. Gajewski and Li (2015) used French data, while 
Orens et al. (2010) used northern American and continental European data. 
On the other hand, Chang et al. (2008) found no significant association between spread and their 
measurement of the quality of a company’s IIR activities. Chang et al. (2008: 386) suggested two 
possible reasons for this non-significant association: 
• Website investor relations information may be perceived to be less credible by investors 
compared to annual report-provided disclosures; and 
• A possible non-linear relationship between disclosure and spread, suggesting that that there 
may be an upper limit in the reduction of spread as disclosure quality improves. 
To test their non-linear relationship argument, Chang et al. (2008) separately analysed high and low 
investor relations disclosing companies. Although both were non-significant, the authors found a 
negative association for low investor relations companies as opposed to a positive association for 
high investor relations companies. 
Although the results are not reported in this study, a separate analysis and a comparison of the 
regression results of the 42 companies with low IIR scores (below median) with the 42 companies 
with high IIR scores (above median) showed some support for Chang et al. (2008). Though both IIR 
coefficients are negative, the IIR coefficient for the high IIR sample is only significant at the 10% 
level compared to the low IIR sample where the IIR coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
While Orens et al. (2010) found a negative association between website disclosure and the bid-ask 
spread using continental European data, they found no association using northern American data. 
They suggested two possible reasons for these conflicting results: 
• Financial information quality in northern America is already sufficient to reduce information 
asymmetry; and 
• There are differences in capital market properties which affect the information asymmetry 
proxies. 
The magnitude of the reported adjusted R² of 91% compares favourably with studies such as 
Gajewski and Li (2015) reporting an adjusted R² of 60%; Welker (1995) reporting 63%; Ajina et al. 
(2015) reporting 74%; Leuz and Verrechia (2000) reporting 81%; and Cheng et al. (2006) reporting 
85%. 
6.5.3.2 Price impact 
Liquidity can be described using three dimensions: width (bid-ask spread), market depth, and 
slippage (Kyle, 1985). Slippage (also referred to as market resilience) captures the ability of investors 
to trade in a share without affecting its price. The price impact ratio was developed by Amihud (2002) 
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to capture slippage. If IIR therefore increases liquidity and decreases information asymmetry, it 
should be negatively related to the price impact ratio as small changes in the share price will result 
in a lower price impact ratio. 
As depicted in Table 6.14, the coefficient for IIR is negative and statistically significant, but only at 
the 10% level. The coefficients of all other independent variables are as expected and highly 
significant (share price, share turnover and share price volatility). The negative IIR coefficient 
indicates that enhanced IIR improves the ability of investors to trade in a share without affecting its 
price, resulting in increased liquidity levels and decreased information asymmetry. 
Compared to the bid-ask spread as information asymmetry, few studies have used the price impact 
ratio as information asymmetry and empirical results are mixed. Fu et al. (2012), for example, found 
the expected negative association, whereas Ajina et al. (2015) found no significant association. Fu 
et al. (2012) used US data, while Ajina et al. (2015) used French data. Neither of these two studies 
however measured corporate website disclosure levels or investor relations levels. Fu et al. (2012) 
used an indirect disclosure proxy, namely financial reporting frequency, and Ajina et al. (2015) 
measured annual report voluntary disclosure levels. 
Fu et al. (2012) reported an adjusted R² of 36% and Ajina et al. (2015) a higher 67%, but with a non-
significant disclosure coefficient. 
6.5.3.3 Share price volatility 
Literature offers various reasons that may be used to explain variations in share price volatility, for 
example: private information revealed to the market (Cheng et al., 2006), changes in investors’ 
expectations (Ajina et al., 2015), disclosure (Berton, 1994; Bushee & Noe, 2000; Kothari et al., 2009), 
informed trading (Cheng et al., 2006), and disagreements between buyers and sellers (Orens et al., 
2010). 
The Financial Executives Institute (Berton, 1994) argued that increased disclosure levels will 
increase share price volatility. Bushee and Noe (2000: 200) reported results that suggest that the 
effect of disclosure on share price volatility depends on the type of investor attracted to the company 
(e.g. institutional or retail). Kothari et al. (2009) separately examined the effect of favourable and 
unfavourable disclosure on share price volatility. They found a positive association between 
unfavourable news and share price volatility. 
Even though the association between disclosure and share price volatility is complex, share price 
volatility is a well-known risk measure and lower share price volatility levels may indicate lower levels 
of information asymmetry. The results of the stepwise regression model, however, found that IIR is 
not significant in explaining variations in share price volatility levels. 
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6.5.3.4 Share turnover 
Share turnover captures the willingness of investors to trade and is therefore positively correlated 
with liquidity. However, as discussed in Section 2.4 and depicted in Figure 2.2, trading volume 
consists of both informed and uninformed trading. Figure 2.2 depicts that increased share turnover 
will only decrease information asymmetry if the relative amount of informed to uninformed trading is 
decreased. Cheng et al. (2006) found that informed trading increases bid-ask spreads and share 
turnover, while uninformed trading reduces spreads and increases share turnover. 
According to Cheng et al. (2006), research by Beaver (1968), Winsen (1976) and Morse (1980) all 
suggest that trading volume increases with the degree of disagreement among investors (i.e. 
information asymmetry), therefore suggesting a positive correlation between share turnover and 
information asymmetry, which is contrary to the hypothesised negative relationship in this study. 
Although the relationship between share turnover and information asymmetry is therefore somewhat 
ambiguous, it is often used in the literature as proxy for liquidity and information asymmetry (Orens 
et al., 2010; Leuz & Verrechia, 2000; Cheng et al., 2006; Ajina et al., 2015). Empirical research found 
both positive (Ajina et al., 2015), negative (Cheng et al., 2006) and no relationship (Orens et al., 
2010) between disclosure and share turnover. 
As depicted in Table 6.14, the coefficient for IIR is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The coefficients of all other independent variables are as expected and significant, although share 
price volatility only at the 10% level. Although various studies (see Table 6.5) have used share price 
volatility as independent variable in their regression models to explain variations in share turnover 
levels, a reverse causality relationship may exist between share turnover and share price volatility. 
The Breusch-Pagan test confirmed the existence of heteroscedasticity. Adapted for 
heteroscedasticity, the IIR coefficient remained positive, but the level of statistical significance 
decreased to 10%. Share price volatility, however, was found non-significant (p = 0.13) in the 
regression results adapted for heteroscedasticity. The statistical significance of share price, 
however, increased to the 1% level in the adapted regression results. 
If share price volatility as independent variable is removed from the regression model reported in 
Table 6.14, all remaining independent variables (share price, free float and IIR) are still significant 
and positive with only a slight decrease in the adjusted R² to 50% from the 51% reported in Table 
6.14. These adjusted R² compares favourably with Orens et al. (2010) who reported an adjusted R² 
of 44% (full sample); Leuz and Verrechia (2000) who reported 34%; Cheng et al. (2006) who reported 
30%; and Ajina et al. (2015) who reported 54%. 
Easley et al. (1996) found a negative association between the probability of informed trading (PIN) 
and share turnover. The positive association between share turnover and IIR found here to some 
extent indicated a negative association between IIR and the probability of informed trading (PIN). 
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Trabelsi et al. (2008) questioned whether disclosure was an endogenous variable in stating that the 
companies with higher share turnovers were likely to be under more pressure to disclose additional 
information via corporate websites. Wu-Hausman test results (see Table 6.13), however, confirmed 
the absence of endogeneity and therefore rejected this reasoning by Trabelsi et al. (2008). 
6.5.3.5 Analyst following 
Analyst following is often used as proxy for the quality of a company’s information environment 
(Orens et al., 2010; Armstrong et al., 2011; Aerts et al., 2007). Based on the argument that an 
improved information environment decreases information asymmetry, analyst following can be used 
as information asymmetry proxy. Merton (1987) and Agarwal et al. (2016: 35) further argued that an 
effective investor relations programme increases analyst following. 
Healy and Palepu (2001), on the other hand, argued that one can either reason that companies 
which disclose more information attract more analysts as these analysts are in a better position to 
create superior forecasts or that additional disclosure reduces the opportunities for analysts, implying 
a lower demand for their services leading to a lower analyst following.  
Ettredge et al. (1999) further suggested that information disclosed on corporate websites varies 
systematically with the relative sophistication of companies’ user bases. They specifically found that 
high levels of analyst following are associated with relatively objective and more extensive data 
compared to relatively subjective and more abbreviated information that is associated with higher 
levels of retail ownership. 
Although the relationship between disclosure and analyst following is therefore not clear, a positive 
association was expected. Table 6.14 shows the expected positive association between IIR, 
significant at the 5% level, and analyst following. The coefficients of all other independent variables 
are as expected and significant. 
The Breusch-Pagan test confirmed the existence of heteroscedasticity. Adapted for 
heteroscedasticity, the IIR coefficient remained positive with the level of statistical significance 
unchanged on 5%. In the adapted regression model, the statistical significance of the share price 
volatility variable, however, increased to the 1% level. 
Orens et al. (2010: 1078) discussed a problem of endogeneity with the extent of disclosure. Orens 
et al. (2010) argued that either financial analysts are more likely to follow companies with more 
disclosure or companies may disclose more in order to attract more analysts. As discussed, the Wu-
Hausman test results (see Table 6.13) confirmed the absence of endogeneity. Similar results (i.e. 
significant association between analyst following and Internet reporting, as well as the absence of 
endogeneity) were reported by Abdelsalam et al. (2007: 20). 
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6.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the relationship between IIR and information asymmetry 
through the use of a regression model to identify the determinants of information asymmetry. This 
section aims to answer each of the following questions briefly in order to conclude this chapter: 
• What causes information asymmetry and why is it a problem?  
• What are the underlying theoretical arguments in support of an association between disclosure 
and information asymmetry? 
• What proxies did this chapter use for information asymmetry? 
• To what extent do the empirical findings in this chapter provide further support or clash with 
empirical evidence and current theoretical thinking? 
• What are the limitations of the methodology followed in this chapter and what further research 
should be undertaken to address these limitations? 
6.6.1 Causes and negative effects of information asymmetry 
Investors require information in order to evaluate investments. In view of both the costs and the skills 
required to gather information, not all investors are equally informed and this, in turn, may result in 
there being informed and uninformed investors. The separation of ownership (investors) and control 
(management), coupled with conflicting incentives between investors and managers, may further 
result in management having access to all the information available about the company and investors 
not. Information asymmetry may therefore exist between the management of a company and its 
investors, and/or between investors. 
Akerlof (1970) first pointed out the negative effects of information asymmetry on the effective 
functioning of markets211.  
Among others, information asymmetry hinders the ability of investors to distinguish between good 
and bad investment opportunities (Healy & Palepu, 2001), creates additional costs through 
promoting adverse selection (Welker, 1995: 802; Leuz & Verrechia, 2000: 92) and decreases liquidity 
levels (Lev, 1988). 
6.6.2 Prior theoretical arguments in support of an association between disclosure and 
information asymmetry 
Brown and Hillegeist (2007) proposed two theories to explain why increased disclosure levels 
decrease information asymmetry. Theory 1 was based on the assumption that increased disclosure 
levels decrease private information search activities through the joint decrease of the available set 
of private information and the expected net benefits of searching for private information. Theory 2 
                                               
211The Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001 was awarded jointly to Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz for their analyses of markets 
with asymmetric information (Source: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2001/ 
index.html) 
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was based on the argument that increased disclosure levels attract more uninformed trading. Brown 
and Hillegeist (2007) admitted that increased uninformed trading would result in more informed 
trading, but suggested that, as informed traders are risk averse and capital constrained, the increase 
in uninformed trading would ultimately outweigh the increase in informed trading. 
The investor recognition hypothesis provides further support for theory 2 in suggesting that 
uninformed investors are likely to invest in companies with which they are familiar.  Based on the 
premise that a well-developed investor relations programme increases company visibility (Chang et 
al., 2008), increased IIR may increase uninformed trading and, through decreasing the probability of 
trading against a privately informed investor, results in a decrease in information asymmetry. 
6.6.3 Proxies used in this chapter for information asymmetry 
As information asymmetry is not directly observable, the use of proxies is called for. After an 
extensive literature review, proxies that were used in the literature were identified. The following five 
proxies were used in this study: bid-ask spread, price impact, share price volatility, share turnover, 
and analyst following.  
The most popular proxy in the literature is the bid-ask spread. The bid-ask spread proxy is based 
upon the premise introduced by the Akerlof (1970) study that investors with less information price 
protect themselves by amending their bid (i.e. highest buy) and ask/offer (i.e. lowest sell) prices away 
from the market. The result is a widening in the bid-ask spread. Small bid-ask spreads are a 
characteristic of liquid markets (Black, 1971). 
The price impact ratio was developed by Amihud (2002) and is based on the argument that, in liquid 
markets, investors should be able to trade without affecting the share price. Price impact is therefore 
a measure of illiquidity. 
Although share turnover captures the willingness of investors to trade, trading volume consists of 
both informed and uninformed trading and, as discussed above, will only theoretically decrease 
information asymmetry if it simultaneously decreases the probability of trading with a more informed 
investor with private information.   
Share price volatility is a well-known risk measure, and as all risk measures, positively correlated 
with expected returns (e.g. cost of equity). Expected returns are further theoretically linked to 
information asymmetry. Private information revealed to the market and disagreements between 
buyers and sellers – both characteristics of information asymmetry – further cause share price 
volatility.  
Analyst following is often used as an indication of the quality of the company’s information 
environment. Based on the assumption that increased analyst following improves the information 
environment, and further that an improved information environment equates to less information 
asymmetry, analyst following is a measure of information asymmetry. 
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6.6.4 Empirical findings in this chapter compared to prior empirical evidence and current 
theoretical thinking 
Of the five proxies used for information asymmetry in this chapter, the bid-ask spread is not only the 
most popular and theoretically appealing proxy, but it also has the strongest empirical support for a 
negative association between disclosure and information asymmetry. The majority of studies about 
disclosure and information asymmetry have, however, been performed using developed country 
data and have either used analyst ratings as disclosure proxy or have measured the annual report 
as disclosure vehicle. This study therefore not only provides further empirical support for a negative 
relationship between disclosure and information asymmetry, but more specifically it provides support 
for the investor recognition hypothesis that states that a well-developed investor relations 
programme improves visibility and decreases information asymmetry. Specifically in respect of IIR, 
this study provides further support for the findings of Gajewski and Li (2015) who used a French 
sample, but contradicts the findings by Chang et al. (2008) who found no association using an 
Australian sample. 
Although used far less as information asymmetry proxy, price impact seems to capture an important 
measure of liquidity, which is the ability of an investor to trade without affecting the share price. 
Empirical support for a negative association between disclosure and price impact is, however, weak 
and unstable. This study not only provides strong empirical support for a negative association 
between IIR and price impact, but also provides further support for the continuous use of price impact 
as illiquidity and information asymmetry proxy (based on the negative association found between IIR 
and the bid-ask spread in this dissertation). 
Share price volatility, share turnover and analyst following are considered less precise measures of 
information asymmetry. As discussed in Section 6.5.3.3, there are opposing theoretical arguments 
and empirical research that support both positive and negative relations between share price 
volatility and information asymmetry. This study found no statistically significant association between 
share price volatility and IIR using multivariate stepwise regression, except for the significant 
negative Pearson correlation as shown in Table 6.12. 
Although far from overwhelming, the weight of evidence provided by the literature favours a positive 
association between share turnover and disclosure. This study therefore adds further empirical 
support for such a positive association. Bearing in mind the conflicting arguments that share turnover 
may either increase or decrease information asymmetry, the negative associations between IIR and 
both the bid-ask spread and price impact found in this study suggest that the increased share 
turnover resulting from an enhanced IIR programme is mainly driven by uninformed trading. This 
provides further support for the investor recognition hypothesis. 
The positive association between IIR and analyst following support the arguments by Merton (1987) 
and Agarwal et al. (2016) that an effective investor relations programme will increase analyst 
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following. This positive association, coupled with the negative association between IIR and both the 
bid-ask spread and price impact, strengthens the use of analyst following as proxy for the quality of 
a company’s information environment, as suggested by Orens et al. (2010), Armstrong et al. (2011) 
and Aerts et al. (2007).  
In theory, the bid-ask spread and price impact are positively related to information asymmetry, and 
share turnover and analyst following, negatively. The level of IIR was found to be statistically 
significantly and negatively related to the bid-ask spread and price impact, and positively related to 
share turnover and analyst following. Based on theory, the observed relationships – two negative; 
two positive – therefore all points towards a negative relationship between IIR and information 
asymmetry. 
Finally, the Wu-Hausman test results indicate that companies are not likely to be under pressure to 
improve their IIR and to disclose more on corporate websites based on increased share turnover 
levels and analyst following, as suggested by Trabelsi et al. (2008) and Orens et al. (2010).  
6.6.5 Limitations of this chapter and suggestions for further research 
As discussed in Section 6.2, information asymmetry proxies based on intraday data were not used 
in this study. Research has found that the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread is 
highest at the beginning of the day and lowest at the end of the day for all but the largest trades (Lin 
et al., 1995). As this study has used the closing bid and closing ask prices at the end of each trading 
day to capture the bid-ask spread, the IIR coefficient reported in Table 6.14 may be an 
underestimate, if research that found a stronger negative relationship between disclosure and 
information asymmetry for high information asymmetry companies is considered (Brown & Hillegeist, 
2007). 
Market microstructure literature shows that spread contains three distinct components: order 
processing costs, adverse selection costs, and inventory holding costs (Ajina et al., 2015). By using 
a spread decomposition model, the spread components can be estimated (Easley et al., 1996; Brown 
& Hillegeist, 2007). Brown and Hillegeist (2007) calculated the probability of informed trading (PIN) 
as information asymmetry proxy. According to Gajewski and Li (2015), PIN is a more precise 
measure of information asymmetry as it excludes the process costs (i.e. transaction costs) and 
inventory holding costs. 
Research further shows that spread and the components of spread vary between trade sizes. Lin et 
al. (1995), for example, found that the average effective spread increases with trade size. As 
discussed in Section 2.4.2, liquidity can be described using three dimensions: width (bid-ask 
spreads), market depth, and slippage (Kyle, 1985). Market depth specifies the maximum number of 
shares for which the quoted bid and ask prices apply. To study the effect of market depth, Heflin et 
al. (2005) calculated the depth-adjusted spread, as discussed in Section 2.4.2.2. 
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Studies such as Gajewski and Li (2015) have found similar results between Internet-based 
disclosure and a variety of information asymmetry proxies, such as quoted bid-ask (as used in this 
study), time-weighted spread, and PIN. However, further research is needed to investigate the 
association between IIR and information asymmetry proxies, such as PIN and the depth-adjusted 
spread, as discussed in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7 
COST OF DEBT 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The cost of debt is the cost at which a company may borrow money and can be defined as the risk-
free rate plus the default risk. Garlappi, Shu and Yan (2008: 2743) defined default risk as “the 
likelihood that a levered firm will not be able to pay the contractual interest or principal on its debt 
obligations”. Debt financing is an important source of external financing for listed companies. The 
average debt–asset ratio for the companies included in the study sample was calculated as 0.45 in 
Chapter 5 (see Table 5.5).   
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between Internet investor relations (IIR) 
and the cost of debt. Besides debt, equity (i.e. shares issued and retained earnings) is the other 
important source of finance for companies. The cost of equity, as well as the weighted average cost 
of capital,212 is discussed in Chapter 8.  
Why would an enhanced policy of IIR decrease the cost of debt? As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
separation of ownership (investors) and control (management) results into information asymmetry 
between investors and management. Agency theory further assumes conflicting incentives between 
management and investors. In a similar vein, the separation between the providers of debt financing 
(hereafter referred to as creditors) and management results into information asymmetry and 
conflicting incentives between creditors and management. 
One of the factors that influences the default risk calculation is the probability that the company is 
withholding important unfavourable information (Sengupta, 1998: 461). The larger this probability 
(as assessed by the creditors), the larger the risk premium (default risk) that is added to the risk-free 
rate. To reduce expropriation by managers, creditors introduce debt covenants and restrictions into 
debt contracts which result in higher agency costs and therefore higher cost of debt (Guidara et al., 
2014: 151). 
Increased disclosure and transparency through IIR, however, can decrease the assessed probability 
that companies withhold adverse private information. Signalling theory can also be used as possible 
explanation for a negative relationship between IIR and the cost of debt, in that a well-developed 
corporate website signals transparency, business success and therefore the ability of the company 
to repay its debts. 
Using US data and analyst ratings as disclosure proxy, Sengupta (1998) and Nikolaev and Van Lent 
(2005) both found a negative association between disclosure and the cost of debt. Orens et al. (2010) 
                                               
212
 The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is calculated as the weighted average of the cost of equity and the cost 
of debt. Weights are assigned based on the capital structure of the company, namely the sources of financing used in the 
business. 
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used a direct disclosure proxy with corporate websites as disclosure vehicle. Orens et al. (2010) 
found a similar negative association for their continental European213 sub-sample, but no significant 
association for their northern American214 sub-sample. Also using developed country data, this time 
South Korean data, Kim and Jeon (2015) examined the association between the implementation of 
the investor relations function in a company and corporate bond credit ratings. They found the 
expected positive association. 
Francis et al. (2005) examined the relationship between disclosure and the cost of debt in a 
multicountry setting of 34 countries and included both developed and developing countries in their 
sample. Overall, Francis et al. (2005) found a significant negative association between disclosure 
and the cost of debt. 
Using data from a developing country, Guidara et al. (2014) established a negative association 
between annual report voluntary disclosure and the cost of debt for a sample of South African listed 
companies. Also using developing country data (China), Wang et al. (2008) found no similar 
association. 
Possible reasons for the mixed results may include: the disclosure proxy used, the proxy used for 
the cost of debt, country data used, and endogeneity. Regarding the measurement of disclosure, 
some studies used an indirect disclosure proxy such as analyst ratings (e.g. Sengupta, 1998; 
Nikolaev & Van Lent, 2005; Francis et al., 2005) or the implementation of the investor relations 
function (Kim & Jeon, 2015), as opposed to direct disclosure proxy studies that measured either the 
annual report (Guidara et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2008) or corporate websites as disclosure vehicle 
(Orens et al., 2010). 
Proxies used for the cost of debt varied from the effective yield of maturity of bonds (Nikolaev & Van 
Lent, 2005; Sengupta, 1998), corporate bond credit ratings (Kim & Jeon, 2015) and the interest 
expense to debt ratio (Guidara et al., 2014; Orens et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2008). 
Nikolaev and Van Lent (2004) and Orens et al. (2010) reported results that show a stronger negative 
relationship between disclosure and the cost of debt after controlling for endogeneity.  Other studies, 
such as Guidara et al. (2014) and Wang et al. (2008), failed to either test or control for endogeneity. 
Theoretically, a well-developed IIR programme can decrease creditors’ assessed probability of the 
default risk, resulting in a decreased cost of debt. Although the weight of empirical evidence points 
to a negative association between disclosure and the cost of debt, literature is far from reaching a 
consensus. Furthermore, studies that used IIR as disclosure proxy or JSE-listed data were scarce. 
The fifth objective of the study, and the purpose of this chapter, is to examine the relationship 
                                               
213
 Belgium, France, Germany and Netherlands. 
214
 Canada and US. 
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between IIR and the cost of debt in a sample of JSE-listed companies. The remainder of this chapter 
is organised into five distinct sections as follows. 
Firstly, Section 7.2 discusses the cost of debt proxies that were used in literature and concludes with 
how the cost of debt is measured in this study. Next, independent variables, besides IIR, that were 
used in the literature to explain variations in the cost of debt are discussed in Section 7.3. Section 
7.4 then elaborates on the specific research methodology, including a discussion of how this study 
addressed endogeneity. In the last two sections, the results are discussed, and finally a summary 
and conclusion close the chapter. 
7.2 COST OF DEBT MEASUREMENT 
Guidara et al. (2014), Orens et al. (2010), Wang et al. (2008) and Francis et al. (2005a) have all 
measured the pre-tax cost of debt (CoD) using the following formula: 
dbe = O+%!(!%	!6'!+!	5*(	%$!	1!&(7$*(%	&+	0*+#	%!( 	0&20%! (7.1) 
Although both components of Formula 7.1 are disclosed in the financial statements of companies, 
the interest expense is disclosed in the statement of profit or loss and the liabilities in the statement 
of financial position. The interest expense is therefore the accrued expense for the year as opposed 
to liabilities that are the outstanding balance as at year end. Companies may be tempted to redeem 
interest-bearing liabilities such as bank overdrafts just before year end to improve the outlook of their 
financial statements. 
Some studies have used the opening balance (i.e. at the beginning of the financial year) (Guidara et 
al., 2014), while others have used the average balance (i.e. the average of the opening and the 
closing balances) (Francis et al., 2005a) of liabilities as the denominator in the formula above. This 
study used the average of the short-term and long-term interest-bearing liabilities as denominator. 
Both the interest expense and the interest-bearing liabilities were captured from the INET BFA 
database. Following Guidara et al. (2014), Orens et al. (2010), Wang et al. (2008) and Francis et al. 
(2005), this study used the pre-tax cost of debt.   
Compared to US companies that rely primarily on bond issues as source of external finance, listed 
companies in an African setting make use of financial institutions such as banks for their primary 
source of finance (Barako, Hancock & Izan, 2006). The use of alternative cost of debt proxies such 
as the yield to maturity and corporate bond credit ratings were therefore not applicable to the South 
African setting of this study. 
The following formula is therefore used in this chapter to calculate the cost of debt: 
dbe = O+%!(!%	!6'!+!	5*(	%$!	1!&(	2!5*(!	%&6(Z'!++#	+%!(!%	2!&(+#	!2%s0*+#	+%!(!%	2!&(+#	!2%)/ (7.2) 
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7.3 PRIOR THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS OF RELATIONSHIPS AND MEASUREMENT  
As discussed in Section 7.1, a negative association between IIR and the cost of debt is expected. In 
addition to the IIR score, additional explanatory variables, as used in the literature to explain 
variations in the cost of debt levels, are discussed in this section. Table 7.1 shows the different 
proxies that were used in the literature for each of the independent variables discussed in this 
section. More specifically, this section discusses: (1) the underlying reasons used by the literature 
to hypothesise the direction of relationships, (2) the results found in the literature in terms of statistical 
significance and the economic sense of directions, (3) the direction hypothesised in this dissertation 
and finally, (4) a brief discussion of how each of these variables were measured in this dissertation. 
Table 7.1: Proxies used in literature to measure the determinants of the cost of debt 
Variable Proxy used  
SIZE Logarithm of total assets: Wang et al. (2008); Orens et al. (2010: 1071);  Guidara 
et al. (2014: 155); Francis et al. (2005a); Sengupta (1996); Kim and Jeon (2015) 
LEVERAGE Debt/total asset: Orens et al. (2010: 1071) and Francis (2005a: 1150) 
Debt/equity ratio: Wang et al. (2008) 
Debt/market capitalisation: Sengupta (1998) 
EPS VARIABILITY Logarithm of the percentage change between two years: Orens et al. (2010: 1071) 
and Guidara et al. (2014: 155) 
PROFITABILITY Return on assets: Wang et al. (2008); Francis et al. (2005a) and Kim and Jeon 
(2015) 
Return of sales: Sengupta (1998) 
Dummy variable of one if the company reports a negative earnings in the latest 
financial year: Guidara et al. (2014: 155); Orens et al. (2010) and Kim and Jeon 
(2015) 
INTEREST COVER Sengupta (1998) 
 
7.3.1 Size (SP) (H2) 
Larger companies are expected to have a lower cost of debt, given their lower risk (Sengupta, 1998: 
464). Kasozi (2009: 42) listed the following arguments in support of the notion that larger companies 
can afford to borrow greater amounts and more often than smaller companies are able to do: larger 
companies are well-established and have a greater diversified pool of assets; larger companies have 
less earnings volatility; and larger companies have lower levels of financial distress which enables 
them to carry more debt. All three arguments listed by Kasozi (2009) support the notion that larger 
companies should have both greater leverage and a lower cost of debt.  
Empirical results are, however, mixed and the majority of disclosure–cost of debt studies did not find 
any significant relationship between size, as independent variable, and the cost of debt, as 
dependent variable (Orens et al., 2010; Guidara et al., 2014; Sengupta, 1998; Wang et al., 2008). 
Francis et al. (2005a) found a negative association between size and the cost of debt, while Kim and 
Jeon (2015) found a positive association between size and credit bond ratings (which equates to a 
negative association with the cost of debt). 
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From an inspection of the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients (not reported in this study) 
between IIR and market capitalisation (+0.65), total assets (+0.73) and the share price (0.51), it was 
decided to use the share price as size variable to avoid potential muliticollinearity. Although studies 
such as Francis et al. (2005a) found a significant negative association between both total assets and 
disclosure and the cost of debt, it should be noted that their reported Pearson correlation between 
disclosure and total assets was only +0.32 (raw disclosure score) and +0.24 (scaled disclosure 
score).  
The daily closing share price for each company was captured from the INET BFA database (product 
called Market Data) for all trading days from 1 December 2014 to 30 November 2015. The average 
share price was then calculated for each company. As already discussed, the JSE listing for three 
companies was suspended215 and two were delisted216 during this period. For these companies 
calculations were adjusted accordingly to reflect the available data. A negative association between 
share price and the cost of debt was expected (H2). 
7.3.2 Leverage (LEV) (H3) 
The higher the financial leverage, the higher the probability that the company will default, increasing 
the default risk and therefore the cost of debt (Francis et al., 2005a: 1147). Research further found 
that larger companies borrow greater amounts and more regularly than smaller companies do 
(Kasozi, 2009: 30), and, as discussed in Section 7.3.1, a lower cost of debt is, ceteris paribus, 
expected for larger companies. Finance theory, however, states that although larger companies may 
be able to borrow money at a lower cost compared to smaller companies, this will only hold up to 
certain point. Excessive leverage beyond this point will increase the financial risk and therefore the 
cost of debt.  
Although disclosure–cost of debt studies usually expect a positive association between leverage and 
the cost of debt, the relationship between leverage and the cost of debt is in fact more complex and 
may even be negative. For example, Orens et al. (2010) found no association between leverage and 
the cost of debt, while Francis et al. (2005a) and Sengupta (1998) both found positive associations, 
and Wang et al. (2008) found a negative association. 
The debt–asset ratio (Francis et al., 2005a), debt–equity ratio (Wang et al., 2008)) and the debt–
market capitalisation ratio (Sengupta, 1998) were used as proxies for leverage in the literature. This 
study used the debt to asset ratio as proxy for leverage. The debt to asset ratio was captured from 
the INET BFA database (product called Ratios-General).  
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 Evraz Highveld Steel & Vanadium Ltd, Firestone Energy Ltd and IPSA Group Plc. 
216
 Fountainhead Property Trust and Infrasors Holdings Ltd. 
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INET BFA calculates the debt to asset ratio as follows: 
*%&0	!2%
*%&0	&!% (7.3) 
A positive association between leverage and the cost of debt was expected (H3). 
7.3.3 Market-to-book value (MTB) ratio (H4) 
As discussed in Section 5.3.5, the market-to-book (MTB) ratio is a proxy for future growth 
opportunities (Orens et al., 2010: 1070; Celik et al., 2006) and companies with high MTB ratios are 
further expected to disclose more information (Trabelsi et al., 2008; Larrán & Giner, 2002: 67) in 
order to communicate or signal such growth opportunities to investors. If creditors agree with the 
positive growth outlook portrayed by a high MTB ratio, they may adjust the default risk and the cost 
of debt downward. 
Orens et al. (2010) found a highly significant negative association between the MTB ratio using 
northern American data, but failed to find any similar association using continental European data.  
The MTB ratio was captured from the INET BFA database (product called Ratios-General). INET 
BFA calculates the MTB ratio as the market value of a share divided by its book value. Book value 
per share is calculated as the ordinary shareholders’ interest divided by the number of ordinary 
shares in issue. 
A negative association between the market-to-book value (MTB) ratio and the cost of debt was 
expected (H4). 
7.3.4 Earnings per share (EPS) variability (EPS VAR) (H5) 
Given the increased risk in predicting the future earnings for companies with high earnings variability, 
creditors require a larger risk premium and therefore cost of debt for such companies (Orens et al., 
2010: 1070). Orens et al. (2010) found a significant positive association between earnings per share 
variability, as independent variable, and the cost of debt for their continental European sample, but 
failed to find any association using northern American data. Guidara et al. (2010) also found no 
association using South African data.  
This study used the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the earnings per share growth over 
the last five years (i.e. four growth percentages) as proxy for the earnings per share variability. The 
annual EPS growth percentages were captured from the INET BFA database. INET BFA calculates 




C  (7.4) 
Owing to data limitations, the standard deviation for six companies were based on only three growth 
percentages and for two companies on only two. A positive association between the earnings per 
share variability (EPS VAR) and the cost of debt was expected (H5). 
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7.3.5 Profitability (ROE) (H6) 
Companies with negative earnings are more difficult to analyse (Brown, 2001) as they tend to 
manipulate their earnings (Orens et al., 2010: 1070). Uncertainty regarding the future profitability of 
companies with negative earnings results in an upward adjustment by creditors of the default risk 
and therefore increases the cost of debt.    
The greater uncertainty regarding the future profitability of companies with negative earnings 
increases the cost at which companies can borrow money (Orens et al., 2010: 1070). Sengupta 
(1998) calculated the profit margin as the income divided by the net sales and expected a negative 
association between the profit margin and the cost of debt. 
Regarding the profitability variable, disclosure–cost of debt studies can be categorised into two 
groups: studies that have used some profitability ratio, for example the return on assets (Wang et 
al., 2008) or return on sales (Sengupta, 1998) and studies that have assigned a dummy variable of 
one to categorise companies that have reported a loss in the last financial year (Guidara et al., 2014; 
Kim & Jeon, 2015).  
Guidara et al. (2014), Francis et al. (2005a) and Sengupta (1998) found no association between 
profitability and the cost of debt. Wang et al. (2008) found the expected negative association between 
profitability and the cost of debt using Chinese data. Orens et al. (2010), however, only found the 
expected positive association between their dummy variable assigned for loss-making companies 
and the cost of debt using North American data, with no similar association for their continental 
European sample. 
This study used the return on equity (ROE) ratio as profitability proxy. The ROE ratio was captured 
from the INET BFA database (product called Ratios-General). INET BFA calculates ROE using the 
following formula: 
@(*5%	&%%(23%&20!	%*	*(+&(1	$&(!$*0!(
Z(+&(1	$&(!$*0!(u	+%!(!%  (7.5) 
A negative association between the ROE and the cost of debt was expected (H6). 
7.3.6 Interest cover (IC) (H7) 
Interest cover is a calculation of a company’s ability to meet its interest payments. The lower the 
interest cover, the larger the debt burden and the financial risk of the company, resulting in an 
increased default risk. Sengupta (1998) hypothesised a negative association between interest cover 
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The interest cover ratio was captured from the INET BFA database. INET BFA calculates interest 
cover using the following formula: 
I&(++#	2!5*(!	+%!(!%	&+	%&6!
O+%!(!%	!6'!+!  (7.6) 
A negative association between interest cover and the cost of debt was expected (H7). 
7.3.7 Dual listing (LIST.D) (H8) 
Multiple stock exchange listings are often associated with increased transparency and increased 
disclosure (Orens et al., 2010: 1070). A research report by Citibank (2011) found a significant 
negative association between the cross-border listing of shares via a depository receipt and the cost 
of debt. Ball, Hail and Vasvari (2013) examined the specific advantage of an equity cross-listing in 
the US and the cost of debt. Using a global sample of more than 40 countries (including South 
Africa), they found that companies do benefit from a lower cost of debt following a cross-listing in the 
US. 
For the purpose of this study, a dummy variable of one was assigned for companies with a dual 
stock exchange listing. The listing status of companies was captured from a spreadsheet received 
directly from a JSE representative. A negative association between the dual listing dummy variable 
and the cost of debt was expected (H8). 
7.4 METHOD OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
As in Chapters 5 and 6, the stepwise regression method is used in this chapter to address the fifth 
research objective, namely to examine the relationship between IIR and the cost of debt. Owing to 
missing data (17 companies recorded no short- or long-term interest-bearing debt in their financial 
statements), the initial sample of 85 companies was reduced to 68. 
Besides the IIR score, additional explanatory variables as used in the literature to explain variations 
in the cost of debt were discussed in Section 7.3. These were also the variables that were used in 
the stepwise regression model-building process. Table 7.2 summarises the calculation of these 
variables, as well as the expected association of each variable with the dependent variable, cost of 
debt. 
Further to the endogeneity discussion in Section 2.8, Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005) specifically 
cautioned the endogeneity problem in disclosure–cost of debt studies. The Wu-Hausman test was 
used to test for this potential endogenous problem. The results thereof are discussed in Section 7.5. 
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Table: 7.2: Independent variables used in the stepwise regression models of the cost of 
debt: description and expected relationship 
Acronym Variable H Description Expected 
relationship 
Independent continuous variables 
IIR IIR score 1 Internet investor relations (IIR) score per company - 
SIZE Share price 2 Natural logarithm of the average daily (over 250 
trading days) closing share price 
- 
LEV Leverage 3 Ratio between debt and assets + 
MTB Market-to-book 
value ratio 
4 Natural logarithm of the ratio between the share price 
(market value) and the book value of equity 
- 
EPS VAR Earnings per 
share variability 
5 Natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the last 
four annual growth percentages in headline earnings 
per share 
+ 
ROE Return on equity 6 Ratio between profit to ordinary shareholders interest - 
IC Interest cover 7 Ratio between earnings before interest and taxes and 
interest expense 
- 
Independent categorical variable 
LIST.D Dual listing 8 Dummy variable representing one if the company is 




7.5.1 Selected descriptive statistics  
The descriptive statistics are set out in Table 7.3. As discussed in Section 7.3, the natural logarithm 
of some of these variables were used to reduce the skewness (based on an examination of the 
normality plots). For the convenience of the reader, statistics for these variables (share price, market-
to-book value ratio and the earnings per share variability) are presented prior to their natural 
logarithmic transformations, which were used in the multivariate regression analysis. Table 7.3 
depicts the descriptive statistics for only the reduced sample of 68 companies, as discussed in 
Section 7.4. 
The results in Table 7.3 underline the significant variation between the companies included in the 
sample. This variation supports the objective of the sample selection criteria followed in Chapter 4 
to select a sample that would ensure significant cross-sectional variation.  
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Table 7.3: Descriptive statistics: variables used to examine cost of debt variations 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
  Average Minimum Quartile Maximum Standard 
deviation 
   Q1 Q2 Q3   
Cost of debt (before tax) 11.27% 0.41% 6.90% 9.30% 12.42% 58.54% 9.09 
Panel B: Independent variables 
 Average Minimum Quartile Maximum Standard 
deviation 
   Q1 Q2 Q3   
Internet investor relations 
(IIR) 
104.85 13.50 70.00 103.00 133.88 193.50 42.00 
Share price (SIZE) (ZAR) R71.85 R0.03 R4.53 R25.66 R113.52 R696.21 R107.95 
Leverage (LEV) 0.49 0.002 0.33 0.44 0.64 1.21 0.23 
Market-to-book ratio 
(MTB) 
2.22 0.13 0.81 1.46 2.13 12.99 2.50 
EPS variability (EPS 
VAR) 
164.11 2.13 15.96 37.65 118.99 3 207.27 422.31 
Return on equity (ROE) 9.05% -40.09% 2.43% 12.30% 17.87% 58.80% 19.38% 
Interest cover (IC) 66.32 -92.69 0.67 4.28 8.65 3 076 378.04 
 
7.5.2 Correlation analysis 
Table 7.4 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the dependent variable (cost of debt) 
and the independent variables as listed in Table 7.2. For the convenience of the reader, correlation 
coefficients significant at the 1% or better level are printed in green, those at 5% or better level in 
blue, and finally those 10% or better level in red. For log transformed variables, the correlation 
coefficient depicts the correlation with the natural logarithm of the variables, as applicable. 
Table 7.4: Correlation matrix: cost of debt and independent variables  
 CoD IIR LEV MTB EPS VAR IC ROE LIST.D SP 
CoD 1.00           
IIR -0.29 1.00        
LEV -0.21 0.29 1.00       
MTB -0.13 0.10 0.33 1.00      
EPS VAR 0.32 -0.19 -0.38 -0.54 1.00     
IC 0.04 0.08 -0.12 0.29 -0.25 1.00    
ROE -0.09 0.23 0.17 0.64 -0.55 0.30 1.00   
LIST.D -0.03 0.30 -0.06 -0.15 0.33 -0.08 -0.10 1.00  
SP -0.26 0.54 0.29 0.54 -0.47 0.16 0.61 0.13 1.00 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level;  Blue = significant at the 5% level; Red = significant at the 10% level; CoD = 
cost of debt; IIR = Internet investor relations; LEV = leverage; MTB = market-to-book value ratio; EPS VAR = earnings per 
share variability; IC = interest cover; ROE = return on equity; LIST.D = dual listing; SP = share price 
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Table 7.4 shows significant negative correlations between the cost of debt (CoD) and both IIR and 
share price (SP), as well as a significant positive correlation with the earnings per share variability 
(EPS VAR). The directions of these coefficients are as expected. The significant negative correlation 
coefficient between the cost of debt and leverage (LEV) is contrary to what was expected. 
The significant positive correlations between leverage and both the share price (SP) and IIR, and 
the negative correlations between the cost of debt and both the share price (SP) and IIR may, 
however, explain the negative correlation between leverage and the cost of debt. Larger companies 
(i.e. share price) therefore not only borrow greater amounts, but also have higher IIR scores that are 
negatively correlated with the cost of debt. The correlation coefficients between the cost of debt and 
each of the following: the market-to-book value ratio, interest cover, return on equity and being a 
dual listed company are not statistically significant. 
7.5.3 Regression estimation results 
As discussed in Section 7.4, the Wu-Hausman test was used to test for a potential endogenous 
problem. The Wu-Hausman test confirmed both the strength of the instrumental variable used (i.e. 
being audited by a big four audit company) and the absence of endogeneity. The Ho hypothesis, 
namely that IIR is an exogenous variable, was accepted as the p-value of 0.86 has indicated that 
the Ho hypothesis cannot be rejected. The Ho hypothesis of a weak instrumental variable was 
however rejected with a highly significant p-value of 0.00. 
Based on an examination of the normality plots of residuals, the dependent variable, namely cost of 
debt, was log transformed to improve normality. Residual plots of predicted versus residual scores 
were examined, and no evidence of heteroscedasticity was found. The minimum tolerance value of 
the reported regression model was 0.96 (i.e. a maximum variance inflation factor of 1.04) and 
indicated the absence of multicollinearity. The Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.03 confirmed the absence 
of autocorrelation. 
Table 7.5 presents the multivariate regression results of the stepwise regression where the 
dependent variable is the cost of debt. As in Table 7.4, regression coefficients statistically significant 
at the 1% or better level are printed in green, those at the 5% or better level in blue, and those at 
the 10% or better level in red.   
The direction of all coefficients reported in Table 7.5 are as expected. The statistically significant 
association between IIR and the cost of debt suggested that companies may benefit from an 
enhanced IIR strategy through a decreased cost of debt. IIR was therefore assessed as credible 
information by creditors, decreasing their perception of the default risk and therefore the cost of debt.  
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Table 7.5: Regression results: regression of the cost of debt on IIR and EPS variability 
 Cost of debt (before tax) 
q0 -1.01 
IIR -0.002 
Earnings per share variability 0.05 
Adjusted R² (%) 14.22% 
F-value 6.55 
Durbin-Watson 2.03 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level; Blue = significant at the 5% level; Red = significant at the 10% level 
Although marginally so, earnings per share variability was significantly positively related to the cost 
of debt. An increased variability in the earnings per share growth increases the difficulty for creditors 
to predict the future profitability of a company, resulting in an upward adjustment of the default risk 
and therefore the cost of debt. 
As a robustness check, the cost of debt (as reported in Table 7.5 and calculated according to 
Formula 7.2) calculation was replaced with three alternative calculations: (1) opening balance of 
interest-bearing debt used as denominator; (2) after-tax cost of debt by merely multiplying the 
Formula 7.2 cost of debt with 72%; and (3) after-tax cost of debt by only multiplying with 72% if the 
company had reported a profit in their latest financial statements. For all three, both IIR and the 
earnings per share variability remained statistically significant, and the directions of all coefficients 
remained unchanged. 
The 72% was calculated as 100% minus the current corporate tax rate in South Africa, namely 28%, 
and the return on equity ratio was used to assess whether the company reported a profit or not. The 
rationale in only multiplying with 72% if the company had reported a profit was that the tax advantage 
was only available for companies that had taxable profits (although the dissertation acknowledges 
that accounting profits are not necessarily the same as taxable profits, given differences between 
accounting and tax rules).  Assuming that JSE-listed companies will in future all realise profits, a 
more straightforward approach is to multiply the cost of debt with 72% irrespective of the results 
reported in the latest financial statements. 
Although the adjusted R² was very low – that is only 14.22% of the variation in the cost of debt was 
explained by the two independent variables – it compared favourably with previous disclosure–cost 
of debt studies. Guidara et al. (2014) examined the relationship between annual report voluntary 
disclosure and the cost of debt using South African data and reported an adjusted R² of 8.22%. 
Similar to this study, Orens et al. (2010) measured corporate website disclosure (although different 
attributes were measured). Orens et al. (2010) reported an adjusted R² of 13.11% in their disclosure–
cost of debt regression using northern American data and 7.63% using continental European data. 
In a multicountry setting, Francis et al. (2005a) reported an adjusted R² of 8.00%. The only 
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disclosure–cost of debt study to date that has reported a significantly higher adjusted R² is the 
Sengupta (1998) study, with 55%. 
7.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the relationship between IIR and the cost of debt. 
Stepwise regression model-building was used with cost of debt as the dependent variable, and the 
independent variables as identified from the literature and summarised in Table 7.2. Of the 
independent variables listed in Table 7.2, only IIR and earnings per share variability remained 
statistically significant predictors of the cost of debt. The results suggest that companies may benefit 
from a reduced cost of debt through an enhanced policy of IIR. 
To the best knowledge of the dissertation, this is the first study that has examined the relationship 
between IIR and the cost of debt in South Africa. A recent study using South African data (Guidara 
et al., 2014) also examined the disclosure–cost of debt relationship and also reported a significant 
negative association between disclosure and the cost of debt. However, the Guidara study differed 
from this study in a number of respects. Firstly, the attributes measured were different. The Guidara 
study measured only content and, although some of the attributes which were measured overlap, 
significant differences exist in the attributes measured. The Guidara study, for example, did not 
measure any of the following attributes that were measured in this study: archived financial results, 
alternative financial statement presentation formats (e.g. Excel), and results or investor 
presentations. Secondly, the Guidara study measured the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports. Thirdly, the sample size differed. The Guidara study measured only 20 JSE-listed 
companies. An advantage of the Guidara study over this study, however, was the fact that the 
Guidara study examined the relationship over a three-year period as compared to this study that 
relied on one measurement in time of both IIR and the cost of debt. 
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CHAPTER 8 
COST OF CAPITAL 
Whether disclosure policies and financial reporting affect a firm’s cost of equity is one of 
the most interesting, and important questions in the accounting and finance literature – 
Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther (2010) 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The cost of capital – also named the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) – is the weighted 
average cost of equity and cost of debt. In its most basic form, weights are assigned according to 
the respective proportions of equity and debt in the capital structure of the company. Cost of capital 
is used, among others, by companies, investors and regulatory authorities, and for a variety of 
reasons. 
Companies use the cost of capital to evaluate capital projects (e.g. as hurdle rate in investment 
decisions) and for the determination of the fair value of assets for corporate reporting purposes (in 
the absence of a liquid market). Investors, on the other hand, use cost of capital to perform 
discounted cash flow valuations and to calculate performance indicators such as economic value 
added (EVA)217 (Correia, Flynn, Uliana & Wormald, 2013: 7-2). According to Correia et al. (2013: 7-
3), cost of capital is further used by regulatory authorities to determine prices for companies that are 
operating in industries such as water and power transmission. 
Chapter 7 discussed the association between the cost of debt and Internet investor relations (IIR) 
and concluded that companies may benefit from increased IIR levels in the form of a decreased 
borrowing cost. Compared to the cost of debt, the cost of equity has by far received most of the 
attention in the literature. It is important to note from the outset that the cost of equity and the cost of 
debt are measured in two fundamentally different ways, and are not necessarily positively related 
(as showed by research), notwithstanding the fact that both are theoretically based on the risk-free 
rate. 
For the purpose of this study, the cost of debt was measured as the interest expense divided by the 
average interest-bearing debt. Theoretically, the cost of debt can also be defined as the sum of the 
risk-free rate plus the default risk applicable to the company. The cost of equity, on the other hand, 
is the rate of return required by investors. This study used the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to 
calculate the cost of equity. As discussed in Section 8.2, the CAPM is based on the risk-free rate, 
the market return and the beta of the share. 
                                               
217
 Economic value added (EVA) = operating income – (WACC x invested capital). 
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In conventional finance literature, it is often reasoned that there is an optimal capital structure218, that 
is an optimal level of equity and debt, at which a company’s cost of capital is minimised. The premise 
on which this notion is based is that the cost of debt is lower compared to the cost of equity, and 
mainly for two reasons. Firstly, creditors will generally face less risk compared to shareholders and, 
secondly, interest payments are tax deductible. Finance theory, however, cautions that as the 
proportion of debt financing increases, shareholders will demand a higher return as they realise that 
the risk of their investment is increasing. Ultimately, creditors will re-adjust their measurement of the 
default risk and therefore increase their required returns (Kasozi, 2009: 16), resulting in an increased 
cost of capital. 
Although a positive association between the cost of debt and the cost of equity can therefore 
intuitively be expected, McKenzie and Partington (2013) emphasised that there is no default risk 
adjustment in the CAPM. They further distinguish between the cost of equity and the cost of debt in 
that the cost of equity is based on expected returns, which is the function of both the return required 
by investors and the expected cash flows. Cost of debt, on the other hand, is the guaranteed return 
and is a function of the default risk. McKenzie and Partington (2013) argued that an adjustment of 
the default risk will only influence the expected future cash flows and not the return required by 
investors.  
Following the prescribed guidelines for expert witnesses in proceedings in the Federal Court of 
Australia, McKenzie and Partington (2003) prepared a report entitled “The relationship between the 
cost of debt and the cost of equity”. In this report, McKenzie and Partington (2013: 20) stated: 
The survey of the literature presented in our response to Question 1.a., highlights that the 
cost of debt and the cost of equity can move independently. There is likely to be some 
commonality in the overall cost of debt and equity since the risk free rate is the benchmark 
for both. However, that relationship is weak, if it exists at all, and the relation is highly 
unstable. Our survey of the literature provides no clear guidance on the appropriate manner 
with which to model the relationship. 
The purposes of this chapter are twofold: firstly, to examine the association between IIR and the cost 
of equity and, secondly, to examine the association between IIR and the cost of capital. The 
association between disclosure and the cost of equity can be examined either through a direct 
examination of the effect of disclosure on the cost of equity, or alternatively through an indirect 
examination of the effect of disclosure on information asymmetry. 
Analytical and empirical research that has examined the direct association between disclosure and 
the cost of equity was discussed in Section 2.5. Although there is strong support for a negative 
                                               
218
 Although various theories have been developed to explain company capital structures, e.g. trade-off theory, pecking 
order theory and the Modigliani-Miller models, a survey of the finance literature shows that there is no universally accepted 
theory in this regard (Kasozi, 2009: 21).  
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association, studies that have found only partial evidence or no relation or even a positive 
relationship were discussed in Section 2.5.2. 
The indirect relationship, as depicted in Figure 2.1, was discussed in Section 2.4. To review the 
discussion briefly, economic theory suggests two distinct routes in support of the hypothesis that 
disclosure could decrease the cost of equity, the liquidity route and the estimation risk route. The 
liquidity route argues that improved disclosure will increase liquidity, which will result in a decrease 
in the cost of equity, either through reduced transaction costs or an increased demand. The 
estimation risk route is associated with the investors’ assessments of the parameters of the expected 
return. Both the reduced estimation risk route and the increased liquidity route are based on a 
reduction of information asymmetry. As with disclosure–cost of equity studies, empirical research to 
date that examined the relationship between disclosure and information asymmetry has produced 
mixed results. 
To summarise the results found in Chapter 6: a significant negative association between IIR and 
information asymmetry was found for four of the five information asymmetry proxies that were used 
in this study (bid-ask spread, price impact, share turnover and analyst following). No association 
between IIR and share price volatility was found. Although the indirect route is often used as proxy 
for the association between disclosure and the cost of equity, the relationship between information 
asymmetry and the cost of equity is, however, rather complex and not clear, as the following studies 
suggest. 
Using the number of shareholders as proxy for the level of competition, Armstrong et al. (2011) found 
that in a perfect market competition setting (i.e. consisting of a high number of shareholders), 
information asymmetry has no separate effect on the cost of equity, as opposed to an imperfect 
competition setting (i.e. where there is a low number of shareholders) where information asymmetry 
can have a separate effect on the cost of equity. Bhattacharya et al. (2007) found that the degree of 
information risk is more important than the distribution thereof (i.e. information asymmetry). Using a 
theoretically rational expectation model, Lambert et al. (2009) showed that, if information precision 
is considered, information asymmetry has no effect on the cost of equity.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised into six distinct sections as follows. Firstly, Section 8.2 
discusses cost of equity proxies that were used in literature and concludes with how the cost of 
equity is measured in this study. Section 8.3 then briefly discusses the measurement of cost of 
capital. Next, independent variables, besides IIR, that were used in the literature to explain variations 
in the cost of equity and capital are discussed in Section 8.4. Section 8.5 then elaborates on the 
specific research methodology, including a discussion of how this study addressed endogeneity. In 
the last two sections, the results are discussed, and finally a summary and conclusion close the 
chapter. 
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8.2 COST OF EQUITY 
Methods used in the literature to measure the cost of equity were categorised into two distinct groups 
in Section 2.6: analyst forecast or ex ante estimates (Section 2.6.1) and share return-based or ex 
post estimates (Section 2.6.2). Even though ex ante estimate methods (e.g. the discounted free cash 
flow model) seem to be the most popular method to estimate the cost of equity, it was considered 
not achievable in this study for the following reason.  
As discussed in Section 2.6.1, all analyst forecast-based or ex ante estimates require analyst 
forecast information (e.g. earnings per share projections). In the study sample, only 45 companies 
were followed by at least one analyst, and of these companies only 30 were followed by two or more 
analysts. This study assumes that at least two analyst forecasts are necessary to reliably use an 
analyst forecast-based estimate technique. A similar argument was used by Armstrong et al. (2011: 
7). The use of ex ante methods were therefore considered not feasible in this study, as the variables 
required would have reduced the sample size to a number that would have severely restricted the 
power of statistical tests. 
Four share return-based or ex post methods were discussed in Section 2.6.2: realised returns, the 
CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model and the earnings-to-price ratio. The earnings-to-price 
ratio is the inverse of the well-known price-to-earnings (PE) ratio. Firer (1993) reasoned that high 
price-to-earnings ratios are a function of growth prospects, and that it is not rational to assume that 
the fact that companies have such prospects results in investors requiring lower returns and 
therefore a lower cost of equity. Realised returns are considered a noisy measure of the cost of 
equity (Fu et al., 2012; Gebhardt et al., 2001). 
A further disadvantage of both the earnings-to-price ratio, as well as the realised returns method is 
the difficulty to use negative values. Of the 85 companies in the sample, 14 had a negative earnings-
to-price ratio and 27 a negative realised return. Given the reduced sample sizes, both the earnings-
to-price ratio and realised returns were only examined as cost of equity alternatives in this study and 
were not used in cost of capital calculations.  
The earnings-to-price ratio was calculated as the inverse of the price-to-earnings (PE) ratio. The PE 
ratio was captured from the INET BFA database. Realised returns were captured from the INET BFA 
database from the total returns model. The total returns model calculates the return of a company 
using the share price and dividend yield.  
Although cost of debt was only calculated using a reduced sample size of 68 companies (as 
discussed in Chapter 7), this did not reduce the cost of capital sample size, as the cost of capital for 
companies without interest-bearing debt is the cost of equity (as discussed in Section 8.3). 
The capital asset-pricing model (CAPM) is based on the notion that the return required by investors 
is positively correlated with risk.  
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The CAPM estimates the cost of equity (!) using the following formula: 
! = S5 + ß	(S − S5) (8.1) 
where:  
S5	 = the risk-free rate; 
ß    = the share beta; and 
S 	 = the expected market return. 
The CAPM is often criticised, mainly because of the assumptions on which it is based. The CAPM 
assumptions are as follows (ACCA, 2015): 
• Investors hold diversified portfolios.  
• There is a single-period transaction horizon (i.e. a minimum holding period of one year). 
• Investors can borrow and lend at the risk-free rate of return. 
• Perfect capital market exists (i.e. there are no taxes or transaction costs, perfect information is 
freely available to all investors; all investors are rational and risk averse; there are a large 
number of buyers and sellers in the market). 
The assumption that investors hold diversified portfolios implies that investors will only require a 
return for the systematic risk (also called market, undiversifiable or uncontrollable risk), as the 
unsystematic risk (also called diversifiable, asset-specific, controllable or idiosyncratic risk) has been 
removed by the holding of a diversified portfolio and can therefore be ignored.  
Although systematic risk affects all companies, some companies are more sensitive to systematic 
risk than others. The beta of a share measures the market risk of that particular share as compared 
to the rest of the market. The beta coefficient of a share is calculated with the following formula 
(Bradfield, 2003): 
s*^&(&+,!	((v,(x)
yQ  (8.2) 
where: 

  = share price; 

  = market index; and 
z²   = market variance. 
The beta coefficient is therefore a measure of the volatility of a share compared to the rest of the 
market. Researchers usually use monthly intervals (over a five-year period) to calculate the returns 
needed for the estimation process (Bradfield, 2003: 50). If a share is, however, thinly traded then it 
is likely that the month-end price may not result from a trade on that day, but is merely the price of 
the last trade in that month. The result is a mismatch between the market index and the share price, 
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leading to a downward bias in the covariance estimate, resulting in a downward bias in the estimate 
of the beta (Bradfield, 2003: 50). 
As discussed in Section 4.2, the study sample was randomly selected from a population that did not 
exclude companies based on liquidity. The study sample therefore included less liquid, thinly traded 
shares, which might have affected the credibility of the CAPM and the results of statistical tests that 
were based thereon. Harvey (1995) further report that betas of emerging markets fail to explain any 
cross-sectional variation in expected returns in a single-factor model framework such as the CAPM. 
Besides the possible bias in beta estimates for companies that suffer from thin-trading effects as 
discussed above, the CAPM is further criticised in disclosure–equity literature for providing no role 
for risk factors other than market beta (e.g. amount (estimation risk) and distribution (information 
asymmetry) of information risk) (Hail, 2002: 760). As discussed above, the CAPM is based on the 
assumption that investors hold diversified portfolios that imply that they will only be rewarded for 
systematic or undiversifiable risk. In the specific context of this study, the cost of equity was therefore 
only linked to IIR when information risk (i.e. information asymmetry) was directly linked to the market 
beta itself. 
Hughes, Liu and Liu (2007) and Lambert et al. (2007) argued that disclosure has no impact on the 
cost of equity, if it conveys only information on diversifiable risks. Voluntary disclosure, and therefore 
IIR, can only lead to a lower cost of equity if information risk is undiversifiable (Eugster, 2014).  
Despite all the critique against the CAPM, it was decided to use the CAPM as cost of equity estimate 
in this study for the following reasons: 
i) As discussed in Section 2.6.2.2, the CAPM is the most preferred method in the valuation 
practice (PwC, 2015). 
ii) No consensus exists, but various studies found a positive association between beta and the 
ex-ante cost of equity (Botosan, 1997; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Hail, 2002).  
iii) As also previously argued by Hail (2002: 756), the purpose of this study was not to explain the 
absolute level of the cost of equity, but rather to examine the cross-sectional variation in the 
cost of equity, conditional on the varying observed levels of IIR. 
iv) Notwithstanding the critique against the CAPM, some empirical support for the CAPM is given 
by Da, Gua and Jagannathan (2012) and the CAPM is often used to measure the cost of equity 
in emerging country studies (Collins & Abrahamson, 2006; Hearn & Piesse, 2015), as well as 
developed country studies where analyst forecast information was not available (Fu et al., 
2012). 
v) Thin-trading adjusted betas were used. According to Gopi (2016), the adjustment is done using 
the well-known trade-to-trade adjustment procedure, as also described by Bradfield (2003). 
To summarise this section: Although ex ante and ex post cost of equity estimate methods are 
available, this study has, owing to the non-availability of data, used the well-known, but also 
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sometimes criticised, CAPM for its cost of equity estimates. The application of the CAPM in this study 
is discussed further in Section 8.5. 
8.3 COST OF CAPITAL  
Most studies to date have examined either the relationship between disclosure and the cost of debt 
or the cost of equity, with the latter receiving most attention in the literature. Disclosure studies that 
have examined both are sparse. Francis et al. (2005a) and Orens et al. (2010) have both separately 
examined the relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity, and disclosure and the cost of 
debt, but neither has examined the relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital. Omran 
and Pointon (2004) calculate the cost of capital by merely using the market interest rate as proxy for 
the cost of debt.  
The cost of capital or WACC is the weighted average of the cost of equity and the cost of debt, and 
is calculated using the following formula (Correia et al., 2013: 7-4): 




S!  = the cost of equity; 
S  = the cost of debt; 
E	 = equity; 
D	 = debt; 
V	 = sum of equity and debt; and 
	,  = the corporate tax rate.  
Although either market values or book values can be used to calculate the cost of capital, the use of 
market values is considered more relevant (Correia et al., 2013: 7-3). The calculation of the cost of 
capital (WACC) for the purpose of this study is further discussed in Section 8.5. 
8.4 PRIOR THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS OF RELATIONSHIPS AND MEASUREMENT  
As discussed, a negative association between IIR and, in turn, the cost of equity and the cost of 
capital is expected. In addition to the IIR score, additional explanatory variables, as used in the 
literature to explain variations in the cost of equity and cost of capital levels, are discussed in this 
section. Table 8.1 shows the different proxies that were used in the literature for each of the 
independent variables discussed in this section. More specifically, this section discusses: (1) the 
underlying reasons used by the literature to hypothesise the direction of relationships, (2) the results 
found in the literature in terms of statistical significance and the economic sense of directions, (3) 
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the direction hypothesised in this dissertation and finally, (4) a brief discussion of how each of these 
variables were measured in this dissertation.  
Table 8.1: Proxies used in the literature to measure the determinants of the cost of equity 
 
Company size is theoretically inversely related to the cost of equity and the cost of capital (Orens et 
al., 2010: 1070; Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Hail, 2002; Botosan & 
Plumlee, 2005). Empirical results are, however, mixed and do not report any consensus. Although 
Botosan (1997) and Fu et al. (2012) both found a significant negative association between size, as 
independent variable, and the cost of equity, Orens et al. (2010) found a similar association only 
when using northern American data. Similar to Froidevaux (2004), Hail (2002) and Liu and De Villiers 
(2011) who all found no significant association between size and the cost of equity, Orens et al. 
(2010) found no association using continental European data. 
As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, share price was used instead of market capitalisation or total 
assets to avoid potential multicollinearity. A further reason to use share price in this chapter was to 
facilitate the comparison of results to Chapters 6 and 7, where share price was used as independent 
variable to proxy for size. 
Financial theory dictates a positive correlation between risk and return. One or a combination of the 
following are often used as risk variable in cost of equity studies: beta, leverage, earnings per share 
variability and analyst forecast dispersion. This study has used leverage and earnings per share 
variability as risk variables.  
8.4.1 Share price (SP) (H2) 
The calculation of share price has already been discussed in Section 6.3.1 and 7.3.1, and is therefore 
only summarised here in Table 8.4 in Section 8.5. A negative association between share price and 
both the cost of equity and cost of capital was expected (H2). 
Variable Proxy used  
SIZE Logarithm of total assets: Orens et al. (2010) 
Market capitalisation: Froidevaux (2004); Fu et al. (2012); Hail (2002) 
LEVERAGE Debt/Assets: Orens et al. (2010); Fu et al. (2012) 
Debt/Equity: Hail (2002) 
PROFITABILITY Dummy variable indicating the value of one if the company reports negative 
earnings: Orens et al. (2010) 
EPS VARIABILITY Logarithm of the percentage change in earnings per share between two years: 
Orens et al. (2010) 
EQUITY GROWTH Logarithm of one plus the percentage change in the book value of equity: 
Francis et al. (2005b) and Fu et al. (2012) 
INDUSTRY Industry specific cost of equity: Orens et al. (2010) and Froidevaux (2004) 
DUAL LISTING Sum of the number of stock exchange listings (one and a half (1.5) assigned 
for each US or LSE listing and one for all other listings): Orens et al. (2010) 
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8.4.2 Leverage (LEV) (H3) 
This study used the debt to asset ratio as proxy for leverage. Leverage has already been discussed 
in Sections 5.3.2, 6.3.2 and 7.3.2 and the calculation thereof is therefore only summarised here in 
Table 8.4 in Section 8.5. Hail (2002), Liu and De Villiers (2011) and Fu et al. (2012) all found a 
significant positive association between leverage, as independent variable, and the cost of equity, 
as dependent variable. Orens et al. (2010), however, found a significant positive association only 
when using northern American data and failed to find a similar association using continental 
European data. 
As risk variable, a positive association between leverage and both the cost of equity and cost of 
capital was expected (H3). 
8.4.3 Earnings per share (EPS) variability (EPS VAR) (H4) 
Although Orens et al. (2010: 1070) argued that, given the increased risk in predicting the future 
earnings for companies with a high earnings variability, investors would require a larger risk premium 
and therefore cost of equity for such companies, they failed to find any significant association using 
both northern American and continental European data.  
EPS variability has already been discussed in Section 7.3.4 and the calculation thereof is therefore 
only summarised here in Table 8.4 in Section 8.5. As risk variable, a positive association between 
EPS variability and both the cost of equity and cost of capital was expected (H4). 
8.4.4 Market-to-book ratio (MTB) (H5) 
Market to book (MTB) is a financial ratio that compares the market’s valuation of a company to the 
book value of the company as reflected in its financial statements. The MTB ratio is said to reflect 
future growth opportunities and shares with a high MTB ratio, often labelled as growth shares, as 
opposed to shares with a low MTB ratio, categorised as value shares. Liu and De Villiers (2011) and 
Orens et al. (2010) found a significant negative association between the MTB ratio as independent 
variable and the cost of equity as dependent variable. 
The MTB ratio has already been discussed in Sections 5.3.5 and 7.3.3 and the calculation thereof is 
therefore only summarised here in Table 8.4 in Section 8.5. A negative association between the MTB 
ratio and both the cost of equity and cost of capital was expected (H5). 
8.4.5 Profitability (ROE) (H6) 
As discussed in Section 7.3.5, uncertainty regarding future profitability equates to higher risk and 
therefore higher expected returns by creditors and investors. This study has used the return on equity 
(ROE) ratio as profitability proxy. Profitability has already been discussed in Sections 5.3.4 and 7.3.5 
and the calculation thereof is therefore only summarised here in Table 8.4 in Section 8.5. 
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Orens et al. (2010) assigned a dummy variable of one for companies that realised a loss in their 
latest financial statements as inverse for profitability and found a significant positive association 
between the dummy variable, as independent variable, and the cost of equity. 
A negative association between ROE and both the cost of equity and cost of capital was expected 
(H6). 
8.4.6 Equity growth (EQUIT) (H7) 
Following Francis et al. (2005b: 307) and Fu et al. (2012), this study has calculated equity growth as 
the natural logarithm of one plus the percentage change in the book value of equity. Similar to 
profitability, higher equity growth means lower uncertainty and risk, and is therefore negatively 
related to the cost of equity. 
Both Fu et al. (2012: 14) and Francis et al. (2005b: 312) found a negative relationship between equity 
growth, as independent variable, and the earnings-to-price ratio, as dependent variable. To calculate 
equity growth, the book value of equity was captured from INET BFA. A negative association 
between equity growth and both the cost of equity and cost of capital was expected (H7). 
8.4.7 Industry membership (IND) (H8) 
Gebhardt et al. (2001) showed that the cost of equity is industry dependent. To control for industry, 
Orens et al. (2010: 1072) and Froidevaux (2004: 71) calculated the industry-specific cost of equity. 
This study used the industry beta as proxy for industry membership. A positive association between 
industry membership and both the cost of equity and cost of capital was expected (H8). 
8.4.8 Dual listing (LIST.D) (H9) 
Maphumulo (2012: 14-18) discussed potential advantages and disadvantages of dual listings. 
Perceived advantages of a dual listing include: increased liquidity, decreased cost of equity and 
increased visibility. Dual listings have already been discussed in Sections 5.3.9, 6.3.6 and 7.3.7 and 
the calculation thereof is therefore only summarised here in Table 8.4 in Section 8.5. A negative 
association between having a dual listing and the cost of equity was expected (H9). 
8.5 METHOD OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
As in Chapters 5 to 7, the stepwise regression method was used in this chapter to address the sixth 
and seventh research objectives, i.e. to respectively examine the relationship between IIR and the 
cost of equity and the cost of capital. This section first elaborated on the methodologies followed in 
the calculation of each of the dependent variables (cost of equity and cost of capital), before dealing 
with the independent variables that were used in the regressions. 
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8.5.1 Cost of equity 
As discussed in Section 8.2, this study used the CAPM and therefore the following formula to 
calculate the cost of equity: 
! = S5 + ß	(S − S5) (8.4) 
where:  
S5	 = the risk-free rate; 
ß    = the share beta; and 
S − S5	= the market risk premium. 
Formula 8.4 therefore requires three components for each company. To summarise what follows, 
the R186 was used as risk-free rate (8.05%), 6.1% as the market risk premium, and share betas, 
using the ALSI as market proxy. 
Although some academics promote the use of the market yield on short-term government securities 
such as Treasury Bills, in practice, users of the CAPM tend to use the long-term bond yield on 
government securities as proxy for the risk-free rate (Correia et al., 2013: 7-22). In South Africa, 
various government bonds are available (e.g. RSA R157, RSA R203 and RSA 186). In a recent PwC 
survey (PwC, 2015), the R186 was the most preferred government bond among survey participants 
in South Africa. This study used the R186 as proxy for the risk-free rate. The daily R186 closing rates 
were captured from INET BFA for all trading days from 1 December 2014 to 30 November 2015. 
The average, 8.05%, was calculated and used as the risk-free rate. 
Regarding the market risk premium, PwC survey participants were further asked to indicate the 
range of risk premiums they use when applying the CAPM. Market risk premiums among survey 
participants varied from 5.4% (low) to 6.8% (high). This study used the average of the low and the 
high, resulting in 6.1%. According to Correia et al. (2013: 7-23), analysts in South Africa have tended 
to use a risk premium between 5% and 7% in the past. 
Share betas were obtained from BNP Paribus Securities South Africa. BNP Paribus calculates share 
betas using monthly returns over a 60-month period. The All Share Index (ALSI) was chosen as 
market proxy. According to Bradfield (2003: 46), the ALSI is preferred as market proxy over 
secondary component indices such as the Financial and Industrial Index, Resource Index and the 
Top-40 index, based on the argument that an index that is as comprehensive as possible in covering 
the market should be used. 
Gopi (2016) is of the opinion that the share betas supplied by BNP Paribus are unique as a result of 
the implementation of two adjustments,  firstly a ‘Bayesian’ adjustment for regression bias and 
secondly an adjustment for thin-trading, known as the ‘trade-to-trade’ procedure.  
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Bradfield (2003: 50) describes the regression bias as follows: “An estimated beta coefficient which 
is far higher than the average beta is more likely to be an overestimate of the true beta than an 
underestimate. Similarly, a very low estimated beta is more likely to be an underestimate”. Gopi 
(2016) claims that this ‘Bayesian’ adjustment improves the predictability of betas by some 20%. 
As discussed in Section 4.2, the study sample was randomly selected from a population that did not 
exclude companies based on liquidity. The study sample therefore included less liquid, thinly traded 
shares. As discussed in Section 8.2, if a share is thinly traded it is likely that the month-end price 
may not result from a trade on that day, but is merely the price of the last trade in that month. The 
result is a mismatch between the market index and the share price, resulting in a downward bias in 
the estimate of the beta. The purpose of the ‘trade-to-trade’ procedure is to match the market returns 
to the same consecutive trade days as the share in order to rectify this mismatch.  
On the other hand, INET BFA does not make any adjustments. Their calculation is done purely using 
ordinary least square regression. In doing this calculation, five years of historical monthly data is 
used with the ALSI as the market proxy and the R186 as the risk free rate. 
BNP Paribus, however, does not report on beta for companies listed on the Venture Capital and the 
Development Capital Boards of the JSE. Two companies in the study sample, Ecsponent Ltd. (ECS) 
and Indequity Group Ltd. (IDQ), are listed on the Venture Capital and the Development Capital Board 
of the JSE, respectively. Share betas for these companies were captured from INET BFA. 
Notwithstanding the fact that BNP Paribus calculates share betas using the well-known ‘trade-to-
trade’ procedure, as discussed above, to adjust for thin trading, negative betas were found for 14 of 
the companies in the study sample. A negative beta means that the share is moving in the opposite 
direction to the ALSI. Although negative betas are theoretically possible, they are not intuitively 
expected for two reasons. Firstly, a negative beta implies a required return less than the risk-free 
rate and, secondly, markets tend to rise over the long term, which raises a question about the long-
term survival of companies with a negative beta. 
One may, however, argue that an investment portfolio may benefit from including companies with 
negative betas, given hedging advantages. Gold companies, for example, are sometimes associated 
with moving in the opposite direction and, as such, are considered as a safe investment in a bear 
market. One may therefore argue that investors will accept returns lower than the risk-free rate for 
such shares. 
The number of days on which no trading occurred can be used as an indication of the extent to which 
the share is thinly traded (Bradfield, 2003: 52). The number of trades per day was captured from 
INET BFA and, from this, the number of non-trading days per company was calculated for the 250 
trading days from 1 December 2014 to 30 November 2015. Table 8.2 shows that only 49 of the 85 
companies (57.65%) in the sample had traded every day, and that almost one quarter of the 
companies (21 companies or 24.71%) had 50 or more non-trading days.  
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On closer inspection of the 14 companies with negative betas in Table 8.2, the following was evident: 
i) All companies with negative betas had not traded for at least one day, except Torre Industries 
Limited. Torre was, however, only listed on the JSE on 26 November 2012 and the calculation 
of its beta was therefore only based on 37 monthly returns, as opposed to the required 60 
monthly returns. 
ii) The seven companies with negative betas and fewer non-trading days than 100 were all 
constituents of the JSE Fledging Index, except for one company that was part of the Small 
Caps Index and one that was listed on the Venture Capital Market. Only two of these 
companies were in the mining sector (but not gold mining). 
iii) The other six companies with negative betas and more non-trading days than 150 were all 
either constituents of the JSE Fledging Index or listed on the Development Capital Market or 
AltX. Only one company in this category was in the mining sector (but not gold mining). 
Table 8.2: Non-trading days, betas and market capitalisation  




Average beta Average market 
cap (millions) 
150–210 10 6 0.16 R193.11 
100–149 4 0 0.37 R745.75 
50–99 7 2 0.32 R1 807.58 
1–49 15 5 0.29 R1 687.70 
0 49 1 0.57 R84 834.62 
 
According to Bradfield (2003: 50), beta coefficients higher or lower than the average beta are, 
respectively, more likely to be an overestimate or underestimate of the true beta than an 
underestimate or overestimate. Table 8.2 shows an inverse relationship between non-trading days 
and the average beta. This inverse relationship with the average beta supports the notion of a 
downward bias for thinly traded shares (Bradfield, 2003: 50).  
As discussed in Section 8.4, theory predicts a negative association between size and the cost of 
equity. Share beta as risk measure is positively correlated with the cost of equity. The positive 
relationship between the average beta and the average market capitalisation, as shown in Table 8.2, 
therefore further raises a question about the reliability of these share betas. 
Two adjustments were therefore done in this study. Firstly, all negative betas were replaced with the 
industry beta as obtained from BNP Paribus Securities. Secondly, an adjustment was made to the 
cost of equity of smaller companies by adding a small share premium (SSP) to the cost of equity. 
The remainder of this dissertation will distinguish between the cost of equity (before SSP) and the 
cost of equity (after SSP). The cost of equity (before SSP) is the cost of equity calculated using the 
CAPM, after replacing the 14 negative betas with their industry betas, but before any SSP 
adjustment. Cost of equity (after SSP) is the cost of equity (before SSP) after the SSP adjustment. 
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The rationale of small share premiums (SSP) will now be discussed. In practice, small companies 
experience a higher rate of corporate failure (Correia et al., 2013) and are expected to have higher 
returns (Fama & French, 1992). Although one will therefore expect that smaller companies will have 
higher betas to reflect this additional risk, it is often argued that the higher betas do not fully explain 
the higher returns historically achieved by smaller companies (Correia et al., 2013; PwC, 2015). 
Besides low liquidity, one further possible reason for this may be that there are other risks besides 
systematic risk that are associated with smaller companies, but are left unexplained by the CAPM. 
According to PwC (2015), the majority of survey participants do adjust for small company risk (86% 
of survey participants), and more specifically the majority do the adjustment by adding a risk premium 
to the overall cost of equity (instead of adjusting the beta or using a multiplying factor). The average 
premiums added to the cost of equity, as based on market capitalisation, are depicted in Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3 further shows the number of companies in this study sample in each suggested adjustment 
category. The risk premiums in Table 8.3 are based on the results of the PwC 2015 survey (PwC, 
2015: 54). 
Table 8.3: Risk premiums added to the cost of equity to adjust for the small company effect, 





251- 500 501 – 1 000 1 001 – 1 500 1 501 – 2 000 2 000+ 
Risk premium 6.5% 5.2% 3.8% 2.3% 1.5% 0.7% 
Number companies 16 4 8 3 1 53 
 
To calculate the cost of equity (after SSP), the cost of equity (before SSP) of companies was 
therefore increased, as depicted in Table 8.3, except for the +0.7% category to avoid subjectivity in 
deciding which companies in this category necessitated such an adjustment. Also, as robustness 
test, the cost of equity (after SSP) was calculated by adding the 0.7% to all companies with a market 
capitalisation exceeding R2 000 million. As discussed in Section 8.6.3.2, the results remained 
unchanged. 
8.5.2 Cost of capital  
Cost of capital (WACC) is calculated according to Formula 8.3,219 as discussed above. Following the 
study of Omran and Pointon (2004: 254), this study used both book values and market values as 
weights. As discussed in Section 7.2, companies in South Africa rely mainly on financial institutions, 
such as banks, as source of external finance, as opposed to US companies, for example that rely 
more heavily on bonds.  
                                               
219
 WACC	 = S!	(I) +  S ∗ (1 −	 s) ∗ 	 (
/
) 
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Whereas the market value of bonds vary as interest rates change, resulting in a difference between 
book values and market values, interest-bearing debt as used by South African companies have a 
much smaller margin between their book values and market values. This study therefore used the 
short-term and long-term interest-bearing debt (which was also used to calculate the cost of debt in 
Chapter 7), as published in the Statement of Financial Position for both the market value and the 
book value of debt.  
The book value of equity is the total equity as captured from INET BFA. Preference shares contribute 
less than 1% of the total equity of the companies in the sample studied and were therefore removed 
from equity for the sake of consistency in the methodology applied. The market value of equity 
(market capitalisation) was also captured from INET BFA.  
As per Formula 8.3, the after-tax cost of debt is used to calculate the cost of capital. As discussed 
in Chapter 7, the after-tax cost of debt can be calculated by merely multiplying the before-tax cost of 
debt with 72%, or by multiplying with 72% only if the company has reported a profit in its latest 
financial statements. Based on the fact that assessed losses can be carried forward and the going 
concern principle,220 this study assumed that all companies would benefit from the tax advantage 
and therefore used the first approach by merely multiplying the before-cost of debt with 72% 
irrespective of whether the companies reported a profit or loss.  
For companies with no interest-bearing debt, the equity component in the cost of capital calculation 
was therefore 100%, resulting in their cost of capital being equal to the cost of equity. 
8.5.3 Independent variables and endogeneity 
Besides the IIR score, additional explanatory variables, as used in the literature to explain variations 
in the cost of equity, were discussed in Section 8.4. These were also the variables that were used in 
the stepwise regression model-building process. Table 8.4 summarises the calculation of these 
variables, as well as the expected association of each variable with the two dependent variables 
examined here, i.e. cost of equity and cost of capital. 
Similar to Chapters 6 and 7, the Wu-Hausman test was used to test for endogeneity. The results 
thereof are discussed in Section 8.6. 
                                               
220
 The going concern principle is a well-known accounting principle and is the assumption that an entity will remain in 
business for the foreseeable future. 
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Table 8.4: Independent variables used to explain variations in cost of equity and cost of 
capital: description and expected relationship 
Acronym Variable H Description Sign 
Independent continuous variables  
IIR  Internet 
investor 
relations 
1 Internet investor relations (IIR) score per company - 
SIZE Share price 2 Natural logarithm of the average daily (over 250 trading days) 
closing share price 
- 
LEV Leverage 3 Ratio between debt and assets  + 
EPS VAR Earnings per 
share 
variability 
4 Natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the last four 




5 Natural logarithm of the ratio between the share price (market 
value) and the book value of equity 
- 
ROE Return on 
equity 
6 Ratio between profit to ordinary shareholders interest - 
EQUIT Equity 
growth 
7 Natural logarithm of one plus the percentage change in the 
book value of equity 
- 
IND Industry 8 Industry beta + 
Independent categorical variables 
LIST.D Dual listing 9 Dummy variable representing one if the company is dually 
listed on the JSE and any other stock exchange. 
- 
 
8.5.4 Non-linear relationships 
Lam and Du (2004: 312) argued that increased disclosure in high information environments is less 
likely to have a negative association with information asymmetry, given the already rich disclosure 
environment. Hail (2002) reasoned that the lower overall disclosure level in Switzerland compared 
to the US may explain the stronger negative relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity 
they found using data from Switzerland as compared to studies using US data.  
Various proxies for the information environment of a company can be found in the literature, such 
as: analyst following (Botosan, 1997), the disclosure or investor relations score (Chang et al., 2008), 
company size (Froidevaux, 2004; Orens et al., 2010; Agarwal et al., 2016) and country-level factors 
(e.g. quality of mandatory reporting and investor protection) (Aerts et al., 2007). Within single country 
studies, high analyst following, high disclosure scores and large companies (as a result of the 
increased visibility) are associated with a high disclosure environment. 
Using analyst following as proxy for the information environment, Botosan (1997) found a negative 
association between disclosure and the cost of equity in a low information environment (low analyst 
following), but failed to find any association in a high information environment (high analyst 
following).  
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Chang et al. (2008) separately analysed high and low investor relations companies. Although these 
authors found a non-significant association between disclosure and information asymmetry for both 
samples, they did find a negative association for low investor relations companies (i.e. low 
information environment), as opposed to a positive association for high investor relations companies 
(i.e. high information environment) (both non-significant). 
Orens et al. (2010: 1085) reasoned that smaller companies with enhanced disclosure are more likely 
to incur a lower cost of equity than larger companies. Agarwal et al. (2016: 31) found that investor 
relations quality is positively associated with analyst following, liquidity and valuation multiples, but 
only for smaller companies. Froidevaux (2004), on the other hand, found a statistically significant 
negative relationship (10% level) between the cost of equity and disclosure for a large company sub-
sample and a negative, but statistically non-significant relationship for a small company sub-sample. 
To explore evidence of such a non-linear relationship and, given the small share premium (SSP) 
adjustments, as discussed above, this chapter separately examines the relationship between IIR 
and both the cost of equity and the cost of capital for a small and large company sub-sample. The 
median market capitalisation was used to divide the sample into these two sub-samples. 
8.6 RESULTS 
8.6.1 Selected descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics are set out in Table 8.5. As discussed in Section 8.4, the natural logarithm  
of some of the independent variables was used to reduce the skewness. For the convenience of the 
reader, the descriptive statistics for these variables (share price, earnings per share variability, 
market-to-book ratio and equity growth) are presented prior to their natural logarithmic 
transformations, where applicable. 
The results in Table 8.5 underline the significant variation between the companies included in the 
sample and support the objective of the sample selection criteria followed in Chapter 4, namely to 
select a sample that would ensure significant cross-sectional variation.  
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Table 8.5: Descriptive statistics: variables used to examine cost of equity and cost of capital 
variations 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
  Average Minimum Quartile Maximum Standard 
deviation 
   Q1 Q2 Q3   
Cost of equity (before 
SSP) 11.92% 8.41% 10.31% 11.76% 13.02% 19.03% 2.19% 
Cost of equity (after 
SSP) 13.68% 8.41% 10.74% 12.84% 15.79% 26.67% 3.92% 
Earnings-to-price ratio 
(N=71) 7.72% 0.30% 4.62% 6.68% 9.23% 24.24% 4.91% 
Realised returns (N=58) 19.56% 0.54% 8.56% 13.96% 28.46% 70.13% 14.83% 
WACC (book value) 
(before SSP) 10.56% 3.97% 8.86% 10.48% 12.44% 17.51% 2.82% 
WACC (market value) 
(before SSP) 10.69% 4.18% 8.99% 10.63% 12.44% 18.40% 2.58% 
WACC (book value) 
(after SSP) 12.00% 3.97% 8.97% 11.56% 14.52% 26.67% 4.29% 
WACC (market value) 
(after SSP) 12.06% 4.18% 9.29% 11.62% 14.66% 26.67% 3.99% 
Panel B: Continuous independent variables 
 Average Minimum Quartile Maximum Standard 
deviation 
   Q1 Q2 Q3   
Internet investor 
relations (IIR) 97.98 13.50 67.00 96.00 130.50 193.50 43.18 
Share price (SP) R65.22 R0.03 R4.11 R18.23 R111.09 R696.21 R101.93 
Leverage (LEV) 0.45 0 0.28 0.40 0.61 1.21 0.25 
EPS variability (EPS 
VAR) 160.10 2.13 16.27 38.79 120.38 3 207.27 392.52 
Market to book (MTB) 2.28 0.13 0.89 1.43 2.88 12.99 2.53 
Return on equity (ROE) 11.03 -40.09 2.78 12.77 20.62 84.02 21.14 
Equity growth (EQUIT) 1.32 0.00 1.03 1.13 1.28 8.87 1.01 
Panel C: Categorical independent variables 
 1 0 Total     
Dual listing (LIST.D) 25 60 85     
 
8.6.2 Correlation analysis 
In Tables 8.6 to 8.9, regression coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1% or better level 
are printed in green, those at the 5% or better level in blue, and those at the 10% or better level in 
red. Table 8.6 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the cost of equity (before SSP), 
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cost of equity (after SSP), the earnings-to-price ratio and realised returns, and the independent 
variables, as listed in Table 8.4. 
Table 8.6 shows the expected negative association between IIR and cost of equity (after SSP), but 
shows no significant association between IIR and the cost of equity (before SSP), the earnings-to-
price ratio or realised returns for the full sample. 
A valid measure of cost of equity will be positively correlated with risk measures and negatively 
correlated with market capitalisation, according to Hail (2002: 758), Froidevaux (2004: 62) and Orens 
et al. (2010: 1078). Only cost of equity (after SSP) and the earnings-to-price ratio are negative and 
statistically significantly related to share price.  
Leverage and earnings per share (EPS) variability are both risk measures. Cost of equity (after SSP) 
and the earnings-to-price ratio was both significantly and positively related to earnings per share 
(EPS) variability, as was expected. Only the earnings-to-price ratio was significantly related to 
leverage, but negative, and not positive, as was expected.  
Table 8.6: Correlation matrix: cost of equity, earnings-to-price ratio, realised returns and 
independent variables 
 
Cost of equity 
(before SSP) 






 N=85 N=85 N=71 N=58 
Independent variables     
Internet investor relations 
(IIR) 0.05 -0.34 -0.09 
-0.06 
Share price (SP) -0.17 -0.65 -0.37 0.22 
Leverage (LEV) 0.05 -0.03 -0.25 -0.02 
EPS variability (EPS 
VAR) 0.12 0.38 0.25 
-0.13 
Market-to-book ratio 
(MTB) -0.27 -0.46 -0.53 
0.32 
Return on equity (ROE) -0.31 -0.44 -0.09 0.13 
Equity growth (EQUIT) -0.14 -0.21 -0.19 0.17 
Industry (IND) 0.51 0.47 0.25 -0.15 
Dual listing (LIST.D) 0.24 0.14 -0.25 0.17 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level;  Blue = significant at the 5% level; Red = significant at the 10% level 
Table 8.6 further shows the expected negative associations between the market-to-book ratio, return 
on equity and equity growth and, respectively, the cost of equity (before SSP), the cost of equity 
(after SSP) and the earnings-to-price ratio. Dual listing, expected to be negatively related, was 
significantly and positively related to the cost of equity (before SSP) and negatively to the earnings-
to-price ratio.   
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As discussed in Chapter 2, information asymmetry was expected to be positively correlated with the 
cost of equity. Table 8.7 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the cost of equity 
(before SSP), cost of equity (after SSP), the earnings-to-price ratio and realised returns, and the 
information asymmetry proxies used in Chapter 6. 
Table 8.7: Correlation matrix: cost of equity, earnings-to-price ratio, realised returns and 
information asymmetry proxies 
 Dependent variables  
 
Cost of equity (before 
SSP) 






 N=84 N=84 N=71 N = 57 
Information 
asymmetry    
 
Bid-ask spread 0.21 0.72 0.39 -0.15 
Price impact 0.21 0.65 0.28 0.003 
Share price volatility 0.41 0.75 0.55 -0.07 
Share turnover 0.01 -0.32 -0.11 -0.09 
Analyst following 0.18 -0.20 -0.16 -0.09 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level;  Blue = significant at the 5% level; Red = significant at the 10% level 
As Table 8.6 shows, realised returns were positively related to share price and the market-to-book 
ratio. Realised returns were further negatively related to the industry beta, indicating that it might not 
be suitable as cost of equity proxy. Realised returns were also non-significantly related to all 
information asymmetry proxies that were used in this study (see Table 8.7).  
Cost of equity (before SSP), cost of equity (after SSP) and the earnings-to-price ratio were all 
statistically significant, and, as expected, positively correlated with the first three information 
asymmetry proxies (bid-ask spread, price impact and share price volatility) in Table 8.7. Share 
turnover and analyst following were inversely related to information asymmetry. The associations 
between share turnover and analyst following with both the cost of equity (after SSP) and the 
earnings-to-price ratio were therefore negative, as theoretically expected. 
If the results in Tables 8.6 and 8.7 were to be used to validate cost of equity proxies, these tables 
indicate that the cost of equity (after SSP) and the earnings-to-price ratio might be superior to 
realised returns and, to a lesser extent, to the cost of equity (before SSP). 
Table 8.8 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the cost of capital (before SSP) and 
the cost of capital (after SSP), and the independent variables as listed in Table 8.4. As discussed in 
Section 8.2, only the cost of equity (before SSP) and the cost of equity (after SSP) were used in cost 
of capital calculations, therefore the distinction made between the cost of capital (before SSP) and 
the cost of capital (after SSP). Further, as discussed in Section 8.3, cost of capital was calculated 
using both market values and book values as capital structure weightings. 
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Table 8.8: Correlation matrix: cost of capital and independent variables  
 Dependent variables 
 Cost of capital (before SSP) Cost of capital (after SSP) 
 Market value Book value Market value Book value 
 N=85 N=85 N=85 N=85 
Independent variables     
Internet investor relations (IIR) -0.33 -0.34 -0.52 -0.51 
Share price (SP) -0.33 -0.41 -0.63 -0.67 
Leverage (LEV) -0.20 -0.32 -0.20 -0.28 
EPS variability (EPS VAR) 0.22 0.25 0.37 0.40 
Market-to-book ratio (MTB) -0.07 -0.25 -0.23 -0.37 
Return on equity (ROE) -0.20 -0.29 -0.28 -0.36 
Equity growth (EQUIT) -0.35 -0.20 -0.28 -0.22 
Industry (IND) 0.37 0.38 0.33 0.35 
Dual listing (LIST.D) -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level;  Blue = significant at the 5% level; Red = significant at the 10% level 
All coefficients in Table 8.8 were significant, except for the MTB ratio (only cost of capital ((before 
SSP)) market value), equity growth (only cost of capital ((before SSP)) book value) and dual listing. 
Further, the directions of all coefficients, except leverage was as expected. This negative association 
may, however, have been the result of the reported negative association between IIR and the cost 
of debt (see Table 7.4). The negative association between IIR and the cost of debt was discussed 
in Section 7.5.2. Another possible reason for this negative association lies in the fact that the cost of 
debt is theoretically lower than the cost of equity (as also supported by the results of this study). As 
discussed in Section 8.1, the cost of capital would therefore decrease as the amount of debt in the 
capital structure increased, but only up to certain point, after which the cost of capital would increase 
as a result of the increased financial risk.  
Table 8.9 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients between the independent variables that were 
used in the stepwise regression model to explain variations in cost of equity and cost of capital levels. 
Although Table 8.9 shows no evidence of any potential multicollinearity, tolerance values in all 
regression models were closely monitored and reported, where necessary. 
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Table 8.9: Correlation matrix: independent variables used to examine variations in the cost 
of equity and cost of capital 
 IIR SP LEV EPS VAR MTB ROE EQUIT IND LIST.D 
IIR 1.00          
Share price (SP) 0.51 1.00        
Leverage (LEV) 0.37 0.29 1.00       
EPS variability (EPS VAR) -0.20 -0.49 -0.32 1.00      
Market-to-book ratio (MTB) 0.12 0.50 0.27 -0.56 1.00     
Return on equity (ROE) 0.10 0.53 0.06 -0.40 0.54 1.00    
Equity growth (EQUIT) 0.05 0.11 0.02 -0.33 0.10 0.24 1.00   
Industry (IND) 0.03 -0.23 -0.22 0.40 -0.29 -0.21 -0.26 1.00  
Dual listing (LIST.D) 0.26 0.04 -0.09 0.31 -0.13 -0.10 -0.20 0.33 1.00 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level;  Blue = significant at the 5% level; Red = significant at the 10% level 
8.6.3 Regression estimation results 
In Tables 8.10 to 8.18, all regression coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1% or better 
level are printed in green, those at the 5% or better level in blue, and those at the 10% or better 
level in red.   
As discussed in Section 8.5, the Wu-Hausman test was used in this chapter to test for a potential 
endogenous problem. As discussed in Chapter 2, an instrumental variable was needed to perform 
the Wu-Hausman test. For the purpose of this chapter, as well as Chapters 6 (information 
asymmetry) and 7 (cost of debt), being audited by a big four audit company was used as the 
instrumental variable.  
In all regression models reported in this chapter, the Wu-Hausman test confirmed the fit of the 
instrumental variable, as well as the absence of endogeneity. The Wu-Hausman test results are 
shown in Table 8.10. For each of the test results shown in Table 8.10, the Ho hypothesis that IIR is 
an exogenous variable was tested. As the P-values in Table 8.10 indicate, none of these hypotheses 
were rejected and all five Ho hypotheses were therefore accepted, thus showing IIR was not an 
endogenous independent variable. The OLS regression model was therefore used in all further 
analyses in this chapter.  
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Table 8.10: Wu-Hausman results: IIR as independent variable, and the cost of equity and 
cost of capital as dependent variables 
Dependent variable F P-value 
Cost of equity (after SSP) 0.100 0.75 
Cost of capital (market value) (before SSP) 0.087 0.77 
Cost of capital (book value) (before SSP) 0.573 0.45 
Cost of capital (market value) (after SSP) 0.567 0.45 
Cost of capital (book value) (after SSP) 0.930 0.34 
 
Tolerance values were assessed for all regression models reported in this section and the minimum 
tolerance value was 0.679 (i.e. a maximum variance inflation factor of 1.472), indicating the absence 
of multicollinearity. The results of the Durbin-Watson statistics were all between 1.746 and 2.120, 
confirming the absence of autocorrelation. 
Histograms of the raw residuals, as well as normality plots of residuals, were examined and, for all 
regression results reported here, results suggested that residuals were approximately normally 
distributed with no influential outliers. Residual plots of predicted versus residuals were examined, 
and no evidence of heteroscedasticity was found in any of the reported regression models.  
8.6.3.1 Cost of equity (before SSP) 
Table 8.11 depicts a non-significant association between IIR and all of the following: cost of equity 
(before SSP), earnings-to-price ratio and realised returns for the full sample. As discussed in Section 
8.5.4, evidence of a possible non-linear relationship between small and large companies was found 
in the literature. The sample of 85 companies was therefore further divided into two sub-samples, 
based on the median market capitalisation.   
For the larger company sub-sample (market cap>median), a positive and significant relationship 
between IIR and the cost of equity (before SSP) was found. Although contrary to theoretical 
expectation, positive associations between disclosure and the cost of equity were found also by 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Kothari et al. (2009), Botosan et al. (2004), Cormier et al. (2009), Liu 
and De Villiers (2011) and Dhaliwal et al. (2011), as discussed in Section 2.5.2. 
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Table 8.11: Correlation matrix: IIR, cost of equity, share price volatility, earnings-to-price 
ratio and realised returns  
Panel A Full sample Market cap>median Market cap<median 
 N = 85 N = 42 N = 43 
Cost of equity (before SSP) 0.05 0.32 -0.05 
Share price volatility -0.35 0.18 -0.19 
Panel B Full sample Market cap>median Market cap<median 
 N = 71 N = 40 N = 31 
Earnings-to-price ratio -0.09 0.10 0.05 
Panel C Full sample Market cap>median Market cap<median 
 N = 58 N = 35 N = 23 
Realised returns -0.06 -0.22 -0.04 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level;  Blue = significant at the 5% level; Red = significant at the 10% level 
This positive association provides some support for the argument raised by the Financial Executives 
Institute (Berton, 1994) that increased disclosure will increase share price volatility and therefore 
risk, resulting in an increased cost of equity. Share price volatility is a widely accepted measure of a 
share’s total risk. This total risk can further be split into two parts, market or systematic risk and 
unique or non-systematic risk (Gopi, 2016: 4). As discussed in Section 8.2, share beta is a measure 
of systematic risk and an important variable in the CAPM.   
Although Table 8.11 shows a negative association between IIR and share price volatility for the full 
sample, the positive (although not significant) association for the larger company sub-sample and 
the negative (although not significant) association for the smaller company sub-sample did provide 
some further support for the argument that disclosure would increase share price volatility, resulting 
in an increased cost of equity, although only for the larger company sub-sample. 
Besides an increased share price volatility, some studies have reasoned that a positive association 
between disclosure and the cost of equity may be caused by the specific disclosure content (e.g. 
good news or bad news) (Kothari et al., 2009), or by the perceived credibility of disclosure (Francis 
et al., 2005a), or as a result of the fact that the cost of disclosure exceeds the benefits thereof (Liu 
and De Villiers, 2011). More specifically to investor relations, Agarwal et al. (2016: 31) argued that 
simply ‘repackaging’ and communicating existing disclosures may have no incremental value and, if 
the cost thereof is significant, will adversely affect shareholders’ interest. 
All other correlation coefficients in Table 8.11 were not significant. Stepwise regressions were 
performed using the cost of equity (before SSP), the earnings-to-price ratio and realised returns, as 
dependent variables, and the independent variables as listed in Table 8.4. For all three of these 
dependent variables, three regressions were done: the full sample, the small company sub-sample 
and the large company sub-sample, therefore nine stepwise regressions in total.  
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Of these nine regressions, IIR remained as significant independent variable in only one stepwise 
regression model, namely the regression model where realised returns was the dependent variable 
and for the full sample (as discussed in Section 8.2 the sample of 85 was reduced to 58 for realised 
returns as a result of not using negative returns). The results are shown in Table 8.12. 
Table 8.12: Regression results: regression of realised returns on IIR and other significant 
independent variables 
 Realised 
returns (N = 58) 
q0 20.476 
Internet investor relations (IIR) -0.084 
Market-to-book ratio (MTB) 7.195 
Dual listing (LIST.D) 9.479 
Adjusted R² (%) 14.094% 
F-value 4.117 
Durbin-Watson 1.747 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level; Blue = significant at the 5% level; Red = significant at the 10% level 
Although the adjusted R² was only 14% and both the market-to-book ratio and dual listing coefficients 
positive, and not negative as expected for a cost of equity proxy, the statistically significant negative 
association (although only at 10%) did provide some evidence of a negative association between 
IIR and the cost of equity, notwithstanding the fact that realised returns were viewed as a noisy cost 
of equity proxy in the literature, as discussed in Section 8.2. This further raises a question about the 
reliability of the cost of equity (before SSP) based on the CAPM as valid cost of equity proxy. 
Table 8.2 shows 36 companies with one or more non-trading days. As discussed in Section 8.5.1, 
only one company in the zero non-trading days category had a negative beta. As robustness check, 
these 36 companies were removed. With the cost of equity (before SSP), the earnings-to-price ratio 
and realised returns, as dependent variables, and the independent variables as listed in Table 8.4, 
three further stepwise regressions were performed. For none of the three regressions did IIR remain 
a statistically significant independent variable.  
Finance textbooks distinguish between the levered and unlevered beta. The market betas are 
calculated using the underlying share returns, which are generated by the existing capital structure 
of the company (which may or may not include debt). The beta as captured from BNP Paribus is 
therefore the levered beta. Levered betas capture both financial and market risk (Botosan & Plumlee, 
2005: 34). The Hamada formula for unlevering betas is described in standard finance textbooks (e.g. 
Correia et al., 2013: 7-20).  
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Tax	rate  = corporate tax rate (28%); 
D/E  = Debt to equity ratio. 
Both cost of equity (before SSP) and cost of (equity after SSP) in this study were calculated using 
the levered beta. As robustness check, the cost of equity (before SSP) was re-calculated using the 
unlevered beta. Results remained unchanged. 
8.6.3.2 Cost of equity (after SSP) 
The rationale of a small share premium (SSP) adjustment was discussed in Section 8.5.1. Table 
8.13 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between IIR and the cost of equity (after SSP) for 
the full sample, the small company sub-sample and the large company sub-sample. 
Table 8.13: Correlation matrix: IIR and the cost of equity (after SSP)  
 Full sample Market cap>median Market cap<median 
 N = 85 N = 42 N = 43 
Cost of equity (after SSP) -0.34 0.32 -0.34 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level;  Blue = significant at the 5% level; Red = significant at the 10% level 
As the SSP adjustments had affected only companies in the small company sub-sample, the 
Pearson correlation coefficient between IIR and both the cost of equity (before SSP) and cost of 
equity (after SSP) remained unchanged from Table 8.11 to 8.13 for the larger company sub-sample. 
For the small company sub-sample, however, IIR was now significantly and negatively related to the 
cost of equity (after SSP) for both the full sample and the small company sub-sample. 
Table 8.14 presents the multivariate regression results of the stepwise regressions that were 
performed using the cost of equity (after SPP), as dependent variable, and the independent variables 
as listed in Table 8.4. For the larger company sub-sample, IIR was found to be non-significant. 
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Table 8.14: Regression results: regression of the cost of equity (after SSP) on IIR and other 
significant independent variables 
 Cost of equity (after 
SSP) 
Cost of equity (after SSP) 
 Full sample Market cap<median 
 N=85 N=43 
q0 0.1529 0.1948 
Internet investor relations (IIR) -0.0002 -0.0004 
Share price (SP) -0.0181 -0.0239 
Leverage (LEV) 0.0485 0.0536 
Market-to-book ratio (MTB) -0.0074 -0.0110 
Industry (IND) 0.0446 0.0338 
Adjusted R² (%) 59.05% 71.07% 
F-value 25.226 21.633 
Durbin-Watson 1.858 2.017 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level; Blue = significant at the 5% level 
As Table 8.14 shows, IIR was negative and statistically significantly related to the cost of equity (after 
SSP) for both the full sample and the small company sub-sample. As expected, it remained non-
significant for the larger company sub-sample as these companies were unaffected by the 
adjustments.  
The direction of all other coefficients in Table 8.14 was as theoretically expected in Table 8.4. It was 
noteworthy that leverage was highly significantly and positively related, as expected, as opposed to 
the negative Pearson correlation between leverage and both the cost of equity (after SSP) and the 
earnings-to-price ratio that were portrayed in Table 8.6.   
The magnitude of the reported adjusted R² of 59.05% and 71.07% compares favourably to studies 
such as Hail (2002) that reported an adjusted R² of 30.6%; Botosan (1997) that reported 13.5%; 
Froidevaux (2004) that reported 5.39%; Orens et al. (2010) that reported 41%; and Fu et al. (2012) 
that reported 14.93%. 
As robustness check, the cost of equity (after SSP) was further re-calculated by (1) including the 
0.7% risk premium adjustment for companies with a market capitalisation exceeding R2 000 million 
(see Table 8.3); (2) using the unlevered beta as discussed above (pages 250-251); and (3) applying 
only 50% of the SSP adjustments in Table 8.3. For all three scenarios, IIR remained a statistically 
significant and independent variable in all three stepwise regression models. 
These results raise questions about both the reliability of share betas for smaller and less liquid 
companies and the ability of the CAPM to capture the specific risks associated with smaller 
companies (e.g. bankruptcy, ability to obtain equity and debt financing, and competition from larger 
and more established companies). 
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8.6.3.3 Cost of capital (before SSP) 
Table 8.15 (Pearson correlation coefficients) shows a highly significant, and negative (as expected), 
association between both measures of the cost of capital (before SSP) (i.e. using both market values 
and book values) and IIR for the full sample. For the large and small company sub-samples the 
association was negative, but not statistically significant. These negative associations were mainly 
caused by the negative association between the cost of debt and IIR. 
Table 8.15: Correlation matrix: IIR and the cost of capital (before SSP), cost of equity (before 
SSP) and cost of debt  
Panel A Full sample Market cap>median Market cap<median 
 N = 85 N = 42 N = 43 
Cost of capital (market value) -0.33 -0.15 -0.18 
Cost of capital (book value) -0.34 -0.16 -0.14 
Cost of equity (before SSP) 0.05 0.32 -0.05 
Panel B Full sample Market cap>median Market cap<median 
 N = 68 N = 36 N = 32 
Cost of debt (after tax) -0.29 -0.20 -0.15 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level;  Blue = significant at the 5% level 
As discussed in Section 8.1, the cost of debt is theoretically lower than the cost of equity. More 
specifically, the average cost of debt and cost of equity used in calculating the cost of capital as 
depicted in Table 8.15 were respectively 8.11% and 11.92%. As further discussed in Section 8.1, 
cost of capital would therefore theoretically decrease as the proportion of interest-bearing debt in the 
capital structure increased, but only up to a point, after which the increased financial risk would result 
in an increased cost of debt and cost of equity.  
The McKenzie and Partington (2003) literature review showed that the relationship between the cost 
of equity and the cost of debt was unclear. This study, too, found no significant correlation between 
the cost of debt and the cost of equity (before SSP). However, the inability of the CAPM to correctly 
assess the risk of smaller companies may be a further reason for the absence of a significant 
association between the cost of equity (before SSP) and the cost of debt. 
Table 8.16 shows the stepwise regression results using the independent variables as listed in Table 
8.4. IIR was highly significantly, and negatively (as expected), related to both cost of capital 
measures. As discussed above, this negative association was mainly caused by the significant 
negative association between the cost of debt and IIR, as discussed above and in Chapter 7. 
The direction of all other coefficients was as theoretically expected in Table 8.4. The statistically 
significant negative coefficient of dual listing, although only at 10%, is noteworthy. This provides 
some support for the argument that one of the advantages of having a dual listing is a lower cost of 
capital. For both the large and the small company sub-samples, IIR did not remain in the stepwise 
regression model as a significant independent variable.  
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Table 8.16: Regression results: regression of the cost of capital (before SSP) on IIR and 
other significant independent variables 





q0 0.1008 0.0992 
Internet investor relations (IIR) -0.0002 -0.0002 
Equity growth (EQUIT) -0.0031  
Dual listing (LIST.D) -0.0099 -0.0107 
Industry (IND) 0.0275 0.0338 
Return on equity (ROE)  -0.0003 
Adjusted R² (%) 29.62% 29.06% 
F-value 9.837 9.604 
Durbin-Watson 1.746 2.035 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level; Blue = significant at the 5% level; Red = significant at the 10% level 
8.6.3.4 Cost of capital (after SSP) 
The cost of capital (after SSP) was calculated using the weighted average of the cost of debt and 
the cost of equity (after SSP), as discussed in Section 8.5.1. Table 8.17 shows the Pearson 
correlation coefficients between IIR and the cost of capital (after SSP) for the full sample, the small 
company sub-sample and the large company sub-sample.  
Table 8.17: Correlation matrix: IIR and the cost of capital (after SSP)  
 Full sample Market cap>median Market cap<median 
 N = 85 N = 42 N = 43 
Cost of capital (market value) -0.52 -0.15 -0.45 
Cost of capital (book value) -0.51 -0.16 -0.42 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level;  Blue = significant at the 5% level 
As expected (based on the regression results discussed in Sections 8.6.3.1 to 8.6.3.3), Table 8.17 
shows a highly significant negative association between IIR and the cost of capital for both the full 
sample and the small company sub-sample. The increased significance compared to Table 8.15 was 
mainly caused by the use of the cost of equity (after SSP) in Table 8.17. The correlation coefficients 
for the larger company sub-sample, however, remained unchanged as only companies included in 
the small company sub-sample were affected by the SSP adjustments. 
Table 8.18 presents the multivariate regression results of the stepwise regressions that were 
performed using the two measures of the cost of capital (after SPP) as dependent variables, and the 
independent variables as listed in Table 8.4. For the large company sub-sample, IIR did not remain 
in the stepwise regression model as significant independent variable. 
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For both the full sample and the small company sub-sample, IIR was highly significant, and 
negatively (as expected) related to both cost of capital measures. The direction of all other 
coefficients was as theoretically expected in Table 8.4. The statistically significant positive coefficient 
of leverage was noteworthy. 
Table 8.18: Regression results: regression of the cost of capital (after SSP) on IIR and other 
significant independent variables 
 Full sample N = 85 Market cap<median N=43 
 Market value Book value Market value Book value 
q0 0.1784 0.1824 0.2248 0.1710 
Internet investor relations (IIR) -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 
Share price (SP) -0.0165 -0.0205 -0.0214 -0.0192 
Equity growth (EQUIT) -0.0028  -0.0034  
Industry (IND) 0.0237 0.0324   
Leverage (LEV)    0.0465 
EPS variability (EPS VAR)    0.0081 
Adjusted R² (%) 50.00% 53.46% 46.57% 50.25% 
F-value 22.004 33.166 13.204 11.604 
Durbin-Watson 1.761 1.954 2.120 1.958 
Notes: Green = significant at the 1% level; Blue = significant at the 5% level 
Table 8.8 shows a negative Pearson correlation coefficient between the cost of capital and leverage, 
and it was reasoned (see Section 8.6.2) that this (unexpected) negative association may have been 
the result of the argument that the cost of debt is lower than the cost of equity. Although the 
dissertation asserted that the cost of capital would therefore decrease as leverage increased, it was 
further felt that this decrease would only hold up to a certain point. The positive coefficient of leverage 
in Table 8.18 therefore supported the related capital structure finance theories. 
8.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The cost of capital – also named the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) – is the weighted 
average cost of equity and cost of debt. It is therefore the average cost at which a company can 
raise the capital needed to maintain and grow its business operations. More specifically, a reduced 
cost of capital will, as hurdle rate for investment decisions, increase both the number of investments 
that will be assessed as profitable and the profitability of those projects for companies. Further, the 
cost of capital used in a discounted cash flow model can have a significant effect on the value of a 
company. Overall, a lower cost of capital is highly desirable for companies. 
In Chapter 7, a statistically significant negative association was found between IIR and the cost of 
debt. The association between disclosure and the cost of equity can be examined either through a 
direct examination of the effect of disclosure on the cost of equity or, alternatively, through an indirect 
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examination of the effect of disclosure on information asymmetry. In Chapter 6, the indirect route 
was examined and a statistically significant negative association was found between IIR and 
information asymmetry for four of the five information asymmetry proxies that were used. 
The purpose of this chapter, as discussed in Section 1.4.1, was to examine the relationship between 
IIR, and the cost of equity and the cost of capital, the sixth and seventh research objectives of this 
dissertation. This was done through a direct examination of the effect of IIR on each.  
Although the dissertation did consider ex ante cost of equity estimate methods, it was considered 
not achievable in this study, as discussed in Section 8.2. In this chapter, the CAPM was used as 
proxy to estimate the cost of equity as a subsequent component in the cost of capital calculation. 
The CAPM is also the preferred cost of equity proxy in practice in South Africa (PwC, 2015). 
Two alternative, but noisy, cost of equity proxies – the earnings-to-price ratio and realised returns – 
were also considered, but not used to calculate the cost of capital. 
As per Formula 8.1, share beta is an important variable in using the CAPM. Criticism against the use 
of the CAPM was discussed in Section 8.2. The reliability of the CAPM in estimating the cost of 
equity for smaller companies is specifically criticised for two reasons. Firstly, smaller companies are 
often thinly traded (e.g. Table 6.11 showed a highly significant positive correlation between share 
price and share turnover), resulting in a downward bias, that is a smaller beta and therefore a lower 
cost of equity. Secondly, as discussed in Section 8.2, the share beta only captures systematic risk. 
As mentioned in Section 8.5.1, there are other risks besides systematic risk that are associated with 
smaller companies, but are left unexplained by the CAPM.  Further, the Fama-French three-factor 
model, as discussed in Section 2.6.2.3, shows that smaller companies tend to outperform the market. 
In support of the premise that the CAPM will underestimate the cost of equity for smaller companies, 
the overwhelming majority of financial analysts and corporate financiers in South Africa adjust the 
cost of equity for smaller companies by adding a small share premium (SSP) (PwC, 2015). The 
regression analysis in this chapter started off with an examination of the cost of equity (before SSP) 
and no significant association between IIR and the cost of equity (before SSP) was found. Using 
stepwise regression model-building, a significant negative association was found between IIR, as 
independent variable, and the cost of equity (after SSP), after controlling for the share price, 
leverage, the market-to-book ratio and industry membership. The level of statistical significance of 
the IIR coefficient increased from 5% to 1% in a separate analysis of companies with a market 
capitalisation smaller than the median market capitalisation of the study sample.  
Although IIR did not remain as a statistically significant independent variable in a separate regression 
analysis for a larger company sub-sample (i.e. companies where the market capitalisation exceeded 
the median sample market capitalisation), a bivariate analysis showed, contrary to expectation, a 
significantly positive association between IIR and the cost of equity (after SSP) for the larger 
company sub-sample. For the reason that only the small company sub-sample was affected by the 
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SSP, Table 8.11 shows the same positive association between IIR and the cost of equity (before 
SSP). Although not as hypothesised, several studies have shown a similar positive association. 
Theoretical arguments for such a positive association were discussed in Section 8.6.3.1. 
The seventh, and final, research objective was to examine the association between IIR and the cost 
of capital. As discussed in Section 8.3, the cost of capital was calculated as the weighted average 
of the cost of equity and cost of debt. This study used both the market value and the book value of 
equity and debt. 
A significant negative association was found between IIR, as independent variable, and the cost of 
capital (before SSP) irrespective of the method used to assign weights (i.e. the book or market 
values). The dissertation has argued, given the non-significant association found between IIR and 
the cost of equity (before SSP), that this negative association is the result of the significant negative 
association between IIR and the cost of debt found in Chapter 7. Separate regression analyses of 
the small and large company sub-samples showed no similar association between IIR and the cost 
of capital (before SSP).  
Finally, cost of capital was calculated using the cost of equity (after SSP) instead of the cost of equity 
(before SSP) that was used to calculate the cost of capital (before SSP). Again, IIR was found highly 
statistically significant and negative, as expected, irrespective of the method used to assign weights. 
A similar negative association between IIR and the cost of capital (after SSP) was found for a smaller 
company sub-sample. 
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarised as follows. Firstly, the results suggests 
that the ability of the CAPM to reliably assess the cost of equity for smaller companies should be 
questioned. Secondly, results pointed toward the existence of a possible non-linear relationship 
between IIR and the cost of equity. Lastly, the results suggested that companies may benefit from 
both a reduced cost of equity and cost of capital through an enhanced policy of IIR in the context of 
a developing country. To the best knowledge of the dissertation, this is the first study in a South 
African context that has examined the association between the IIR and the cost of capital. 
One possible limitation of the analysis in this chapter is the use of only one ex post estimate (i.e. 
CAPM) of the cost of equity and the cost of capital. Although it was not considered  possible to make 
ex ante estimates in this chapter, Collins and Abrahamson (2006: 72) argued that the most sensible 
and robust approach to measuring the cost of equity in an emerging country (like South Africa) is to 
calculate the cost of equity as the average of a number of estimates derived from various estimate 
techniques.  Another possible shortcoming is the use of a local CAPM instead of a global CAPM, 
specifically for the dual-listed companies in the study sample. A global CAPM involves the use of an 
international risk-free rate and an international market risk premium, as well as the application of a 
global instead of a local market index to calculate the beta coefficients. 
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CHAPTER 9 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
9.1 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Accounting standards boards, professional auditing firms and investor relations professionals often 
claim decreased cost of capital as one of the benefits of a well-developed and well-implemented 
disclosure policy and investor relations strategy. Others, however, have argued that enhanced 
disclosure levels would increase share price volatility, resulting in an increased cost of equity. Some 
researchers further contend that investor relations as the mere repackaging and communication of 
existing information may have no incremental value in decreasing the cost of capital. 
The association between voluntary annual report disclosure and both information asymmetry and 
the cost of capital have been extensively researched globally. Owing to the laboriousness of the task 
of a manual content analysis, numerous studies have used an indirect disclosure proxy, for example 
analyst ratings.  
The vast majority of studies that have examined the corporate website as disclosure vehicle could 
be classified as either a descriptive or determinant study.  Few of these studies made any attempt 
to measure widely enough to embrace a measurement of investor relations, and specifically Internet 
investor relations (IIR). Investor relations is a much wider concept than mere financial statements. 
Marston (1996), for example, defined investor relations as the link between a company and the 
financial community in terms of which information is provided to the financial community for 
evaluating the company. 
Limited research has been conducted on IIR in South Africa. The purpose of this study was to 
investigate the quality of the corporate website for investor relations purposes in South Africa, to 
establish the determinants thereof, and to establish whether the use thereof has any effect on the 
level of information asymmetry and the cost of capital. 
Economic theory suggests two distinct routes in support of the hypothesis that IIR could decrease 
the cost of equity, the liquidity route and the estimation risk route. With the liquidity route, it is 
generally argued that an enhanced IIR policy will increase liquidity, which will result in a decrease in 
the cost of equity, either through reduced transaction costs or an increased demand. The estimation 
risk route is associated with the investors’ assessments of the parameters of the expected return. 
Both the reduced estimation risk route and the increased liquidity route are based on a reduction of 
information asymmetry.  
Information asymmetry was described in this dissertation as the situation where some investors have 
private information (i.e. informed traders), while others only have publicly available information (i.e. 
uninformed traders). The level of information asymmetry depends on the balance between the 
informed and the uninformed. Increased IIR can decrease information asymmetry, either by 
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discouraging private information search activities (and therefore private information) or by 
decreasing the relative amount of privately informed trading (i.e. relative to uninformed trading).  
One way to hypothetically decrease the relative amount of privately informed trading is to increase 
the level of uninformed trading. The investor recognition hypothesis is that uninformed investors are 
more likely to invest in companies with which they are familiar. Enhanced IIR can potentially improve 
the visibility of companies and attract more uninformed trading. An increased proportion of 
uninformed trading will decrease the probability of trading with a better informed investor and as a 
result, the need for investors to price protect themselves by adjusting their bid (buy) and ask (sell) 
prices away from the market. In theory, such price protection is said to widen the bid-ask spread, 
increase transaction cost, decrease liquidity, and ultimately increase the cost of capital.  
Although the majority of empirical studies showed a negative association between 
disclosure/investor relations and both information asymmetry and the cost of capital, the literature is 
far from reaching a consensus; and numerous studies have found no or even positive associations. 
The research problem of this study was: Will variations in IIR between companies have any effect, 
positive or negative, on the level of information asymmetry and cost of capital? The research problem 
was addressed by answering three research questions. The research problem and research 
questions were addressed via seven research objectives.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised into four distinct sections as follows. Firstly, Section 9.2 
discusses the seven research objectives that were set for this study. Next, recommendations are 
made on how companies can improve their IIR (Section 9.3), followed by a discussion on the 
contributions made by this study (Section 9.4). To conclude, the limitations of this study, with 
suggestions for future research are discussed in Section 9.5. 
9.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
9.2.1 First objective: the development of a measurement instrument to measure the extent 
of Internet investor relations 
Although no standards currently exist to regulate IIR, best practice corporate website guidelines to 
help companies communicate more effectively with investors and other stakeholders are published 
annually by the Investor Relations Society. Based on these guidelines, core attributes were identified 
to develop a measurement instrument to measure IIR. To ensure that this instrument measured as 
widely as possible (i.e. to mitigate the risk of important attributes being omitted), to improve 
comparability with the literature, and for guidance on how to measure specific attributes, these core 
attributes were further supplemented following an extensive literature review.  
Finally, a pilot study was done to evaluate the practicality of measuring the attributes as selected, to 
identify any omitted attributes that may be applicable only in the South African environment, and for 
further guidance on how to measure specific attributes. 
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The result was an extensive measurement instrument that consisted of 346 attributes, organised into 
11 categories (number of attributes are given in brackets): accessibility (13), navigation (14), 
timeliness (12), company information (36), financial information (65), relevant news (23), investment 
case (26), shareholder information (60), bondholder information (5), corporate governance (50) and 
corporate responsibility (42). The complete list of attributes that were measured are given in 
Annexure D.   
Although the reliability and validity of the measurement instrument were finally assessed only after 
all measurements were completed (i.e. after research objective two, as discussed below), the 
assessment thereof is discussed here for practical reasons. Reliability (i.e. internal consistency) was 
assessed using Cronbach’s alpha and by examining the relationships (i.e. correlation coefficients) 
between the total IIR score per company and the measurement instrument categories (e.g. financial 
information and corporate governance). Overall, these tests confirmed the reliability of the 
measurement instrument. Construct validity was used to validate the use of the measurement 
instrument. The statistically significant correlations, all directions being as theoretically expected, 
between IIR and size, leverage, listing status, financing activities and ownership structure confirmed 
the validity of the measurement instrument. Reliability and validity were discussed in Sections 3.2.8, 
3.3.6 and 4.5. 
9.2.2 Second objective: to measure the extent of Internet investor relations scores 
Stratified random sampling with proportional allocation (using JSE industry membership) was used 
to select a sample of 85 companies from a population of 315 companies. The population was defined 
as all companies currently listed on the JSE that had not been suspended, had traded since inception 
date, had published 2013 annual reports, and had a dedicated, working website. The 85 corporate 
websites were assessed from March to September 2015 using the measurement instrument in 
Annexure D.  
For each company, an IIR score was calculated by adding the scores of the 346 attributes together. 
Although the majority of attributes were measured as either available (1) or absent (0), 50 attributes 
were measured as partially available (0.5), based on the breadth and depth of content available. 
Non-functional and unuseful links were assessed as absent (0). Outdated information was assessed 
as either partially available (0.5) or absent (0). Where information was available, but as a result of 
factors such as poor layout, inconsistencies and incompleteness was not fully useful, the attributes 
were assessed as partially available (0.5). Measurement conventions followed are specifically 
discussed in Annexure C and Chapter 4. As discussed in Section 1.3.2, for the purpose of this study, 
IIR is defined as to refer to the quality of IIR. 
The results of the measurement process were discussed by means of both a vertical and horizontal 
analysis. The vertical analysis entailed the calculation of an average availability per attribute 
measured and the horizontal analysis the calculation of an IIR score per company. Overall, the 
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majority of companies did not use corporate websites optimally to communicate with investors. In 
Section 4.6.1, possible reasons for low IIR scores were discussed and, in Section 9.3, suggestions 
are made on how companies can improve their IIR. 
9.2.3 Third objective: to establish the determinants of Internet investor relations 
In Chapter 2, theories that were used in the literature to explain the disclosure policies followed by 
companies were discussed, namely the agency problem, information problem, signalling theory, 
investor recognition hypothesis, follower’s effect, and cost–benefit analysis. Based on these 
theories, various company-specific characteristics were developed and tested in the literature to 
explain disclosure levels. 
From the literature, this study identified the following company characteristics that could explain 
variations in IIR levels: company size, leverage, the current ratio, financial performance (return on 
equity), market-to-book value, number of years listed, directors’ shareholding percentage, free float 
percentage, financing activities (i.e. issue or buy back of shares), auditors, industry membership, 
dual listing status, primary listing and the existence of block ownership. 
Stepwise regression was applied to establish the determinants of IIR by means of a regression model 
linking the IIR score per company to selected explanatory variables (i.e. company characteristics 
listed in the paragraph above). The following were found to be significant independent variables as 
determinants of IIR: company size, leverage, being audited by a big four audit company, JSE industry 
membership, free float percentage and dual listing status. 
More specifically, larger companies, companies with more debt, companies that are audited by a big 
four audit company, companies with a higher free-float percentage (i.e. fewer restricted shares) and, 
lastly, companies that were dual-listed had higher IIR scores. Companies that were members of one 
of the following four JSE industries, namely consumer services, consumer goods, financials, and 
technology, each had a lower IIR score compared to companies listed in one of the other nine 
industries. Signalling theory (Aly et al., 2010) and the ‘follower’s effect’ (Lybaert, 2002) have been 
used in the literature to explain an association between industry type and disclosure. 
9.2.4 Fourth objective: to examine the relationship between Internet investor relations and 
information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is said not only to increase transaction costs and decrease liquidity, but also 
to diminish the quality of the investment decisions taken by investors, thus weakening the overall 
functioning of markets. As information asymmetry is not directly observable, five proxies were used 
in this study. As discussed in Chapters 2, 6 and summarised above in Section 9.1, increased 
disclosure levels should theoretically decrease information asymmetry levels. Besides the IIR score, 
as measured in this study, additional variables used in the literature to explain variations in 
information asymmetry levels were identified. 
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Stepwise regression was applied and a statistically significant negative association was found 
between IIR and information asymmetry for four of the five information asymmetry proxies that were 
used: bid-ask spread, price impact, share turnover, and analyst following. The first two proxies were 
positively related to information asymmetry and the last two were negatively related. More 
specifically, increased levels of IIR were found to decrease the bid-ask spread and price impact, and 
increase share turnover and analyst following. IIR was, however, not found to be a statistically 
significant independent variable in explaining variations in share price volatility. 
Overall, the results suggested that companies may potentially benefit from a well-developed IIR 
strategy through decreased information asymmetry. Regression models explained 51%, 54%, 90% 
and 91% of the variations in the share turnover, analyst following, price impact and bid-ask spread, 
respectively. The Wu-Hausman test statistic confirmed the absence of endogeneity in all four 
regression models. 
9.2.5 Fifth objective: to examine the relationship between Internet investor relations and 
the cost of debt 
The cost of debt is the cost at which a company can borrow money from creditors. Hypothetically, 
the cost of debt is equal to the risk-free rate plus a risk premium to compensate creditors for default 
risk. Default risk, as assessed by creditors, is, among others, a function of the probability that the 
company is withholding unfavourable information. A well-developed IIR programme can therefore 
theoretically decrease the cost of debt if it could decrease this assessed probability. 
For the purpose of this study, the cost of debt was measured as the interest expense for the year, 
scaled by the average interest-bearing liabilities. Besides the IIR score, additional variables used in 
the literature to explain variations in the cost of debt were identified.  
Stepwise regression was applied and a statistically significant negative association was found 
between IIR, as independent variable, and the cost of debt, as dependent variable. Although the 
explanatory power of the regression model was very low (adjusted R² of 14%), the adjusted R² 
compared favourably with previous disclosure–cost of debt studies. The Wu-Hausman test statistic 
confirmed the absence of endogeneity. 
9.2.6 Sixth objective: to examine the relationship between Internet investor relations and 
the cost of equity 
The cost of equity is the rate of return required by shareholders before they invest in a company. 
Companies will primarily benefit from a decreased cost of equity through a decreased financing cost. 
As with information asymmetry, the cost of equity is not directly observable and the credibility of any 
research that is based upon the cost of equity will therefore depend on the reliability of the cost of 
equity proxy that was used. Owing to data limitations, this study has primarily used the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) to estimate the cost of equity.  
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The CAPM is often criticised for the assumptions on which it is based. These criticisms, as discussed 
in Sections 8.2 and 8.5.1, are summarised in Section 9.5.3. Notwithstanding all disapprovals, the 
CAPM is still by far the most popular cost of equity estimate used in South Africa by financial analysts 
and corporate financiers (PwC, 2015). Based on a PwC valuation report (PwC, 2015), the cost of 
equity of companies with a market capitalisation less than R2 000 million was adjusted by adding a 
small share premium (SSP). 
Besides the IIR score, additional variables used in the literature to explain variations in the cost of 
equity were identified. Stepwise regression was applied and a significant (at the 5% level) negative 
association between IIR, as independent variable, and the cost of equity (after SSP) was found. IIR, 
together with share price, leverage, the market-to-book ratio and industry membership, explained 
59% (i.e. adjusted R²) of the variation in the cost of equity (after SSP). The adjusted R² compared 
favourably with previous disclosure–cost of equity studies. The Wu-Hausman test statistic confirmed 
the absence of endogeneity. 
A separate analysis of two sub-samples, namely a large company sub-sample comprising 42 
companies and a smaller company sub-sample comprising 43 companies, was done. The median 
market capitalisation of the sample of 85 companies was used to create the two sub-samples. For 
the large company sub-sample, IIR was found non-significant, but for the small company sub-
sample, the IIR coefficient was negative and highly significant at the 1% level. This non-significant 
association for the large company sub-sample opposed to the significant association for the small 
company sub-sample, suggests the existence of non-linear relationships as discussed in Section 
8.5.4.  
The small company sub-sample regression model (also including IIR, share price, leverage, the 
market-to-book ratio and industry membership, as independent variables) explained 71% (i.e. 
adjusted R²) of the variation in the cost of equity (after SSP).  
Excluding the small share premium (SSP), IIR was found to be non-significant in all multiple 
regression models (i.e. for the full sample and the two sub-samples). A bivariate analysis, on the 
other hand, found a positive and significant (at the 5% level) correlation coefficient for the large 
company sub-sample and a negative, but non-significant, correlation coefficient for the small 
company sub-sample. These results provide some support for the notion of a non-linear relationship 
between IIR and the cost of equity, as discussed in Section 8.5.4. Although the positive correlation 
coefficient is contrary to what was expected, it confirmed previous studies that found a similar 
positive association. Possible reasons for this were discussed in Section 8.6.3.1. 
9.2.7 Seventh objective: to examine the relationship between Internet investor relations 
and the cost of capital 
Cost of capital – also named the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) – is the weighted average 
cost of equity and cost of debt. This study used both the market value and the book value of equity 
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and debt to assign weights, as well as the cost of equity (before SSP) and the cost of equity (after 
SSP), resulting in four cost of capital measures: cost of capital (book value) (before SSP), cost of 
capital (market value) (before SSP), cost of capital (book value) (after SSP), and cost of capital 
(market value) (after SSP). To test for indications of a non-linear relationship, regression tests were 
further performed for the full sample, a small company sub-sample and a larger company sub-
sample, and discussed in Section 9.2.6. 
A highly significant (at the 1% level) negative association between IIR, as independent variable, and 
the cost of capital (after SSP) was found for the sample of 85 companies, irrespective of how weights 
were assigned (i.e. using market value or book value). A similar negative association was found for 
the small company sub-sample, but not for the large company sub-sample. 
Excluding the SSP adjustment to the cost of equity, an examination of the association between IIR 
and the cost of capital (before SSP) showed a similar highly significant negative association (at the 
1% level) between IIR, as independent variable, and the cost of capital (before SSP), also 
irrespective of how weights were assigned. The dissertation has, however, argued that this negative 
association is the result of the negative association between IIR and the cost of debt, given the 
results in Chapter 8 that found no significant negative association between IIR and the cost of equity 
(before SSP) in any multiple regression model. Further, for both the large and small company sub-
samples, IIR was found non-significant in explaining variations in the cost of capital (before SSP), 
using stepwise regression. 
The explanatory power of the regression models were significantly lower in explaining variations in 
the cost of capital (before SSP) (30% and 29% for market value- and book value-based calculations, 
respectively) compared to the cost of capital (after SSP) (50% and 53% for market value- and book 
value-based calculations, respectively). Again, this was expected given the results found in Chapter 
8, namely the non-significant association between IIR and the cost of equity (before SSP).  
9.3 RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW COMPANIES CAN IMPROVE INTERNET INVESTOR 
RELATIONS (IIR) 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the majority of companies examined did not use their corporate websites 
optimally to communicate with investors. While the results of the measurement process and possible 
reasons for the somewhat lower than expected average IIR scores  were discussed in Sections 4.3 
and 4.6.1 respectively, the purpose of this section is to make suggestions on how companies can 
improve their IIR. 
Some corporate websites were, however, clearly neglected, as evidenced by the amount of outdated 
information and the number of non-functional links.  As a minimum, companies must ensure that: 1) 
all information subject to regular change (e.g. market capitalisation, history, financial calendar, 
shareholder analysis, principal shareholders and the list of directors) is continuously updated; 2) only 
the latest documents (e.g. BBBEE certificates and King III compliance schedules) are published or 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
265 
clearly labelled as archived if not the latest; 3) links to the “latest” information are in fact the latest 
(e.g. links to annual reports for information must be updated if more recent annual reports are already 
available and published on the website); and 4) all links are functional and that non-functional links 
are removed (e.g. non-functional links to third party websites for further information). 
To improve the usability of information, all documents must be dated, with the ‘date last updated’ 
provided throughout the corporate website. The use of presentation technologies, such as an e-mail 
alert service, RSS content feed, the option to sync calendars and dedicated links/sections to the 
‘latest information’, will ensure that users are always aware of the latest available information. 
Website traffic can potentially be improved by 1) using a unique URL and/or optimising the website 
search engine ranking; 2) ensuring that both .co and .com extensions are functional (where feasible); 
3) using social media channels such as Twitter with links to the corporate website for further 
information; 4) promoting the corporate website as information source in the integrated annual report; 
and 5) improving the accessibility the corporate website for users with specific impairments (e.g. 
deafness) or preferences (e.g. some investors prefer HTML and others PDF, as discussed in Section 
3.2.3.4). Some basic steps that companies could follow to improve accessibility to these users are 
to refrain from the excessive use of graphics without a text-only option; to make use of alternative 
forms (e.g. transcripts and podcasts); to optimise content for screen readers (e.g. short and 
descriptive headings); and to provide an option to adjust font size. 
Throughout this dissertation it was argued that, although many of the attributes measured were also 
available from other sources or even elsewhere on the corporate website, but locked away 
somewhere (e.g. inside a PDF document), it is often inconvenient, costly or time-consuming for 
investors to access information. The majority of companies can significantly improve the accessibility 
of information which is either locked away in reports or somewhere on the website, or readily 
available on a third party website by 1) duplicating the information in HTML, or offering dedicated 
and descriptive downloadable documents, or providing dedicated and descriptive links; 2) providing 
a search function or sitemap; 3) providing a search or filter option for news items and annual report 
content; 4) providing options to customise information (e.g. customised annual report, share price 
history and financial ratios); and 5) using internal hyperlinks effectively (e.g. drill down links and 
linking HTML financial statements to notes). 
Further, to avoid users getting lost on websites (i.e. becoming disoriented), users should be given 
an easy way to know where they are on the website (e.g. through the use of a breadcrumb trail or 
navigation panel) and a ‘back to the homepage’ link should be clearly visible on all pages.  
Although the cost of providing attributes will differ from attribute to attribute and from company to 
company, examples of attributes that companies can upload with little additional cost or effort include 
attributes such as: PDF slides of annual and interim results presentations; financial calendars of 
upcoming events; and dividend and company history. 
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Alternative formats to PDF financial statements (e.g. dedicated online mini results sites where annual 
results are provided in HTML format) will involve some costs and time to develop. As a minimum, 
companies could provide internal hyperlinks to relevant sections inside PDF annual reports to 
promote access to attributes that are usually available inside integrated reports (e.g. financial ratios, 
highlights, shareholder information, names of board of directors, names of board committees, 
environmental reports, employee information, and critical success factors). 
Management access and company visibility are key drivers of the success of an investor relations 
programme (Bushee & Miller, 2007). Overall, companies can make it easier for investors to contact 
or request information by: 1) providing a dedicated investor relations contact e-mail address and, 
where possible, the name of the person that can be contacted and his or her job title; 2) providing a 
manual (with a descriptive title) to facilitate access to information (e.g. in terms of the PAIA Act); and 
3) providing a shareholder communication or stakeholder relationship policy. 
9.4 CONTRIBUTIONS OF STUDY 
The measurement instrument that was used in this study is primarily based on best practice 
guidelines as issued by the Investor Relations Society, but was further improved for the purposes of 
this study through an extensive literature review and pilot study. Reliability and validity tests were 
performed using the measurement results of 85 JSE-listed companies. Measurement conventions 
followed in measuring companies are described in Annexure C. Given the methodology that was 
followed in the development of the measurement instrument, the instrument itself may serve as a 
useful contributor to investor relations literature. 
The results of the study moreover contribute to investor relations literature, specifically in providing 
further support for the investor recognition hypothesis. The results of this study suggest that a well-
developed IIR programme may increase the visibility of a company, resulting in an increased share 
turnover and analyst following and a decreased bid-ask spread and price impact, all pointing towards 
improved liquidity. 
According to Allen and Morris (2001: 17), finance can be broadly divided into two fields: asset pricing, 
which is concerned with the decisions of investors, and corporate finance, which is concerned with 
the decisions made by companies. Information asymmetry, cost of debt and the cost of equity are 
all concerned with investor decisions. As discussed in Section 8.1 companies use the cost of capital 
for a variety of reasons. 
This study therefore contributes to international finance and economics literature by providing further 
evidence in support of economic theory that depicts a relationship between disclosure, and 
information asymmetry, cost of debt and cost of equity, using developing country data and through 
the examination of corporate websites as communication medium. 
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Some researchers found that annual report disclosure levels are positively correlated with the 
disclosure levels provided through corporate investor relations and other publications (Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993). As discussed, IIR is unregulated and primarily voluntary in nature. This study 
contributes to international accounting literature by providing further support for the advantages of 
voluntary disclosure in an accounting context. An understanding of IIR is also important for standard 
setters, for example professional accountancy bodies such as the IASB and the FASB. 
Given the advantages of a reduced level of information asymmetry and cost of capital for companies, 
knowledge about the circumstances under which and how these may be achieved would enable 
companies to optimise their IIR strategies. Following the results of the measurement process, as 
discussed in Section 4.3, recommendations were made in Section 9.3 on how companies can 
improve their IIR. This study therefore also contribute to practice (i.e. listed companies, website 
developers and regulators). 
9.5 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
9.5.1 Alternative information sources and communication channels 
Besides using the company as information source, investors can also obtain information through a 
variety of information intermediaries. Chapter 1 argued that the proliferation of information sources 
have driven users closer to the company as information source. In addition to corporate websites, a 
wide variety of communication channels is available to companies, such as the integrated annual 
report, investor presentations, and social media channels (e.g. Twitter, Facebook and YouTube). 
This study has investigated the association between IIR and both information asymmetry and the 
cost of capital, based on the underlying assumption that, given the advantages of corporate websites 
as communication medium (as discussed in Chapter 1), corporate websites will be the preferred 
investor relations communication channel and information source for companies and investors, 
respectively. All other communication channels used by companies, as well as information provided 
by information intermediaries, have therefore been excluded.  
Users of company information and corporate websites vary from the naïve decision maker, to the 
institutional investor and analyst, to creditors – each with unique information needs. This study made 
no attempt to distinguish between the information needs of the various users of information. Further 
research is needed to ascertain to what extent the information available on corporate websites fulfils 
the information needs of specific investors and creditors. Turel (2010) used Turkish data to examine 
whether an expectation gap exists between the information perceived to be important by investors 
and the information that companies disclosure on their corporate websites. Turel (2010) did a survey 
in which financial analysts were asked to choose the most important 15 items from a list of 51 items 
to ascertain the perceived importance of information to investors. Allam (2005) used web server logs 
to study how online reports were accessed by users. Requests that are made by users for information 
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on corporate websites (e.g. by clicking on a link to view specific information) are stored by servers 
in log files, known as web server logs (Allam, 2005: 5). 
Given the recent growth in social media channels such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, further 
research is needed on how companies use social media to communicate with investors, and to 
examine the effect thereof on information asymmetry and the cost of capital. Blankespoor, Miller and 
White (2014), for example, found that the communication of company-initiated news via Twitter is 
associated with lower bid-ask spreads and higher liquidity. 
9.5.2 The measurement instrument and the measurement process 
Disclosure has both a ‘news’ and information asymmetry effect (Leuz & Verrechia, 2000: 99). The 
news effect, for example, refers to whether favourable or unfavourable information is disclosed. 
Although this study made no attempt to distinguish between favourable or unfavourable information, 
such a distinction may be important, given the results found by, for example,  Kothari et al. (2009). 
These authors found a positive association between unfavourable disclosure and each of the 
following: cost of capital, share price volatility, and earnings forecast dispersion.  On the other, the 
same authors found a negative association between favourable disclosure and each of the following: 
cost of capital, share price volatility, and earnings forecast dispersion. 
Given the laborious nature of the manual content analysis as was applied in this study, future 
research should consider following an automated approach using software packages (Hassan & 
Marston, 2010). 
Further, as this study is not an investigation into the contents of annual reports and presentations of 
companies, the contents were not examined for the availability of attributes, unless dedicated and 
descriptive hyperlinks were provided to specific information within annual reports and presentations. 
Results reported in this study were therefore probably an underestimation of the actual content 
available to investors. 
Some attributes measured by the instrument used in this study, for example information on debt-
listed instruments, analyst reports, the carbon report and a discussion of work-related accidents, 
may not be applicable to all companies. No attempt was made by this study to distinguish between 
companies with respect to the relevancy or not of such attributes. Future studies should consider the 
calculation of a unique score per company by removing attributes which are not applicable for some 
companies, and then calculate their IIR using the lower score. For practicality, an alternative 
approach here would be to include only one or very similar industries in the sample. 
This study did not separately analyse the association between the components of the measurement 
instrument (e.g. corporate governance) and both information asymmetry and the cost of capital. 
Future research may focus on specific areas, for example: the association between having a more 
timely, updated corporate website and information asymmetry, or the association between 
shareholder services (e.g. financial calendar and share charts) and liquidity. 
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9.5.3 Sample selection, and information asymmetry and cost of equity proxies 
This study has specifically included all industries without excluding or stratifying for size, as well as 
dual-listed companies and companies with a primary listing other than the JSE, for a number of 
reasons as discussed in Section 4.2.1. The inclusion of dual-listed companies with a primary listing 
other than the JSE has to a certain extent impacted on the credibility of the ownership variable 
(20%.SH) that was calculated in Section 5.3.10. As these companies are governed by jurisdictions 
other than those governing only JSE-listed companies, information on main shareholders is not as 
readily available as for JSE-listed companies, as was thoroughly discussed in Section 5.3.10.   
Moreover the inclusion of smaller companies that are less liquid and therefore associated with a 
downward (and sometimes negative) bias in share betas amplified the difficulty of using the CAPM 
as cost of equity estimate in this study. Analyst forecasts are also less easily available for smaller 
companies, contributing to a certain extent to the fact that it was not possible to use analyst forecast 
dispersion as information asymmetry proxy and ex ante estimate methods for the cost of equity. To 
overcome these limitations, future research can examine the association between IIR and these 
proxies by including only companies for which analyst forecast information is available in the study 
sample. On the downside, such studies will be biased for including only larger companies. 
The statistically significant negative associations found between the dual-listed variable and both the 
bid-ask spread (Table 6.14) and the cost of capital (Table 8.16) are noteworthy. Future research 
including only dual-listed companies can provide further evidence for the notion that having a dual-
listing will decrease the cost of capital. 
9.5.4 Intraday-based information asymmetry proxies 
Although the bid-ask spread is by far the most widely accepted information asymmetry proxy used 
in the literature, the specific version of the bid-ask spread that was used as proxy in this study is not 
without criticism and more refined versions based on intraday data are often used in the literature. 
The use of intraday data-based information asymmetry proxies (such as the time-weighted, effective 
and depth-adjusted effective spread) and spread decomposition models (such as the probability of 
informed trading) warrant future research on the association between IIR and information 
asymmetry. 
9.5.5 Longitudinal studies and the use of lagged data 
This study relied on only one IIR measurement per company and examined the association between 
IIR and both information and the cost of capital using only historical share data information. 
Considering that building an investor relations reputation and visibility take time, future research 
should include both longitudinal studies and the use of lagged data (e.g. the association between 
IIR in 2015 and information asymmetry in 2016). 
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9.5.6 The existence of non-linear relationships 
The positive and significant correlation coefficient between the cost of equity (before SSP) and IIR 
for a large company sub-sample found in Chapter 8, as opposed to the negative, but non-significant, 
correlation coefficient for the small company sub-sample, provides some evidence for the existence 
of a non-linear relationship between the IIR and the cost of equity. Theories used in the literature to 
explain the existence of such a non-linear relationship were discussed in Section 8.5.4. Future 
research, using South African data, is needed to examine the existence of such a relationship. 
9.5.7 Regulation of Internet investor relations 
As discussed in Section 1.2.2, the decision to use the corporate website as investor relations 
communication channel is voluntary in the South African context. A consequence of this voluntary 
aspect is the significant cross-sectional variation in the use of corporate websites by companies as 
investor relations communication channel, as was found in Chapter 4.  
Such cross-sectional variation may result in an overall decrease in the use of corporate websites as 
information source by investors. Investors may be discouraged to use corporate websites if all 
websites differ in respect of the type of information that is available and the way in which the 
information is presented. Another consequence of the voluntary nature of the use of websites is the 
negative impact it may have on the credibility of the information voluntarily disclosed thereon, given 
the conflicting incentives that companies will have (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Hedlin (1999) stated that 
“corporate reporting over the Internet becomes a problematic issue the day that it contains more 
information than traditional sources or when the time lag between Internet reporting and traditional 
means is reversed”. 
According to the FASB (2001), one of the principles that guide the activities of standard setters is to 
issue standards only when the expected benefits exceed the perceived costs. The findings of this 
study suggest that a well-developed IIR strategy may increase liquidity and decrease the cost of 
capital. Not only companies will benefit from an increased liquidity and a decreased cost of capital, 
for example investors will draw advantage from the reduced likelihood that they will misallocate their 
capital. The generally economy, too will benefit from more liquid capital markets, from a more 
effective allocation of scarce resources (i.e. investment capital) and as a result of the investment 
effect of a lower cost of capital (FASB, 2001). This warrants research into whether IIR should be 
regulated or not, and, if regulation is deemed necessary, how it should be regulated?  
The corporate websites of companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market  (AIM) (as sub-
market of the London Stock Exchange) are, for example, regulated in that each company listed on 
the AIM must maintain a website on which certain minimum information must be made available 
(LSE, 2016). 
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9.5.8 Value relevance   
Value relevance research empirically investigates the usefulness of financial statements to equity 
investors. Beisland (2009: 9) defines value relevance as “the ability of financial statement information 
to capture and summarise information that determines the firm’s value”. The main objective of value 
relevance research is to study the relationship between market values of equity and accounting 
variables (Beisland, 2009). Future research may focus on the relationship between the market value 
of equity and IIR. 
9.5.9 Standardisation 
The use of standardised measurement instruments in psychological testing (e.g. IQ tests and 
personality tests) are well-known. Sauro (2012) lists the following eight advantages of using a 
standardised questionnaire (i.e. measurement instrument): reliability, validity, sensitivity, objectivity, 
quantification, economy, communication and norms.  Future research may focus on the development 
of a standardised measurement instrument to measure IIR.  
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ANNEXURE A: SAMPLE STUDIED 
Table A1: Companies included in the sample studied 
COMPANY JSE CODE JSE INDUSTRY 
AECI Ltd AFE Basic Materials 
African Oxygen Ltd AFX Basic Materials 
Assore Ltd ASR Basic Materials 
Firestone Energy Ltd FSE Basic Materials 
Insimbi Refractory and Alloy Supplies Ltd. ISB Basic Materials 
Rockwell Diamonds Inc RDI Basic Materials 
Infrasors Holdings Ltd IRA Basic Materials 
Hulamin Ltd HLM Basic Materials 
Atlatsa Resources Corporation ATL Basic Materials 
Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd HAR Basic Materials 
Evraz Highveld Steel and Vanadium Ltd EHS Basic Materials 
Tawana Resources NL TAW Basic Materials 
BHP Billiton plc BIL Basic Materials 
Randgold & Exploration Company Ltd RNG Basic Materials 
Sentula Mining Ltd SNU Basic Materials 
Anglogold Ashanti Ltd ANG Basic Materials 
Trans Hex Group Ltd TSX Basic Materials 
Capevin Holdings Ltd CVH Consumer Goods 
British American Tobacco plc BTI Consumer Goods 
AH-Vest Ltd AHL Consumer Goods 
Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd SHF Consumer Goods 
Illovo Sugar Ltd ILV Consumer Goods 
Distell Group Ltd DST Consumer Goods 
Nu-World Holdings Ltd NWL Consumer Goods 
Curro Holdings Ltd COH Consumer Services 
Cashbuild Ltd CSB Consumer Services 
Truworths Int Ltd TRU Consumer Services 
Woolworths Holdings Ltd WHL Consumer Services 
Clicks Group Ltd CLS Consumer Services 
City Lodge Hotels Ltd CLH Consumer Services 
Tsogo Sun Holdings Ltd TSH Consumer Services 
Mr Price Group Ltd MRP Consumer Services 
Pik n Pay Stores Ltd PIK Consumer Services 
Nictus Ltd NCS Consumer Services 
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COMPANY JSE CODE JSE INDUSTRY 
Arrowhead Properties Ltd AWB Financials 
Dipula Income Fund Limited DIA Financials 
Redefine International plc RPL Financials 
Rockcastle Global Real Estate Company Ltd ROC Financials 
Capital & Counties Properties plc CCO Financials 
New Europe Property Investments plc NEP Financials 
Growthpoint Properties Ltd GRT Financials 
Hosken Consolidated Investments Ltd HCI Financials 
JSE Ltd JSE Financials 
Oasis Crescent Property Fund Ltd OAS Financials 
Ecsponent Ltd ECS Financials 
Discovery Ltd DSY Financials 
Indequity Group Ltd IDQ Financials 
Standard Bank Group Ltd SBK Financials 
Peregrine Holdings Ltd PGR Financials 
Santam Ltd SNT Financials 
Fountainhead Property Trust FPT Financials 
SA Corporate Real Estate Ltd SAC Financials 
Investec plc INP Financials 
Brait SE BAT Financials 
Barclays Africa Group Ltd BGA Financials 
Nutritional Holdings Ltd NUT Health Care 
AfroCentric Investment Corporation Ltd ACT Health Care 
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd APN Health Care 
Micromega Holdings Ltd MMG Industrials 
Torre Industries Ltd TOR Industrials 
Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd AEL Industrials 
Mpact Ltd MPT Industrials 
ARB Holdings Ltd ARH Industrials 
Ellies Holdings Ltd ELI Industrials 
Hudaco Industries Ltd HDC Industrials 
PSV Holdings Ltd PSV Industrials 
Murray and Roberts Holdings Ltd MUR Industrials 
Aveng Group Ltd AEG Industrials 
Value Group Ltd VLE Industrials 
Iliad Africa Ltd ILA Industrials 
Primeserv Group Ltd PMV Industrials 
Reunert Ltd RLO Industrials 
Astrapak Ltd APK Industrials 
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COMPANY JSE CODE JSE INDUSTRY 
Howden Africa Holdings Ltd HWN Industrials 
Argent Industrial Ltd ART Industrials 
Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon Ltd WBO Industrials 
Transpaco Ltd TPC Industrials 
Sacoil Holdings Ltd SCL Oil & Gas 
Silverbridge Holdings Ltd SVB Technology 
Datacentrix Holdings Ltd DCT Technology 
EOH Holdings Ltd EOH Technology 
Datatec Ltd DTC Technology 
Telkom SA Ltd TKG Telecommunications 
MTN Group Ltd MTN Telecommunications 
IPSA Group plc IPS Utilities 
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ANNEXURE B: 
EXPLANATORY LITERATURE REVIEW – MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS 
Table B1: A summary of determinant and effect studies that have measured corporate website disclosures  
(see notes end table) 
  
                                               
221
 Austria and Germany 
222
 Amsterdam Stock Exchange (ASX) 
223
 Madrid Stock Exchange (MSE) 
224
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK 
225
 US; UK; Canada; Australia and Hong Kong 
226
 Belgium, France and Netherlands 
227
 Belgium (48%), France (59%) and Netherlands (61%) 
 Study Country Sample selection criteria Atr. P C Max Avg. W Q R V 
1 Ettredge et al. (1999) US AIMR rated 15 1 14   No No No No 
2 Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999) Multi (2)221 Largest in each country 51 30 21 95% 65% Yes No* No No 
3 Ettredge et al. (2001) US AIMR rated 17 3 14 88% 33% No No No Yes 
4 Ettredge et al. (2002) US AIMR rated 16 1 15  37% No No No No 
5 Lybaert (2002) Netherlands AEX222 listed 43 21 22 83% 54% Yes No No No 
6 Larrán and Giner (2002) Spain MSE223 listed 26 4 22   Yes No* No No 
7 Bonsón and Escobar (2002) Multi (15)224 Largest in each country 23 1 22 91% 48% No* No No No 
8 Allam and Lymer (2003)  Multi (5)225 Largest in each country 36 4 32 86% 64% No No* No No 
9 Geerings et al. (2003) Multi (3)226 Largest in each country 29 9 20  56%227 No No No No 
10 Froidevaux (2004) US Smallest and largest listed 102 4 98 55% 27% No* No* No Yes 
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228
 Deutscher Aktienindex (German stock index) 
229
 Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) 
230
 South Africa, Australia, Belgium, France, Netherlands and UK 
231
 Croatian and Slovene 
232
 Slovene listed companies average is 59% compared to 23% average reported for Croatian listed companies 
233
 Eastern European countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey. 
234
 Germany, France, Benelux, Canada and US 
235
 Calculated as the average of Europe (German, France and Benelux) (20%) and North America (Canada and US) (32%) 
236
 National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) 
 Study Country Sample selection criteria Atr. P C Max Avg. W Q R V 
11 Marston and Polei (2004) Germany Smallest & largest DAX228 
listed 
71 25 46 86% 68% Yes Yes No No 
12 Xiao et al. (2004) China Largest listed on Shanghai or 
Shenzhen 
82 22 60 60% 31% No* No No No 
13 Celik et al. (2006) Turkey ISE229 listed 162 24 138 39% 9% No* No No No 
14 Bollen et al. (2006) Multi (6)230 Largest in each country 29 9 20 86% 59% Yes Yes No No 
15 Pervan (2006) Multi (2)231 Actively traded listed  30 5 25 97% 23%232 No* No No No 
16 Bonsón and Escobar (2006) Multi(13)233 Random sample  44 5 39 73% 20% No* No No No 
17 Serrano-Cinca et al. (2007) Spain Financial sector 26 7 19   No No* Yes Yes 
18 Abdelsalam et al. (2007) UK Stratified size (largest 25%) 143   86% 66% No Yes No No 
19 Aerts et al. (2007) Multi (5)234 Largest non-financials 101 0 101  26%235 Yes Yes Yes No 
20 Kelton and Yang (2008) US NASDAQ236 listed 36 10 26 86% 55% No No Yes No 
21 Trabelsi et al. (2008) Canada Random sample 79 0 79   No* Yes Yes Yes 
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Atr = number of attributes measured; P = number of presentation related attributes; C = number of content related attributes 
Max = maximum disclosure score in study; Avg = average disclosure score in study 
W = use of weights in study (either individual attributes or categories), where Yes indicate the use of weights; No* indicate that weights were not used, but reasons therefore 
motivated in study and No indicate that weights were neither used or discussed 
Q = quality versus quantity in study, where Yes indicate an attempt to measure quality; No* indicate that quality were not measured, but referred to / discussed in the study and 
No indicate no discussion to quality versus quantity in the study 
R = Reliability tests, where Yes indicate that a reliability test is discussed in the study and No indicate no reference thereto 
V = Validity tests, where Yes indicate that a validity test is discussed in the study and No indicate no reference thereto 
 
                                               
237
 Irish Stock Exchange (ISE) 
238
 Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) 
239
 Madrid Stock Exchange (MSE) 
 Study Country Sample selection criteria Atr. P C Max Avg. W Q R V 
22 Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) Ireland ISE237 listed 13 6 7 75% 46% No No No No 
23 Chang et al. (2008) Australia S&P/ASX listed 44 3 41 90% 49% Yes Yes No Yes 
24 Cormier et al. (2009) Canada Largest non-financials 111 8 103 58% 25% Yes Yes Yes No 
25 Aly et al. (2010) Egypt Largest actively traded listed 90 31 59   No* No No No 
26 Orens et al. (2010) Multi (6) Largest in each country 88 0 88  27% Yes Yes Yes Yes 
27 Lai et al. (2010) Taiwan TSE238 listed 32 4 28 50% 31% Yes No* No No 
28 Sánchez et al. (2011) Spain Non-financials MSE239 listed 8 0 8 88% 26% No* No No No 
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240
 South Africa and 21 other countries 
241
 US, UK and Germany 
 Study Country 
1 Lymer et al. (1999) 22 countries240 
2 Deller et al. (1999) Three countries241 
3 Hedlin (1999) Sweden 
4 FASB (2000) US 
5 Brennan and Kelley (2000) Ireland 
6 Venter (2002) South Africa 
7 Fisher et al. (2002) New Zealand 
8 Loxton (2003) South Africa 
9 Lodhia et al. (2004) Australia 
10 Barac (2004) South Africa 
11 Davey and Homkajohn (2004) Thailand 
12 Matherly and Burton (2005) US 
13 Khadaroo (2005a) Malaysia 
14 Hamid (2005) Malaysia 
15 Khadaroo (2005b) Malaysia and Singapore 
16 Khan (2006) 30 countries 
17 Spanos (2006) Greece 
18 Khan (2007) 30 countries 
19 Mohammed et al. (2009) Oman 
20 Ali (2010) New Zealand 
21 Baard and Nel (2011) Multi 
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ANNEXURE C: MEASUREMENT CONVENTIONS 
1. GENERAL   
The main purpose of this annexure is to describe how the measurement instrument was 
applied in this study in order to enable other researchers to use it, as is, or to use it as a 
benchmark in the development of their own instruments. Two issues are important: first, how 
each attribute measured in this dissertation is scored (e.g. 0, 0.5 or 1) and, second, which 
sections of corporate web homepages are surveyed, and if any documents or document types 
are not examined.  
Each of the 11 categories used to categorise the 346 attributes measured are discussed 
separately and in the following sequence: brief reference to the Investor Relations Society 
(IRS) best practice guidelines and the number of attributes as per Annexure D; reference or 
brief discussion of the website sections and documents examined/not examined; and finally a 
discussion of the scoring of the attributes. As the majority of attributes were measured using 
the same measurement rules and given the impracticality of repeating information for 346 
attributes, only specific exceptions as discussed below in Section 1.1 and 1.2 were discussed 
per category. 
1.1 Website sections and document types examined/not examined 
1.1.1 Website sections 
Most attributes were measured through an examination of the entire website. In some cases, 
however, only one or a combination of the following sections was examined:  homepage, 
investor relations section, financial results section, and news section. In a few cases, reference 
to external links were also examined. 
1.2.2 Document types  
The majority of attributes were measured through an examination of only HTML sections and 
dedicated and descriptive PDF documents. As a general rule, the detailed content of PDF 
annual and interim reports (including related reports, e.g. sustainability and corporate 
governance reports), presentations, manuals and policies, and fact sheets were not examined.  
1.2 Scoring of attributes 
Most of the 346 attributes listed in Annexure D were measured as either available (1) or absent 
(0), with two exceptions as discussed below. 
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1.2.1 Partially available attributes 
The first exception is the 50 attributes that were specifically measured from the outset as either 
available (1), partially available (0.5) or absent (0). As the measurement of these attributes 
were in general more complicated and may have involved some subjectivity, they are 
discussed in detail, with applicable examples for further illustration, in this annexure. 
1.2.2 Outdated and not fully usable attributes 
The second exception relates to attributes that were available, but outdated (i.e. not timely), 
or links that were unusable (e.g. the link was not functional or no link was available) or the 
usability of the attribute was negatively impacted (e.g. by incomplete information, or by the 
availability of two links for the same attribute where one was not functional, or by extremely 
poor layout of information). 
Some outdated information was still relevant and therefore 0.5 was awarded, but other 
information was deemed unusable given either the specific nature of the information (forward-
looking information) or simply the fact of being too outdated (e.g. history last updated in 1999). 
Although the dissertation admits to the subjective nature of using such a methodology, it was 
deemed necessary to ensure that disclosure scores would differentiate between quantity and 
quality. 
2. ACCESSIBILITY 
The accessibility category combines three related Investor Relations Society (IRS) best 
practice consideration categories: awareness, usability and accessibility. According to these 
best practice guidelines, a best practice website should be available to the widest possible 
audience and should be fully accessible to allow equal access to all users, including those 
with visual, hearing, cognitive and motor impairments. 
Table D1, Annexure D, lists the 13 attributes that were used to measure this construct.  
2.1 Website sections and document types examined/not examined 
For all accessibility-related attributes the entire website was examined and no document types 
were excluded, except for the ‘user-friendliness of homepage242’ attribute, where only the 
homepage was examined. 
2.2 Scoring of attributes 
Besides the usability and timeliness issues as discussed in Section 1.2.2 above, all 
accessibility-related attributes were measured as either available (1) or absent (0), except for 
                                               
242
 The landing page or first page that a visitor to a corporate website will see. 
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the three attributes discussed below (Section 2.2.1 to 2.2.3) that were measured as either 
available (1), partially available (0.5), or absent (0). 
2.2.1 User-friendliness of the homepage 
Homepages that are not user-friendly will also decrease the usability of the corporate website 
as information source and may decrease the accessibility thereof for specific users. To 
measure the user-friendliness of the homepage, a default score of 1 was given if the company 
had a working website. For both homepages where excessive scroll down was necessary to 
access all homepage information and homepages that were characterised by the excessive 
use of graphics, 0.5 was deducted from the default score of 1.243 
The excessive use of graphics was measured with four sub-attributes: use of large icons on 
homepage, use of large static graphics on homepage, use of moving graphics on homepage, 
and use of rolling script on homepage. If either large icons or large static graphics were used 
on the homepage, as well as moving graphics and moving script, the homepage was classified 
as using excessive graphics. 
2.2.2 Disclaimers (terms of use and/or privacy policy) 
Disclaimers that describe the terms of use of websites (e.g. privacy policy) improve the 
usability of corporate websites by setting the boundaries within which users should use the 
websites and provide assurance that privacy will be protected. A score of  1 was awarded for 
the availability of such a disclaimer on the homepage, but if users were required to accept 
specific terms or conditions (e.g. having to click on “I agree”) before they could gain access to 
the disclaimer or the disclaimer specifically excluded specific jurisdictions from using the 
website, 0.5 was deducted. 
2.2.3 Multiple languages 
Information that is available in multiple languages (i.e. additional languages to English) can 
potentially improve the usability and accessibility of information (e.g. financial results, 
presentations, media interviews and articles). A maximum score of 1 was awarded for the use 
of multiple languages, as follows: current information is available in Afrikaans (0.5), archive 
information is available in Afrikaans (0.5), and current information is available in any other 
additional language (1). Archived Afrikaans information was awarded 0.5 to recognise the 
historical practice of some JSE-listed companies to publish Afrikaans and English annual 
reports. If specific information was, however, only available in Afrikaans (e.g. media 
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 For only two companies in the study sample, 0.5 was deducted for both excessive scroll down and the 
excessive use of homepage graphics (i.e. 0 was awarded for this attribute). 
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interviews), the dissertation argued that as the accessibility of the information would decrease 
for non-Afrikaans-speaking users, 0.5 should be deducted.  
3. NAVIGATION 
According to the IRS best practice guidelines, a best practice website should be easy to 
navigate and its use should be intuitive. Table D1, Annexure D, lists the 14 attributes that were 
used to measure this construct.  
3.1 Website sections and document types examined/not examined 
For the search function, sitemap, frequently asked questions (FAQ) and help function, only 
the homepage or dedicated investor relations section (if available) were examined. For the 
cookie policy, the homepage and all disclaimers (including privacy policy, terms and 
conditions, and ‘legal’) were examined.  
For the ‘convenience – read more’ and ‘drill down’ attributes only internal links to HTML 
sections were counted. PDF and other downloads were not counted as an internal link. 
3.2 Scoring of attributes 
Besides the usability and timeliness issues, as discussed in Section 1.2.2 above, all 
navigation-related attributes were measured as either available (1) or absent (0), except for 
the two attributes discussed below (Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2) that were measured as either 
available (1), partially available (0.5) or absent (0). 
3.2.1 Effectiveness of the search function 
Where a search function was provided on the website, the effectiveness thereof was tested 
by searching for news about the chairman, or, if this was not found, for news about another 
director or for annual results/report (both annual results and annual report were searched for). 
If useful and timely information was found within the first five search results, the search 
function was deemed effective, with 0.5 awarded for each (i.e. only 1 was awarded if useful 
and timely information for both were found within the first five search results). 
3.2.2 Cookie policy 
According to Microsoft244 a cookie is a small text file that is stored on the user’s hard drive by 
a web page server and will personalise webpages based on browsing history. Cookies allow 
the website owner (i.e. company) to be efficient in for instance learning which pages are 
important for visitors and which not. 
                                               
244
 Source: www.microsoft.com/info/cookies.mspx 
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If a company explains its use of cookies on the homepage, a score of 1 is awarded. Some 
companies, however, only explain the use thereof in a company disclaimer245, in which case 
only 0.5 was awarded, as it would be more likely for the user to overlook the information in 
such cases than when provided with a separate link on the homepage. 
4. TIMELINESS 
According to the IRS best practice guidelines, information should be available simultaneously 
to everyone, ensuring equal access. Table D1, Annexure D, lists the 12 attributes that were 
used to measure this construct.  
4.1 Website sections and document types examined/not examined 
For the ‘latest update’ attribute, only HTML formats were considered, i.e. PDF and other 
downloads were not examined.  
For the copyright attribute and the five timeliness indicators (SENS246, news, results, share 
price, ‘any other’) only the homepages were examined. SENS and news published on the 
homepage were assessed to be the latest, if clearly labelled ‘latest’ or dated (and not older 
than three months).  
For the e-mail alert and RSS247 content feed attributes, the homepage and, if available, the 
investor-relations and news sections were examined. 
4.2 Scoring of attributes 
Besides the usability and timeliness issues as discussed in Section 1.2.2 above, all timeliness-
related attributes were measured as either available (1) or absent (0), except for the one 
attribute discussed in Section 4.2.1, which was measured as either available (1), partially 
available (0.5), or absent (0). 
4.2.1 Timeliness indicators – latest share price 
As listed in Annexure D, a number of attributes were measured as indicators of a timely 
website. One of these attributes was the share price. If the company clearly indicated that it 
had given the latest share price or if it was clear that the latest share price had been displayed 
(i.e. it was dated), 1 was awarded. Otherwise, 0.5 was awarded.  
 
 
                                               
245
 Some companies have only one general disclaimer, others have separate links, for example disclaimer, privacy 
policy, terms and conditions and legal.  
246
 Stock exchange news service 
247
 Rich site summary or really simple syndication. 
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5. COMPANY INFORMATION 
According to the IRS best practice guidelines, telling the company story is one of the main 
functions of the corporate website. Table D1, Annexure D, lists the 36 attributes that were 
used to measure this construct. These attributes were categorised into 10 sub-categories: 
dedicated ‘about us link’, history, contact details, organisational chart and group structure, 
vison and mission, customer information, product and services, suppliers, properties, and 
critical success factors. 
5.1 Website sections and document types examined/not examined 
Only contact information provided on the homepage or via a dedicated homepage link was 
measured248. For all ‘company information’ attributes this study examined only HTML and 
dedicated and descriptive downloads (e.g. PDF with title “group structure”) and therefore 
ignored all annual and interim reports, presentations and fact sheets. 
For attributes related to customer information, products and services, suppliers and properties, 
this study also examined external links which were given (e.g. “for more information about 
products see www.companyb.co.za”) as well as HTML and descriptive PDF downloads. 
External links to which the user was not specifically referred to for information were not 
examined. 
5.2 Scoring of attributes 
Besides the usability and timeliness issues as discussed in Section 1.2.2 above, all company 
information-related attributes were measured as either available (1) or absent (0), except for 
the one attribute discussed in Section 5.2.1, which was measured as either available (1), 
partially available (0.5), or absent (0). 
5.2.1 Geographical presence 
If companies published a map(s) to indicate areas in which they do business, a score of 1 was 
awarded. A score of 0.5 was, however, awarded for companies that had published only a list 
of geographical areas. 
6. FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
According to the IRS best practice guidelines, one of the main reasons that investors visit 
corporate websites is to access reliable and up-to-date financial information. Table D1, 
Annexure D, lists the 65 attributes that were used to measure this construct. These attributes 
                                               
248
 Contact information provided under the Investor Relations section was measured under shareholder information 
as per Section 9 in this annexure. 
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were categorised into four sub-categories: financial reports, presentations, financial analysis, 
and archives. 
6.1 Website sections and document types examined/not examined 
To assess the presence or absence of financial highlights/summaries, ratios and key 
performance indicators, only the following documents were examined: HTML content, 
dedicated and descriptive downloads (e.g. “for financial ratios, click here”), and company fact 
sheets. The content of annual (including provisional, preliminary and abridged), interim and 
quarterly reports, as well as all presentations, were therefore not examined, unless a 
dedicated link to the information was provided. 
6.2 Scoring of attributes 
Besides the usability and timeliness issues as discussed in Section 1.2.2 above, all financial 
information-related attributes were measured as either available (1) or absent (0), except for 
the three attributes discussed below (Section 6.2.1 to 6.2.3) that were measured as either 
available (1), partially available (0.5) or absent (0). 
To measure the completeness of archived information, the listing age of companies was also 
considered. Four attributes were used to measure the availability of all archived annual and 
interim results. For each attribute two criteria were used. If any one of the two criteria were 
present, the attribute was assessed as present. These two criteria were: the percentage of 
archived reports available over the number of qualifying years, and a substantial number of 
years. Qualifying years were calculated as the number of years listed minus 2.249 The 
substantial number of years were used as alternative criteria to accommodate companies that 
had been listed for longer periods.  
For example, for annual report archives, the first attribute measured whether archived reports 
(annual financial statements or integrated annual report) were available for at least 25% of 
qualifying years listed or three years. The three years were used as a substantial number of 
years for companies listed for longer periods, e.g. if a company were listed for 80 years and 
provided archived results for only 12 years, the attribute would be deemed present although 
archived results were available for less than 25% of years. 
                                               
249
 Two years were used based on the assumption that newly listed companies will not publish annual reports 
within their first two years. It is acknowledged that a company’s age as measured from registration date may be 
older than the listing age and that archived reports may be available for the years between registration date and 
listing date.  
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To measure archived presentations, the number of years listed were also considered and 
adjustments were made for companies listed for fewer than five250 years (result presentations) 
and four251 years (investor presentations). 
6.2.1 Ability to manipulate report downloads 
Given the scope of annual reports, some users may be more interested or only interested in 
specific sections of the annual reports. If users had the option to create their own report by, 
for example, the use of tick boxes, a score of 1 was awarded. For the option of separate PDF 
downloads only, a score of 0.5 was awarded. The advantage of the former is that only one 
PDF report is created that can be downloaded, as opposed to per-section downloads where 
various files would have to be downloaded. 
6.2.2 Archive result presentations (slides) 
If both annual and interim result presentation slides were available for a specific archive year, 
a score of 1 was awarded. If however slides were only available for the annual or interim 
presentations, 0.5 was awarded.   
6.2.3 Archive investor presentations (slides) 
For companies that provide two or more investor presentations (excluding result 
presentations), a score of 1 was awarded. If only one investor presentation was provided, a 
score of 0.5 was awarded. 
7. RELEVANT NEWS 
According to the IRS best practice guidelines, a key element of a good corporate website is 
keeping investors up to date with news about the company, its strategy and operating 
environment. Table D1, Annexure D, lists the 23 attributes that were used to measure this 
construct. These attributes were categorised into three sub-categories: SENS252), 
media(press) releases made by the company and news published by the financial media. 
7.1 Website sections and document types examined/not examined 
To assess the availability of social media channels (e.g. Twitter and Facebook) only the 
following sections of the corporate website were examined: homepage and, if available, 
                                               
250
 Presentations were based on results and on the methodology used to measure archived annual and interim 
results. The five years were calculated as the three years for which archived presentations were measured plus 
two years. 
251
 The four years were calculated as the three years for which archived presentations were measured plus one 
year. These presentations exclude result presentations and the two-year exemption used for result presentations 
were therefore relaxed to one year. 
252
 Stock Exchange News Service.  
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investor relations, contact and news sections. The respective social media channels were 
therefore not directly examined to assess whether each is used or not used by the company. 
7.2 Scoring of attributes 
Besides the usability and timeliness issues as discussed in Section 1.2.2 above, all news-
related attributes were measured as either available (1) or absent (0), except for the two 
attributes discussed below (Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2) that were measured as either available 
(1), partially available (0.5) or absent (0). 
7.2.1 News (excluding SENS): dedicated and descriptive link 
News links provided on the homepage are more visible and therefore more accessible to 
users. Links available via the homepage were therefore assessed as available (1) and links 
available only via the investor relations or ‘about us’ sections as partially available (0.5). 
7.2.2 SENS: dedicated and descriptive link  
As with 7.2.1 above, links via the homepage were assessed as available (1) and links available 
only via investor relations, ‘about us’ or news (unless indicated as SENS) were assessed as 
partially available (0.5). 
8. INVESTMENT CASE 
According to the IRS best practice guidelines, the corporate website should provide users with 
a clear statement of strategy and vision. Table D1, Annexure D, lists the 26 attributes that 
were used to measure this construct. These attributes were categorised into four sub-
categories: investment pack, forecasts, industry, and corporate profile. 
8.1 Website sections and document types examined/not examined 
For all attributes measured in the investment case category only the following website sections 
were examined: HTML content, dedicated and descriptive downloads, corporate fact sheet 
and investor pack. The contents of the following were therefore not examined to assess 
investment case attributes: annual and interim reports, presentations and news items. 
8.2 Scoring of attributes 
Besides the usability and timeliness issues as discussed in Section 1.2.2 above, all investment 
case-related attributes were measured as either available (1) or absent (0). 
9. SHAREHOLDER INFORMATION 
According to the IRS best practice guidelines, the corporate website should provide an up-to-
date source of shareholder information. Table D1, Annexure D, lists the 60 attributes that were 
used to measure this construct. These attributes were categorised into 13 sub-categories: 
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dedicated investor relations section, investor contact details, shareholder communications, 
PAIA,253 company advisors, analysts, share price information, dividend information, 
shareholder information, shareholder meetings, financial calendar, listing information, and 
other shareholder services/information. 
9.1 Website sections and document types examined/not examined 
To assess whether the company provided a dedicated investor relations link only the 
homepage was examined. The followed link titles were assessed in this study as a dedicated 
investor relations link: investor relations, investor centre, investors, investors and media, 
investor information, investor relations and media, investor profile, stakeholder relations, and 
shareholder relations.  
Corporate fact sheets, investor packs, annual and interim reports, circulars and presentations, 
SENS and press releases were not examined (except as discussed below). 
For listing information, only annual and interim reports, circulars and presentations were 
specifically excluded, with corporate fact sheets and investor packs, as well as HTML and 
dedicated and descriptive downloadable documents examined. 
For share price information, only the homepage or investor relation section (if available) was 
examined, except for market capitalisation where corporate fact sheets and investor packs 
were also examined. 
9.2 Scoring of attributes 
Besides the usability and timeliness issues as discussed in Section 1.2.2 above, all 
shareholder information-related attributes were measured as either available (1) or absent (0), 
except for the six attributes discussed below (Section 9.2.1 to 9.2.6) that were measured as 
either available (1), partially available (0.5) or absent (0). 
9.2.1 Investor relations contact details: e-mail available 
A personalised e-mail address (e.g. JohnDoe@hunter.co.za) was assessed as available (1), 
compared to a general e-mail address (e.g. Investor@hunter.co.za) that was assessed as only 
partially available (0.5). 
9.2.2 Analyst contact details 
If contact details were provided for some analysts, but not all, the attribute was assessed as 
only partially available (0.5). 
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 Public Access to Information Act. 
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9.2.3 Latest analyst report or presentation: opinion 
Analyst reports that include only a general discussion without a clear opinion (i.e. buy, sell or 
hold), were assessed as only partially available (0.5). 
9.2.4 Annual General Meeting (AGM): outcome 
Minutes, transcripts or a detailed list of the voting results and decisions were assessed as 
available (1), compared to only brief summaries (e.g. “all resolutions were passed”) which 
were assessed as only partially available (0.5). 
9.2.5 Annual General Meeting (AGM): notice 
A complete downloadable notice of the next or most recent AGM was assessed as available 
(1), compared to only a summary or only the proxy thereof, which were assessed as only 
partially available (0.5). 
9.2.6 Shareholder relations policy 
A mere reference to the existence of a shareholder relations policy was assessed as only 
partially available (0.5), and only complete downloadable policies were assessed as available 
(1).  
10. BONDHOLDER INFORMATION 
According to the IRS best practice guidelines, companies should provide clear information 
about their corporate debt situation, as applicable. Table D1, Annexure D, lists the five 
attributes that were used to measure this construct. 
10.1 Website sections and document types examined/not examined 
For this category, only HTML content, descriptive and downloadable documents, corporate 
fact sheets and investor packs were examined. Annual and interim reports and presentations 
were specifically excluded. 
10.2 Scoring of attributes 
Besides the usability and timeliness issues as discussed in Section 1.2.2 above, all 
bondholder-related attributes were measured as either available (1) or absent (0). 
11. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
According to the IRS best practice guidelines, it is no longer sufficient for companies simply to 
refer corporate website users to relevant parts of the annual report for corporate governance 
information. Table D1, Annexure D, lists the 50 attributes that were used to measure this 
construct. These attributes were categorised into 11 sub-categories: dedicated corporate 
governance link, corporate governance report, King III, directors, executives and 
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management, board committees, management committees, code of conduct, memorandum 
of incorporation, insider trading policy, and whistle blowing policy. 
11.1 Website sections and document types examined/not examined 
Annual and interim reports, corporate governance reports or policy documents, presentations, 
press releases, SENS and the code of conduct were not examined, unless a dedicated and 
descriptive link was provided. 
To assess the availability of insider trading and whistle blowing polices, the code of conduct/ 
code of ethics (if available) was, however, assessed. 
11.2 Scoring of attributes 
Besides the usability and timeliness issues as discussed in Section 1.2.2 above, all corporate 
governance-related attributes were measured as either available (1) or absent (0), except for 
the 19 attributes discussed below (Section 11.2.1 to 11.2.19) that were measured as either 
available (1), partially available (0.5) or absent (0).  
11.2.1 Dedicated corporate governance link 
Dedicated homepage links (e.g. the corporate governance link on the homepage) are more 
accessible compared to sub-links (e.g. corporate governance link available as a sub-link for a 
homepage link such as ‘about us’ or investor relations). Dedicated homepage links were 
therefore assessed as available (1), and sub-links as partially available (0.5). 
11.2.2 King III 
As King III compliance is only applicable to companies with a primary listing on the JSE, King 
III equivalents (e.g. Corporate Governance Code, UK, or Sarbanes-Oxley, US) were included 
in the assessment and the attribute ‘King III’ therefore also includes these equivalents, as 
applicable. Mere references to King III compliance were assessed as partially available (0.5). 
Only complete King III schedules were therefore assessed as being available (1). 
11.2.3 Directors’ qualifications 
Companies that provided qualifications for at least one director, but not for all directors, were 
assessed as only partially available (0.5). 
11.2.4 Directors’ experience 
Companies that provided a brief discussion of directors’ experience for at least one director, 
but not for all directors, were assessed as only partially available (0.5). 
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11.2.5 Directors’ date appointed to the board 
Companies that provided the date of appointment or the number of years of service as a 
director for at least one director, but not for all directors, were assessed as only partially 
available (0.5). 
11.2.6 Directors’ ownership 
Ownership that was discussed only in qualitative terms (e.g. director A is a substantial 
shareholder) was assessed as only partially available (0.5), as opposed to ownership 
discussed in quantitative terms (e.g. director A has a 20% interest), which was assessed as 
being available (1). 
11.2.7 Board membership policies 
Any reference or brief discussion of a board membership policy was assessed as only partially 
available (0.5), as opposed to the provision of a detailed policy describing, for instance, the 
procedures for the appointment of new directors and maximum periods that directors may 
serve, which was assessed as being available (1). 
11.2.8 Responsibilities of the board 
References or brief summaries of board responsibilities were assessed as only partially 
available (0.5), compared to detailed policies, which were assessed as available (1). 
11.2.9 Executive and management – qualifications 
As for directors, refer to 11.2.3 above. 
11.2.10 Executive and management – experience 
As for directors, refer to 11.2.4 above. 
11.2.11 Executive and management – date appointed 
As for directors, refer to 11.2.5 above. 
11.2.12 Board committee charters or terms of reference 
Companies that provide only summary charters or terms of reference, but provide these 
summaries for at least 75% of board committees (as listed by the company) were assessed 
as being partially available (0.5). To be assessed as available, this study required complete 
charters for at least 75% of board committees (as listed by the company). 
11.2.13 Board committee – members 
If only a broad policy (e.g. “risk committee will always consist of at least two non-executive 
directors”) was available for at least 75% of board committees (as listed by the company), it 
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was assessed as being only partially available (0.5). Companies that provided a list of 
committee members for at least 75% of board committees (as listed by the company) were 
assessed as available (1). 
11.2.14 Management committee charter or terms of reference 
As for directors, refer to 11.2.12 above. 
11.2.15 Management committee – members 
As for directors, refer to 11.2.13 above. 
11.2.16 Remuneration policy 
Summaries of remuneration policies were assessed as partially available (0.5), as opposed to 
complete policies that were assessed as available (1). 
11.2.17 Code of conduct 
Mere references to code of conduct or brief summaries thereof were assessed as partially 
available (0.5), as opposed to complete policies, which were assessed as available (1). For 
the purpose of this study, the code of conduct also included the code of ethics.254 
11.2.18 Insider trading policy 
Mere references to insider trading policy or brief summaries thereof were assessed as partially 
available (0.5), as opposed to complete policies, which were assessed as available (1). 
11.2.19 Whistle blowing policy 
Mere references to whistle blowing policy or brief summaries thereof were assessed as 
partially available (0.5), as opposed to complete policies, which were assessed as available 
(1). 
12. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
According to the IRS best practice guidelines, a best practice corporate website should contain 
comprehensive information about the company’s sustainability policies and data, including a 
detailed review of how policies are linked to environmental and social management. Table D1, 
Annexure D, lists the 42 attributes that were used to measure this construct. These attributes 
were categorised into seven sub-categories: dedicated corporate responsibility link, reports, 
policies, BBBEE, employees, corporate citizenship, and stakeholders. 
                                               
254
 Although slightly different in that the code of ethics are generally wide-ranging and non-specific as compared to 
the code of conduct that generally outlines specific behaviours that are required, both attempt to encourage specific 
forms of behaviour by employees. Companies often combine these two codes in a single document (source: 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com) 
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12.1 Website sections and document types examined/not examined 
Annual and interim reports, corporate responsibility reports (including social and sustainability 
reports), presentations and press releases were not examined, unless a dedicated and 
descriptive link was provided. 
12.2 Scoring of attributes 
Besides the usability and timeliness issues as discussed in Section 1.2.2 above, all corporate 
responsibility-related attributes were measured as either available (1) or absent (0), except for 
the 13 attributes discussed below (Section 12.2.1 to 12.2.13) that were measured as either 
available (1), partially available (0.5) or absent (0). 
12.2.1 Dedicated corporate responsibility link 
Dedicated homepage links (e.g. corporate responsibility link on homepage) are more 
accessible compared to sub-links (e.g. corporate responsibility link available as a sub-link for 
a homepage link, such as ‘about us’ or investor relations). Dedicated homepage links were 
therefore assessed as available (1) and sub-links as partially available (0.5). 
12.2.2 Progress – environmental issues 
Summaries of qualitative discussions of progress relating to environmental issues were 
assessed as only partially available (0.5), compared to quantitative discussions of progress, 
which were assessed as available (1). 
12.2.3 JSE Socially Responsible Investment Index 
Mere references to companies’ inclusion in the JSE Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) 
Index were assessed as partially available (0.5), as opposed to the provision of an SRI 
certificate, which was assessed as available (1). 
12.2.4 Global Reporting Initiative  
References to or statements of compliance were assessed as partially available (0.5). Only 
complete Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) reports were assessed as being available (1). 
12.2.5 United Nations Global Compact principles 
As with GRI above, references to or statements of compliance with the United Nations Global 
Compact (UNGC) principles were assessed as partially available (0.5), and reports were 
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12.2.6 International Organization for Standardization  
Mere references to compliance with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
were assessed as only partially available (0.5), as opposed to ISO certificates that were 
assessed as available (1). 
12.2.7 Environmental policies 
Summaries of environmental policies were assessed as partially available (0.5), and complete 
downloadable policies were assessed as available (1). 
12.2.8 Environmental objectives 
Mere summaries of or references to environmental objectives were assessed as partially 
available (0.5), as opposed to more detailed and quantitative discussions, which were 
assessed as available (1). 
12.2.9 Health and safety policies 
Summaries of health and safety policies were assessed as partially available (0.5), and 
complete downloadable policies as available (1). 
12.2.10 Supplier Code of Conduct 
Mere references to supplier codes of conduct or brief summaries thereof were assessed as 
partially available (0.5), as opposed to complete policies that were assessed as available (1).  
12.2.11 Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) 
Mere references to BBBEE compliance (i.e. status) were assessed as only partially available 
(0.5), as opposed to BBBEE certificates that were assessed as available (1). 
12.2.12 Workplace policy 
Summaries of workplace policies were assessed as partially available (0.5), as opposed to 
complete downloadable policies that were assessed as available (1). 
12.2.13 Stakeholders 
Mere stakeholder lists, with or without brief descriptions or discussions, were assessed as 
partially available (0.5), as opposed to detailed stakeholder engagement plans or strategies 
that were assessed as available (1). 




Table D1: List of attributes measured, organised per category 
  Category Attribute 
1 Accessibility Dual functionality – both .co.za and .com URL extensions are functional 
2 Accessibility Unique URL 
3 Accessibility User-friendliness of the homepage 
4 Accessibility Interactive/dynamic/e-reader/web version (excluding similar items 
separately measured) 
5 Accessibility Excel downloads (excluding similar items separately measured) 
6 Accessibility Presentations – Webcasts/Podcasts/Transcript (excluding similar items 
separately measured) 
7 Accessibility Print this page function 
8 Accessibility Disclaimer – terms use and/or privacy policy 
9 Accessibility Disclaimer – media/forward-looking information 
10 Accessibility Multiple languages 
11 Accessibility Option tailor content (e.g. font size) to improve accessibility for a specific 
disability 
12 Accessibility Support for users mobile / other devices 
13 Accessibility Recommend this page function 
14 Navigation Search function 
15 Navigation Effectiveness of the search function 
16 Navigation Either FAQ or Help function is organised in categories 
17 Navigation Either FAQ or Help function has useful information for investors 
18 Navigation Sitemap   
19 Navigation Position on website clearly visible 
20 Navigation Cookie policy 
21 Navigation Convenience – ‘read more’ links 
22 Navigation Drill down links 
23 Navigation Convenience – between sections links 
24 Navigation External links – warning flag (e.g. “you are now leaving the company’s 
website”) 
25 Navigation Use of external links to provide more information (e.g. subsidiaries / 
segments / parent) 
26 Navigation Homepage link clearly visible on all pages 
27 Navigation Ability to manipulate information (excluding items separately measured) 
28 Timeliness Last update – Homepage  
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  Category Attribute 
29 Timeliness Copyright date at bottom of page 
30 Timeliness Copyright date – 2014 or 2015 
31 Timeliness Timeliness indicators – latest SENS   
32 Timeliness Timeliness indicators – latest news  
33 Timeliness Timeliness indicators – latest results   
34 Timeliness Timeliness indicators – latest share price   
35 Timeliness Timeliness indicators – any other latest   
36 Timeliness E-mail alert service 
37 Timeliness E-mail alert service – categories available 
38 Timeliness RSS content feed 
39 Timeliness Option synchronise financial calendar with own 
40 Company ‘About’ or ‘About us’ homepage link 
41 Company Corporate video / webcasts  / podcast 
42 Company Fact sheet / booklet 
43 Company Summary information available via homepage 
44 Company Date founded 
45 Company History  
46 Company History – updated within last two years 
47 Company Contact details – Email 
48 Company Contact details – Telephone number 
49 Company Contact details – Online form  
50 Company Investor relations as contact option 
51 Company Organisational chart / organogram / structure 
52 Company Group structure 
53 Company Operating divisions 
54 Company Dedicated and descriptive link or sub-link to vision/mission/strategy 
55 Company Vision 
56 Company Mission 
57 Company Strategy    
58 Company Strategy – discussed (qualitative) 
59 Company Strategy – discussed (quantitative) 
60 Company Business model 
61 Company Objectives   
62 Company Values  
63 Company Discussion (excluding strategy) 
64 Company Customers – description / profile  
65 Company List major customers   
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  Category Attribute 
66 Company Geographical presence  
67 Company List current products / services 
68 Company Description current products / services 
69 Company Downloads current products / services 
70 Company Reference to suppliers / business partners (including list, description, 
discussion relationship) 
71 Company List major factories, warehouses and properties   
72 Company Description of factories, warehouses and properties 
73 Company Virtual visits/videos to factories, warehouses and properties 
74 Company Photos of factories, warehouses and properties 
75 Company Reference to critical success factors, excluding measurement thereof 
(see financial information) or strategies for implementation (see 
investment case) 
76 Financial  Annual financial statement (AFS) or integrated annual report (IAR)  (PDF) 
77 Financial AFS/IAR: e-Book (or e-Reader) 
78 Financial AFS/IAR: Online mini results site (OMRS) 
79 Financial AFS/IAR: HTML financial statements 
80 Financial AFS/IAR: Financial statements hyperlinked to notes 
81 Financial AFS/IAR: Excel financial statements 
82 Financial AFS/IAR: ability to manipulate report downloads   
83 Financial AFS/IAR: homepage link 
84 Financial Interim results (PDF) 
85 Financial Interim results: alternative format to PDF download 
86 Financial Interim results: homepage link 
87 Financial Any additional financial results to AFS, IAR and Interim results 
88 Financial Auditors report (AR): OMRS link or sub-link  
89 Financial Auditors report (AR) hyperlinked to financial statements or notes 
90 Financial Chairman’s Report: OMRS link or sub-link  
91 Financial HTML links to inside IAR or AFS 
92 Financial Annual results presentation: PDF slides 
93 Financial Annual results presentation: webcast 
94 Financial Annual results presentation: podcast 
95 Financial Annual results presentation: transcript 
96 Financial Annual result presentation: homepage link 
97 Financial Annual result presentation: dedicated and descriptive link 
98 Financial Interim results presentation: PDF slides 
99 Financial Interim results presentation: webcast 
100 Financial Interim results presentation: podcast 
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  Category Attribute 
101 Financial Interim results presentation: transcript 
102 Financial Interim result presentation: homepage link 
103 Financial Interim results presentation: dedicated and descriptive link 
104 Financial Financial statements: highlights/summaries   
105 Financial Financial statement: highlights/summaries comparison previous years  
106 Financial Financial statement highlights/summaries: dedicated and descriptive link 
107 Financial Share price related ratios 
108 Financial Share price related ratios: dedicated and descriptive link 
109 Financial Financial ratios (excluding share price ratios): at least one ratio 
110 Financial Financial ratios (excluding share price ratios): two or more ratios 
111 Financial Financial ratios (excluding share price ratios): five or more ratios 
112 Financial Financial Ratios (excluding share price ratios): organised categories   
113 Financial Financial Ratios (excluding share price ratios): comparison with previous 
years  
114 Financial Financial ratios (excluding share price ratios): dedicated and descriptive 
link 
115 Financial Key performance indicators  
116 Financial Key performance indicators: comparison with previous years  
117 Financial Key performance indicators: dedicated and descriptive link 
118 Financial Archive IAR/AFS: hyperlinked or per annum filter 
119 Financial Archive IAR/AFS: available for at least 25% qualifying years listed or 3 
years 
120 Financial Archive IAR/AFS: available for at least 50% qualifying years listed or 6 
years 
121 Financial Archive IAR/AFS: available for at least 75% qualifying years listed or 9 
years 
122 Financial Archive IAR/AFS: available for all qualifying years listed or 12 years 
123 Financial Archive IAR/AFS: at least one alternative format available for the first 
archive year 
124 Financial Archive IAR/AFS: at least two alternative formats available for the first 
archive year 
125 Financial Archive IAR/AFS: three or more alternative formats available for the first 
archive year 
126 Financial Archive Interim results: available for at least 25% qualifying years listed or 
3 years 
127 Financial Archive Interim results: available for at least 50% qualifying years listed or 
6 years 
128 Financial Archive Interim results: available for at least 75% qualifying years listed or 
9 years 
129 Financial Archive Interim results: available for all qualifying years listed or 12 years 
130 Financial Archive Interim results: at least one alternative format available for the 
first archive year 
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  Category Attribute 
131 Financial Archive Interim results: at least two alternative formats available for the 
first archive year 
132 Financial Archive result presentations (slides): first archive year 
133 Financial Archive result presentations (slides): second archive year 
134 Financial Archive result presentations (slides): third archive year 
135 Financial Archive investor presentations (slides): 2014 
136 Financial Archive investor presentations (slides): 2013 
137 Financial Archive investor presentations (slides): 2012 
138 Financial Results or investor  presentations: at least one alternative format 
available for the first archive year 
139 Financial Results or investor  presentations: at least two alternative formats 
available for the first archive year 
140 Financial Results or investor  presentations: at least three alternative formats 
available for the first archive year 
141 News News (excluding SENS): dedicated and descriptive link  
142 News News (excluding SENS): pod- or webcasts 
143 News SENS: dedicated and descriptive link 
144 News News (excluding SENS): option to manipulate  
145 News SENS: option to manipulate  
146 News News (excluding SENS): archive 
147 News SENS: current 
148 News SENS: archive 
149 News Archive – categorised per annum – News 
150 News Archive – categorised per annum – SENS 
151 News Press or media releases –printed material 
152 News Press release – 2014: at least one available 
153 News Press release – 2013: at least one available 
154 News In the media – printed material 
155 News In the media – 2014: at least one available 
156 News In the media – 2013: at least one available 
157 News In the media: pod or webcasts 
158 News Contact details for media / public relations department 
159 News Twitter 
160 News YouTube 
161 News Linkedln 
162 News Facebook  
163 News Other (less popular) social media channels (Google+; 
Flickr;Pinterest;Blog;Instagram;Foursquare) 
164 Investment Investor pack 
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  Category Attribute 
165 Investment Forecasts: dedicated link or sub-link 
166 Investment Future goals/plans 
167 Investment Key risks 
168 Investment Future or recently released new products / projects / services 
169 Investment Production/sales/profit forecasts 
170 Investment Cash flow forecast 
171 Investment Industry forecast 
172 Investment Sector (industry)     
173 Investment Accolades: dedicated link or sub-link  
174 Investment Accolades: at least one available 
175 Investment Accolades: at least two available 
176 Investment Management of quality   
177 Investment Marketing opportunities   
178 Investment Activities/transactions with government/state entities 
179 Investment Strategies & plans for critical success factors  
180 Investment Actions during year 
181 Investment Research and development: discussion 
182 Investment Research and development: spent 
183 Investment Intangible assets: discussion 
184 Investment Investor presentations in the past 12 months – PDF slides: at least one 
available 
185 Investment Investor presentations in the past 12 months – PDF slides: at least two 
available 
186 Investment Descriptive link  available for current and/or archive investor 
presentations 
187 Investment Investor presentations in the past 12 months: transcripts 
188 Investment Investor presentations in the past 12 months: pod- or webcasts 
189 Investment Updated financial information 
190 Shareholder Descriptive and dedicated investor relations link on homepage 
191 Shareholder Dedicated link for investor relations contact details 
192 Shareholder Investor relations contact details: e-mail available 
193 Shareholder Investor relations contact details: online form to complete 
194 Shareholder Investor relations contact details: name to contact  
195 Shareholder Investor relations contact details: job title or description 
196 Shareholder Profile of investor relations department 
197 Shareholder Shareholder communications – circulars: dedicated heading/link 
198 Shareholder Shareholder communications – circulars: scattered (i.e. available, but no 
dedicated link is available) 
199 Shareholder Shareholder communications: PDF newsletters 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
322 
  Category Attribute 
200 Shareholder Shareholder communication: Online shareholder administration 
201 Shareholder Access to information manual (PAIA) 
202 Shareholder PAIA act: descriptive title/link 
203 Shareholder Company advisors: dedicated list or link 
204 Shareholder Sponsor or corporate advisor   
205 Shareholder Transfer agent (secretaries) 
206 Shareholder Commercial bankers 
207 Shareholder External auditor 
208 Shareholder List of analysts following the company 
209 Shareholder Analyst contact details 
210 Shareholder Analyst report or presentations by analysts: current  
211 Shareholder Analyst report or presentations by analysts: archive 
212 Shareholder Latest analyst report or presentation: forecast 
213 Shareholder Latest analyst report or presentation: opinion 
214 Shareholder Reference to closed or silent periods 
215 Shareholder Volume traded (shares) 
216 Shareholder Interactive chart (share prices, volume traded) 
217 Shareholder Comparative (e.g. industry or JSE share price movements) 
218 Shareholder Share price history for at least last 12 months 
219 Shareholder Share price calculator 
220 Shareholder Market capitalisation 
221 Shareholder Interactive statistics  
222 Shareholder Capital structure: current 
223 Shareholder Capital structure: recent changes 
224 Shareholder Latest dividend declared / paid 
225 Shareholder Dividend dates (e.g. declared, paid, cum, ex) 
226 Shareholder Dividend history 
227 Shareholder Dividend policy: qualitative information    
228 Shareholder Dividend policy: quantitative information 
229 Shareholder Dividend reinvestment plan 
230 Shareholder Dividend calculator 
231 Shareholder Shareholder analysis 
232 Shareholder Principal shareholders  
233 Shareholder Annual General Meeting (AGM): outcomes 
234 Shareholder AGM: presentations (slides, transcript, web- or podcasts) 
235 Shareholder AGM outcomes: archives  
236 Shareholder Other meetings (excluding AGM): outcomes 
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237 Shareholder Online participation meetings 
238 Shareholder AGM: date of next meeting 
239 Shareholder AGM: notice/proxy of next meeting 
240 Shareholder Other meetings (excluding AGM): date of next meeting or notice/proxy 
241 Shareholder Glossary of terms 
242 Shareholder Financial calendar 
243 Shareholder Financial calendar: descriptive link title 
244 Shareholder Name of exchange listed 
245 Shareholder Date listed 
246 Shareholder Exchange / listing information 
247 Shareholder American depository receipts (ADR) program 
248 Shareholder JSE compliance statement or equivalent 
249 Shareholder Shareholder relations policy 
250 Bondholder Dedicated and descriptive link to bondholder information 
251 Bondholder Credit ratings and debt listings  
252 Bondholder Debt presentations 
253 Bondholder Contact details treasury department 
254 Bondholder Information on listed debt instruments 
255 Governance Dedicated corporate governance link 
256 Governance Separate dedicated corporate governance report 
257 Governance At least one archive corporate governance report   
258 Governance Inside link to corporate governance report 
259 Governance Dedicated link to corporate governance manual/policies 
260 Governance King III 
261 Governance Directors: list   
262 Governance Directors: photos 
263 Governance Directors: age 
264 Governance Directors: qualifications 
265 Governance Directors: experience 
266 Governance Directors: date appointed to the board 
267 Governance Directors: committees involved  
268 Governance Directors: type (e.g. Chairman, CEO, CFO, executive, non-executive) 
269 Governance Directors: clear distinction between executives versus non-executives 
270 Governance Company secretary 
271 Governance Directors: compensation 
272 Governance Directors: other directorships 
273 Governance Directors: ownership 
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  Category Attribute 
274 Governance Directors: recent share trading  
275 Governance Directors: changes composition board members (board membership 
policies) 
276 Governance Directors: discussion/list new appointments / retirements to board  
277 Governance Directors: responsibilities of the board 
278 Governance Directors: attendance records board meetings 
279 Governance Directors: minutes board meetings 
280 Governance Executives and management: list 
281 Governance Executives and management: photos 
282 Governance Executives and management: age 
283 Governance Executives and management: qualifications 
284 Governance Executives and management: experience 
285 Governance Executives and management: date appointed 
286 Governance Executives and management: responsibility per executive 
287 Governance Board committees: list 
288 Governance Board committees: board charter (or terms of reference) 
289 Governance Board committees: members 
290 Governance Board committee meetings: attendance records 
291 Governance Board committee meetings: outcomes 
292 Governance Management committees: list 
293 Governance Managements committees: members 
294 Governance Managements committees: charter (or terms of reference) 
295 Governance Remuneration policy 
296 Governance Board performance evaluation policy  
297 Governance Compensation linked performance evaluation 
298 Governance Risk management framework   
299 Governance Code of conduct 
300 Governance Code of conduct: HTML discussion of importance 
301 Governance Memorandum of incorporation (MOI) / Constitution / Articles of 
association 
302 Governance Insider trading policy 
303 Governance Whistle blowing policy 
304 Governance Relevant contact detail (whistle blowing) 
305 Responsibility Dedicated corporate responsibility link 
306 Responsibility Corporate responsibility report (CRR) / Sustainability report (separate 
report from IAR / AFS) 
307 Responsibility At least one archive corporate responsibility report (CRR) / sustainability 
report (SR) 
308 Responsibility Inside link to corporate responsibility report 
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  Category Attribute 
309 Responsibility Environmental report 
310 Responsibility Health and safety report 
311 Responsibility Value added statement 
312 Responsibility Carbon report 
313 Responsibility Water usage report 
314 Responsibility Progress - environmental issues 
315 Responsibility Discussion work related accidents 
316 Responsibility JSE SRI (Social Responsibility Index) 
317 Responsibility GRI (Global Reporting Initiative) 
318 Responsibility UNGC (United Nations Global Compact) 
319 Responsibility Reference to compliance any other rules/standards (environment related) 
320 Responsibility International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
321 Responsibility Environmental policies 
322 Responsibility Environmental objectives 
323 Responsibility Health and safety policies 
324 Responsibility Internal arrangements for implementing environmental and health and 
safety policies 
325 Responsibility Authority/contacts (i.e. names committee members or dedicated 
executive responsible for environmental, health and safety issues) 
326 Responsibility Sustainability auditor 
327 Responsibility Supplier code of conduct  
328 Responsibility Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) 
329 Responsibility BBBEE structure – Group structure/partners/empowerment  
transactions/equity program 
330 Responsibility Work place policy 
331 Responsibility Work place related polices 
332 Responsibility Employees: number 
333 Responsibility Employees: average age 
334 Responsibility Employees: breakdown 
335 Responsibility Employees: temporary / permanent 
336 Responsibility Employees: turnover 
337 Responsibility Employees: compensations – qualitative (e.g. policy) 
338 Responsibility Employees: work conditions/development/teamwork 
339 Responsibility Human resource  spent (e.g. cost of training) 
340 Responsibility Unions 
341 Responsibility Corporate citizenship: projects involved (i.e. non-commercial community 
involvement) 
342 Responsibility Corporate citizenship: spent 
343 Responsibility Corporate citizenship: news updates 
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  Category Attribute 
344 Responsibility Corporate citizenship: policy or criteria for donations 
345 Responsibility Stakeholders 
346 Responsibility Sustainability web- or podcasts (e.g. interviews with directors on 
sustainability issues) 
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ANNEXURE E: 
TOP 30 AND BOTTOM 30 ATTRIBUTES  
Table E1: Top 30 attributes (highest average availability) 
Category Attribute Average 
availability 
Company Annual financial statement or integrated annual report  96% 
Company Company contact details: telephone number 94% 
Financial Archive IAR & AFS available for at least 25% qualifying years listed or 3 
years 
94% 
Financial Archive Interim results available for at least 25% qualifying years listed or 
3 years 
92% 
Shareholder Descriptive and dedicated investor relations link on homepage 89% 
Financial Interim results available in PDF format 88% 
Navigation Homepage link clearly visible on all pages 86% 
Financial Archive IAR & AFS available for at least 50% qualifying years listed or 6 
years 
82% 
Governance Directors: list   82% 
Financial Archive Interim Results available for at least 50% qualifying years listed or 
6 years 
81% 
Governance Directors: type (e.g. Chairman, CEO, CFO, non-executive, etc.) 81% 
Shareholder Name of stock exchange listed 79% 
Accessibility User-friendly homepage 78% 
Company List of current products/services 76% 
News SENS: current 75% 
Accessibility Unique URL 74% 
Governance Directors: other directorships 73% 
Financial Any additional financial results to AFS, IAR and Interim results 72% 
Company Date founded 67% 
News Dedicated news link (excluding SENS) 67% 
Governance Directors: photos 67% 
Navigation Internal search function   64% 
Navigation Position on website clearly visible   64% 
Company ‘About’ or ‘About us’ homepage link 72% 
Financial Archive IAR & AFS available for at least 75% qualifying years listed or 9 
years 
72% 
Navigation Convenience – ‘read more’ internal hyperlinks 71% 
Company Company contact details: email 71% 
Governance King III 71% 
Company Operating divisions 69% 
News SENS: archive 68% 
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Table E2: Bottom 30 attributes (lowest average availability) 
Category Attribute Average 
availability 
Timeliness Option synchronise financial calendar with own 1% 
Financial Archive IAR & AFS – three or more alternative formats available for the 
first archive year 
1% 
Investment Investor presentations in the past 12 months: transcripts 1% 
Shareholder Profile investor relations department 1% 
Shareholder Online participation meetings 1% 
Bondholder Contact details treasury department 1% 
Governance Directors: recent share trading 1% 
Governance Board meetings: minutes 1% 
Navigation External links – warning flag 2% 
Investment Forecasts – dedicated link or sub-link 2% 
Investment Cash flow forecast 2% 
Investment Strategies & plans for critical success factors   2% 
Investment Actions during year to achieve critical success factors   2% 
Investment Intangibles: discussion 2% 
Shareholder Dividend policy: quantitative information 2% 
Shareholder Dividend reinvestment plan 2% 
Bondholder Debt presentations 2% 
Governance At least one archive corporate governance report   2% 
Governance Separate dedicated corporate governance report 4% 
Governance Compensation linked performance evaluation 4% 
Responsibility Employees: average age 4% 
Responsibility Sustainability web- or podcasts (e.g. interviews with directors on 
sustainability issues) 
4% 
Financial Results or investor  presentations: at least three alternative formats 
available for the first archive year 
4% 
Governance Board committee meetings: outcomes 4% 
Investment Research and development - spent 5% 
Investment Investor presentations in the past 12 months: Pod- or Webcasts 5% 
Governance Dedicated link to corporate governance manual/policies 5% 
Governance Directors: discussion/list new appointments / retirements to board 5% 
Governance Board meetings: attendance records 5% 
Accessibility Disclaimer – media/forward looking information 6% 
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